World Chess Championship 1972 Explained

Comp1:Boris Spassky
Comp2:Bobby Fischer
Title1:Defending champion
Title2:
Challenger
Flag1:URS
Flag2:USA
Elo1:2660[1]
Elo2:2785
Rank1:2
Rank2:1
Dob1:30 January 1937
Dob2:9 March 1943
Age1:35 years old
Age2:29 years old
Score1:8 1/2
Score2:12 1/2
Qual1:Winner of the 1969 World Chess Championship
Qual2:Winner of the 1971 Candidates Tournament
Prev:1969
Prev Link:World Chess Championship 1969
Next:1975
Next Link:World Chess Championship 1975

The World Chess Championship 1972 was a match for the World Chess Championship between challenger Bobby Fischer of the United States and defending champion Boris Spassky of the Soviet Union. The match took place in the Laugardalshöll arena in Reykjavík, Iceland, and has been dubbed the Match of the Century. Fischer became the first American born in the United States to win the world title, and the second American overall (Wilhelm Steinitz, the first world champion, became a naturalized American citizen in 1888). Fischer's win also ended, for a short time, 24 years of Soviet domination of the World Championship.

The first game was played on July11, 1972. The last game (the 21st) began on August31, was after 40 moves, and Spassky resigned the next day without resuming play. Fischer won the match 12½–8½, becoming the eleventh undisputed world champion. The game was covered on ABC's Wide World of Sports and W.N.E.T. Channel 13 in the United States.[2]

Background

The match was played during the Cold War, although during a period of increasing détente. The Soviet Chess School had a 24-year monopoly on the world championship title, with Spassky the latest in an uninterrupted chain of Soviet world chess champions, stretching back to the 1948 championship.[3]

Fischer, an eccentric[4] 29-year-old American, claimed that Soviet players gained an unfair advantage by agreeing to short draws among themselves in tournaments.[5] In 1962, the American magazine Sports Illustrated and the German magazine Der Spiegel published Fischer's article "The Russians Have Fixed World Chess", in which he expounded this view.[6] [7] Fischer himself rarely agreed to early draws.

Spassky faced enormous political pressure to win the match.[8] [9] [10] While Fischer was often famously critical of his home country ("Americans want to plunk in front of a TV and don't want to open a book ..."), he too carried a burden of expectation because of the match's political significance.[11] No American had achieved the world championship since the first champion, Wilhelm Steinitz, became a naturalized American citizen in 1888.[12] The unusual public interest and excitement surrounding the match was so great that it was called the "Match of the Century",[13] [14] [15] [16] even though the same term had been applied to the USSR vs. Rest of the World match just two years before.[17]

Spassky, the champion, had qualified for world championship matches in 1966 and 1969. He lost the world championship match to Tigran Petrosian in 1966.[18] In the 1969 cycle, he won matches against Efim Geller, Bent Larsen, and Viktor Korchnoi to win the right to challenge a second time,[19] then defeated Petrosian 12½–10½ to win the world title.[20] He is often said to have had a "universal style", "involving an ability to play the most varied types of positions",[21] but Garry Kasparov notes that "from childhood he clearly had a leaning toward sharp, attacking play, and possessed a splendid feel for the initiative."[21]

Fischer, the challenger, was in dominant form. In the Candidates matches en route to becoming the challenger in 1972, he had beaten two grandmasters, Mark Taimanov and Bent Larsen, by perfect scores of 6–0 each time, a feat not previously achieved in a Candidates match. In the Candidates final against Petrosian, Fischer won the first game, lost the second, drew the next three, then finished with four consecutive wins to win the match 6½–2½.[3] "No bare statement conveys the magnitude and impact of these results. ... Fischer sowed devastation."[22] From the last seven rounds of the Interzonal until the first game against Petrosian, Fischer won 19 games (plus 1 win on forfeit) without losing once, almost all against top grandmasters.

Fischer also had a much higher Elo rating than Spassky.[23] On the July 1972 FIDE rating list, Fischer's 2785 was a record 125 points ahead of the number two player – Spassky, whose rating was 2660.[24] Fischer's recent results and record Elo rating made him the pre-match favorite.[25] [26] [27] Other observers, however, noted that Fischer had never won a game against Spassky.[28] Before the match, Fischer had played five games against Spassky, drawing two and losing three.[29]

Spassky's for the match were Efim Geller, Nikolai Krogius and Iivo Nei. Fischer's was William Lombardy.[30] [31] [32] [33] His entourage also included lawyer Paul Marshall, who played a significant role in the events surrounding the match, and USCF representative Fred Cramer.[34] The match referee was Lothar Schmid.[35]

For some time, it seemed as though the match might not be played at all.[36] Shortly before the match, Fischer demanded that he and Spassky receive 30% of the box-office receipts, in addition to the agreed-upon prize fund of $125,000 (5/8 to the winner, 3/8 to the loser) and 30% of the proceeds from television and film rights.[37] [38] He did not arrive in Iceland in time for the opening ceremony on July 1.[37] [39] [40] Fischer's erratic behavior was seemingly full of contradictions, as it had been throughout his career. FIDE President Max Euwe postponed the match by two days. Fischer finally flew to Iceland and agreed to play after British investment banker Jim Slater doubled the prize fund, and after much persuasion, including a phone call from Henry Kissinger (the US National Security Advisor).[41] [42] Commentators, particularly from the USSR, suggested that all this (and his continuing exorbitant demands and unreasonable attitude) was part of Fischer's plan to "psych out" Spassky, while Fischer's supporters claimed that winning the World Championship was the mission of his life, that Fischer simply wanted the setting to be perfect for it when he took the stage, and that his eccentric behavior was no different than it had always been.

World-class match play (i.e., a series of games between the same two opponents) often involves one or both players preparing one or two openings very deeply, and playing them repeatedly during the match.[43] Preparation for such a match also involves analysis of lines known to be played by the opponent. Fischer had been famous for his unusually narrow opening repertoire: for example, almost invariably playing 1.e4 as White, and almost always playing the Najdorf Variation of the Sicilian Defense as Black against 1.e4.[44] [45] He surprised Spassky by repeatedly switching openings, and by playing openings that he had never, or only rarely, played before (such as 1.c4 as White, and Alekhine's Defense, the Pirc Defense, and the Paulsen Sicilian as Black).[44] Even in openings that Fischer had played before in the match, he continually deviated from the variations he had previously played, almost never repeating the same line.[46]

1970 Interzonal tournament

The Interzonal tournament was held in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, in November and December 1970. The top six players of the interzonal (shown in bold in the table below) qualified for the Candidates matches. Bobby Fischer had not qualified to play in this event, as he had not participated in the 1969 US Championship (Zonal). However, Pal Benko (and the reserve William Lombardy) gave up his spot, and FIDE President Max Euwe controversially allowed Fischer to participate instead. A compensation of USD $1,500 was paid to Benko for this to occur.[47]

1970 Interzonal Tournament
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Total Tiebreak
1 0 1 ½ 1 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ½ 1 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ 18½
2 1 ½ ½ 0 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 1 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 1 ½ 1 ½ 15 167.50
3 0 ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 1 ½ ½ 15 167.00
4 ½ ½ 0 ½ 1 ½ 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 1 1 1 ½ 1 1 1 1 15 155.25
5 0 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 1 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 1 1 14 146.50
6 0 0 0 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ 0 1 ½ 1 1 ½ 1 1 1 1 14 141.50
7 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 1 ½ 1 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 1 0 13½ 149.75
8 0 ½ 0 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 1 ½ 1 1 1 13½ 141.00
9 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 0 ½ 1 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 13 146.75
10 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ ½ 1 0 ½ 1 ½ 1 1 13 135.50
11 0 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ ½ ½ 1 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 1 ½ 1 12½ 130.75
12 0 0 0 ½ 1 ½ 0 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 1 1 1 1 12½ 130.00
13 0 1 ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 1 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 ½ 11½
14 0 ½ ½ 0 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ ½ 10½
15 0 ½ 0 ½ 0 1 ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 1 ½ 0 1 ½ 1 10 105.75
16 0 0 ½ 0 0 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 ½ 0 ½ 1 1 ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ 1 1 10 96.00
17 0 ½ 0 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ 1
18 ½ 0 ½ 0 0 0 ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 0 ½ 1 9 98.50
19 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 ½ 0 0 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ 0 0 1 1 9 95.25
20 0 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 0 0 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 ½ 0 91.50
21 ½ 0 0 0 ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ 0 0 0 0 ½ 1 0 1 1 1 ½ 0 0 1 88.75
22 ½ ½ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ ½ 0 0 ½ 0 0 ½ 1 1 1 0 1 1 ½ 85.25
23 0 0 ½ 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 ½ 0 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ ½ 0 ½ 1 0 1 6
24 ½ ½ ½ 0 0 0 1 0 ½ 0 0 0 ½ ½ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ½ 0

Portisch and Smyslov contested a six-game playoff in Portorož, Yugoslavia, in early 1971 for the reserve position for the Candidates Tournament. The match ended 3–3; Portisch was declared the winner because of a better tie-break score in the main tournament.

1971 Candidates matches

Petrosian, as the loser of the last championship match, and Korchnoi, as runner-up of the previous Candidates final, were seeded directly into the Candidates match stage, and were joined by the top six from the Interzonal. In the Petrosian–Hübner quarterfinal in Seville, Hübner withdrew from the match after a loss in the 7th game due to noise complaints.The quarterfinals and semifinals matches were played as the best of 10 games. The final match was the best of 12 games.

Fischer dominated the 1971 Candidates Tournament; his defeats of both Mark Taimanov and Bent Larsen were, and still are, unparalleled at this level of chess. His loss in game 2 of the Candidates Final versus Tigran Petrosian ended a 20-game winning streak.

Fischer's victory earned him the right to challenge reigning champion Spassky for the title.

1972 World Championship match

Schedule and results

The match was played as the best of 24 games, with wins counting 1 point and draws counting ½ point, and would end when one of the players scored 12½ points.[48] If the match ended in a 12–12 tie, the defending champion (Spassky) would retain the title.[49] The first time control was 40 moves in 2½ hours.[50] Three games per week were scheduled.[51] Each player was entitled to three postponements for medical reasons during the match.[52] [53] Games were scheduled to start on Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday.[54] If a game was adjourned, it was to be continued the next day.[54] Saturday was a rest day.[54] Over the course of the match "nearly one thousand" were played, with each player taking a turn.[55] In grand total, somewhat less than two thousand plies were played.

Fischer insisted that a Staunton chess set from Jaques of London be used. The chessboard had to be remade at Fischer's request.[56] The match was covered throughout the world. Fischer became a worldwide celebrity, described as the Einstein of chess. His hotel received dozens of calls each day from women attracted to him, and Fischer enjoyed reading the numerous letters and telegrams that arrived, whether with compliments or criticisms.[57] Excitement grew as the match was postponed and people questioned whether Fischer would appear. Previously, he had come to the airport and, surrounded by reporters, left. The combination of the intrigue surrounding whether Fischer will play or not and the "American versus Russian" narrative within the Cold War context sparked excitement throughout the world.

World Chess Championship Match 1972
Rating width=141 !width=142 !width=143 !width=144 !width=145 !width=146 !width=147 !width=148 !width=149 !width=1410 !width=1411 !width=1412 !width=1413 !width=1414 !width=1415 !width=1416 !width=1417 !width=1418 !width=1419 !width=1420 !width=1421 !Points
align=left 2660 1 1 0 ½ 0 0 ½ 0 ½ 0 1 ½ 0 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 0
align=left 2785 0 0 1 ½ 1 1 ½ 1 ½ 1 0 ½ 1 ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ ½ 1 12½
Running totals
align=left 2660 1 2 2 3 3 5 5 6 7 8
align=left 2785 0 0 1 4 5 7 8 9 10 10½ 11 11½ 12½ 12½

Games

Game 1: Spassky–Fischer, 1–0 (Nimzo-Indian Main)

. At the beginning of play, Fischer was not present. Spassky played 1.d4 and pressed the clock, and nine minutes elapsed before Fischer arrived, shook hands with Spassky, and responded 1...Nf6.[58] The opening was a placid Nimzo-Indian Defense, and after 17...Ba4 the game was even (according to analysis by Filip).[59] After a series of piece exchanges it appeared to be a ending, and no one would have been surprised if the players had agreed to a draw here.[60] [61] [62]

Shockingly, Fischer played 29...Bxh2[63] as shown, a move that few players would consider in light of the obvious 30.g3, trapping the bishop.[62] In exchange for the lost bishop, Black is only able to obtain two pawns (see chess piece relative value). Gligorić, Kasparov and other commentators have suggested that Fischer may have miscalculated, having planned 30...h5 31.Ke2 h4 32.Kf3 h3 33.Kg4 Bg1, but overlooking that 34.Kxh3 Bxf2 35.Bd2 keeps the bishop trapped.[64] [65] Anatoly Karpov suggested that Spassky was afraid of Fischer and wanted to show that he could draw with the white pieces, while Fischer wanted to disprove that as the game headed for a stale draw.[66] Owing to unusual features in the position, Fischer had good drawing chances despite having only two pawns for the bishop.[67] But the position became hopeless after he made at least one more bad move (39th and/or 40th, see cited source) before the, which took place after move 40.[68] Fischer could still have drawn the game with the correct 39th or 40th move.[69] He on move 56.

Game 2: Fischer forfeits

After his loss Fischer made further demands on the organizers, including that all cameras be removed. When they were not, he refused to appear for game 2, giving Spassky a default win. His appeal was rejected. Karpov speculates that this forfeited game was actually a masterstroke on Fischer's part, a move designed specifically to upset Spassky's equanimity.[66]

With the score now 2–0 in Spassky's favor, many observers believed that the match was over and Fischer would leave Iceland, and, indeed, Fischer looked to board the next plane out, only to be dissuaded by his second, William Lombardy.[70] His decision to stay in the match was attributed by some to another phone call from Kissinger and a deluge of cablegrams.[71] [72] Sportingly, Spassky agreed to play the third game in a small room backstage, out of sight of the spectators. According to Pal Benko and Burt Hochberg, this concession was a psychological mistake by Spassky.[73]

Game 3: Spassky–Fischer, 0–1 (Modern Benoni)

. This game proved to be the turning point of the match. After 11.Qc2, Fischer demonstrated his understanding of the position with 11...Nh5—a seemingly move allowing White to shatter Black's pawn structure, but Fischer's assessment that his kingside attack created significant proved correct.[74] Surprised by Fischer's, Spassky did not react in the best way. Instead of 15.Bd2, 15.Ne2!? was possible (Zaitsev),[75] or 15.f3 to prevent ...Ng4.[76] In particular, Spassky's 18th move, weakening the light squares, was a mistake.[77] The game was, and Spassky resigned the next day upon seeing that Fischer had sealed the best move, 41...Bd3+ It was Fischer's first-ever win against Spassky.[78]

Game 4: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (Sicilian Sozin)

. The match resumed with this game on the main hall stage per Spassky's request, but without TV cameras per Fischer's request. Fischer as White played the Sozin Attack against Spassky's Sicilian Defense. Spassky sacrificed a pawn, and after 17...Bxc5+ had a slight advantage (Nunn).[79] Spassky developed a strong kingside attack, but failed to convert it into a win,[80] the game ending in a draw.

Game 5: Spassky–Fischer, 0–1 (Nimzo-Indian Hübner)

. Game 5 was another Nimzo-Indian, this time the Hübner Variation: 4.Nf3 c5 5.e3 Nc6 6.Bd3 Bxc3+ 7.bxc3 d6.[81] Fischer rebuffed Spassky's attempt to attack; after 15...0-0 the game was even (Adorján).[82] Fischer obtained a blocked position where Spassky was saddled with weak pawns and his had no prospects.[83] After 26 moves, Spassky blundered with 27.Qc2, and resigned after Fischer's 27...Bxa4!, as shown. After 28.Qxa4 Qxe4, Black's dual threats of 29...Qxg2 and 29...Qxe1# would decide; alternatively, 28.Qd2 (or 28.Qb1) Bxd1 29.Qxd1 Qxe4 30.Qd2 a4 wins. Thus Fischer had drawn level (the score was now 2½–2½), although FIDE rules stipulated that the champion retained the title if after 24 games the match ended in a tie.

After game 5, Fischer hinted to Lombardy about a surprise he had in store for game 6.[84]

Game 6: Fischer–Spassky, 1–0 (QGD Tartakower)

. Before the match began, the Soviet team that had been training Spassky debated about whether Fischer might play an opening move different from his usual 1.e4.[85] "But when the question was raised as to whether 1.d4 or 1.c4 could be expected of Fischer, Spassky replied: 'Let's not bother with such nonsense – I'll play the Tartakower [Defence]. What can he achieve?...[86]

Fischer played 1.c4 (instead of 1.e4) for only the third time in a serious game.[87] With 3.d4 the game transposed to the Queen's Gambit Declined, surprising many who had never seen Fischer play the White side of that opening. In fact, he had previously openly condemned it.

Spassky played Tartakower's Defense (7...b6), his favorite choice in many tournaments and a line with which he had never lost.[88] After 14.Bb5 (introduced in Furman–Geller, Moscow 1970),[89] Spassky responded with 14...a6. Geller had previously shown Spassky 14...Qb7, the move with which Geller later beat Jan Timman at Hilversum 1973,[89] but Spassky apparently forgot about it.[90] Fischer's 20.e4! – "the key move of the game" – struck at Black's center and left Spassky with no good alternatives.[91] After Spassky's 20...d4, "the pawns have no hope of further advance and the white bishop is unimpeded."[92] After 21.f4, Fischer had the upper hand (Hort).[93] After 26.f5, White had a crushing attack.

After this game, Spassky joined the audience in applauding Fischer's win.[94] This astounded Fischer, who called his opponent "a true sportsman".

"Lombardy was ecstatic: 'Bobby has played a steady, fluent game, and just watched Spassky make horrendous moves. Spassky has not met a player of Bobby's genius and caliber before, who fights for every piece on the board; he doesn't give in and agree to draws like the Russian grandmasters. This is a shock to Spassky.[95]

According to C.H.O'D. Alexander:[96] "This game was notable for two things. First, Fischer played the Queen's Gambit for the first time in his life in a serious game; second, he played it to perfection, the game indeed casting doubt on Black's whole opening system."

The win gave Fischer the lead (3½–2½) for the first time in the match.[97]

Game 7: Spassky–Fischer, ½–½ (Sicilian Najdorf)

. Spassky played 1.e4 for the first time in the match.[94] [98] Fischer defended aggressively with his favorite Poisoned Pawn Variation of the Najdorf Sicilian, and after 17...Nc6 had the upper hand (Gipslis).[99] He consolidated his extra pawn and reached a winning endgame, but then played carelessly, allowing Spassky to salvage a draw.[100] In the final position, Fischer had two extra pawns but had to execute a draw by in order to escape being checkmated by Spassky's two rooks and knight.[101]

Game 8: Fischer–Spassky, 1–0 (English Symmetrical)

. Fischer again played 1.c4; the game remained an English Opening rather than transposing to another opening as in game 6. After 14...a6 the game was even.[102] Spassky gave up an exchange with 15...b5 for little compensation in the way of a positional advantage. It is unclear whether Spassky's 15th move was a sacrifice or a blunder, but his 19th move was definitely a blunder that lost a pawn and left him with a hopeless position. Fischer won, putting him ahead 5–3.

Game 9: Spassky–Fischer, ½–½ (QGD Semi-Tarrasch)

. After game 8 Spassky took time off, citing an illness, which delayed game 9 by two days. The opening to the Semi-Tarrasch Defense of the Queen's Gambit Declined. Fischer then played a of 9...b5!. After 13...0-0 the game was even (Parma).[103] Several exchanges followed, as the game proceeded to a quiet draw after just 29 moves.

Game 10: Fischer–Spassky, 1–0 (Ruy Lopez Breyer)

. Fischer played the Ruy Lopez, an opening on which he was considered an expert.[104] After a balanced opening, Spassky's 25...Qxa5 gave Fischer the upper hand (25...axb5 26.Rxb5 Ba6 gives Spassky a better chance; Gligorić). Fischer responded by initiating a dangerous attack on Spassky's king with 26.Bb3 (Matanović),[105] suddenly placing Black in a critical situation.[106] [107] Spassky sacrificed the exchange for a pawn, reaching a sharp endgame where his two connected passed pawns gave almost sufficient compensation for Fischer's small advantage.[108] Spassky then had chances to draw, but played inexactly, and Fischer won the game with precise play.[107] [109]

Game 11: Spassky–Fischer, 1–0 (Sicilian Najdorf)

. As in game 7, game 11 opened with the Sicilian Najdorf and Fischer played his favorite Poisoned Pawn Variation. Spassky responded with the startling 14.Nb1 (given by many annotators at the time), retreating his knight to its starting position.[110] Although later analysis showed that the game would maintain if Black responded correctly, Fischer was unprepared for the move and did not find the optimal reply.[111] If Fischer had instead played 15...Ne7 then 16.N1d2!? and the game is unclear (Gipslis).[112] After inferior defense by Fischer, Spassky trapped Fischer's queen to reach a winning position, at which point Fischer resigned. It was Spassky's first win since games 1 and 2; for Fischer it was the only time in his career that he lost using the Poisoned Pawn variation in a competitive game.[113]

Game 12: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (QGD Neo-orthodox)

. As in game 6, Fischer's opening 1. c4 transposed into the Queen's Gambit Declined. A quiet game followed. After 19.Be4, analysts gave Fischer a slight advantage (Yudovich),[114] but by 24...a5 the game was even again (Polugaevsky).[115] Neither player was able to find an advantage, and after 55 moves they reached an opposite-colored bishops endgame. Although Spassky had an extra pawn (four against Fischer's three), they could not make progress, and agreed to a draw.

Game 13: Spassky–Fischer, 0–1 (Alekhine's Defense Modern)

. Fischer avoided the Sicilian Defense, with which he had lost game 11, opting for Alekhine's Defense. After 8...a5 9.a4 (9.c3 and Black is only slightly better; Gligorić) dxe5 10.dxe5 Na6! 11.0-0 Nc5, Fischer had the upper hand (Bagirov).[116] The game swung one way, then another, and was finally adjourned at move 42 with Fischer having an edge in a sharp position but no clear win. The Soviet team's analysis convinced them that the position was drawn. Fischer stayed up until 8 a.m. analyzing it (the resumption being at 2:30 p.m.). He had not found a win either, but managed to win a complicated pawns-versus-rook endgame after Spassky missed a relatively simple draw with 69.Rc3+. Spassky's seconds were stunned, and Spassky himself refused to leave the board for a long time after the game was over, unable to believe the result. He remarked, "It is very strange. How can one lose with the opponent's only rook locked in completely at g8?"[53]

Lombardy noted the shock that Spassky was in after he resigned:[117]

While Fischer dashed for his car, Spassky remained glued to his seat. A sympathetic Lothar Schmid came over, and the two shifted the pieces about with Boris demonstrating his careless mistakes. The two were left wondering how Bobby could have squeezed a win from a position which a night of competent analysis by a renowned Soviet team had showed to be a guaranteed draw.

Former World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik said this game made a particularly strong impression on him. He called it "the highest creative achievement of Fischer". He resolved a opposite-colored bishops endgame by sacrificing his bishop and trapping his own rook. "Then five passed pawns struggled with the white rook. Nothing similar had been seen before in chess".[118]

David Bronstein said, "Of all the games from the match, the 13th appeals to me most of all. When I play through the game I still cannot grasp the innermost motive behind this or that plan or even individual move. Like an enigma, it still teases my imagination."[119]

When Spassky and Fischer shook hands, many in the audience thought they had agreed to a draw, thinking that 75.Rf4 draws. But 75...Rxd4! 76.Rxd4 Ke2 wins; 75.Be5 Rd1 76.Kxb3 Re1 also wins for Black.[120]

The next seven games (games 14 through 20) were drawn. Fischer was unable to get the initiative. Spassky chose lines that Fischer was unable to break.[121] With a three-point lead, Fischer was content to inch towards the title, and Spassky seemed resigned to his fate.

The off-the-board antics continued, including a lawsuit against Fischer for damages by Chester Fox, who had filming rights to the match (Fischer had objected to what he said were noticeable camera noises, and the Icelandic hosts had reluctantly – they were to share in film revenues along with the two contestants – removed the television cameras), a Fischer demand to remove the first seven rows of spectators (eventually, three rows were cleared), and Soviet claims that Fischer was using electronic and chemical devices to 'control' Spassky, resulting in an Icelandic police sweep of the hall.

Game 14: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (QGD Harrwitz)

. The game was postponed at Spassky's request.[53] Fischer was again White in a Queen's Gambit Declined. After 18.Be5 (18.Nxb6 Qxb6 19.Be5 and Fischer keeps a slight advantage; Gligorić) Bxa4 19.Qxa4 Nc6! Spassky had the upper hand (Karpov).[122] Fischer blundered a pawn on move 21. Spassky blundered it back on move 27, however, and the game settled into a 40-move draw.[123]

Game 15: Spassky–Fischer, ½–½ (Sicilian Najdorf)

. Fischer returned to the Najdorf Sicilian, but played the main line rather than the Poisoned Pawn Variation with which he had lost game 11. At move 13, Fischer sacrificed a pawn for, which Spassky accepted. After 19.c3, Spassky had the upper hand (Gipslis).[124] After 28...Rd7 the game was even, but when Spassky took a second pawn with 29.Qxh5 it allowed Fischer a very strong attack.[125] Spassky, on the brink of disaster, "found miraculous replies while in time pressure" and Fischer was only able to achieve a draw by threefold repetition after 43 moves.[126] Two years later, Yugoslav grandmaster Dragoljub Velimirović improved on Spassky's play with the piece sacrifice 13.Bxb5, winning a crushing victory in Velimirović–Al Kazzaz, Nice Olympiad 1974.[127] [128] [129] Black in turn later improved on Fischer's 12...0-0-0 with 12...b4.[130]

Game 16: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (Ruy Lopez Exchange)

. Fischer played the Exchange Variation of the Ruy Lopez, a favorite line of his.[131] After 17...Rfe8 the game was equal (Gipslis).[132] Spassky defended well, and after a tactical flurry in the endgame, ended up with the nominal advantage of an extra pawn in a rook ending known to be an easy .[133] Although a draw could have been agreed after move 34,[134] Spassky "used his symbolic advantage for a little psychological torture", prolonging the game until move 60 before agreeing to a draw.[135]

Game 17: Spassky–Fischer, ½–½ (Pirc Defense)

. Fischer played the Pirc Defense for the first time in his career.[136] After 18...Qc7 the game was unclear (Parma).[137] The game ended in a draw by the threefold repetition rule.[138]

Game 18: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (Sicilian Rauzer)

. The game opened with a Richter–Rauzer Attack. After 19...Ne5 the game was equal (Matanović, Ugrinović).[139] Like game 17, the game ended in a draw by threefold repetition.

Game 19: Spassky–Fischer, ½–½ (Alekhine's Defense)

. The second Alekhine's Defense of the match, the game ended in a draw after 40 moves. After 18...Bg5, Gligorić commented "a queer situation has arisen with many tactical possibilities for both sides."[140] After 19.Bh5 the position was unclear (Bagirov).[141] After 37...a6, C.H.O'D. Alexander wrote: "A miracle; after all the excitements – two piece sacrifices by White and the counter-sacrifice of a rook by Black – the players have reached a completely equal endgame with no chances for either side."[142]

Game 20: Fischer–Spassky, ½–½ (Sicilian Rauzer)

. Another Richter–Rauzer, after 13...Nxd2 the game was equal (Matanović, Ugrinović).[143] Spassky outplayed Fischer and got a better position. Fischer headed for a endgame but Spassky twice avoided a draw by threefold repetition.[121] After 54 moves, Fischer made an incorrect claim of threefold repetition, but Spassky agreed to a draw anyway.[144]

Game 21: Spassky–Fischer, 0–1 (Sicilian Taimanov)

. The 21st game proved to be the last of the match. Fischer used a line of the Sicilian that he had never before played as Black, and further surprised Spassky with a on move eight.[44] [145] After 14...Qxf6 the game was equal (Taimanov).[146] Spassky played badly in the endgame, and the game was adjourned with a big advantage for Fischer. Fischer's 40th move was not the best, however; he should have played 40...Kg4 before ...h5 (his actual 40th move). Had Spassky 41.Kh3! (preventing ...Kg4), he would have had drawing chances. Instead he sealed 41.Bd7, which would have permitted Black to win with 41...Kg4 followed by his h-pawn.[147] On September1, the day scheduled for resumption of the game, arbiter Lothar Schmid informed Fischer and the audience that Spassky had resigned the game by telephone, making Fischer the winner of the match.[148] FIDE President Max Euwe expressed disappointment that Spassky did not go to the playing hall to congratulate Fischer.[149]

The final score was 12½–8½ in favor of Fischer, making him the eleventh world champion. Spassky won three games (including the forfeit in game 2), Fischer won seven games, and there were eleven draws.[150]

Aftermath

Fischer's crushing victory made him an instant celebrity. Upon his return to New York,[151] a Bobby Fischer Day was held.[152] He was offered numerous product endorsement offers worth millions of dollars, all of which he declined.[153] He appeared on the cover of Sports Illustrated with American Olympic swimming champion Mark Spitz.[154] Fischer also made television appearances on a Bob Hope special and The Tonight Show starring Johnny Carson.[155] But the games in this match proved to be his last public competitive games for two decades. Fischer had, prior to the match, felt that the first-to-12½-points format was not fair, since it encouraged whoever was leading to play for draws instead of wins. He himself adopted this strategy in the match: after having taken a comfortable lead, he drew games 14–20. With each game, he coasted closer to the title, while Spassky lost a chance to fight back.

This style of chess offended Fischer. Instead he demanded the format be changed to that used in the very first World Chess Championship, between Wilhelm Steinitz and Johannes Zukertort, where the winner was the first player to score 10 wins, with draws not counting. In case of a 9–9 score, the champion would retain title, and the prize fund split equally.[156] [157] A FIDE Congress was held in 1974 during the Nice Olympiad. The delegates voted in favor of Fischer's 10-win proposal, but rejected the 9–9 clause as well as the possibility of an unlimited match.[158] In response, Fischer refused to defend his title. Anatoly Karpov, who had fought his way through the 1975 candidates tournament, was declared World Champion by forfeit.

Seventeen years later, Fischer entered negotiations with sponsors willing to fund a match under his proposed format, settling on a bid from Yugoslav millionaire Jezdimir Vasiljević. Fischer insisted that since he had not been defeated in a match, he was still the true world champion. He further claimed that all the games in the FIDE-sanctioned World Championship matches, involving Karpov and his challengers Korchnoi and Kasparov, had prearranged outcomes.[159] He then challenged Spassky (tied for 96th–102nd on the FIDE rating list at the time) to a rematch, leading to the 1992 Fischer–Spassky match.

In popular culture

See also

References

External links

Notes and References

  1. Chess Informant 14, pp. 299–316.
  2. https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/11/archives/play-may-be-televised.html Play May Be Televised
  3. Evans & Smith 1973, p. 8
  4. "Fischer, according to some of the psychiatrists who are regulars at the Manhattan Chess Club, is a paranoid and is 'psychotically suspicious, like most paranoids'." Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 75
  5. "Bobby Fischer, then as now the enfant terrible of the chess world, charged that the Russians were in collusion, agreeing to draw with each other while playing no-holds-barred games with non-Russians, and to nothing to jeopardize the position of whichever one of them was leading." Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 35
  6. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1074080/ Bobby Fischer: The Russians Have Fixed World Chess
  7. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45123575.html Bobby Fischer: Schacher im Schach. Das abgekartete Spiel der Russen (09.10.1962)
  8. "Throughout all the Soviet comments on their chess successes runs the theme that more than chess is at stake. For example, when Botvinnik won the world title in 1948 Pravda commented, 'Botvinnik was not simply playing chess, he was defending the honour of his country', and in 1961 The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism stated, 'Our task is to educate chess-players towards communist consciousness, love of labour and discipline and loyalty to the good of society. Alexander 1972, p. 46
  9. "When Botvinnik won the Nottingham tournament of 1936, Pravda said in an editorial that his victory was a triumph of Marxist–Leninist chess". Donner 2006, p. 138 (originally published in De Tijd, June 28, 1972)
  10. "Spassky, of course, was carrying a burden that Fischer was not laden with: he was playing not only for himself, but also for the Soviet government, the Soviet system. He represented an ideology. Soviet chess players were supreme, so the theory went, because the Soviet social, political and governmental system was so much better." Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 108
  11. https://www.theguardian.com/worldlatest/story/0,,-7238823,00.html Fisher's 1972 Match Was Cold War Battle
  12. http://www.chessmuseum.org/bio_steinitz_popup.htm Steinitz entry at World Chess Museum and Hall of Fame
  13. Perhaps the best-selling book on the match was subtitled The New York Times Report on the Chess Match of the Century (Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972). Gligorić's book on the match was also subtitled The Chess Match of the Century (Gligorić 1972).
  14. "Even before a move has been made, this breathtaking, blood-curdling and heartrending encounter is justly being labelled as 'the Match of the Century'." Donner 2006, p. 136 (originally published in De Tijd, June 28, 1972)
  15. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. vii
  16. Web site: Koshnitsky . Gary . 2022-07-10 . From the Archives, 1972: The Match of the Century . 2022-12-03 . The Sydney Morning Herald . en.
  17. The term is used that way in Russian, and also by Edmar Mednis in his book How to Beat Bobby Fischer. Mednis 1997, p. 247
  18. Kažić 1974, pp. 230–31
  19. Kažić 1974, pp. 194–96
  20. Kažić 1974, pp. 231–32
  21. Kasparov 2004a, p. 182
  22. Steiner 1974, p. 42
  23. Alexander 1972, p. 74
  24. http://chess.eusa.ed.ac.uk/Chess/Trivia/AlltimeList.html All Time Rankings
  25. "Despite his dismal score against Spassky, Fischer is the choice of nearly every expert. Indeed, London bookmakers favor him 6-to-5." Evans & Smith 1973, p. 8
  26. Of the players and expert commentators at the annual Hastings Christmas tournament in 1971–72, apart from one International Master who predicted a Spassky victory, almost everyone else predicted that Fischer would win easily. Gligorić 1972, pp. 13–14
  27. "Lay opinion is overwhelmingly in support of Fischer, expert opinion is divided in the proportion of about 2 to 1 in his favour." Alexander 1972, p. 74
  28. [Bill Goichberg]
  29. Alexander 1972, pp. 60–61
  30. Alexander 1972, p. 79
  31. Edmonds & Eidinow 2004, p. 156
  32. Brady 2011, p. 184
  33. Lombardy 2011, pp. 219–20
  34. Alexander 1972, pp. 77, 79
  35. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 76
  36. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, pp. 63–64
  37. Alexander 1972, p. 77
  38. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 60
  39. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, pp. 62–63
  40. Edmonds & Eidinow 2004, pp. 138–39
  41. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, pp. 63–67
  42. Edmonds & Eidinow 2004, pp. 143–44
  43. An extreme example of this was seen in the 1927 World Championship match between José Raúl Capablanca and Alexander Alekhine, where all but two of the 34 games featured the Queen's Gambit Declined. José Raul Capablanca, World's Championship Matches, 1921 and 1927, Dover Publications, 1977, p. 46,
  44. Mednis 1997, p. xxviii
  45. "Before the match there was a lot of talk that it is comparatively easy to prepare for Fischer, because he is very conservative in his choice of openings. Especially with White, Fischer plays [1.e4] almost without exception." Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 106
  46. Gligorić 1972, pp. 48, 65, 87, 91, 113, 117
  47. Book: Russians versus Fischer. Plisetsky. Dmitry. Voronkov. Sergey. 2005. Everyman Chess. 166.
  48. [FIDE]
  49. [FIDE]
  50. [FIDE]
  51. [FIDE]
  52. [FIDE]
  53. Gligorić 1972, p. 86
  54. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 59
  55. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. vii
  56. Edmonds & Eidinow 2004, pp. 163–64
  57. Bobby is Not a Nasty Kid . Life . 1972-08-11 . March 25, 2013 . Darrach, Brad . 40.
  58. Gligorić 1972, p. 31
  59. Matanović 1991 (Vol E), p. 312, n. 28
  60. Evans & Smith 1973, p. 26
  61. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 82
  62. Alexander 1972, p. 86
  63. [Garry Kasparov]
  64. Kasparov 2004b, p. 434
  65. Gligorić 1972, p. 34
  66. Karpov 1990, p. 100
  67. [Robert Byrne (chess player)|Robert Byrne]
  68. Mednis 1997, pp. 275–76
  69. Gligorić 1972 (p. 34), Alexander 1972 (p. 86), and Evans & Smith 1973 (p. 29) all give Fischer's 40th move as a bad move, stating that he could still have drawn with the correct 40th move. More recent books by Kasparov 2004b (p. 435) and Plisetsky & Voronkov 2005 (p. 443) give Fischer's 39th move as weak, claiming that his last opportunity to draw the game was with 39...e5! Mednis 1997 (pp. 274–76) says that Fischer's 37th move was bad, and thinks he missed a draw with 37...a6. Euwe & Timman 2009 (pp. 55–57), citing analysis of Friðrik Ólafsson and independently Jon Speelman say that Fischer could have forced a draw after 36.a4? with 37...a6 or with 39...e5.

    Speelman analyzed the position in depth in his 1980 book, Analysing the Endgame, pp. 74–80, taking into account previous analysis by others. He states that 29...Bxh2 was a bad move, giving White excellent winning chances without any compensating chances for Black. But the position was not lost after that move; only after two more errors (37...Ke4?! and 39...f5?) was Black was clearly lost.

  70. "Fischer lodged a formal protest [over the second-game-forfeit] less than six hours after the forfeiture. It was overruled by the match committee... Everyone knew that Fischer wouldn't accept it lightly. And he didn't. His instant reaction was to make a reservation to fly home immediately. He was dissuaded by Lombardy, but it seemed likely that he'd refuse to continue the match unless the forfeit was removed." Brady 2011, p. 193
  71. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, pp. 99–100
  72. Brady 2011, pp. 194–95
  73. They write that it "had a costly psychological effect on Spassky". Pal Benko and Burt Hochberg, Winning with Chess Psychology, David McKay, 1991, p. 87, ; Benko and Hochberg also quote Spassky as saying after the match, "My acceding to Fischer's groundless demand to play in a closed room was a big psychological mistake." Id., p. 92
  74. Evans & Smith 1973, p. 40
  75. Matanović 1996 (Vol A), p. 481, n. 26
  76. Alexander 1972, p. 89
  77. Evans & Smith 1973, pp. 40–42
  78. Gligorić 1972, p. 41
  79. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 438, n. 72
  80. Gligorić 1972, pp. 43–46
  81. Gligorić 1972, p. 48
  82. Matanović 1991 (Vol E), p. 251, n. 67
  83. Gligorić 1972, pp. 47–49
  84. "Despite the victory [in game 5], neither Bobby nor I was satisfied with the outcome of his king pawn sally in Game Four. "Don't worry. Sunday I will play something that will make you very happy...""A Mystery Wrapped in an Enigma" William Lombardy, January 21, 1974, Bobby-Fischer.net
  85. "Krogius: Of course, we ourselves tried to forecast the direction of the American grandmaster's preparations. I remember that repeated suggestions were made about possible changes in Fischer's style, and in particular his opening repertoire." Plisetsky & Voronkov 2005, p. 308.
  86. Plisetsky & Voronkov 2005, p. 308.
  87. The two prior occasions were at the 1970 Palma de Mallorca Interzonal, when Fischer played 1.c4 against Lev Polugaevsky and Oscar Panno. Gligorić 1972, p. 52
  88. Gligorić 1972, pp. 51–52
  89. D. Marović, Play the Queen's Gambit, Maxwell Macmillan Chess, 1991, p. 130,
  90. After Furman–Geller, Semyon Furman, Geller, Spassky, and Eduard Gufeld analyzed the game, and "Geller analyzed a plan associated with material sacrifices that would begin with the move 14...Qb7!" Geller was also one of Spassky's for the match, and "during the preparation for the match they studied this position" (after 14.Bb5). Eduard Gufeld, "Inventors and Novelty-Makers", Chess Life, March 2001, p. 26
  91. "20...d4 weakens his light squares. 20...dxe4 21.Rc4 and Black's pawns are all weak and doomed; or 20...Nf6 21.e5 Nd7 (21...Ne4 22.f3) 22.f4." Gligorić 1972, p. 53
  92. Alexander 1972, p. 98
  93. Matanović 1976 (Vol D), p. 273, n. 69
  94. Gligorić 1972, p. 55
  95. Brady 1973, p. 252.
  96. Alexander 1972, p. 96
  97. Gligorić 1972, p. 54
  98. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 112
  99. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 489, n. 163
  100. Gligorić 1972, pp. 58–59
  101. Gligorić 1972, p. 59
  102. Matanović 1996 (Vol A), p. 285, n. 36
  103. Matanović 1976 (Vol D), p. 197, n. 32
  104. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 106
  105. Matanović 1981 (Vol C), p. 466, n. 68
  106. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 133
  107. Gligorić 1972, p. 71
  108. Byrne & Nei 1974, p. 134
  109. Byrne & Nei 1974, pp. 134–35
  110. Mednis 1997, pp. 278–79
  111. Mednis 1997, p. 279
  112. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 489, n. 158
  113. Web site: Fischer games as Black in Poisoned Pawn . . 28 February 2009.
  114. Matanović 1976 (Vol D), p. 289, n. 35
  115. Matanović 1987 (Vol D), p. 354, n. 27
  116. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 41, n. 82
  117. http://bobbyfischer.net/bobby07.html "A Mystery Wrapped in an Enigma"
  118. Soltis 2003, p. 271
  119. Plisetsky & Voronkov 2005, p. 359
  120. Soltis 2003, p. 275
  121. Gligorić 1972, p. 116
  122. Matanović 1987 (Vol D), p. 205, n. 88
  123. Gligorić 1972, pp. 87–89
  124. Matanović 1997 (Vol B), p. 539, n. 48
  125. Gligorić, pp. 92–93
  126. Gligorić 1972, pp. 90–91
  127. [Raymond Keene]
  128. Web site: Velimirović vs. Al Kazzaz, Nice Olympiad 1974 (1–0, 28) . . 5 March 2009.
  129. See also Web site: Gunawan vs. Adianto, Indonesia 1983 (1–0, 31) . . 5 March 2009. But see Web site: Anderson vs. Gormally, British Championship 2007 (0–1, 73) . . 5 March 2009.
  130. [Nick de Firmian]
  131. [Larry Kaufman]
  132. Matanović 1981 (Vol C), p. 327, n. 83
  133. Gligorić 1972, pp. 96–98
  134. Gligorić 1972, p. 99
  135. Gligorić 1972, p. 96
  136. Gligorić 1972, p. 102
  137. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 81, n. 32
  138. Alexander 1972, p. 132
  139. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), pp. 336–37, n. 9
  140. Gligorić 1972, p. 114
  141. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 48, n. 113
  142. Alexander 1972, p. 135
  143. Matanović 1984 (Vol B), p. 335, n. 12
  144. Gligorić 1972, p. 119
  145. Byrne & Nei 1974, pp. 207–08
  146. Matanović 1997 (Vol B), p. 279, n. 31
  147. Gligorić 1972, p. 123
  148. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, pp. 192–93
  149. Andrew Torchia, Fischer is Crowned World Chess Champ, Associated Press, September 1, 1972
  150. Roberts, Schonberg, Horowitz & Reshevsky 1972, p. 194
  151. Soltis 2003, pp. 10–11.
  152. "Wearing city's gold medal and accompanied by Mayor John Lindsay, Bobby shakes hands with some 3,000 fans attending..." Saidy & Lessing 1974, photo on pp. 224–25; captions on p. 227.
  153. Larry Evans, in Müller 2009, p. 13.
  154. BOBBY'S CHESSBOARD MASTERY . Sports Illustrated . August 14, 1972 . May 12, 2007 .
  155. News: Cavett. Dick . Was It Only a Game? . The New York Times . February 8, 2008 . January 4, 2014.
  156. Book: Seirawan, Yasser . Winning Chess Brilliancies . 2003 . Microsoft Press . 978-1857443479.
  157. Book: Kasparov, Garry . My Great Predecessors, Volume IV . 2003 . Gloucester Publishers . 1-85744-395-0.
  158. Plisetsky & Voronkov 2005, pp. 412–13
  159. Web site: Weeks. Mark . 1992 Fischer – Spassky Rematch Highlights . Printer . 1997–2008 . January 28, 2014.
  160. [William Hartston]
  161. Web site: Zhaskyran. Musin . Chess Problems (about chess songs of Vladimir Vysotsky) . January 2001 . January 29, 2014. ru.
  162. Games . Drunk History . 6 October 2015 . https://web.archive.org/web/20151010044847/http://www.cc.com/episodes/4vpgrn/drunk-history-games-season-3-ep-309 . dead . October 10, 2015 . Comedy Central . 3 . 6 .