| Hangul: | 탈북자, 탈북민 |
| Hanja: | , 脫北民 |
| Rr: | talbukja, talbungmin |
| Mr: | t'albukcha, t'albungmin |
People defect from North Korea for political, material, and personal reasons. Defectors flee to various countries, mainly South Korea. In South Korea, they are referred to by several terms, including "northern refugees" and "new settlers".
Towards the end of the North Korean famine of the 1990s, there was a steep increase in defections, reaching a peak in 1998 and 1999. Since then, some of the main reasons for the falling number of defectors have been strict border patrols and inspections, forced deportations, the costs of defection, and the end of the mass famine that swept the country when Soviet aid ceased with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The most common strategy for defectors is to cross the China–North Korea border into the Chinese provinces of Jilin or Liaoning. About 76% to 84% of defectors interviewed in China or South Korea came from the North Korean provinces bordering China.
From China, defectors usually flee to a third country, due to China being a relatively close ally of North Korea. China is the most influential of North Korea's few economic partners, with the latter's situation as the target of decades of UN sanctions. China is also a continuous source of aid to North Korea. To avoid worsening the already tense relations with the Korean Peninsula, China refuses to grant North Korean defectors refugee status and considers them illegal economic migrants. Defectors caught in China are repatriated back to North Korea, where human rights groups say they often face years of punishment and harsh interrogation, or even death.
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 determined that all North Korean nationals earning income in a member state must be sent back to North Korea. Exceptions can be made in cases where humanitarian law or refugee status apply, and all member states need to elaborate reports on these deportations, "including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated... if applicable". This resolution was adopted in December 2017, and the deadline for repatriating defectors was December 2019.[1]
Different terms, official and unofficial, refer to North Korean refugees. One such term in South Korea is "northern refugees" (or).
On 9 January 2005, the South Korean Ministry of Unification announced the use of ("people of new land") instead of (Korean: 탈북자, 'people who fled the North'), a term about which North Korean officials expressed displeasure.[2] A newer term is, which has the more forceful meaning of 'residents who renounced North Korea'.[3]
North Korean expert Andrei Lankov has criticized the term "defectors", as most who flee North Korea are not political dissents seeking asylum, but are instead primarily motivated by poverty.[4]
North Korean defectors must first enter the North Korean Refugee Protection Center, or Hanawon, run by the National Intelligence Service for investigation when they leave North Korea and enter the Republic of Korea. The interrogation process is conducted in conjunction with the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Unification, the National Police Agency, and the North Korean Five Star Committee. It is also necessary to check during the interrogation whether they are spies sent by the North Korean regime or ethnic Koreans disguised as North Korean defectors. In addition, if North Korean defectors pass the interrogation safely, they will be admitted to Hanawon and trained to adapt to South Korean society.[5]
According to Courtland Robinson, assistant professor at the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, around 10,000 North Korean defectors are staying in China.[6] 1,418 were registered as arriving in South Korea in 2016.[7] In 2017, there were 31,093 defectors registered with the Unification Ministry in South Korea, 71% of whom were women.[8] In 2018, the numbers had been dramatically dropping since Kim Jong-Un took power in 2011, trending towards less than a thousand per year, down from the peak of 2,914 in 2009.[9]
Professor Courtland Robinson of the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University estimated that in the past the total number of 6,824 and 7,829 children were born to North Korean women in the three Northeastern Provinces of China.[10] Recently, survey results conducted in 2013 by Johns Hopkins and the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) showed that there were about 8,708 North Korean defectors and 15,675 North Korean children in China's same three Northeastern Provinces which are Jilin, Liaoning and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.
Most North Korean refugees reportedly leave the country due to economic reasons.[11] [12] Based on a study of North Korean defectors, women make up the majority of defections. In 2002, they comprised 56% of defections to South Korea (1,138 people), and by 2011, the number had grown to 71% (2,706 people). More women leave the North because they are more likely to suffer financial hardships.[13] This is due to the prevalence of women in service sector jobs whereas men are employed in the military. According to South Korean government data, 45% of defectors cited economic reasons for defecting. According to NK News, men had a higher tendency to leave the country due to political, ideological or surveillance pressure.[14] During the first half of 2018, 88% of defectors to the South were women.
See also: North Koreans in South Korea and List of North Korean defectors in South Korea.
South Korea's Ministry of Unification is a government organization that is in charge of preparing for a future reunification between North and South Korea. It is responsible for north–south relations including economic trade, diplomacy, and communication, and education of reunification, which involves spreading awareness in schools and among the public sphere. The Ministry of Unification is thus the main organization that manages North Korean defectors in South Korean territory by establishing admission processes and resettlement policies. It also has regional sub-organs called Hana Centers that help defectors in their day-to-day life for a more smooth transition into South Korean society.[15] The number of defectors since the 1950–1953 Korean War is more than 26,000.[16] Military defections across the heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ) are few in number, with only 20 defectors since 1996.[17]
In 1962, the government of South Korea introduced the "Special law on the protection of defectors from the North" which, after revision in 1978, remained effective until 1993. According to the law, every defector was eligible for an aid package. After their arrival in the South, defectors would receive an allowance. The size of this allowance depended on the category to which of three categories the particular defector belonged. The category was determined by the defector's political and intelligence value. Apart from this allowance, defectors who delivered especially valuable intelligence or equipment were given large additional rewards. Prior to 1997 the payments had been fixed in gold bullion, not in South Korean won—in attempts to counter ingrained distrust about the reliability of paper money.[18]
In 2004, South Korea passed controversial new measures intended to slow the flow of asylum seekers because of concern that a growing number of North Koreans crossing the Amnok and Duman rivers into China would soon seek refuge in the South.The regulations tighten defector screening processes and slash the amount of money given to each refugee from ₩28,000,000 ($24,180) to ₩10,000,000 ($8,636). South Korean officials say the new rules are intended to prevent ethnic Koreans living in China from entering the South, as well as to stop North Koreans with criminal records from gaining entry.[19]
As of 2006, the state provided some defectors with apartments, and all those who wished to study were granted the right to enter a university of their choice. For a period of time after their arrival, defectors were also provided with personal bodyguards.[18]
By 2015, the South Korean government paid interview fees to defectors ranging from $50 to $500 per hour depending on the quality of the information provided.[20]
In 2016, defectors past retirement age received Basic Livelihood Benefits of about ₩450,000 ($390) per month, which covered basic necessities, but left them amongst the poorest of retirees.[21]
In 2017, the South Korean government increased to $860,000 the reward it pays to defectors who provide information that helps South Korean security interests.[22] Those who defect with weapons are entitled to other amounts.
In 2021, the Ministry of Unification described the support package for defectors as:
According to the Ministry of Unification, over 33,000 North Korean refugees were living in South Korea in 2019.[23] North Korean refugees arriving in the South first face joint interrogation by authorities having jurisdiction including the National Intelligence Service and the National Police Agency to ensure that they are not spies. They are then sent to Hanawon, a government resettlement center where they are provided a 12-week social adaptation mandatory course, mainly focused on economic and political education and job training.[24] After three months of resettlement training, the government provides assistance in residence, employment, and health insurance. However, apart from these essential trainings for social adaptation, psychological needs such as mitigating traumatic experiences and vulnerable mental health statuses are not significantly addressed.
There are also non-profit and non-governmental organizations that seek to make the socio-cultural transition easier and more efficient for the refugees. One such organization, Saejowi, provides defectors with medical assistance as well as an education in diverse topics ranging from leadership and counseling techniques to sexual violence prevention and avoidance.[25] Another organization, PSCORE, runs education programs for refugees, providing weekly English classes and one-on-one tutoring.[26]
Children can attend local South Korean schools or specific schools for North Korean refugee children. At local South Korean schools, they may suffer discrimination and cruelty from other children. The refugee schools do not prepare them well for South Korean society. North Korean students generally fall behind South Korean peers academically. Until up to age 35, they can go to college without paying any fees.
In 2021, 56% of defectors had a low income. Nearly 25% were in the lowest income bracket so they were given national basic livelihood subsidies, which are six times the proportion in the general South Korean population.
| Status of North Korean defectors entering South Korea[27] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Criteria / Year | ~1998 | ~2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Total | |
| Male | 831 | 565 | 510 | 474 | 626 | 424 | 515 | 573 | 608 | 662 | 591 | 795 | 404 | 369 | 305 | 251 | 299 | 188 | 168 | 202 | 72 | 40 | 35 | 32 | 9,533 | |
| Female | 116 | 478 | 632 | 811 | 1,272 | 960 | 1,513 | 1,981 | 2,195 | 2,252 | 1,811 | 1,911 | 1,098 | 1,145 | 1,092 | 1,024 | 1,119 | 939 | 969 | 845 | 157 | 23 | 32 | 164 | 24,448 | |
| Total | 947 | 1,043 | 1,142 | 1,285 | 1,898 | 1,384 | 2,028 | 2,554 | 2,803 | 2,914 | 2,402 | 2,706 | 1,502 | 1,514 | 1,397 | 1,275 | 1,418 | 1,127 | 1,137 | 1,047 | 229 | 63 | 67 | 196 | 34,021 | |
Results of a survey conducted by the North Korean Refugees Foundation show that approximately 71% of North Koreans to have defected to South Korea since about 1998 are female. The percentage of female defectors has risen from 56% in 2002 to a high of 85% in 2018.
As of February 2014, age demographic of North Korean defectors show that 4% were ages 0–9, 12% were ages 10–19, 58% were ages 20–39, 21% were ages 40–59, and 4% were over 60. More than 50% of defectors come from North Hamgyong Province.[28]
The employment status of defectors before leaving North Korea was 2% held administrative jobs, 3% were soldiers (all able-bodied persons are required to serve 7–10 years in the military), 38% were "workers", 48% were unemployed or being supported by someone else, 4% were "service", 1% worked in arts or sports, and 2% worked as "professionals".
According to a poll by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, around 50% of defectors said they had experienced discrimination because of their background. The two major issues were their inability to afford medical care and poor working conditions. Many complained of disrespectful treatment by journalists.[29] According to the World Institute for North Korea Studies, a young female defector who does not attend a university has little chance of making a living in the South.
North Korean refugees who resettle in South Korea have been exposed to various forms of traumatic experiences in their home country before migration. 49–81% of adult North Korean refugees have reported experiencing or witnessing at least one type of traumatic event, directly and/or indirectly.[30] These events include witnessing public executions, starvation, torture, and being sent to a correctional facility. Moreover, during migration, they are subjected to additional trauma through multiple relocations before arriving in South Korea.[31] Once resettled, many experience acculturation stress that includes homesickness, cultural shock, alienation, perceived discrimination, and feelings of marginalization.[32] As a consequence, in a survey of over 24,000 of North Koreans who migrated to South Korea between August and December 2012, 607 identified as suffering from depression, anxiety, or suicidal ideation. Moreover, North Korean refugees exhibit post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms which are not significantly addressed through governmental agencies. A study of 182 defectors has shown that, due to mutual mistrust between North and South Koreans, defectors are often unable to receive medical help. With limited government-sponsored programs for migrants, North Koreans face vocational, medical, and educational difficulties assimilating in South Korea and rely on nongovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations have repeatedly urged recipient nations of North Korean defectors to better identify defectors who are at high risk for poor mental health and to provide them with appropriate medical and social support.
About 15% of North Korean refugees say they have suicidal thoughts, compared to 5% for South Koreans overall.[33]
The politics of identity plays a considerable role in deepening the social and ethnic gulf that separates North and South. Most South Koreans, who unlike North Koreans can be readily interviewed and polled in large numbers, harbour at least somewhat negative attitudes towards their neighbors, which North Korean defectors have experienced up-close on arrival. In 2010, the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) conducted face-to-face research of over 1,000 South Koreans on their perspectives on the ethnic identity of North Korean defectors assimilating into South Korea.[34] The results reveal that South Koreans generally do not support the reunification of the two countries. One reason for this opposition is that some South Koreans have grown suspicious of defectors and of their true intentions in migrating southwards. South Koreans' politically (rather than personally) relevant antagonism against North Korea as a whole, however, is mainly targeted at its Communist regime and at what they perceive as its contribution to the division of the formerly coherent national identity. Some have interpreted the outcome of the KGSS survey as evidence that the idea of "one nation, two countries" does not exist in the minds of most South Koreans.[34] According to a 2015 UC Santa Cruz paper, many interviewed defectors wanted to resettle in China or emigrate to a Western country, due to bigotry, semi-official discrimination, difficulty with the ultra-competitive aspects of South Korean society, and disappointment with unfulfilled promises of ease and prosperity by missionaries and the government.[35]
North Korean asylum seekers and defectors have been rising in numbers in Canada since 2006.[36] Radio Free Asia reports that in 2007 alone, over 100 asylum applications were submitted, and that North Korean refugees have come from China or elsewhere with the help of Canadian missionaries and NGOs. The rapid increase in asylum applications to Canada is due to the limited options, especially when receiving asylum is becoming more difficult. On 2 February 2011, then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper met Hye Sook Kim, a North Korean defector and also received advice from Dr. Norbert Vollertsen, "Canada can persuade China, among others, not to repatriate the North Korean refugees back to North Korea but, instead, let them go to South Korea and other countries, including Canada."[37] 780 North Koreans lived in Canada in 2016.[38]
According to estimates by the US State Department, 30,000 to 50,000 defectors have legal refugee status, out of a larger total of North Koreans hiding in the country.[39] China does not grant asylum or refugee status to North Koreans and, with few exceptions, considers them illegal immigrants and deports them back to North Korea.[40] According to an ETH Zurich report, China does this to avoid jeopardising relations with Pyongyang.[41] A 2009 world refugee study found that around 11,000 North Korean refugees remained in hiding in China close to the North Korean border.[42]
Some NGOs have been releasing inflated numbers on the amount of North Korean defectors in China, but many experts and official organizations such as the UNHCR have criticized their figures as unreliable.[43] [44] [45]
These refugees are not typically considered to be members of the ethnic Korean community, and the Chinese census does not count them as such. Some North Korean refugees who are unable to obtain transport to South Korea marry ethnic Koreans in China and settle there; they blend into the community but are subject to deportation if discovered by the authorities. Those who have found brokers and traffickers try to enter the South Korean consulate in Shenyang. The brokers are often Korean-Chinese or South Korean missionaries, or other North Korean defectors.[46] As of 2002, the Chinese government has tightened the security and increased the number of police outside the consulate.
In 2015, the number of defectors crossing the border illegally to China was reported to be dropping due to increased border security, improved economy in North Korea, and Kim Jong Un's new promotion of legitimate labour migration. Lankov wrote that the vast majority of refugees would first move to China to earn money, and later decide to continue on to South Korea.[47] According to documentarian Cho Cheon-hyeon[48] in February 2021, most North Koreans in China preferred to stay there or return to the North rather than go to South Korea.[49]
During the mid-1990s, the percentages of male and female defectors were relatively balanced.[50] In early to mid-1990s, male labour was valuable since North Korean defectors could work in Chinese countrysides and factories and secure hideout in return. However, due to rising social security issues including crime and violence involving North Koreans, the value of male labour decreased. Females, on the other hand, were able to find easier means of settlement including performing smaller labour tasks and marrying Chinese locals (mostly ethnic Korean). As of today, 80–90% of North Korean defectors residing in China are females who settled through de facto marriage; a large number of them experience forced marriage and human trafficking.[51]
Before 2009, over 70% of female North Korean defectors were victims of human trafficking. Due to their vulnerability as illegal migrants, they were sold for cheap prices, around 3,000 to 10,000 yuan. According to defector testimonies, those repatriated to North Korea are sentenced to penal-labour colonies (and/or executed), where Chinese-fathered babies are executed "to protect North Korean pure blood," and pregnant repatriates get forced abortions.[52] [53] After 2009, the percentage of female North Korean defectors with experience of human trafficking decreased to 15% since large numbers of defectors began to enter South Korea through organized groups led by brokers. Academics Andrei Lankov and Kyunghee Kook have disputed the label of human trafficking or forced marriages for some cases.[54] [55] Lankov wrote in 2010 that many Chinese husbands attempt to improve their Korean wives' official standing and may try expensively bribing the officials to get them a Chinese Resident Identity Card where they are registered as China-born ethnic Koreans.[56]
In the early to mid-1990s, the Chinese government was relatively tolerant with the issue of North Korean defectors.[57] Unless the North Korean government sent special requests, the Chinese government did not display serious control of the residence of North Koreans in Chinese territory. However, along with intensified North Korean famine in the late 1990s, the number of defectors drastically increased, which raised international attention. As a result, China stepped up the inspection of North Korean defectors and began their deportations. According to a 2014 paper from the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korean authorities in China would generally be unable (or unwilling) to help North Korean escapees who approached them, although there were exceptions where South Korea had requested Chinese permission for the transfer of a North Korean escapee who entered a South Korean diplomatic compound. Requests have usually been granted after 1–3 years.[58]
In June 2002, a diplomatic row broke out between China and South Korea after Chinese security guards dragged a would-be asylum seeker from Seoul's embassy in Beijing. Before the incident, China had reportedly allowed North Koreans inside other foreign missions to go to South Korea by way of a third country,[59] including a North Korean family who was detained in Shenyang on May.[60] In 2012, Beijing allowed 5 defectors to leave for South Korea after they had spent three years in China.[61]
In February 2012, Chinese authorities repatriated 19 North Korean defectors being held in Shenyang and five defectors in Changchun from the same location. The case of the 24 detainees, who had been held since early February, garnered international attention due to the North's reported harsh punishment of those who attempted to defect. Human-rights activists say those repatriated face harsh punishment, including torture and imprisonment in labour camps.[62] North Korean repatriation gained Chinese media coverage on 2012,[63] [64] and drew sympathy towards the refugees from Chinese netizens.[65] [66] [67]
In August 2014, 11 North Koreans detained by China on the Laos border was reported by Sky News to have been released rather than repatriated after talks between Chinese and South Korean diplomats.[68]
In April 2016, China allowed 13 North Korean restaurant workers to defect to South Korea, with spokesman Lu Kang saying they all had valid identity documents.[69] The case became controversial 2 years later after 4 waitresses said they were brought to the South against their will, with the restaurant manager claiming he had been pressured by South Korea's intelligence agency.[70] [71]
South Korean human-rights activists have held rallies at the Chinese embassy in Seoul and have appealed to the U.N. Human Rights Council to urge China to stop the deportation of the refugees.[72] [73] [74] The North Korea Freedom Coalition has created a list alleging that thousands of North Korean defectors have been repatriated by China. For some of them the fate after repatriation to North Korea ranges from torture, detention, prison camp to execution. The list includes humanitarian workers, who were assassinated or abducted by North Korean agents for helping refugees.[75] [76]
In 2021, one such North Korean defector Zhu Xianjian escaped prison in China but was quickly recaptured by police. China's policy involves forcibly repatriating North Korean defectors, whom it calls illegal migrants rather than refugees. As such China can deal with such defectors as criminals within their own judicial and legal system.[77]
In 2014, research by the human rights organisation the European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea claims that there are around 1,400 North Korean refugees in Europe. Citing UNHRC statistics, the report identified North Korean communities in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.[78]
As of 2015, the largest North Korean community in Europe resides in New Malden, South West London. Approximately 600 North Koreans are believed to reside in the area,[79] which is already notable for its significant South Korean community.[80]
According to a Eurostat report, a total of 820 North Koreans became citizens of European Union countries in the 2007–2016 period, with nearly 90 percent of them living in Germany and Britain.[81]
According to a 2020 Waseda University paper, Japanese diplomats and NGOs quietly collaborated with Chinese authorities to fly a number of defectors to Japan. China stopped collaborating with Japan on this issue in 2010 after relations deteriorated from the Senkaku Islands dispute.[82]
There have been three cases of North Koreans defecting directly to Japan by boat. In January 1987, a stolen boat carrying 13 North Koreans washed ashore at Fukui Port in Fukui Prefecture, and then continued to South Korea via Taiwan.[83] [84] In June 2007, after a six-day boat ride a family of four North Koreans was found by the Japan Coast Guard off the coast of Aomori Prefecture.[85] They later settled in South Korea.[86] [87] [88] In September 2011, the Japan Coast Guard found a wooden boat containing nine people, three men, three women and three boys. The group had been sailing for five days towards South Korea but had drifted towards the Noto Peninsula and thought they had arrived in South Korea. They were found in good health.[89]
Japan resettled about 140 ethnic Koreans who managed to return to Japan after initially immigrating to North Korea under the 1959–1984 mass "repatriation" project of ethnic Koreans from Japan. This supposed humanitarian project, supported by Chongryon and conducted by the Japanese and North Korean Red Crosses, had involved the resettlement of around 90,000 volunteers (mostly from South Korea) in North Korea, which Chongryon hailed as a "paradise on earth".[90] Some of the Koreans who were repatriated, including Kim Hyon-hui, a student of Yaeko Taguchi, revealed evidence about the whereabouts of Japanese citizens who had been kidnapped by North Korea.[91]
Public Radio International reported in 2011 that Laos, along with Vietnam and Myanmar, were largely unsympathetic to North Korean refugees.[92] In 2013, nine defectors were arrested and sent back to North Korea. This caused international outrage partially because one of the defectors is the son of a Japanese abductee.[93] [94] [95] [96]
A much shorter route than the standard China-Laos-Thailand route is straight to Mongolia, whose government tries to maintain good relations with both North and South Korea, but is sympathetic to northern refugees. North Korean refugees who are caught in Mongolia are sent to South Korea, effectively granting them a free air ticket.[97] However, using this route requires navigating the unforgiving terrain of the Gobi Desert. Also, tighter border control with China has made this route less common.
The Philippines has been used in the past as a transit point for North Korean refugees, often arriving from China and then being sent on to South Korea.[98] A 2005 leaked US embassy cable suggested that for 2 years, the South Korean embassy in Beijing facilitated the transit of nearly 500 refugees annually to Ninoy Aquino International Airport for transfer to South Korea.[99] In its 2020 census, the Philippine Statistics Authority reported that there are 406 North Koreans with permanent resident status in the Philippines, with 159 living in Metro Manila.[100] The country has been hard to reach due to the fact refugees have to cross China and get on a boat to the archipelago.
A notable incident of North Korean defection to the Philippines happened in 1997 when Hwang Jang-yop, who served as the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly from 1972 to 1983, defected to South Korea. He initially walked into the South Korean embassy in Beijing posing as one of their diplomats. The Chinese government cordoned off the embassy from leaving, but a few weeks later a deal was brokered, and Hwang and his companion Kim Duk-hong were permitted to leave Beijing for a 3rd country. The Philippines was selected as a transit point before they could fly to South Korea. President Fidel V. Ramos tasked the National Security Advisor Jose T. Almonte in ensuring the safety of the North Korean defectors. Hwang and Kim arrived in Clark Air Base, and were taken custody by the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency