Convoys HX 229/SC 122 explained

Conflict:Convoy HX 229 (plus delayed 229A) /SC 122
Partof:World War II
Date:16–19 March 1943
Place:North Atlantic
Result:German Victory
Combatant2: United Kingdom
United States
Canada
Commander2:B4 Group: GJ Luther; later EC Day
B5 Group: RC Boyle
Commander1:Admiral Karl Dönitz
Strength2:HX229:
50 ships, 5 escorts
SC122:
60 ships, 8 escorts
plus reinforcements
Strength1:Raubgraf 10 U-boats
Stürmer 18 U-boats
Dränger 11 U-boatsTotal: 39
Casualties2:HX229:
13 ships (93,502 GRT)
SC122:
9 ships (53,694 GRT)
Casualties1:1 U-Boat destroyed
7 damaged

During the Battle of the Atlantic, British merchant shipping was formed into convoys for protection against German submarine attack.[1] In March 1943 convoys HX 229 and SC 122 were the focus of the largest convoy battle of the war.[2] Kriegsmarine tactics against convoys employed multiple-submarine wolfpack tactics in nearly simultaneous surface attacks at night. Patrolling aircraft restricted the ability of submarines to converge on convoys during daylight. The North Atlantic winters offered the longest periods of darkness to conceal surfaced submarine operations. The winter of 1942–43 saw the largest number of submarines deployed to the mid-Atlantic before comprehensive anti-submarine aircraft patrols could be extended into that area.

During March, there was a series of fierce convoy battles which became, for the Allies, the crisis point of the whole campaign.[3] One hundred merchant ships in trade convoys HX 229 and SC 122 encountered three wolfpacks of 38 submarines in a single sprawling action, which German radio reported as "the greatest convoy battle of all time" (Die grösste Geleitzugschlacht aller Zeiten).[4] A Royal Navy report later concluded "The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first 20 days of March 1943".[5]

Convoy SC 122

SC 122 was a slow eastbound convoy of 60 ships, routed from New York to Liverpool. (This was during the period when SC convoys were switched from Sydney, Cape Breton, to New York; this was reversed later due to congestion problems there.) It sailed on 5 March 1943, protected at first by one destroyer and five corvettes of the Western Local Escort Force. On 6 March, off Cape Cod, two ships put back to New York due to heavy weather, and on 8 March, another six abandoned the crossing, and put into Halifax.

The convoy pressed on, changing escorts on 13 March off Cape Race. The western local group left, after the Mid-Ocean Escort Force B5 Escort Group joined from St John's. B5 Escort Group consisted of eight warships, led by Commander RC Boyle in the destroyer, the destroyer, the, the s,,, and, and a trawler as rescue vessel.

Convoy HX 229

HX 229 was also eastbound and sailed from New York on 8 March, with 40 ships and the local escort. A further 34 ships which should have been included were delayed due to congestion at New York; they sailed the following day as HX 229A. The first few days of the convoy were uneventful; HX 229 met its Mid-Ocean Escort Force on 14 March and the local escort departed. The ocean escort was B4 Escort Group from St John's, of four destroyers and a corvette. It was led on this occasion by Lieutenant Commander Gordon John Luther of, as its regular leader was in dock for repairs. Luther, although an ASW specialist, had recently joined the group and this was only his second crossing. The other ships of B4 were the destroyers HMS Beverley, Mansfield and and the corvette, although Witherington had to detach on 15 March, to be replaced by the corvette for the crossing.

HX 229A sailed on 9 March, meeting its ocean escort, 40 Escort Group, on 15 March. This comprised six sloop-type warships under Cdr. J Dalison in HMS Aberdeen. Taking a more northerly route than HX 229, the convoy remained undetected by German patrol lines and made a safe and timely landfall on 26 March. The voyage was not without its perils though. The more northerly route took it into an icefield and two ships were damaged by icebergs, rerouting to Iceland. The convoy vice-commodore's vessel the Svend Foyn was also damaged and ultimately sank on March 19, 1943.[6]

Wolfpacks

Arrayed against them were three patrol lines (rakes) of U-boats:[7]

The battle

See main article: Convoys HX 229/SC 122 order of battle. The German B-Dienst signals intelligence group, had given notice of an east-bound convoy and by 8pm on 13 March had a location for SC 122. Admiral Karl Dönitz, commanding the U-boat fleet, directed Raubgraf to intercept, forming a new rake to the west. A westerly gale gave speed to SC 122, which passed through Raubgrafs patrol area on the morning of 15 March just 24 hours before the patrol line was formed.

The Allied Ultra intelligence, which decrypted German messages enciphered using the Enigma machine and which had helped the Admiralty to divert convoys away from wolf packs, had been "blinded" on 10 March 1943 as the result of the Germans bringing in a new short weather report. This resulted in the British code breakers being starved of the cribs necessary to break "Shark", the cipher used by the German U-boats. The U-boat tracking room at the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre was therefore unable to divert convoys around the U-boat packs. A message from a U-boat gave away its position once that position had been fixed by DF and the convoy SC 122 was diverted around the estimated danger area.

The Allied Cipher Number 3 used by the convoy escorts had been broken by the Germans. This allowed them to position wolf packs in the way of HX 229, which was following a similar course. It passed through Raubgrafs rake in the night of without being sighted because of bad weather. On the morning of 16 March, which had detached from Raubgraf to return to base with mechanical problems, sighted HX 229 heading east and sent a sighting report. Dönitz immediately ordered Raubgraf to pursue and intercept, while Stürmer and Dränger were ordered west to form a line ahead of the convoy. He saw in this an opportunity to attack an east-bound convoy, full of war materials bound for Europe, with the full width of the Air Gap to cross.

Raubgraf caught up with HX 229 on the evening of 16 March and mounted an attack that night. Three ships were sunk and another five on the morning of 17 March, a total of eight in just 8 hours. The escort was reported to be weak, as 2 ships had dropped out to pick up survivors. The escorts chased 3 contacts during the night but with no result. During the rest of the day, boats from Stürmer began to arrive. One of these was attacked by a destroyer but again without success.

At the north-eastern end of Stürmers rake, had sighted SC 122 heading east, about 120 miles from HX 229's position. After sending a sighting report she attacked, sinking four ships in quick succession. A fifth, Fort Cedar Lake, was damaged, to be sunk later in the day. Two more ships from HX 229 were lost during the day. Two boats from Stürmer were able to penetrate the defences about midday on 17 March but the escorts were able to fend off any further attacks, assisted by brief visits from Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft flying at extreme range. SC 122 was also able to resist further attacks until evening.

During the night of the attack on both convoys, now just 70 miles apart, continued. U-338 sank the freighter Granville, of SC 122 in the evening, surviving a fierce counter-attack by escorts, and after midnight sank two more ships (Port Auckland and Zouave).

HX 229's escort suffered a blow as HMS Mansfield was forced to detach during the night of Help was on its way in the form of the destroyer, under Commander ECL Day. Arriving on 18 March, Day, as a senior and more experienced officer, took command of B4 Group for the rest of the engagement. Also en route from Hvalfjord, in Iceland, were the destroyers and, for HX 229, and the US Coast Guard cutter for SC 122. These were dispatched on the morning of 18 March, and arrived the following day.

On the afternoon of 18 March, succeeded in sinking two ships of HX 229 but further losses were avoided. HMS Highlander joined that afternoon, a welcome addition as B4 was by this time reduced to five ships.

During the night of the two convoys were running in tandem, though sailing independently. All attacks on both convoys were repelled this night, and six firm contacts were attacked but little damage was inflicted. One ship from HX 229 was lost, a romper which broke away to proceed independently; this ship, Matthew Luckenbach, ran into the melée around SC 122 and was torpedoed, to be sunk later on 19 March. A straggler from SC 122, Clarissa Radcliffe, was also sunk with all hands by U-663.

On 19 March the escorts were reinforced by the arrival of Vimy and Babitt, for HX 229, and Ingham for SC 122. HX 229 was also joined by the corvette, detached from another convoy. Also on 19 March was attacked by air patrol to the north of SC 122 and sunk. There were no further losses to the convoys that day; faced with stiffening resistance and sensing nothing further would be achieved without disproportionate losses, Dönitz called off the assault.

The convoys continued east. Further changes to the escort occurred on 20 March as reinforcement arrived in the form of the corvette HMCS Sherbrooke, while Upshur and Ingham were detached. The local escort groups met on 23 March, and HX 229, with 27 ships surviving, arrived at Liverpool on 23 March. SC 122, with 42 remaining ships, arrived later the same day.

Outcome

The double battle had involved 90 merchant ships and 16 escort ships (though not all were present at the same time). 22 merchant ships were sunk (13 from HX 229 and 9 from SC 122), a loss of 146,000 tons. More than 300 merchant seamen died. In total, 38 U-boats had taken part (though throughout the battle not all had been in contact). One U-boat had been lost with all hands, though a number had been damaged.The battle was undoubtedly a success for the Germans. However, they had failed to interrupt the North Atlantic convoy route to any extent; 68 ships (two-thirds of those involved) made a safe and timely arrival, and the 38 ships of HX 229A, which had been detached at New York to cross separately, arrived unscathed.

This was the largest convoy battle of the Atlantic campaign. A Royal Navy report later concluded "It appeared possible that we should not be able to regard convoy as an effective system of defence".[5]

March 1943 marked the low point of Allied fortunes in the Atlantic campaign. The month saw four home-bound convoys attacked, and a total of 39 ships sunk; yet of those four convoys over 200 arrived safely, while four other eastbound convoys were unharmed. None of the eight westbound convoys in March were attacked.[8] Also during March nine U-boats were destroyed in the Atlantic, and more were damaged, leading to a hiatus in U-boat operations during April. When the offensive renewed in May, it saw a major defeat for the U-boat Arm, and the turning point of the campaign.

Losses

Allied ships

HX 229

DateNameFlagCasualtiesTonnage (GRT)Sunk by
16 March 1943Elin K05,214
16/17 March 1943Zaanland06,513
16/17 March 1943Southern Princess412,156
16/17 March 1943Harry Luckenbach806,366
16/17 March 1943Coracero57,252
16/17 March 1943Terkoeli365,158, ?
17 March 1943James Oglethorpe447,176,
17 March 1943William Eustis07,196,
17 March 1943Nariva08,714,
17 March 1943Irenee du Pont246,125,
18 March 1943William Q Gresham277,191
18 March 1943Canadian Star298,293
19 March 1943Matthew Luckenbach?5,848,

SC 122

DateNameFlagCasualtiesTonnage (GRT)Sunk by
16/17 March 1943Kingsbury44,898
16/17 March 1943King Gruffydd225,072
16/17 March 1943Alderamin07,886
17 March 1943Fort Cedar Lake07,134,
17 March 1943Port Auckland88,789
18 March 1943Zouave134,256
18 March 1943Granville124,071
18/19 March 1943Carras05,234,
19 March 1943Clarissa Radcliffe[9] 535,754

U-boats

U-boats damaged
DateNumberTypeU-boat groupConvoy attackedNotes[10]
19 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer HX 229 d/c, damaged by Anemone, Volunteer
18 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer SC 122 d/c by aircraft x4; forced to break off and return to base
19 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer SC 122 d/c by Lavender, Upshur (17th): d/c, s damaged by Sunderland /423 Sqdn
19 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer HX 229 d/c Liberator /86 Sqdn (17th); dc, damage by Highlander
17 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer HX 229 dc, damage by Beverley
20 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer SC 122, HX 229 d/c, damage by Sund. /201 Sqdn
20 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer HX 229 d/c, damage by Sund. /201 Sqdn
19 Mar 1943 VIIC Sturmer SC 122 d/c by Lib /86 Sqdn, Godetia, Upshur (17th); dc, damage by Fortress /220 Sqdn

See also

Bibliography

External links

50.6333°N -34.7667°W

Notes and References

  1. Book: Gordon Smith. Don Kindell. Donald A. Bertke. World War II Sea War, Vol 9: Wolfpacks Muzzled. April 2012. Lulu.com. 978-1-937470-16-6. 34.
  2. Book: Jak Mallmann Showell. Hitler's Navy: A Reference Guide to the Kriegsmarine 1935-1945. 19 March 2009. Seaforth Publishing. 978-1-78346-917-8. 84.
  3. Web site: Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 4, Section 2 . Pitz . John . HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service . ibiblio . 9 September 2016.
  4. Middlebrook p.276
  5. Roskill p367.
  6. Web site: Lawson . Siri . 21 March 2024 . Convoy HX 229A . 21 March 2024 . Warsailors.
  7. Web site: Volume III German Naval Communications Intelligence, Chapter 4, Section 4 . Pitz . John . HyperWar Foundation publishing National Security Agency, Central Security Service . ibiblio . 20 September 2016.
  8. Blair p.272
  9. Web site: LLOYD'S REGISTER, NAVIRES A VAPEUR ET A MOTEURS. Plimsoll Ship Data. 19 February 2009.
  10. Middlebrook App. 4 (pp.316-320)