| Conflict: | Convoy QP 14 |
| Partof: | The Arctic convoys of the Second World War |
| Date: | 13–26 September 1942 |
| Place: | Arctic Ocean |
| Combatant1: | Germany |
| Combatant2: | United Kingdom |
| Commander1: | Karl Dönitz |
| Commander2: | John Dowding |
| Strength1: | 7 U-boats |
| Strength2: | 17 merchant ships 65 escorts |
| Casualties1: | 1 U-boat sunk 5 damaged |
| Casualties2: | 3 merchant ships sunk 2 warships sunk |
Convoy QP 14 (13–26 September 1942) was an Arctic convoy of the QP series which ran during the Second World War. The convoy was a return journey of Allied ships from the port of Archangelsk in the Soviet Union to Loch Ewe in the west of Scotland. The British planned to send Convoy PQ 18 from Iceland to Murmansk and when the convoys crossed transfer much of the escort force from the outbound convoy to Convoy QP 14 and escort back it through the most dangerous waters off Norway.
Rather than provide a covering force of cruisers and a distant covering force of battleships and aircraft carriers as hitherto, a large Fighting Destroyer Escort was formed to accompany Convoy PQ 18 and be capable of independently operating, to present an attack by German ships with the risk of massed torpedo salvoes. To keep the larger number of escorts fuelled, Force P of fuel tankers with escorts were sent to Svalbard and fleet oilers joined Convoy PQ 18; on 16 September much of the PQ 18 escort force and oilers transferred to QP 14 as the convoys crossed.
There was a scare on 19 September that German ships were attacking but this was a false alarm and the convoy was opposed only by aircraft and submarines. The German attacks sank three merchant ships and two of the escorts for the loss of a U-boat and five damaged, the aircraft on the escort carrier doing much to deter U-boat attacks, assisted by land-based aircraft from 23 September. The convoy reached Loch Ewe in Scotland on 26 September.
Operation EV, the escort operation for QP 14 and PQ 18, was judged a success by its commander, Rear-Admiral Robert Burnett. He noted that the risks had been great and had re-fuelling not being achieved due to bad weather or if there had been better co-ordination between U-boats and Luftwaffe aircraft, there could have been another disaster like Convoy PQ 17. Burnett was criticised by Stephen Roskill, the official historian, for sending Avenger back to base on 20 September; weather grounded the land-based aircraft and three ships were sunk on 22 September but in 2004, Richard Woodman wrote that the risks to QP 14 had been justified.
See main article: Arctic Ocean.
Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, of water under gales full of snow, sleet and hail. Around the North Cape and the Barents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4° Celsius and a man in the water will probably die unless rescued immediately. The cold water and air makes spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which has quickly to be removed to avoid the ship becoming top-heavy. The cold Arctic water is met by the Gulf Stream, a flow of warm water from the Gulf of Mexico, which becomes the North Atlantic Drift further north. Arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland. North of Norway the drift splits.
The northern stream of the drift goes north of Bear Island to Svalbard and the southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide. The waters drastically reduced the effectiveness of Asdic as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density. In winter, polar ice can form as far south as off the North Cape, forcing ships closer to Luftwaffe air bases and in summer it can recede to Svalbard, allowing ships to sail further out to sea. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer which makes visual air reconnaissance almost impossible or easy.
See main article: Arctic convoys of World War II and Home Fleet. In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by and another more than already promised. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur (Hvalfiord) in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.
By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.
Following Convoy PQ 16 and the disaster to Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942, Arctic convoys were postponed for nine weeks and much of the Home Fleet was detached to the Mediterranean for Operation Pedestal, a Malta convoy. During the lull, Admiral John Tovey concluded that the Home Fleet had been of no great protection to convoys beyond Bear Island, midway between Spitsbergen and the North Cape. Tovey would oversee the operation from Scapa Flow, where the fleet was linked to the Admiralty by landline, immune to variations in wireless reception. The next convoy should be accompanied by sufficient protection against surface attack; the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet could be used to augment the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, to confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed destroyer torpedo attack. The practice of meeting homeward-bound QP convoys near Bear Island was dispensed with and QP 14 was to wait until PQ 18 was near its destination, despite the longer journey being more demanding of crews, fuel and equipment. The new escort carrier (Commander Anthony Colthurst) had arrived from the United States and was added to the escort force, to give the convoy air cover.
See main article: Ultra (cryptography).
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (German: Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older German: Heimish (German: Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British) settings. By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.
See main article: B-Dienst.
The rival German German: [[Beobachtungsdienst]] (German: B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the German: [[Kriegsmarine]] German: [[Marinenachrichtendienst]] (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help German: Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, German: B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. German: B-Dienst broke Naval Cypher No 3 (the convoy cypher) in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra. In early September, Finnish Radio Intelligence deciphered a Soviet Air Force transmission which divulged the convoy itinerary, which was forwarded it to the Germans.
See main article: Luftflotte 5.
In March 1942, Adolf Hitler issued a directive for a greater anti-convoy effort to weaken the Red Army and prevent Allied troops being transferred to northern Russia, preparatory to a landing on the coast of northern Norway. German: Luftflotte 5 (German: Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff) was to be reinforced and the German: Kriegsmarine was ordered to put an end to Arctic convoys and naval incursions. The Luftwaffe and German: Kriegsmarine were to work together with a simplified command structure, which was implemented after a conference; the Navy had preferred joint command but the Luftwaffe insisted on the exchange of liaison officers. German: Luftflotte 5 was to be reinforced by 2./Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) and KG 30 was to increase its readiness for operations. A squadron of German: Aufklärungsflieger Gruppe 125 (Aufkl.Fl.Gr. 125) was transferred to Norway and more long-range Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor patrol aircraft from Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) were sent from France. At the end of March, the air fleet was divided.
German: Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) [{{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Alexander Holle]]], the largest command, was based at Kirkenes with 2./JG 5, 10.(Z)/JG 5, 1./StG 5 (Dive Bomber Wing 5) and 1.German: Fernaufklärungsgruppe 124 [1./(F) 124] (1 Squadron, Long Range Reconnaissance Wing 124) charged with attacks on Murmansk and Archangelsk as well as attacks on convoys. Part of German: Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was based at Petsamo (5./JG 5, 6./JG 5 and 3./Kampfgeschwader 26 (3./KG 26), Banak (2./KG 30, 3./KG 30 and 1./(F) 22) and Billefjord (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 125). German: Fliegerführer Lofoten (German: Oberst Hans Roth) was based at Bardufoss but had no permanently attached units, which were added according to events. At the start of the anti-shipping campaign only the coastal patrol squadrons 3./German: Küstenfliegergruppe 906 at Trondheim and 1./1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 123 at Tromsø were attached to German: Fliegerführer Lofoten. German: Fliegerführer Nord (West) was based at Sola and was responsible for the early detection of convoys and attacks south of a line from Trondheim westwards to Shetland and Iceland, with 1./(F) 22, the German: Kondors of 1./KG 40, short-range coastal reconnaissance squadrons 1./German: Küstenfliegergruppe 406 (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406), 2./ German: Küstenfliegergruppe 406 (2./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406) and a weather reconnaissance squadron.
As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, German: Fliegerführer Nord (West) would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three German: Fliegerführer were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. German: Fliegerführer Lofoten would begin the anti-convoy operation east to a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence German: Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) would take over using his and German: Fliegerführer Lofoten's aircraft, which would to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range. German: Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Archangelsk. From late March to late May the air effort against PQ 13, 14, 15 and QP 9, 10 and 11 had little effect, twelve sinkings out of 16 lost in PQ convoys and two out of five sinkings from QP convoys being credited to the Luftwaffe; 166 merchant ships had sailed for Russia and 145 had survived the journey.
Bad weather had been nearly as dangerous as the Luftwaffe, forcing 16 of the ships in PQ 14 to turn back. In April, the spring thaw grounded many Luftwaffe aircraft and in May bad weather led to contact being lost and convoys scattering, being impossible to find in the long Arctic night. When air attacks on convoys had taken place, the formations rarely amounted to more than twelve aircraft, greatly simplifying the task of convoy anti-aircraft gunners, who shot down several aircraft in April and May. Failings in liaison between the Luftwaffe and German: Kriegsmarine were uncovered and tactical co-operation greatly enhanced, Hermann Böhm (German: Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen) noting that in the operation against PQ 15 and QP 11, there were no problems in co-operation between aircraft, submarines and destroyers. From 152 aircraft in January, reinforcements to German: Luftflotte 5 increased its strength to 221 front-line aircraft by March 1942. By May German: Luftflotte 5 had 264 aircraft based around the North Cape in northern Norway, consisting of 108 Ju 88 long-range bombers, 42 Heinkel 111 torpedo-bombers, 15 Heinkel He 115 float-plane torpedo-bombers, 30 Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers and 74 long range Focke Wulf 200s, Junkers 88s and Blohm & Voss BV 138s.
See main article: Golden Comb.
The German: Luftwaffe had used the lull after PQ 17 to assemble a force of 35 Junkers Ju 88 A-4 dive-bombers of KG 30 and 42 torpedo-bombers of KG 26 (I/KG 26 with 28 Heinkel He 111 H-6s and III/KG 26 with 14 Ju 88 A-4s) to join the reconnaissance aircraft of German: Luftflotte 5. After analysing the results of anti-shipping operations against PQ 17, in which the crews of German: Luftflotte 5 made exaggerated claims of ships sunk, including a cruiser, the anti-shipping units devised the German: [[Golden Comb (tactic)|Goldene Zange]] (Golden Comb). Ju 88 bombers were to divert the defenders with medium and dive bombing attacks as the torpedo-bombers approached out of the twilight. The torpedo bombers were to fly towards the convoy in line abreast, at wave-top height to evade radar, as the convoy was silhouetted against the lighter sky, then drop their torpedoes in a salvo. When German: B-Dienst discovered that an aircraft carrier would accompany the next convoy, German: Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring gave orders that it must be sunk first; German: Luftwaffe aircrew were told that the destruction of the convoy was the best way to help the German army at Stalingrad and in southern Russia.
The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (German: [[Seenotdienst]]) along with the German: Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised German: Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and German: Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18 and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes.
German: [[Oberkommando der Luftwaffe]] (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained. After the experience of PQ 16, Stumpff gave the task to the coastal reconnaissance squadrons, whose aircraft were not usually engaged in attacks on convoys. They would henceforth stand by to rescue aircrew during anti-shipping operations.
See main article: Operation Wunderland and Operation Doppelschlag.
Authority in the German: Kriegsmarine was derived from the German: Seekriegsleitung (Supreme Naval Command) in Berlin and Arctic operations were commanded by Admiral Boehm, the Admiral Commanding Norway, from the German: Marinegruppenkommando Nord (Naval Group North) HQ in Kiel. Three flag officers were detached to Oslo in command of minesweeping, coast defence, patrols and minelaying off the west, north and polar coasts. The large surface ships and U-boats were under the command of the Flag Officer Northern Waters at Narvik, who did not answer to Boehm but had authority over the Flag Officer Battlegroup, who commanded the ships when at sea. The Flag Officer Northern Waters also had tactical control of aircraft from German: [[Luftflotte 5]] when they operated in support of the German: Kriegsmarine. The Norwegian-based aircraft had tactical headquarters at Kirkenes, Trondheim and Bardufoss. The German: Luftwaffe HQs were separate from the German: Kriegsmarine commanders except at Kirkenes, with the Flag Officer Polar Coast.
On 24 June, a British minesweeper based at Kola was sunk by Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and on 16 August, Admiral Scheer conducted Operation Wunderland (German: Unternehmen Wunderland), a sortie against Russian ships thought to be sailing along the route north of Siberia. Admiral Scheer sailed north of Novaya Zemlya and then to the east and sank a Soviet icebreaker; by 30 August Admiral Scheer was back in Narvik. German: B-Dienst signals interception and documents recovered from the crashed Hampden UB-C, revealed the crossover and escort changeover points of convoys PQ 18 and QP 14 and other details including Operation Orator. U-boats, destroyers and the minelayer Ulm sailed on Operation Zar (German: Unternehmen Zar) to sow mines at the entrance of the White Sea and off Novaya Zemlya. Tirpitz, the cruiser Lützow and three destroyers had been in dock for repairs since German: [[Operation Rösselsprung (Naval)|Unternehmen Rosselsprung]] against Convoy PQ 17 (2–5 July) and were not available. Twelve U-boats formed a patrol group in the Norwegian Sea against PQ 18 and the German: Kriegsmarine planned German: Unternehmen Doppelschlag (Operation Double Hit) in which the cruisers Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper and Köln with four destroyer escorts, would sail against the convoy.
See main article: Operation Orator.
After Convoy PQ 17, the supplies lost in the convoy, bound for the ships at Archangelsk, were replaced by the destroyers,, and The destroyers sailed on 20 July and arrived without German interference, despite being spotted by German reconnaissance aircraft, near Jan Mayen Island. During August, Operation Orator, a Royal Air Force detachment, known as the Search & Strike Force, was sent to the USSR comprising two squadrons of Handley-Page Hampden torpedo bombers, a section of Photographic Reconnaissance Unit Spitfires and part of 210 Squadron with Catalina flying boats, to guard against sorties by German ships. The aircraft made a risky flight to the USSR, in which several Hampdens were lost; the ground crews and equipment were delivered by and three destroyers. On 25 August, during the return journey of Tuscaloosa and its escorts, Ultra revealed the itinerary of the minelayer Ulm, part of the German Operation Zar (German: Unternehmen Zar). Three of the destroyers were sent to intercept the ship to the south-west of Bear Island; Ulm was sunk that night and sixty survivors were taken prisoner. The Germans had to press the heavy cruiser into service as a minelayer.
Operation EV was the code-name for a naval operation to escort the northern USSR-bound Convoy PQ 18 through the Barents Sea, the area most dangerous to the convoy from air, sea and submarine attack, then to detach and join the returning Convoy QP 14. PQ 18 was to be taken over by the British and Soviet escorts from Archangelsk, which had escorted QP 14. PQ 18 consisted of forty merchant ships and three minesweepers to be based in Russia, along with Force Q, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) oilers and . A Close Escort (Commander Archibald Russell) was led by the flotilla leader with the destroyers and, the anti-aircraft ships and, the Flower-class corvettes,, and, the minesweepers, and and the submarines and . The Carrier Force comprised Avenger with 802 Naval Air Squadron and 882 Naval Air Squadron, Fleet Air Arm (six Hawker Sea Hurricane fighters each) and 825 Naval Air Squadron (three Fairey Swordfish reconnaissance and torpedo-bombers with five crews) and the destroyers and to allow the carrier to dispatch and recover aircraft whilst sailing into the wind, independent of the convoy.
Rather than providing a few destroyers for the escort with a cruiser force nearby, the permanent close escorts were reinforced by a Fighting Destroyer Escort (FDE) to command all of the escort forces with the convoy. Rear-Admiral Robert Burnett in the cruiser the commander of the FDE had sixteen fleet destroyers disposed in Force A [Captain (D) H. T. Armstrong] in with Onslaught,,,,,, and Force B [Captain (D) I. M. R. Campbell] in with Marne, Martin,,,, and . (Burnett ["Bullshit Bob"] had tried to explain the reason for the scattering of PQ 17 when the destroyers had returned to Scapa Flow but his address fell flat.) Before PQ 18 sailed, the FDE was visited by Churchill to try to restore morale. The summer melt of the polar ice cap reached its most northerly extent in September and the convoys could sail north of Bear Island, considerably lengthening the journey. To conserve fuel, destroyer attacks on U-boats were to be limited to 90 minutes' duration.
The Spitzbergen Fuelling Force (Force P), departing ahead of Convoy PQ 18 on 3 September, was made up of the oilers and with the destroyers,, and, bound for Van Mijenfjorden (Lowe Sound). Vice-Admiral Stuart Bonham Carter commanded a Cruiser Covering Force (CCF) with, and . Operation Gearbox II, a concurrent supply run, was to be made to Svalbard by the cruisers and with the destroyer detached from the CCF. A Distant Covering Force (Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser) with the battleships and, the cruiser and five short-range destroyers, was to sail from Akureyri on the north Icelandic coast. Four submarines took station off the Lofoten Islands and three off north Norway.
Convoy QP 14 departed Archangelsk on 13 September, the day after German attacks on Convoy PQ 18 began. The convoy was accompanied by the Eastern Local Escort comprising the four anti-submarine Halcyon-class minesweepers,, and, which departed after two days leaving the Close Escort of (Captain J. J. W. Crombie, escort commander) with the Halcyon-class minesweepers and, the Hunt-class destroyers and Middleton, the anti-aircraft ships Palomares and Pozarica, the Flower-class corvettes,, and and the anti-submarine trawlers,, and . The voyage proved uneventful until the night of 15/16 September when Troubador and Winston Salem straggled from the convoy.
The ground crew of Avenger had got thirteen Sea Hurricanes operational, one more than on the outbound voyage, because advantage had been taken of Avengers merchant ship origins to store dismantled aircraft in its holds, which replaced the four aircraft lost during PQ 18. The three Swordfish remained airworthy but flying an open-cockpit aircraft in Arctic conditions was exhausting for the crews. On 16 September QP 14 passed PQ 18 and the ocean escort began to transfer, leaving PQ 18 in three groups to avoid drawing attention, completing the transfer by on 17 September at about 75°N 48°W. The weather on 17 September was bitter cold with low, snow-laden clouds and frequent squalls. As the Germans were concentrating on PQ 18, only shadowing aircraft kept contact with QP 14, hiding in low cloud behind the ships and edging closer until anti-aircraft fire was received; as the weather worsened, the shadowing aircraft lost contact.
Shadowing aircraft re-appeared before noon but lost touch in bad weather during the afternoon. During the afternoon a Catalina approached the convoy but gave the wrong recognition signal due to mistakes by the British Naval authorities at Archangelsk and the flying boat base at Graznaya. The Catalina crew reported that two U-boats were on the surface, ahead of the convoy, to the north-east. To keep as far as possible from the Luftwaffe airfields in Norway, Burnett made course for the Sørkapp (South Cape) of Spitzbergen in Svalbard and then head north towards Bellsundet (Bell Sound) to collect the oiler Oligarch from Force P which had fuelled the Cruiser Covering Force around 77°N 5°W on 17 and 18 September. Burnett sent the destroyers Impulsive and Fury ahead to make rendezvous, Force Q having run out of fuel, having been taken by the escorts during Operation EV. During the evening, a Swordfish spotted a U-boat about behind the convoy at 76°N 28°W and attacked with depth-charges, with no obvious result.
During the morning, Offa was sent to check on mastheads seen to the north-east, which had caused apprehension that a German sortie by surface ships was under way. Offa found the superstructure to be Winston Salem, which had been creeping along the edge of the Polar ice and it was escorted back to the convoy. To decoy the shadowing U-boats, Burnett sent several destroyers across the wake of the convoy as it turned north-west, to sail up the west coast of Spitzbergen; after the decoys re-joined the escorts. U-boats,, distant from the convoy between and spotted by Swordfish crews, were forced to dive but a German reconnaissance aircraft was present at to observe the final course change. A distress call was received from a ship to the south-east, which turned out to be Troubador, under attack by a U-boat. At a Swordfish was sent to provide air cover while Onslaught raced to the scene. There were indications of several U-boats in the vicinity and Commander William Selby, the captain of Onslaught, had depth-charges dropped periodically and shone searchlights to deter the U-boats from attacking, while urging Troubador to make its best speed. Night fell and the ships headed for Bellsundet (Bell Sound) to join Force P, the oiler Blue Ranger and its three accompanying destroyers, with which they returned to Britain. QP 14 had met Oligarch, Worcester, Impulsive and Fury, Worcester taking the place of Onslaught in the close escort as the Fighting Destroyer Escort spent the night chasing Asdic contacts.
At Leda, at 76.5°N 5°W in the rear of the convoy, was hit by two torpedoes from U-453. The ship remained afloat for an hour and the captain, Commander Wynne-Edwards, 86 members of the crew and two merchant navy passengers were rescued but six men died of their wounds or of hypothermia; the survivors were accommodated in Seagull, Rathlin and Zamalek. As more U-boats came into the vicinity of the convoy, Swordfish patrols began to spot them on the surface and before noon about five U-boats were stalking the convoy. At a Swordfish crew depth-charged a U-boat to the rear of the convoy at 76.1667°N 52°W as it submerged and two destroyers racing to the scene were then re-directed by the crew towards another U-boat, which evaded them. At Ashanti, at full speed, on another search at 76°N 31°W, spotted a U-boat as it dived, then saw its periscope distant and dropped several salvoes of depth-charges, leading to bubbles of air and oil being seen as Asdic contact was lost, the U-boat being claimed as sunk. Before the submarines P. 614 and P. 615 were due to depart from the convoy, Burnett ordered them to drop back and set an ambush, Opportune covering them. At about the submarines split up and submerged. At the captain of P. 614 saw U-408 on the surface at 76.3333°N 30°W and fired torpedoes from distance. A lookout on the U-boat saw a torpedo and the boat crash-dived; the first torpedo exploded prematurely and this set off the second torpedo.
P. 615 found no U-boats and both boats then began their journeys to Britain, arriving by 25 September. At Silver Sword at the rear of the convoy at 75.8333°N -40°W was torpedoed by U-255 and caught fire. The crew was rescued with considerable difficulty and the hulk was sunk by gunfire from Worcester. During the Polar twilight, the captain of Avenger, Commander Anthony Colthurst, signalled to Burnett that the Swordfish crews were exhausted. Burnett decided that Avenger and Scylla, his flagship, had become liabilities and at Burnett transferred to the destroyer Milne; soon afterwards, Avenger, Scylla with Wheatland, Wilton and Fury departed the convoy. At on the port side of QP 14 at 75.6667°N -2°W, the destroyer Somali was torpedoed by U-703. Eskimo and Intrepid commenced Asdic sweeps as Opportune and Lord Middleton manoeuvred to take off survivors. Lieutenant-commander Colin Maud, captain of Somali urged that his ship be taken under tow and Burnett ordered Ashanti to help.
High-frequency direction finding (huff-duff) detected wireless transmissions from at least three U-boats near the convoy and two 138 flying boats arrived to shadow the ships. With ships assisting Somali astern, Burnett ordered Milne back from the convoy to check on the towing attempt but had to break wireless silence to find their position, which was another away. Burnett turned back and as Milne returned to the convoy, another U-boat was spotted trailing the convoy, which dived and escaped. The convoy had reached a position to which Catalina flying-boats from Shetland could reach and one had escorted briefly the convoy. Later in the morning Z-Zebra, the 330 (Norwegian) Squadron Catalina, returned and attacked U-378, which replied with anti-aircraft fire and damaged the Catalina. The crew continued the attack as their aircraft lost fuel and dropped four depth-charges at the U-boat. The Catalina crew landed and were taken on board by Marne, which sank the flying-boat with gunfire. Soon after, at Bramble and Worcester dropped depth-charges at 73.8333°N -28°W. The attack was thwarted when a U-boat used a German: [[Pillenwerfer]] to release a German: [[Bold (decoy)|Bold]] (an Asdic decoy). The lack of success of the anti-submarine effort was thought to be due to differing sea densities which interfered with Asdic but five U-boats had been damaged.
At Burnett took Milne towards Seidisfiord in Iceland, leaving Alan Scott-Moncrieff, commander of the flotilla leader Faulknor and head of Destroyer Force B, to command the remaining eleven destroyers and nine smaller escort craft. At about 71°N -11°W, U-435 got inside the escort screen and quickly sank Bellingham, Ocean Voice and the Force Q oiler Grey Ranger. The convoy commodore, John Dowding, was shipwrecked again and with his staff was rescued by Seagull, no casualties being suffered in the sunken ships. Dowding remained in Seagull and handed over to the vice-convoy commodore in Ocean Freedom. Scott-Moncrieff drew in the convoy screen, Middleton and Impulsive patrolling the flanks; a U-boat sighting during the afternoon turned out to be the last and Worcester zig-zagged across the rear of the cordon during the night, depth-charges being dropped occasionally as a deterrent.
Regular Catalina patrols began to appear; Rathlin and Zamalek sailed for Seidisfiord to re-victual, Onslow, Offa and Worcester put in to re-fuel and Marne dropped off the crew of Z-Zebra at Akureyri, its base in Iceland. Langanes (Long Peninsula) at the north-east of Iceland came into view at the convoy passing to the south towards Cape Wrath. The weather deteriorated, a gale blowing from the north-east. Catalina U-Uncle from 210 Squadron reached QP 14 at and flying back along its course, soon saw U-253 and attacked at very low altitude. The crew dropped six depth-charges whose detonations forced the U-boat to the surface, it submerged again, re-surfaced then sank bows first. The gale backed to the north, causing the merchant ships to yaw, roll and scend, leading to Winston Salem heaving to, facing the gale. Despite the risk, Scott-Moncrieff sent Martin to keep watch. By 25 September the gale abated and the convoy sailed on in a heavy swell. The rescue ships and three destroyers detached to Seidisfiord returned to the convoy. During the next day, Bramble and Seagull left for Scapa Flow, followed by Middleton, Blankney, Oligarch and Black Ranger. When the convoy reached Cape Wrath, Faulknor led the Home Fleet destroyers to Scapa and Acting-Commander Archibald Russell, in Malcolm, guarded the ships as they anchored at Loch Ewe, Winston Salem arriving later.
Burnett wrote "for eighteen days there was no let-up"; he had doubts about the results of Operation EV, dwelling on the risks run, particularly the Allied dependence on oilers to refuel the destroyers. The consequences of greater German success could have been dire, had the Luftwaffe and German: Kriegsmarine better co-ordinated their attacks or had the destroyers run out of ammunition. If the weather prevented re-fuelling, EV could have become a "tragic failure". In the 1962 edition of "The War at Sea" volume II, the naval official history, the official historian Stephen Roskill wrote that Burnett's decision to detach Avenger and its escorts forfeited routine anti-submarine flights and Somali was torpedoed soon afterwards. Burnett signalled for land-based aircraft and on 21 September Catalina and Liberator aircraft from Iceland and Shetland gave about four hours' protection but Convoy SC 100 in the Atlantic was also under attack and this limited the cover available for QP 14. On 22 September, the weather grounded the shore-based aircraft and three ships were sunk in quick succession. The lack of aircraft and the exhaustion of the warship crews probably contributed to U-435 getting inside the escort screen.
In 2004, Richard Woodman wrote that the gamble was worth it. EV showed the crews of the smaller close escort vessels that the destroyers had proved their worth. When there were no air-raids [during PQ 18] the destroyers performed
| Name | Year | Flag | GRT | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alcoa Banner | 1919 |  | 5,035 | |
| Bellingham | 1920 | | 5,345 | Sunk by 22 September west of Jan Mayen Island, no casualties, survivors rescued by Rathlin |
| Benjamin Harrison | 1942 | | 2,191 | |
| Deer Lodge | 1919 | | 6,187 | |
| Empire Tide | 1941 | 6,978 | CAM ship, 23 Passengers | |
| Harmatris | 1932 | 5,395 | ||
| Minotaur | 1918 | | 4,554 | |
| Ocean Freedom | 1942 | 7,173 | 8 Passengers, Captain also vice-convoy commodore | |
| Ocean Voice | 1941 | 7,174 | Captain John Dowding (convoy commodore), 5 naval staff officers, 25 Soviet passengers. Sunk by on 22 September, no casualties. | |
| Rathlin | 1936 | 1,600 |
| |
| Samuel Chase | 1942 | | 7,191 | |
| Silver Sword | 1919 | | 4,937 | Torpedoed by south-west of Spitzbergen, 20 September, sunk by Worcester. |
| Tobruk | 1942 |  | 7,048 | |
| Troubador | 1920 |  | 6,428 | Straggled 15/16 September, joined Force P, 19 September |
| West Nilus | 1920 | | 5,495 | |
| Winston-Salem | 1920 | | 6,223 | Straggled 15/16 September, rejoined convoy 19 September |
| Zamalek | 1921 | 1,567 |
| |
| Name | Year | Flag | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1941 | 3,417 | Oiler, sailed in Convoy PQ 18, returned with QP 14 | ||
| 1941 | 3,313 | Oiler, sailed in Convoy PQ 18, returned with QP 14; sunk by 22 September west of Jan Mayen.; six killed, survivors picked up by Rathlin | ||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASW Minesweeper | 13–15 September | |||
| ASW Minesweeper | 13–15 September | |||
| HMS Hazard | ASW Minesweeper | 13–15 September | ||
| ASW Minesweeper | 13–15 September | |||
| HMT Lord Middleton | ASW trawler | 13–15 September | ||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HMS Alynbank | Anti-aircraft cruiser | Left convoy PQ 18 16 September, joined Convoy QP 14, 17 September | ||
| Anti-aircraft cruiser | 13–26 September | |||
| Anti-aircraft cruiser | 23–26 September | |||
| Destroyer | 13–25 September | |||
| Destroyer | 13–25 September | |||
| HMS Dianella | Corvette | 13–26 September | ||
| Corvette | 13–26 September | |||
| Corvette | 13–26 September | |||
| Corvette | 13–26 September | |||
| ASW minesweeper | 13–25 September | |||
| HMS Leda | ASW Minesweeper | 13–20 September, sunk, 20 September south-west of Spitzbergen | ||
| ASW Minesweeper | 13–25 September | |||
| HMS Ayrshire | ASW trawler | 13–25 September | ||
| HMS Lord Austin | ASW trawler | 13–25 September | ||
| HMT Northern Gem | ASW trawler | 13–25 September | ||
| HMS P. 614 | Submarine | 17–21 September, left Convoy PQ 18, 16 September, joined Convoy QP 14 on 17 September | ||
| HMS P. 615 | Submarine | 17–21 September, left Convoy PQ 18, 16 September, joined Convoy QP 14 on 17 September | ||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Battleship | 19–22 September, Distant Cover Force, flagship (Vice-Admiral Bruce Fraser) | ||
| Battleship | 19–22 September, Distant Cover Force | ||
| Cruiser | 19–22 September, Distant Cover Force | ||
| Destroyer | 23 September, Distant Cover Force | ||
| Destroyer | Replaced Bramham on the second sailing | ||
| Destroyer | 19–22 September, Distant Cover Force | ||
| HMS Mackay | Destroyer | 19–22 September, Distant Cover Force | |
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Escort carrier | Sailed with Convoy PQ 18, transferred to QP 14, 17–20 September | |||
| Destroyer | 17–20 September | |||
| Destroyer | 17–20 September | |||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cruiser | Detached from cruiser force 16–18 September, Spitzbergen supply mission | |||
| Cruiser | 14–22 September, Cruiser Covering Force | |||
| Cruiser | Flagship (Vice-Admiral S. S. Bonham Carter) 14–22 September | |||
| Cruiser | Detached from cruiser force 17–19 September, Spitzbergen supply mission | |||
| Cruiser | 14–22 September Cruiser Covering Force | |||
| Cruiser | 17–20 September Ocean Escort, Flagship (Rear-Admiral Robert Burnett) | |||
| Destroyer | 15–22 September | |||
| Destroyer | ||||
| Destroyer | 14–22 September | |||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Destroyer | 17–21 September Ocean Escort | |||
| Destroyer | 17–21 September Ocean Escort | |||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort | |||
| HMS Onslaught | Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort, detached 19 September for Troubador, joined Force P | ||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort | |||
| Destroyer | 17–21 September Ocean Escort | |||
| Destroyer | 17–20 September Ocean Escort, torpedoed by, 20 September. | |||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort | |||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort | ||
| Destroyer | 17–20 September, Ocean Escort, detached 18 September to rendezvous with tanker Oligarch, rejoined 19 September | ||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Western Local Escort, detached 18 September to join Oligarch, rejoined 19 September | ||
| Destroyer | 17–21 September Ocean Escort | ||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort; 19 September, rescued crew of Catalina Z-Zebra, 330 Squadron, forced down attacking | ||
| Destroyer | 17–25 September Ocean Escort | ||
| Destroyer | 17–22 September Ocean Escort | ||
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RFA Blue Ranger | Oiler | 14–20 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | ||
| RFA Oligarch | Oiler | 14–18 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | ||
| HMS Cowdray | Destroyer | 14–20 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | ||
| HMS Oakley | Destroyer | 14 –20 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | ||
| Destroyer | 14–20 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | |||
| Destroyer | 19–25 September, Spitzbergen re-fuelling mission | |||
See main article: Operation Gearbox II.
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cruiser | Detached from cruiser force, 16–18 September | |||
| Cruiser | Detached from cruiser force, 17–19 September | |||
| Destroyer | Detached from cruiser force, 16–19 September | |||
| Force | Name | Flag | Type | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Covering force | P. 45 | U-class | |||
| Covering force | P. 221 | S-class | |||
| Covering force | U-class | ||||
| Patrol force | T-class | ||||
| Patrol force | T-class | ||||
| Patrol force | P. 54 | U-class | |||
| Patrol force | P-class | ||||
| Minelayer | Rubis | Saphir-class | |||
| Name | Type | Contact | Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VIIc | — | |||
| VIIc | — | Sunk by 210 Squadron Catalina, 23 September | ||
| VIIc | 20 September | Sank Silver Sword, 20/21 September, damaged by 210 Squadron Catalina U-Uncle, 23 September | ||
| VIIc | — | |||
| VIIc | 20–22 September | Sank HMS Leda 20 September, sank Bellingham, Ocean Voice, Gray Ranger 22 September | ||
| VIIc | — | |||
| VIIc | 20 September | Torpedoed and severely damaged HMS Somali, 20/21 September, which foundered 24 September | ||
The War at Sea 1939–1945
. The Period of Balance . II . . London . 1962 . 1956 . 3rd impr. . 22 March 2018 . 174453986.Websites