Staggered elections explained

Staggered elections are elections where only some of the places in an elected body are up for election at the same time. For example, United States senators have a six-year term, but they are not all elected at the same time. Rather, elections are held every two years for one-third of Senate seats.

Staggered elections have the effect of limiting control of a representative body by the body being represented, but can also minimize the impact of cumulative voting.[1] Many companies use staggered elections as a tool to prevent takeover attempts. Some legislative bodies (most commonly upper houses) use staggered elections, as do some public bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Application in business

A staggered board of directors or classified board is a prominent practice in US corporate law governing the board of directors of a company, corporation, or other organization, in which only a fraction (often one third) of the members of the board of directors is elected each time instead of en masse (where all directors have one-year terms). Each group of directors falls within a specified "class"—e.g., Class I, Class II, etc.—hence the use of the term "classified" board.[2] The work of the Shareholder Rights Project has had a significant effect on the number of classified boards on the S&P 500.[3]

In publicly held companies, staggered boards have the effect of making hostile takeover attempts more difficult; however, they are also associated with lower firm value.[4] When a board is staggered, hostile bidders must win more than one proxy fight at successive shareholder meetings in order to exercise control of the target firm. Particularly in combination with a poison pill, a staggered board that cannot be dismantled or evaded is one of the most potent takeover defenses available to U.S. companies.[5]

In corporate cumulative voting systems, staggering has two basic effects: it makes it more difficult for a minority group to get directors elected, as the fewer directorships up for election requires a larger percent of the equity to win; and it makes takeover attempts less likely to succeed as it is harder to vote in a majority of new directors.[6] Staggering may also however serve a more beneficial purpose, that is provide "institutional memory" — continuity in the board of directors — which may be significant for corporations with long-range projects and plans.[6]

Institutional shareholders are increasingly calling for an end to staggered boards of directors—also called "declassifying" the boards. The Wall Street Journal reported in January 2007 that 2006 marked a key switch in the trend toward declassification or annual votes on all directors: more than half (55%) of the S&P 500 companies have declassified boards, compared with 47% in 2005.[7]

Use in legislative bodies

National

Chamber! rowspan="2"
TypeClasses% of seats up per electionMethod of Staggering
Total123
Argentine Chamber of DeputiesLower house2Every constituency has seats in both classes, with roughly half of the seats contested in each class individually
Argentine SenateUpper house3Each constituency has all its seats in one class only
Australian SenateUpper house2Most constituencies have seats in both classes, with half of the seats contested in each class individually
Some constituencies have all of their seats contested in each and every class
Brazilian SenateUpper house2Every constituency has seats in both classes, with two-thirds of the seats contested in class 1 and the remaining one-third in class 2
Senate of ChileUpper house2Each constituency has all its seats in one class only
Senate of the Czech RepublicUpper house3Each constituency has all its seats in one class only
Senate (France)Upper house2Each constituency has all its seats in one class only
Rajya Sabha (India)Upper house3
House of Councillors (Japan)Upper house2Every constituency has seats in both classes, with half of the seats contested in each class individually
Senate of LiberiaUpper house2Every constituency has seats in both classes, with half of the seats contested in each class individually
National Assembly (Nepal)Upper house3Every constituency has seats in all three classes, with roughly a third of the seats contested in each class individually
Senate of PakistanUpper house2Every constituency has seats in both classes, with half of the seats contested in each class individually
Senate of the PhilippinesUpper house2The Senate is elected nationwide at-large, with half of the seats contested in each class individually
United States SenateUpper house3Every constituency has seats in two out of the three classes, with half of the seats contested in each of those classes individually

State

Argentina

12 of the 24 provincial legislatures have staggered elections:

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Unicameral legislature

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Unicameral legislature

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Unicameral legislature

Unicameral legislature

Unicameral legislature

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Unicameral legislature

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Chamber of Deputies and Senate

Australia

In the federal Senate, half of the Senate's 76 members are eligible for re-election every 3 years. All members elected from states have a six-year term staggered over two election cycles; senators elected from the ACT and the NT have 3 year terms only. These half-Senate elections are usually held in conjunction with an election of all members for the Federal House of Representatives. There are rare instances in which a Federal election is held for the all members of the House of Representatives and all the members of the Senate at once, this is called a double dissolution election.

Three of Australia's five State Legislative Councils use staggered elections:

Local councils in Western Australia also have staggered elections.[8]

India

All six Legislative councils of states have staggered elections:

United States

27 of the State Senates in the United States have staggered elections:[9]

Local

Historical usage

National

Local

See also

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Archived copy . 2016-08-24 . 2011-07-17 . https://web.archive.org/web/20110717124912/http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub341.pdf . dead .
  2. See Faleye,O., 2007, Classified Boards, Firm value, and Managerial Entrenchment, Journal of Financial Economics83, 501-529.
  3. Bebchuk. Lucian A.. Hirst. Scott. Rhee. June. 2014-02-01. Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards. en. Rochester, NY. 2400652 .
  4. Hirst. Scott. Bebchuk. Lucian. 2010-01-01. Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate. The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series. No. 653.
  5. See Lucian Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002).
  6. Book: Hillier. David. Ross. Stephen. Westerfield. Randolph. Jaffe. Jeffrey. Jordan. Bradford. Corporate Finance. 2013. McGraw-Hill Education. Berkshire. 9780077139148. 34–35. 2nd European.
  7. Jared A. Favole, "Big Firms Increasingly Declassify Boards", The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 2007.
  8. https://www.elections.wa.gov.au/elections/local "Local Government Elections"
  9. https://ballotpedia.org/Length_of_terms_of_state_senators "Length of terms of state senators"
  10. Electoral Commission https://democracy.peterborough.gov.uk/documents/s47107/13a.%20Appendix%20A%20Electoral%20Commission%20The%20cycle%20of%20local%20government%20elections%20in%20England.pdf
  11. http://www.consellgeneral.ad/fitxers/documents/dia-de-la-democracia-2016/labstencio-al-principat-dandorra Consell General - L'abstenció al Principat d'Andorra
  12. Web site: Direction des élections - Evolution de la législation électorale. elections.fgov.be.
  13. http://www.dst.dk/Site/Dst/Udgivelser/GetPubFile.aspx?id=20213&sid=rigsvalg Danmarks Statistik - Rigsdagsvalgene og folkeafstemningerne i april og maj 1953, p. 182
  14. Web site: Negentiende-eeuws districtenstelsel in Nederland . Parlement.com . nl . 18 February 2019.
  15. Web site: Geschiedenis kiesstelsel Eerste Kamer . Parlement.com . nl . 18 February 2019.
  16. Akio Kamiko (2010, bilingual): 近代地方行政の黎明期(1868-1880年), pp. 7–8: 府県会規則 /The Start of Modern Local Government (1868 – 1880), pp. 10–11: Prefectural Assembly Law (Fukenkai Kisoku)