Business-firm party explained

A business-firm party, entrepreneurial party, or personal party[1] is a type of political party that is centered on a charismatic political entrepreneur, most often created by that person to further their own interests.

Definition

It can be considered "the most extreme case of party personalization, consisting in the full control by an individual leader of the party he has himself created", in the words of political scientist Mauro Calise. A business-firm party is modeled off the top-down organizational structure of a corporation as opposed to operating on the basis of internal party democracy. The party structure is related to the older type of elite party, but is even more strongly oligarchic in form, as the political entrepreneur maintains complete control of the party's assets.[2] The entrepreneur controls all aspects of the party's platform and campaigning, plays the ultimate role in selecting candidates to run in elections, managing the party's resources, and wielding party discipline over other politicians in the party.

One characteristic distinguishing them from other parties is that the party organization is either dormant or limited outside of campaign seasons, and members are actively discouraged from becoming more involved in the party, therefore leading entrepreneurial parties to lack grassroots capacity. Entrepreneurial parties may have only one member, the party leader (as in the case of Party for Freedom or the Ticino League), or very few aside from politicians. The Party for Freedom initially did not recruit members out of fear of infiltration by the far-right; later, deputy leader Martin Bosma said that a party membership structure interfered with direct accountability between party leadership and voters. In a completely memberless business-firm party, volunteers, donors, and officeholders invest time, money, and their reputation (if the party is controversial) without any formal say in the party's operations.

Causes and effects

More monocratic systems of government, such as presidential systems, tend to encourage the formation of personal parties while the personalization of politics fuels the centralization of power. Entrepreneurial parties tend to be short-lived and rarely outlast their founders, except where the entrepreneur is successful in using his charisma to build a mass-membership party, as in the case of the Finns Party.[3] [4] Due to the lack of grassroots mobilization, leader-oriented parties may be less successful in local and regional politics, which are more distant from the charismatic leader, as occurred with ANO 2011 and Forza Italia.

Entrepreneurial parties are commonly far-right, nationalist, and/or populist.[2] However, another tendency is not to have a firm ideology and instead closely follow opinion polls while being vague or self-contradictory on the party's standpoint. Tatiana Kostadinova and Barry Levitt argue that in a personalist party, "interactions between the leader and other politicians are driven mainly by loyalty to that leader rather than, for example, organizational rules, ideological affinities, or programmatic commitments".[5] Business-firm parties are likely to emerge in new democracies[6] and in situations of high electoral volatility.[2] They may also result from declines in political participation and membership in traditional parties. In central Europe, entrepreneurial parties have formed as a type of state capture where state powers are used for private benefit.[7] Entrepreneurial parties are especially common in Latin America.[2] In Slovakia, the personal Freedom and Solidarity party has a market-liberal ideology.[1]

Constitutionality

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany requires that political parties "conform to democratic principles" in their internal organization.[8] [9] When the Socialist Reich Party was banned in 1952, the Federal Constitutional Court's judgement stated: "If a party's internal organization does not correspond to democratic principles, one may generally conclude that the party seeks to impose upon the state the structural principles that it has implemented within its own organization."[9] The constitutions of Portugal, Spain, Argentina, and Turkey include similar provisions.[9] Israeli jurist argues that non-democratically organized parties are undesirable because "There is a greater likelihood of the pursuit of nondemocratic goals in parties that have a nondemocratic structure."[9]

Examples

Asia

Indonesia

Israel

Thailand

Turkey

Africa

Lesotho

Europe

Austria

Belgium

Czech Republic

Finland

France

Hungary

Italy

Lithuania

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Romania

Serbia

Slovakia

Spain

Switzerland

Oceania

Australia

South America

Peru

See also

Further reading

Notes and References

  1. Michal . Smrek . Can Personal Parties Facilitate Women’s Political Seniority? A Study of Internal Rules of Conduct . . 29 . 1 . 240–259 . 10.1093/sp/jxaa031 .
  2. Book: Saalfeld . Thomas . Strøm . Kaare . Martin . Shane . Saalfeld . Thomas . Strøm . Kaare . The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies . 2014 . Oxford University Press . 978-0-19-965301-0 . en . Political Parties and Legislators. 380.
  3. Arter . David . 147209589 . When new party X has the 'X factor': On resilient entrepreneurial parties . Party Politics . 2016 . 22 . 1 . 15–26 . 10.1177/1354068813509523.
  4. Bolleyer . Nicole . Bytzek . Evelyn . Origins of party formation and new party success in advanced democracies: Origins of party formation and new party success . European Journal of Political Research . 2013 . 52 . 6 . 773–796 . 10.1111/1475-6765.12013. 10871/14874 . free .
  5. Kostadinova . Tatiana . Levitt . Barry . Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties: Concept Formation and Theory Building: Concept Formation and Theory Building . Politics & Policy . 2014 . 42 . 4 . 490–512 . 10.1111/polp.12081.
  6. Book: Svåsand . Lars . Party Governance and Party Democracy . 2013 . Springer . 978-1-4614-6588-1 . 253–274 . en . Party Development in the Old World: And in the New.
  7. Innes . Abby . The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe . JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies . 2014 . 52 . 1 . 88–104 . 10.1111/jcms.12079. free.
  8. Wise, Judith (1998) "Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the Banning of the Free German WorkersParty,"The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 11.Available at:http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol5/iss1/11
  9. Mersel . Yigal . The dissolution of political parties: The problem of internal democracy . International Journal of Constitutional Law . 2006 . 4 . 1 . 84–113 . 10.1093/icon/moi053. free.
  10. Book: Rohman . Ahmad Zaki Fadlur . Afala . Laode Machdani . Proceedings of the Unhas International Conference on Social and Political Science (UICoSP 2017) . Perindo: The emergence of the Business Party in Indonesia . 2017 . 10.2991/uicosp-17.2017.2. 978-94-6252-396-8 . free .
  11. McDonnell . Duncan . Cabrera . Luis . 149464986 . The right-wing populism of India's Bharatiya Janata Party (and why comparativists should care) . Democratization . 2019 . 26 . 3 . 484–501 . 10.1080/13510347.2018.1551885.
  12. Tezcür . Güneş Murat . 153849306 . Trends and Characteristics of the Turkish Party System in Light of the 2011 Elections . Turkish Studies . 2012 . 13 . 2 . 117–134 . 10.1080/14683849.2012.685251.
  13. Web site: RFP's violation of democratic norms - the Post . 5 July 2022 .
  14. Cabada . Ladislav . Tomšič . Matevž . 158044729 . The Rise of Person-Based Politics in the New Democracies: The Czech Republic and Slovenia . Politics in Central Europe . 2016 . 12 . 2 . 29–50 . 10.1515/pce-2016-0011. free .
  15. Hloušek . Vít . Kopeček . Lubomír . Different Ways of Institutionalising Entrepreneurial Parties: Czech Public Affairs Party and ANO . Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science . 2017 . 24 . 2 . 92–115 . 10.5817/PC2017-2-92 .
  16. Just . Petr . Charvát . Jakub . Business‑Firm Parties and the Czech Party System after 2010 . Politics in Central Europe . 2016 . 12 . 3 . 83–110 . 10.1515/pce-2016-0018. free.
  17. Kopeček . Lubomír . 148118413 . "I'm Paying, So I Decide": Czech ANO as an Extreme Form of a Business-Firm Party . East European Politics and Societies . 2016 . 30 . 4 . 725–749 . 10.1177/0888325416650254.
  18. Hloušek . Vít . Kopeček . Lubomír . How to run an efficient political machine: the billionaire Andrej Babiš and his political-business project . Politics in Central Europe . 2019 . 15 . 1 . 35–54 . 10.2478/pce-2019-0002. free.
  19. Kubát . Michal . Hartliński . Maciej . 210074150 . Party Leaders in the Czech Populist Parties and Movements . Polish Political Science Review . 2019 . 7 . 1 . 107–119 . 10.2478/ppsr-2019-0007. free .
  20. Arter . David . Kestilä-Kekkonen . Elina . 144217768 . Measuring the Extent of Party Institutionalisation: The Case of a Populist Entrepreneur Party . West European Politics . 2014 . 37 . 5 . 932–956 . 10.1080/01402382.2014.911486.
  21. Book: Musella . Fortunato . Political Leaders Beyond Party Politics . 2018 . Springer International Publishing . 10.1007/978-3-319-59348-7 . 978-3-319-59348-7 .
  22. Hopkin . Jonathan . Paolucci . Caterina . The business firm model of party organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy . European Journal of Political Research . 1999 . 35 . 3 . 307–339 . 10.1023/A:1006903925012. free.
  23. Raniolo . Francesco . 153444704 . Forza Italia: A Leader with a Party . South European Society and Politics . 2006 . 11 . 3–4 . 439–455 . 10.1080/13608740600856470.
  24. Book: Bonnet . Nicolas . Leadership and Uncertainty Management in Politics: Leaders, Followers and Constraints in Western Democracies . Palgrave Macmillan UK . 978-1-137-43924-6 . 93–110 . en . Silvio’s Party. 11 August 2015 .
  25. McDonnell . Duncan . 143141811 . Silvio Berlusconi's Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Libertà . Political Studies . 2013 . 61 . 1_suppl . 217–233 . 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.01007.x.
  26. Vercesi . Michelangelo . Owner parties and party institutionalisation in Italy: is the Northern League exceptional? . Modern Italy . 2015 . 20 . 4 . 395–410 . 10.1017/S1353294400014848. 232399657 .
  27. Book: Hloušek . Vít . The Rise of Entrepreneurial Parties in European Politics . Springer International Publishing AG . 978-3-030-41915-8 . 179. en . 7: Collapse or Survival: The Organisational Resilience of Entrepreneurial Parties. 2020 .
  28. Book: Jupskås . Anders Ravik . Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe . Palgrave Macmillan UK . 978-1-137-58197-6 . 159–187. en . 6: The Norwegian Progress Party: Between a Business Firm and a Mass Party. October 2016 .
  29. Kosowska-Gąstoł . Beata . Sobolewska-Myślik . Katarzyna . New Political Entrepreneurs in Poland . Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science . 2017 . 24 . 2 . 137–157 . 10.5817/PC2017-2-137 .
  30. Gherghina . Sergiu . Soare . Sorina Cristina . From TV to Parliament: The Successful Birth and Progressive Death of a Personal Party . Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science . 2017 . XXIV . 2 . 201–220 . 10.5817/PC2017-2-201 . en . 1211-3247.
  31. Book: Orlović, Slaviša . Partije i izbori u Srbiji: 20 godina . Friedrich Ebert Foundation . 2011 . 9788684031497 . Belgrade . 171 . sr.
  32. Brunnerová. Olga. 2019. Not all political entrepreneurs are created equal: The institutionalisation of entrepreneurial parties in Central Europe. Central European Journal of Politics. 5 . 1. 100–124.
  33. Mazzoleni . Oscar . Voerman . Gerrit . 148179700 . Memberless parties: Beyond the business-firm party model? . Party Politics . 2017 . 23 . 6 . 783–792 . 10.1177/1354068815627398.
  34. News: Berlusconi, Katter and Assange: a very personal party. The Conversation. 16 April 2013. 30 August 2020.
  35. Kefford . Glenn . McDonnell . Duncan . 148747749 . Inside the personal party: Leader-owners, light organizations and limited lifespans . The British Journal of Politics and International Relations . 2018 . 20 . 2 . 379–394 . 10.1177/1369148117750819.
  36. Book: Kelly . Norm . Party Rules? . ANU Press . 978-1-76046-076-1 . 73–100 . Party registration and political participation:: Regulating small and ‘micro’ parties. 2016 . j.ctt1rrd7k8.10 .
  37. Web site: Why does David have a party if he’s an independent? . David Pocock.

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