Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps explained

Unit Name:Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Dates:1954  - present
Allegiance: Chinese Communist Party
Type:State-owned enterprise
Paramilitary organisation
Size:2.6 million
Garrison:Ürümqi & Xinjiang
Garrison Label:Headquarters and area served
Nickname:XJBT
Bingtuan ("The Corps")
Equipment:14
Equipment Label:Divisions
Commander1:Ma Xingrui
Commander1 Label:First Political Commissar
Commander2:Li Yifei
Commander2 Label:Political Commissar and Party Secretary
Commander3:Xue Bin
Commander3 Label:Commander
Notable Commanders:Tao Zhiyue[1]
T:新疆生產建設兵團
S:新疆生产建设兵团
Order:st
P:Chinese: 新疆生产建设兵团; pinyin: Xīnjiāng Shēngchǎn Jiànshè Bīngtuán
S2:新疆兵团
T2:新疆兵團
P2:Xīnjiāng Bīngtuán
S3:兵团
T3:兵團
P3:Bīngtuán
L3:The Corps
S4:中国新建集团
T4:中國新建集團
P4:Zhōngguó Xīnjiàn Jítuán
Altname4:China Xinjian Group
Uig:شىنجاڭ ئىشلەپچىقىرىش قۇرۇلۇش بىڭتۇەنى‎
Uly:Shinjang Ishlepchiqirish Qurulush Bingtueni

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XJBT; 新疆生产建设兵团; 新疆兵团), also known as Bingtuan ("The Corps"), trading with the external name China Xinjiang Group,[2] is a state-owned enterprise and paramilitary organization in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The XJBT was established in 1954 under the orders of Mao Zedong, and developed sparsely populated areas in its early decades, taking the model of the traditional tuntian system of setting military units in frontier areas. The XJBT was severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, and was outright abolished in 1975, before being re-established in 1981, partly due to the Soviet-Afghan War. It re-established its economic dominance over Xinjiang afterwards, also being responsible for maintenance against the "three evils" (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism). In its history, the XJBT has built farms, towns, and cities, provided land and employment to disbanded military units, and re-settled Han migrants from other parts of China in what has been called a campaign of assimilation.

The XJBT operates cities, where it provides prisons, healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education, and has stakes in numerous publicly traded companies. It is extensively involved in economic, political and military affairs of Xinjiang, being called a "state in a state".[3] [4] It is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xinjiang Committee secretary, currently Ma Xingrui, though the CCP secretary of the XJBT handles the daily affairs of the organization.

History

See also: Migration to Xinjiang.

The XJBT draws from the traditional Chinese tuntian system, a policy of settling military units in frontier areas so that they become self-sufficient in food, and similar policies in the Tang and Qing dynasties. Construction corps were set up for sparsely populated frontier regions, including Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

After the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces deployed into Xinjiang were commanded to start production in the area. In 1953, PLA there were separated into National Defense and Production Divisions. XJBT was formed from soldiers from First Field Army, Kuomintang, and from the local Ili National Army.[5]

In October 1954 the Production Division was ordered by the Mao Zedong to form People's Liberation Army Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, tasked to "Integrate labor with violent, colonize and populate the frontier" in 1954.[6] [7] [8] XJBT was founded by Wang Zhen. It initially comprised 175,000 military personnel, led by Tao Zhiyue as its first commander.

XJBT was initially focused on settling, cultivating, and developing sparsely populated areas, such as the fringes of the Taklamakan Desert and the Gurbantünggüt Desert, under the principle of "not competing for benefits with the local people".[9] It provided a reserve military force, although they were not called upon. XJBT was expanded by youth from other parts of China, to equalize its sex ratio and include members with better education. In 1962, after the Sino-Soviet split, rioting occurred in Yining and 60,000 ethnic minorities living near the border fled to the Soviet Union. The Chinese government feared that the USSR was trying to destabilize China and start a war. XJBT was ordered to cultivate the farms of the exiles. By 1966 XJBT had a population of 1.48 million.

The XJBT was severely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 it was abolished completely. Its powers were transferred to the government of Xinjiang and regional authorities. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic movements gained force, fears of Soviet encirclement and Islamic fundamentalism led to the re-establishment of the XJBT in 1981 as well as the cultivation of frontier lands and economic development. During the 1990s, XJBT began to contribute significantly to Xinjiang's economy, producing 40% of the region's cotton in 1997.[10] After 2008, as a result of improvements in farm mechanization, students were no longer compelled to pick the cotton crop.[11]

Starting in the 1980s, a stated task has been to prevent and break down "destructive activities of the three forces", (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism), in order to protect social stability and national unity. In 2012, XJBT generated 11.1 billion yuan from the 37 settlements they control, "allowing the Corps to spread advanced culture and Chinese culture, while taking in and infusing culture of ethnic minority in Xinjiang".

At the end of the 20th century, XJBT's military role was given instead to the Xinjiang Military District, a part of the current Western Theater Command that includes all of western China. XJBT military personnel are mostly reservists or militia.

Sanctions

United States

See also: Persecution of Uyghurs in China, Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and United States sanctions against China.

XJBT was sanctioned by the United States in 2020, citing alleged human rights abuses. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Commissioner Nury Turkel remarked "Now, no business can claim ignorance of China's oppression of the Uyghur people. We hope the sanctions signal to other Chinese officials that there are costs associated with taking part in the Communist Party's repression of religion. The world is watching and we know which officials and entities are responsible for the abuses against the Uyghur people."[12] She added:

In July 2020, the United States announced Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on XJBT in connection with human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.[13] [14] [15] XJBT was alleged to run many internment camps,[16] as well as implementing the CCP's efforts to settle ethnic Han in the region.[17]

In December 2020, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced that XJBT-produced cotton and cotton products would be prohibited from import into the U.S. due to forced labor concerns.[18] In June 2021, the United States Department of Commerce placed XJBT on the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List.[19]

Canada

Following the U.S. footsteps, Global Affairs Canada imposed sanctions against the XJBT in January 2021 due to human rights abuses.[20]

European Union

In March 2021, the Council of the European Union listed the XJBT public security bureau as an entity subject to restrictive measures.[21] The reason given for this listing was that this entity is "responsible for serious human rights violations, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities".[22]

Organization and function

The XJBT is a ministerial-level institution under the State Council and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region regional government.[23] It has administrative authority over medium-sized cities, settlements and farms in Xinjiang. It provides services such as healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education. Nominally subject to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, its internal affairs, including city and reclaimed land administration, are separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government. The XJBT has been described to operate as a "state within a state"[24] [25] [26] and has been considered by scholars as acting as a de facto prefecture-level governmental entity.

The XJBT's internal affairs, including the administration of its cities and reclaimed land, is separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government.[27] It has sub-provincial powers on par with sub-provincial cities. The XJBT is headed by the Communist Party secretary of Xinjiang, who is "executive political commissar" ex officio. The XJBT's own party secretary, usually a ministerial-level official, typically concurrently serves as its political commissar and acts as its highest day-to-day authority, and is considered to be the second most-powerful person in Xinjiang after the CCP secretary.[28] Additionally XJBT has a commander, usually a deputy-ministerial level official.

Headquartered in Ürümqi, XJBT is subdivided into divisions, then regiments. Each XJBT division corresponds to a prefecture-level administrative division, and are in themselves of sub-prefectural rank. In addition to regiments, the XJBT also administers regiment-level farms and ranches. XJBT and each individual division are headed by three leaders: a first political commissar, a political commissar, and a commander. The first political commissars of each XJBT division are their committee secretaries.

Administrative structure

The XJBT's 14 divisions which are then subdivided into 185 regiment-level entities (including regiments, farms, and ranches), scattered throughout Xinjiang, mostly in previously unpopulated or sparsely populated areas.

The divisions are:

Name Founded Location (approximate) Headquarters
1953 Aral
2nd Division1953 Tiemenguan
3rd Division1966 Tumxuk
4th Division1953 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture
(southern, directly administered portion)
Kokdala
5th Division1953 Shuanghe
6th Division1953 Wujiaqu
1953 Huyanghe
1953 Shihezi
9th Division1962 Emin County
10th Division1959 Beitun
11th Division
the former Construction Division
1953 ÜrümqiXinshi, Ürümqi
12th Division1982 Ürümqi
13th Division1982 HamiHami
14th Division1982 Kunyu

In May 1953, the PLA's 25th, 26th and 27th Divisions from the 9th Corps were reorganized as 7th, 8th and 9th Agriculture Construction Division of the XJBT, respectively.

Settlements

The XJBT has settled Han in Xinjiang[29] and has built eleven medium-sized cities during its history, and now controls ten of them.[30] The governments of these cities are combined entirely with the division that controls them. For example, the division headquarters is the same entity as the city government, the division political commissar the same person as the city committee secretary, the division commander the same person as the city's mayor, and so forth. Ten XJBT-administered cities are nominally listed as "sub-prefectural-level cities" of Xinjiang, but the local government is usually not involved in the administration of these cities.

Name Dates of official
designation as a "city"
Governing period Division
奎屯市 August 29, 1975 1953–1975 7th
天北新区 - 2002–2019
石河子市 January 2, 1976 1953–1975, 1980–present 8th
阿拉尔市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 1st
五家渠市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 6th
图木舒克市 January 19, 2004 1966–1975, 1980–present 3rd
北屯市 November 28, 2011 2002–present 10th
铁门关市 December 30, 2012 2002–present 2nd
双河市 February 26, 2014 2002–present 5th
可克达拉市 March 18, 2015 2003–present 4th
昆玉市 January 20, 2016 2003–present 14th
胡杨河市 December 6, 2019 2010–present 7th
新星市 February 4, 2021 2010–present 13th
白杨市 January 20, 2023 2010–present 9th
Beiting 北亭市 TBD 2010–present 12th

Demographics

XJBT is predominantly composed of Chinese citizens of Han ethnicity. While the Han are by far the largest group of XJBT workers, their relative numbers have declined: from 1980 to 1993 the overall population remained constant, while Han membership declined slightly from 90% to 88%.[31]

align=center colspan=3 Ethnic groups in XJBT, 2002 estimate[32]
Population Percentage
2,204,500 88.1
165,000 6.6
64,700 2.6
Kazakh42,700 1.7
Mongol6,200 0.3
Others 18,100 0.7

Economic activity

XJBT created many publicly traded subsidiary companies.[33] XJBT uses the name "China Xinjian Group" for its economic activities. XJBT plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy, with the organization producing , or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was .[34] The area and population of the XJBT are generally given as part of Xinjiang's total figures, but XJBT's GDP is generally reported separately.[35]

XJBT's primary economic activity remains agriculture, including cotton, fruit, vegetables, food crops, vegetable oils, and sugar beets. Important products are cotton, tomatoes, ketchup, Korla pears, Turpan grapes, and wine. In 2018 the XJBT produced 30% of China's cotton output. XJBT has a mix of factory farming and smaller farms. XJBT dominates Xinjiang's agriculture and controls nearly a quarter of Xinjiang's arable land.[36] During its history, XJBT established significant mining and mining-related industries, most of which subsequently were handed over to the Xinjiang government. XJBT is also involved in tertiary industries, including trade, distribution, real estate, tourism, construction and insurance.

Subsidiaries

The XJBT has thousands of subsidiary companies. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies has identified 2,923 subsidiaries.[37] Currently the XJBT has eleven publicly traded subsidiaries. They are:

Education and media

XJBT operates its own educational system covering primary, secondary and tertiary education (including two universities, Shihezi University (石河子大学) and Tarim University (塔里木大学)); its own daily newspaper, Bingtuan Daily; and its own TV stations at both provincial and division levels.

References

Sources

External links

Notes and References

  1. "Tao Zhiyue 1892 - 1988)" in James Z. Gao: Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949), p. 358, 2009, Scarecrow Press
  2. Web site: Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps . . 31 October 2010 . 3 March 2016 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172801/http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm . live .
  3. News: Allen-Ebrahimian . Bethany . 2022-07-26 . Xinjiang paramilitary group plays "critical role" in Uyghur repression, report finds . 2022-07-27 . . en.
  4. Web site: Murphy . Laura T. . Elimä . Nyrola . Tobin . David . July 2022 . Until Nothing Is Left: China's Settler Corporation and its Human Rights Violations in the Uyghur Region. A Report on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps . 26 July 2022 . Helena Kennedy Centre . . 27 July 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220727004102/https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/until-nothing-is-left . live .
  5. News: The Conqueror of China's Wild West. O'Neill. Mark. 2008-04-13. 2011-04-22. Asia Sentinel. https://web.archive.org/web/20130921061414/http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1148&Itemid=31. 21 September 2013. dead.
  6. Web site: 2014-10-05 . 康小兰 . 新疆生产建设兵团的历史与发展 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20170320052558/http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/Document/1382608/1382608.htm . 2017-03-20 . 2014-10-12 . State Council Information Office.
  7. "Tao Zhiyue 1892 - 1988)" in James Z. Gao: Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949), p. 358, 2009, Scarecrow Press
  8. https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/11/the-xinjiang-production-construction-corps-key-policy-tool-from-mao-to-xi/ Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps: Key Policy Tool from Mao to Xi
  9. Web site: IX. Establishment, Development and Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. May 2003. History and Development of Xinjiang. State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2010-10-31. https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172801/http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/9.htm. 3 March 2016. live.
  10. Becqelin . Nicolas . Xinjiang in the Nineties . . July 2000 . 44 . 44 . 65–90 . 10.2307/2667477 . University of Chicago Press. 2667477 . 144549708 .
  11. News: Douclose . Eva . 2020-08-22 . Sanctions on China's top cotton supplier weave a tangled web for fashion brands . en . . live . 2020-08-23 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200822233108/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sanctions-china-cotton-xinjiang-uighurs-fashion/2020/08/20/188ec374-dd48-11ea-b4f1-25b762cdbbf4_story.html . 22 August 2020.
  12. News: Linda Lew. 24 August 2020. Xinjiang's sprawling conglomerate may be biggest ever to face US sanctions. 24 August 2020. South China Morning Post. 24 August 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20200824050523/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3098490/xinjiangs-sprawling-conglomerate-may-be-biggest-ever-face-us. live.
  13. News: Allen-Ebrahimian . Bethany . 2020-07-31 . U.S. sanctions China's paramilitary in Xinjiang . . live . 2020-07-31 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200823234328/https://www.axios.com/us-sanctions-china-paramilitary-xinjiang-xpcc-41e29c92-9649-4e47-9e91-a7f78330d4d8.html . 23 August 2020.
  14. News: Lipes . Joshua . 2020-07-31 . US Sanctions Key Paramilitary Group, Officials Over Abuses in China's Xinjiang Region . . live . 2020-07-31 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200731210506/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xpcc-07312020143418.html . 31 July 2020.
  15. Web site: 2020-07-31 . Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20200823234326/https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073 . 23 August 2020 . 2020-07-31 . U.S. Department of the Treasury.
  16. Web site: On Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers in Xinjiang, China . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20200804164951/https://www.state.gov/on-sanctioning-human-rights-abusers-in-xinjiang-china/ . 4 August 2020 . 2020-08-06 . . en-US.
  17. News: 2020-07-31 . U.S. imposes sanctions on Chinese company over abuse of Uighurs . en . . live . 2020-08-06 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200803032940/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-idUSKCN24W29O . 3 August 2020.
  18. News: Lawder. David. 2020-12-03. U.S. bans cotton imports from China producer XPCC citing Xinjiang 'slave labor'. en. Reuters. 2020-12-03. 3 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201203021952/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-idUSKBN28C38V. live.
  19. News: June 23, 2021. U.S. restricts exports to 5 Chinese firms over rights violations. Reuters. live. June 23, 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210623235311/https://www.reuters.com/business/us-restricts-exports-5-chinese-firms-over-rights-violations-2021-06-23/. June 23, 2021.
  20. Web site: 2022-03-10 . Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Committee of the Whole – Portfolio list – Briefing material . 2023-03-30 . . 3 February 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230203123420/https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/briefing-documents-information/parliamentary-committee-comite-parlementaire/2021-12-07-cw-pl-lp-cp.aspx?lang=eng . live .
  21. News: 2021-03-23 . Statement: EU sanctions to four Chinese individuals and a Chinese entity on human rights violations; Counter-sanctions by the PRC . en . . live . 25 September 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220621005735/https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/231386/03_23_D-CN_Chair%27s%20statement_Chinese%20counter-sanctions_Uyghurs.pdf . 21 June 2022.
  22. News: 2021-03-22. Official Journal of the European Union, L 99 I, Vol. 64, p.12. en. EUR Lex Access to European Union Law. 25 September 2022. 26 March 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210326175005/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN#page=12. live.
  23. Web site: Decoding Chinese Politics . 2 October 2023 . Asia Society.
  24. Web site: The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: an Insider's Perspective . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20180616002211/https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/node/3661 . 16 June 2018 . 2020-08-06 . www.bsg.ox.ac.uk . en.
  25. News: 2020-07-31 . US imposes sanctions on Chinese 'state-within-a-state' linked to Xinjiang abuses . en-GB . . 2023-06-24 . 0261-3077 . 10 August 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200810000555/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/us-sanctions-china-xinjiang-uighurs . live .
  26. Murphy, L and Elimä, N. (2021). "In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains."  Sheffield, UKSheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice
  27. Web site: The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Bao. Yajun. Oxford University BSG. 19 April 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20200501161414/https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/BSG-WP-2018-023.pdf. 1 May 2020. live.
  28. News: 9 January 2020 . Dismantling China's Muslim gulag in Xinjiang is not enough . . live . subscription . 2020-01-19 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200119100700/https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/01/09/dismantling-chinas-muslim-gulag-in-xinjiang-is-not-enough . 19 January 2020 . 0013-0613.
  29. News: 'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims. Ramzy. Austin. 2019-11-16. The New York Times. 2019-11-16. Buckley. Chris. en-US. 0362-4331. https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html. 22 December 2019. live.
  30. News: 9 January 2020 . Many Han Chinese don't mind the gulag for their Uighur neighbours . . live . subscription . 2020-01-12 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200112203900/https://www.economist.com/china/2020/01/09/many-han-chinese-dont-mind-the-gulag-for-their-uighur-neighbours . 12 January 2020 . 0013-0613.
  31. Book: Rossabi, Morris. Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers. University of Washington Press. 2005. 157–158.
  32. Web site: Source . 2 July 2005 . https://web.archive.org/web/20070929093410/http://www.bingtuan.gov.cn/gaikuang/f_filelist_v.asp?p_index=251020&p_id=1644 . 29 September 2007 . dead .
  33. News: Feng . Emily . 23 May 2018 . China tightens grip on restive western region . subscription . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20190920180954/https://www.ft.com/content/60fbc746-1d34-11e8-956a-43db76e69936 . 20 September 2019 . 2020-01-19 . Financial Times.
  34. Web site: 28 March 2023 . 新疆生产建设兵团2022年国民经济和社会发展统计公报 . 2023-06-22 . www.btdsys.gov.cn . 22 June 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230622141953/https://www.btdsys.gov.cn/zyxw/tzgg/5647.html#:~:text=%E5%85%A8%E5%B9%B4%E4%BA%BA%E5%9D%87%E7%94%9F%E4%BA%A7%E6%80%BB,%E5%B9%B4%E6%9C%AB%E5%A2%9E%E5%8A%A012.00%E4%B8%87%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%82 . live .
  35. News: Olesen . Alexa . 8 October 2014 . China's Vast, Strange, and Powerful Farming Militia Turns 60 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20191230134739/https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/08/chinas-vast-strange-and-powerful-farming-militia-turns-60/ . 30 December 2019 . 2020-01-19 . . en-US.
  36. News: Allen-Ebrahimian . Bethany . 26 July 2022 . Report: Xinjiang paramilitary group has "central role" in genocide . . 22 June 2023.
  37. News: Rajagopalan . Megha . 10 August 2021 . Goods Linked To A Group That Runs Chinese Detention Camps May Be Ending Up In US Stores . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20210903162819/https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-xinjiang-banned-goods-united-states . 3 September 2021 . 3 September 2021 . .
  38. Web site: June 14, 2022 . Built on Repression: PVC Building Materials' Reliance on Labor and Environmental Abuses in the Uyghur Region . Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice . 22 June 2022 . 23 June 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220623044111/https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/built-on-repression . live .