Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia explained

Courtseal:District of Columbia Court of Appeals Seal.svg
Arguedate:May 29,
Argueyear:1957
Decidedate:October 17,
Decideyear:1957
Fullname:Washington Ethical Society, a corporation, Petitioner v. District of Columbia Respondent.
Citations:249 F.2d 127
Lawsapplied:D.C.Code, 47-801a (1951)

Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (1957), was a case of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Washington Ethical Society functions much like a church, but regards itself as a non-theistic religious institution, honoring the importance of ethical living without mandating a belief in a supernatural origin for ethics. The case involved denial of the Society's application for tax exemption as a religious organization. The D.C. Circuit reversed the ruling of the Tax Court for the District Columbia and found that the Society was a religious organization under the Distinct of Columbia Code, 47-801a (1951). The Society thus was granted its tax exemption.

Significance

Along with Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, this was one of the earliest cases establishing the right in the U.S. of nontheistic institutions that function like churches to be treated similarly to theistic religious institutions under the law.

This case is sometimes cited as establishing secular humanism as a religion under the law. That characterization of the case is disputed by others, for a number of reasons:

Rationale for decision

The decision of the court was written by then-Judge Warren Burger (who was later appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court). Judge E. Barrett Prettyman and Judge Charles Fahy joined.[1] The decision stated:

The sole issue raised is whether petitioner falls within the definition of a "church" or a "religious society" . . . . The taxing authority urges denial of the tax exemption asserting petitioner is not a religious society or church and that it does not use its buildings for religious worship since "religious" and "worship" require a belief in and teaching of a Supreme Being who controls the universe. The position of the tax Court, in denying tax exemption, was that belief in and teaching of the existence of a Divinity is essential to qualify under the statute. . . . To construe exemptions so strictly that unorthodox or minority forms of worship would be denied the exemption benefits granted to those conforming to the majority beliefs might well raise constitutional issues . . . . The question before us now is not broadly whether petitioner is in an ecclesiastical sense a religious society or a church, but narrowly whether under this particular statute it is qualified for tax exemption. . . . We hold on this record and under the controlling statutory language petitioner qualifies as "a religious corporation or society" . . . .

References

Notes and References

  1. 249 F.2d 127 (1957).