National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Explained

Agency Name:National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
Preceding1:National Highway Safety Bureau[1]
Jurisdiction:U.S. motor vehicles[2]
Headquarters:Washington, D.C., U.S.
Motto:"People saving people"[3]
Employees:626 (FY 2017)[4] [5]
Chief1 Name:Sophie Shulman
Chief1 Position:Acting Administrator
Chief2 Name:Sophie Shulman
Chief2 Position:Deputy Administrator
Parent Department:Department of Transportation
Budget:$1.6 billion (FY 2024)[6]
Footnotes:Leadership[7]

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)[8] is an agency of the U.S. federal government, part of the Department of Transportation, focused on transportation safety in the United States.

NHTSA is charged with writing and enforcing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards as well as regulations for motor vehicle theft resistance and fuel economy, as part of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) system. FMVSS 209 was the first standard to become effective on March 1, 1967. NHTSA licenses vehicle manufacturers and importers, allows or blocks the import of vehicles and safety-regulated vehicle parts, administers the vehicle identification number (VIN) system, develops the anthropomorphic dummies used in U.S. safety testing as well as the test protocols themselves, and provides vehicle insurance cost information. The agency has asserted preemptive regulatory authority over greenhouse gas emissions, but this has been disputed by such state regulatory agencies as the California Air Resources Board.

The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are contained in the United States . Additional federal vehicle standards are contained elsewhere in the CFR. Another of NHTSA's activities is the collection of data about motor vehicle crashes, available in various data files maintained by the National Center for Statistics and Analysis, in particular the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the Crash Investigation Sampling System (CISS, where technicians investigate a random sample of police crash reports), and others.[9]

History

In 1964 and 1966, public pressure grew in the United States to increase the safety of cars, culminating with the publishing of Unsafe at Any Speed, by Ralph Nader, an activist lawyer, and the report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences entitled .

In 1966, Congress held a series of publicized hearings regarding highway safety, passed legislation to make the installation of seat belts mandatory, and created the U.S. Department of Transportation on October 15, 1966 . Legislation signed by President Lyndon Johnson earlier on September 9, 1966, included the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and Highway Safety Act that created the National Traffic Safety Agency, the National Highway Safety Agency, and the National Highway Safety Bureau, predecessor agencies to what would eventually become NHTSA. Once the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) came into effect, vehicles not certified by the maker or importer as compliant with US safety standards were no longer legal to import into the United States.

Congress established NHTSA in 1970 with the Highway Safety Act of 1970 (Title II of, at). In 1972, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act expanded NHTSA's scope to include consumer information programs. Despite improvements in vehicle design and public awareness of issues like drunk driving, traffic fatalities have remained stubbornly high. In the early 2020s, more than 40,000 U.S. residents died in automotive collisions every year.

NHTSA has conducted numerous high-profile investigations of automotive safety issues, including the Audi 5000/60 Minutes affair, the Ford Explorer rollover problem, and the Toyota sticky accelerator pedal problem. The agency has introduced a proposal to mandate Electronic Stability Control on all passenger vehicles by the 2012 model year. This technology was first brought to public attention in 1997, with the Swedish moose test. Other than that, NHTSA has issued only a few regulations in the past 25 years. Most of the reduction in vehicle fatality rates during the last third of the 20th century were gained from the initial NHTSA safety standards during 1968–1984 and subsequent voluntary changes in vehicle crashworthiness by vehicle manufacturers.[10]

Regulatory performance

Audits by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General in 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2021 have concluded that NHTSA is ineffectual; the 2021 audit found NHTSA failing to issue or update Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards effectively or to act within timeframes on petitions and investigations; having no process in place for critical agency responsibilities like evaluating petitions, and having failed to implement consensus recommendations derived from the Inspector General's audit a decade before, in 2011.[11] [12] The 2018 audit found NHTSA incapable of conducting adequate, timely safety recalls.[13] The 2015 audit found NHTSA's collection and analysis of safety-related data to be inadequate,[14] and the agency to be lackadaisical and careless in examining safety defects.[15]

Government data (from FARS for the U.S.) in a 2004 book by former General Motors safety researcher Leonard Evans shows other countries achieving greater traffic safety improvements over time than those achieved in the United States:

Country1979 fatalities2002 fatalitiesPercent change
align=left United States51,09342,815−16.2%
align=left Great Britain6,3523,431−46.0%
align=left Canada5,8632,936−49.9%
align=left Australia3,5081,715−51.1%

Research suggests one reason the U.S. continues to lag in traffic safety is the relatively high prevalence in the U.S. of pickup trucks and SUVs, which a 2003 study by the U.S. Transportation Research Board found are significantly less safe than passenger cars.[16] Comparisons of past data with the present in the U.S. can result in distortions, due to a significant population increase and since the level of large commercial truck traffic has substantially increased from the 1960s, but highway capacity has not kept up.[17] [18] However, other factors exert significant influence; Canada has lower roadway death and injury rates despite a vehicle mix and regulations similar to those of the U.S.[19] Nevertheless, the widespread use of truck-based vehicles as passenger carriers is correlated with roadway deaths and injuries not only directly by dint of vehicular safety performance per se, but also indirectly through the relatively low fuel costs that facilitate the use of such vehicles in North America. Motor vehicle fatalities decline as gasoline prices increase.[20]

International counterparts and the grey market

In 1958, under the auspices of the United Nations, a consortium called the Economic Commission for Europe had been established to normalize vehicle regulations across Europe to standardize best practices in vehicle design and equipment and minimize technical barriers to pan-European vehicle trade and traffic. This eventually became the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, which began to promulgate what would eventually become the UN Regulations on the design, construction, and safety and emissions performance of vehicles and their components. Many of the world's countries accept or require vehicles and equipment built to the UN Regulations,[21] but the U.S. does not recognize the UN Regulations and blocks the importation of vehicles and components not manufacturer-certified as complying with the U.S. regulations.[22]

Because of the unavailability in America of certain vehicle models, a grey market arose in the late 1970s. This provided a method to acquire vehicles not officially offered in the United States, but enough vehicles imported this way were faulty, shoddy, and unsafe[23] [24] [25] that Mercedes-Benz of North America helped launch a successful congressional lobbying effort to close down the grey market in 1988.[26] As a result, it was no longer possible to import foreign vehicles into the United States as a personal import, with few exceptions—primarily vehicles meeting Canadian regulations substantially similar to those of the United States, and vehicles imported temporarily for display or research purposes. In practice, the gray market involved a few thousand cars annually, before its virtual elimination in 1988.[27]

In 1998, NHTSA exempted vehicles older than 25 years from the rules it administers, since these are presumed to be collector vehicles.[22] In 1999, certain very low production volume specialist vehicles were also exempt for "Show and Display" purposes.

In the mid-1960s, when the framework was established for US vehicle safety regulations, the US auto market was an oligopoly, with three companies (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) controlling 85% of the market.[28] The ongoing ban on newer vehicles considered safe in countries with lower vehicle-related death rates has created a perception that an effect of NHTSA's regulatory activity is to protect the U.S. market for a modified oligopoly consisting of the three U.S.-based automakers and the American operations of foreign-brand producers. It has been suggested[29] that the impetus for NHTSA's seeming preoccupation with market control rather than vehicular safety performance is a result of overt market protections such as tariffs and local-content laws having become politically unpopular due to the increasing popularity of free trade, thus driving the industry to adopt less visible forms of trade restrictions in the form of technical regulations different from those outside the United States.[30]

An example of the market-control effects of NHTSA's regulatory protocol is found in the agency's 1974 banning of the Citroën SM automobile, which contemporary journalists described as one of the safest vehicles available at the time. NHTSA disapproved the SM's designs featuring steerable headlamps that were not of the sealed beam design that was then mandatory in the U.S. as well as its height adjustable suspension, which made compliance with the 1973 bumper requirements cost-prohibitive. The initial bumper regulations were intended to prevent functional damage to a vehicle's safety-related components such as lights and fuel system components when subjected to barrier crash tests at 5mph at the front and 2.50NaN0 at the rear.[31] However, these regulations at low-speed collisions did not enhance occupant safety.[32]

Vehicle manufacturers have acknowledged the functional equivalence of the UN and U.S. regulations, encouraged developing countries to recognize and accept both,[21] and advocated for equal recognition of both systems in developed countries.[33] However, some structural features of the U.S. legal system are incompatible with some aspects of the UN regulatory system.[34] Studies have concluded that commonizing regulations between the US and the rest of the world (which uses U.N. Regulations) would save significant money, likely without affecting safety.[35]

Cost and cost-benefit

NHTSA uses cost–benefit analysis for every safety device, system, or design feature mandated for installation on vehicles.[36] No device, system, or design feature may be mandated unless it costs no more than a specified amount of money per life saved, or will save more money (in property damage, health care, etc.) than it costs. Requirements are balanced through estimated costs and estimated benefits. For example, FMVSS #208 effectively mandates the installation of frontal airbags in all new vehicles in the United States, for it is written such that no other technology can meet the stipulated requirements. It has been argued that even using conservative cost figures and optimistic benefit figures, airbags' cost–benefit ratio so extreme that it may fall outside of the cost–benefit requirements for mandatory safety devices.[37] [38] Cost–benefit requirements have been used as the basis for lighting-related regulation in the U.S; for example, while many countries in the world since at least the early 1970s have required rear turn signals to emit amber light so they might be distinguished from adjacent red brake lamps, U.S. regulations permit rear turn signals to emit either amber or red light. This has historically been justified on grounds of lower manufacturing cost and greater automaker styling freedom in the context of no demonstrated safety benefit to amber over red.[39] More recent NHTSA-sponsored research has demonstrated that amber rear turn signals provide significantly better crash avoidance than red ones,[40] [41] and NHTSA has found there is no significant cost penalty to amber signals versus red ones, yet the agency has not moved to require amber—instead proposing in 2015 to award extra NCAP points to passenger vehicles with amber rear turn signals.[42] As of September 2022, however, the agency has not put this proposal into effect.

Fuel economy

CAFE regulations

NHTSA administers the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE), which is intended to incentivize the production of fuel-efficient vehicles by dint of fuel economy requirements measured against the sales-weighted harmonic average of each manufacturer's range of vehicles. Many governments outside North America promote fuel economy by heavily taxing motor fuel and/or by including a vehicle's weight, engine size, or fuel economy in calculating vehicle registration taxes (road tax).

NCAP

United States has been the first country/region to have a NCAP program before being copied by other regional, European, American, Asiatic, Oceanic or global NCAP programs. This makes the New Car Assessment Program colloquial and design either US NCAP or generic NCAP.

In 1979, NHTSA created the/a New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in response to Title II of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972, to encourage manufacturers to build safer vehicles and consumers to buy them. Since that time, the agency has improved the program by adding rating programs, facilitating access to test results, and revising the format of the information to make it easier for consumers to understand.[43] NHTSA asserts the program has influenced manufacturers to build vehicles that consistently achieve high ratings.[43]

The first standardized 350NaN0 front crash test was on May 21, 1979, and the first results were released on October 15 that year.

The agency established a frontal impact test protocol based on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("Occupant Crash Protection"), except that the frontal 4 NCAP test is conducted at 350NaN0, rather than 300NaN0 as required by FMVSS No. 208.

To improve the dissemination of NCAP ratings, and as a result of the (SAFETEA–LU), the agency has issued a Final Rule requiring manufacturers to place NCAP star ratings on the Monroney sticker (automobile price sticker). The rule had a September 1, 2007 compliance date.[44]

Since 2020, it is mandatory to show a safety label with all display vehicles in Malaysia. The printed information does not show the presence of crash eCall, presence eCall, drunk driving warning, anti-theft and lack of keyless technology as features. It does not seem that NCAPs less strict than the local one or which do not penalize flammability, fire toxicity, lifecycle toxicity, true climate impact, water impact, worker and population impact, biodiversity impact, weak cybersecurity, or heavy or pedestrian-unfriendly vehicles are banned.[45]

Administration

The agency has an annual budget of $1.09 billion (FY2020). The agency classifies most of its spending under the driver safety heading, with a minority spent on vehicle safety, and a smaller amount on energy security matters of which it is in charge, i.e., vehicular fuel economy.

Past administrators

AdministratorTerm startedTerm ended
Steven Cliff20222022
Mark Rosekind20142017
David Strickland20102014
Nicole Nason20062008
Jeffrey W. Runge20012005
Sue Bailey20002001
Ricardo Martinez19941999
Marion Blakey19921993
Jerry Ralph Curry19891992
Diane K. Steed19831989
Raymond A. Peck Jr.19811981
Joan Claybrook19771981
John W. Snow19761977
James Gregory19731976
Douglas W. Toms19701973
[46]

See also

Further reading

External links

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Who We Are and What We Do. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. November 1, 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20151018102517/http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Who+We+Are+and+What+We+Do. October 18, 2015. dead.
  2. Web site: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . International Trade Data System . November 1, 2015 . https://web.archive.org/web/20150923191043/http://www.itds.gov/xp/itds/toolbox/organization/pgas/dept_of_trans_pgas/natl_highlway_traffic_safety.html. September 23, 2015 . dead.
  3. Web site: THIS IS NHTSA . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . November 1, 2015 . March 5, 2016 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160305185301/http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/reports/810552.pdf . dead .
  4. Web site: Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 2018 . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . United States Department of Transportation . September 9, 2021.
  5. Web site: Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2016 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . U.S. Department of Transportation . November 1, 2015 . February 21, 2015 . https://web.archive.org/web/20150221095751/http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/administration/pdf/Budgets/FY2016-NHTSA_CBJ_Final.pdf . dead .
  6. Web site: Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 2025 . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . United States Department of Transportation . April 4, 2024.
  7. Web site: NHTSA Leadership. August 2021. August 31, 2021. NHTSA.
  8. Web site: Minding the Minders of G.M. . Jackie . Calmes . April 5, 2014 . New York Times.
  9. Web site: Crash Investigation Sampling System . 2023-07-08 . www.nhtsa.gov . NHTSA . en.
  10. Book: Robertson, Leon S. . Injury Epidemiology . Third . 186–194 . Oxford University Press . 2007 . 978-0-19-506956-3 . registration .
  11. Web site: Stern . Daniel . Systemic Dysfunction at NHTSA: Audit . Driving Vision News . November 16, 2021 . September 19, 2022.
  12. http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/NHTSA%20FMVSS%20Final%20Report_11-9-21.pdf Weaknesses in NHTSA's Training and Guidance Limit Its Ability To Set and Enforce Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
  13. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/36626 NHTSA's Management of Light Passenger Vehicle Recalls Lacks Adequate Processes and Oversight
  14. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/32523 Inadequate Data and Analysis Undermine NHTSA's Efforts To Identify and Investigate Vehicle Safety Concerns
  15. Web site: Ballaban . Michael . Scathing Audit Reveals NHTSA Is A Five-Star Government Clusterfuck . Jalopnic . June 22, 2015 . September 19, 2022.
  16. Web site: Wenzel . Tom . Ross . Marc . Are SUVs Safer than Cars? An Analysis of Risk by Vehicle Type and Model . Transportation Research Board 82nd Annual Meeting . January 15, 2003 . http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130503020729/http://www.neotrucks.com/pdf/trb_safety_1%2D03.pdf . dead . May 3, 2013 . December 21, 2020.
  17. Web site: Federal Highway Administration . Chapter 14 Freight Transportation . United States Department of Transportation . 2006 . 2006 Status of the Nation's Highways, Bridges, and Transit: Conditions and Performance . https://web.archive.org/web/20070823204506/http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2006cpr/chap14.htm . August 23, 2007 . December 21, 2020.
  18. Leon S. . Robertson . Motor Vehicle Deaths: Failed Policy Analysis and Neglected Policy . Journal of Public Health Policy . 27 . 2 . 182–189 . 2006 . 10.1057/palgrave.jphp.3200074 . 16961196. 19954345 .
  19. Book: Evans, Leonard . Traffic Safety . Science Serving Society . 2004 . 978-0-9754871-0-5 .
  20. David C. . Grabowski . Michael A. . Morrissey . Gasoline Prices and Motor Vehicle Fatalities . Journal of Policy Analysis and Management . 23 . 3 . 575–593 . 2004 . 10.1002/pam.20028.
  21. Web site: Automotive Regulations and Certification Processes: Global Manufacturers' Perspective . U.S. Automotive Industry Coalition Meeting - Andean/Mexico Delegation . December 7, 2016 . December 21, 2020.
  22. Web site: What you need to know to avoid seeing your grey market car get crushed . August 30, 2013 . Digital Trends . May 30, 2015.
  23. News: Ramos . George . U.S. Accuses 'Gray Market' Car Importer . The Los Angeles Times . May 23, 1985 . December 21, 2020.
  24. News: Deception on Engines Charged: 'Gray Market' Mercedes Dealer Held . Los Angeles Times . April 26, 1986 . December 21, 2020.
  25. News: Dean . Paul . Wheeling-Dealing Gray Market Hits the Skids: Bad Publicity, Corporate Action, Legislation Put Brakes on Car Conversions . Los Angeles Times . July 11, 1986 . December 21, 2020.
  26. Web site: How To: Win the Car-Importing Game . https://web.archive.org/web/20150203062314/http://blog.caranddriver.com/how-to-win-the-car-importing-game/. dead. February 3, 2015. May 30, 2015.
  27. Web site: Car Show Classic: 1985 Citroen CX 25 GTi Series 2 – Blue Is A Warmer Color Than Grey. Curbside Classic . January 10, 2014 . May 30, 2015.
  28. Web site: Carpe Diem . May 30, 2015.
  29. Web site: M.E. . Wenners . J.M. . Frusti . J.S. . Ninomiya . Global Regulatory Harmonization—One American Manufacturer's Perspective . SAE Technical Paper Series . Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) . September 29, 1998 . 1 . 10.4271/982266 . December 21, 2020.
  30. Web site: Stern . Daniel . Crouching Tariff, Hidden Trade Barrier? . Driving Vision News . June 24, 2013 . September 19, 2022.
  31. Web site: Warren G. . La Heist . Frank G. . Ephraim . An Evaluation of the Bumper Standard - As Modified in 1982 - NHTSA Report Number DOT HS 807 072 . https://web.archive.org/web/20090304122233/http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/807072.html . March 4, 2009 . December 21, 2020.
  32. Web site: Top 5: Citroen SM innovations that saw the future video - CNET . CBS Interactive. CNET. May 30, 2015.
  33. Web site: Stern . Daniel . Ford Push for Global Regs...Meaning What? . Driving Vision News . May 20, 2013 . September 19, 2022.
  34. Web site: Stern . Daniel . Legal Hurdles to Regulatory Harmony . Driving Vision News . September 19, 2022 . October 28, 2013.
  35. Beene . Ryan . http://web.archive.org/web/20220919000000/http://www.autonews.com/article/20150725/OEM/307279968/wiping-out-u.s.-eu-rules-disparities-would-yield-big-savings . September 19, 2022 . Wiping out U.S.-EU rules disparities would yield big savings . Automotive News . July 25, 2015 . December 4, 2018. Alt URL
  36. Viscusi, Kip Regulatory Economics in the Courts: an Analysis of Judge Scalia's NHTSA Bumper Decision Law and Contemporary Problems volume 50 issue 4 1988 Retrieved July 29, 2015.
  37. Web site: John Graham Releases Results of Cost–Benefit Analysis of Air Bag Safety . Riskworld.com . March 25, 1997 . November 13, 2011 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20110928020856/http://www.riskworld.com/NEWS/97q1/nw7aa028.htm . September 28, 2011 .
  38. Risk Analysis . 22 . 4 . 803–811 . October 3, 2002 . 10.1111/0272-4332.00070 . Thompson . Kimberly M.. Segui-Gomez . Maria . Graham . John D. . Validating Benefit and Cost Estimates: The Case of Airbag Regulation . 12224752 . 2002RiskA..22..803T . 27273577 .
  39. http://www.drivingvisionnews.com/download.php?fileid=20110830 Automotive Lighting in North America
  40. Web site: The Influence of Rear Turn Signal Characteristics on Crash Risk . October 17, 2011 . https://web.archive.org/web/20090511053347/http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crash%20Avoidance/2008/811050.pdf . May 11, 2009 . dead .  
  41. Web site: Allen . Kirk . The Effectiveness of Amber Rear Turn Signals for Reducing Rear Impacts, DOT HS 811 115 . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . 2009 .
  42. Web site: Regulations.gov. www.regulations.gov.
  43. Web site: The New Car Assessment Program Suggested Approaches for Future Program Enhancements . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration . January 2007 . November 24, 2008 .
  44. Web site: safercar.gov | NHTSA. https://web.archive.org/web/20070925184625/http://www.safercar.gov/NewCarAssessmentEnhancements-2007.pdf. dead. September 25, 2007. www.nhtsa.gov.
  45. Web site: ASEAN NCAP and KPDNHEP mandatory safety rating labels begin appearing on new cars in showrooms - paultan.org. May 18, 2020.
  46. Web site: Past NHTSA Administrators. nhtsa.gov.