Korean People's Army Strategic Force Explained

Native Name:	조선인민군 전략군
Allegiance:	Kim Jong Un^[1]
Type:	Strategic missile force
Role:	Strategic deterrence
Size:	13 brigades
Commander1:	Colonel General Kim Jong Gil^[2]
Commander1 Label:	Commander

The Korean People's Army Strategic Force,^[3] previously known as the Korean People's Army Strategic Rocket Force,^[4] is a military branch of the Korean People's Army (KPA) founded in 2012 that operates surface-to-surface missiles in the nuclear and conventional strike roles. It is mainly armed with ballistic missiles. The inventory includes domestic and Soviet designs.

History

North Korea received rocket artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-ship missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and then from China in the 1970s. The decision to develop a domestic missile production capability was likely made by 1965 after the Soviet Union refused to supply ballistic missiles. Military and industrial preparations began shortly afterward. China agreed to assist North Korea develop ballistic missiles. A joint development program for the DF-61 missile began in 1977. It was cancelled in 1978 due to Chinese domestic politics.

In the late-1970s or early-1980s, North Korea received R-17 Elbrus (Scud-B) ballistic missiles from Egypt. The Hwasong-5 was based on reverse engineering the R-17. Flight-testing began in 1984. The Hwasong-5 was supplied to Iran in 1985. Its use in the War of the Cities provided considerable operational data. The missile had suffered a number of launch failures in North Korean testing and in Iranian service. A 1985 cooperative agreement may have provided North Korea with Iranian funds for missile development.

The Hwasong-5 entered serial production in 1987. Development continued by "scaling up Scud technology." North Korea received Soviet and then Russian assistance in the mid-1980s and early-1990s.

The Hwasong-7 (Nodong) began development in 1988 or 1989. In 1995, it began deploying, after one failed and one reduced-range flight test. Iran and Pakistan were manufactured missiles based on the Hwasong-7. Flight data from the Pakistani Ghauri missile was provided to North Korea.

In the late-1990s, a rocket division was created within the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. Rocket and ballistic units were organized under the Missile Guidance Bureau in 1999.

Since Kim Jong Un came to power in December 2011, North Korea has attempted to launch nearly three times as many ballistic missiles as during the entire reign of his father, Kim Jong Il. Between 2011 and the end of 2016, North Korea launched 42 ballistic missiles: 20 short-range Scud- type missiles with a range of 300–1,000 km, 10 medium-range No Dong missiles that can fly 1,300-1,500 km, eight intermediate-range Hwasong 10 (Musudan) missiles traditionally assessed to have a range of 3,500-4,000 km, and four submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These tests can be divided into three categories: tests of operational missiles, tests of missiles North Korea considered operational but were untested, such as the Musudan, and those still under development, such as the Pukkuksong [Polaris] family of solid-fuelled missiles.^[5]

In 2012, the United Nations and independent experts said that North Korea did not operate missiles beyond the intermediate range, and that the long-range missiles shown at parades are mock-ups. There were doubts about the authenticity of the KN-08 missiles displayed on 16-wheel carrier trucks during a 2012 military parade, and the Musudan missiles shown in 2010.^{[6] [7] [8] [9]}

The testing in 2018 and 2019 of four new road-mobile, solid propellant propulsion, SRBMs marked a qualitative improvement in North Korean missiles. These have a reduced firing preparation signature, making destruction before launch more difficult. Some have a flattened trajectory, making in-flight interception more difficult. Japanese Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya stated "I believe that [North Korea’s] development of a missile that flies at a lower altitude than a conventional ballistic missile in an irregular trajectory is aimed at breaking through the [Japanese] missile defence system".^[10]

These new missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24 are more sophisticated than the previous Hwasong series. They employ flattened trajectories to remain below 50 km in altitude, putting them in between the 40 km maximum engagement altitude of Patriot missile-defense interceptors and 50 km minimum engagement altitude of THAAD and Aegis missile defense systems. Flying through this coverage gap and using active steering increases survivability against missile defenses. They have the advantage of being solid-fueled and more accurate than their predecessors, making them more effective weapons.^{[11] [12] [13]}

Between 2018 and 2020, North Korea expanded its missiles brigades, from 8 to 13.^[14]

Organization

The Strategic Force is a branch of the KPA and is likely directly subordinate to the General Staff Department.

Facilities

• Musudan-ri is a rocket launching site in North Korea at 40°51′N, 129°40′E. It lies in southern North Hamgyong Province, near the northern tip of East Korea Bay. The area was formerly known as Taep'o-dong (대포동), from which the Taepodong rockets take their name.
• Kittaeryŏng (깃대령) site is in Kangwon Province, which borders South Korea. It is used for launches of short to medium-range missiles and has a pad for mobile launchers.
• Kalgol-dong (갈골동) site is in Chagang Province and houses Hwasong-5/6 missiles, targeting South Korea.
• Panghyon Airport site is in North P'yongan Province and houses Rodong missiles. It targets U.S. forces in Japan.
• Okp’yŏng-dong (옥평동) site is in Kangwon Province and houses Hwasong and Rodong missiles.
• Pongdong-ri(봉동리) site is on North Korea's west coast, about 50 km south of the North Korean-Chinese border.
• Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base is a short-range ballistic missiles site in North Hwanghae Province.^[15] Geo-located at 38.5847°N 126.1079°W
• Chia-ri (지하리) north of Chorwon County, Kangwon Province, it is a missile support facility and operational launch base.^{[16] [17]}
• Kumchon-ni (금천리) in Anbyon County, it is equipped with Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).^[18]
• Sing'ye (Shin'gye) (신계) across from Chia-ri, this is a small missile support facility and SCUD-C base. Construction began in 1985.^{[19] [17]}
• Sil-li(신리) a missile support facility next to Pyongyang International Airport constructed between 2016 and 2020.^[20]
• Hodo Peninsula (호도반도) is a rocket and missile testing facility near Wonsan. It was established in the 1960s and was modernized in 2014–2016.^[21]
• Yusang-ni (유상리) Twenty-eight kilometers east of Sunchon, it is one of the newest operating bases built (c. 2003). It has been reported to house either the Hwasong-13, Hwasong-14, or Hwasong-15 missiles.^[22]
• Hoejung-ni(회정리) is North Korea's newest missile base, built c. 2012–13. It is likely capable of deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles as it lies in the country's missile "strategic belt".^{[23] [17]}
• Riman-ri (Yongnim)(리만리) it is south of Chonchon County, Chagang Province and is the largest missile base by area.^[17]
• Sangnam-ri (상남리) in South Hamgyong Province, it is equipped with intermediate-range ballistic missiles.^[24]
• Sinpo-Mayang the site is a submarine base and SLBM development facility
• Sino-ri (신오리) the site houses a regiment-sized unit equipped with Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missiles.^[25] Geo-located at 39.6449°N 125.3553°W^[26]
• Taegwan(대관) is the home of a missile base^[17] and a nearby missile manufacturing facility.^[27]
• Yeongjeo-dong(영저동) the site is near the Chinese border in Ryanggang Province.^[28]
• Magun'po(마군포) is a solid rocket motor test facility.^[29]
• Chamjin-ni(잠진리) is North Korea's oldest known vertical engine test stand.^[30]

There are other numerous smaller sites, scattered around the country, serving for mobile launcher pads. Some larger sites are under construction.

Launch capabilities

Silo-based launch

South Korean government sources are reported to have stated in 2013 that a missile silo complex is located south of Paektu Mountain near the Chinese border. The silos are reportedly designed for mid- to long-range missiles, but it is not clear if all of them are operational;^[31] however, these claims have not been independently verified.

Launch pads

Launching pads are required for the more sophisticated Taepodong-1/2, as their liquid propellant is difficult to store and the missiles must be fueled immediately before launch. This launching method poses a great risk, as the sites themselves are extremely vulnerable to airstrikes. Launching pads can be used to test different types of SRBM, IRBM and ICBMs, and to launch space satellites, but they are of little value if any of these missiles is to be deployed as a strategic weapon.

Mobile launcher vehicles

North Korea extensively uses mobile launchers for its missiles, including the Rodong-1 and the Hwasong-10. These are hard to detect and significantly improve survivability.

Submarine/ship-based launch

The Korean People's Navy is not known to have ballistic missile submarines in service. However, it has started research and development into a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submarines^[32] and has successfully fired a missile from one of its test submarines.^[33]

Active missiles

Detailed listings of the equipment holdings of the Korean People's Army are rather scarce in unclassified literature. North Korea operates the FROG-7, Hwasong-5 (Locally built Scud-B), Hwasong-6 (Locally built Scud-C), Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) and Hwasong-7 (mislabeled as Rodong-1^[34]) The U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center reported in 2009 that the Rocket Forces had fewer than 100 launchers for Tochka and Hwasong-5/6 SRBMs, and fewer than 50 launchers for the Hwasong-7.^[35] Academic research in 2015 suggested North Korea had about 1,000 ballistic missiles:^[36] 600 Hwasong-series; 100 KN-02s;^[37] and 300 Hwasong-7s.^[38]

As of 2016, South Korea's military has identified three belts of North Korean missiles. The first are located about 50–90 km north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This belt reportedly has 500-600 Scud missiles that have ranges of 300–700 km. It said the North has some 40 transporter erector launchers (TELs) in this belt, which makes the missiles harder to detect.^[39]

In the second belt, lying 90–120 km north of the DMZ, Pyongyang is known to have placed 200-300 No Dong (also called Rodong) medium-range missiles with a range of around 1,300 km, with 30 TELs. In the third belt, lying deeper inside the country, the North may have 30-50 Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 30 TELs, with the latest reports indicating the deployment of the North's KN-08 long-range missiles.^[40]

As of 2017, North Korea is thought to possess about 900 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).^[41]

Rather speculative estimates are given in the following table:

Missile	Type	Origin	Range	Quantity	Comments
Hwasal-1	Cruise missile				In testing.
Hwasal-2	Cruise missile		1800 km^[42] ~2000 km^[43]		In testing.
Hwasong-5 (Scud-B)	SRBM		340 km^[44]	30+ launchers
Hwasong-6 (Scud-C)	SRBM		500 km
Hwasong-7 (Nodong mod 1/mod 2)	MRBM		900–1,500 km	10 launchers (est.)
Hwasong-8Hwasong-8 mod 1	SRBM			1+ launchers	In testing
Hwasong-11A (KN-23)	SRBM		240~800 km^[45] ^[46] ^[47] ^[48] ^[49]	17+ launchers	Similar to 9K720 Iskander or Hyunmoo-2, tested in August 2017.^[50] ^[51] ^[52] ^[53] In 2019, tests of the missile were conducted in May, July and August.^[54] ^[55] ^[56] ^[57] First launched from a railcar, September 2021.^[58]
Hwasong-11B (KN-24)	SRBM		410 km^[59]	9+ launchers	Some similarities to MGM-140 ATACMS, but larger, with aft-fins to maintain aerodynamic control over entire flight. Tested in August 2019 and March 2020.^[60]
Hwasong-11C (KN-23 mod 1)	SRBM			6+ launchers	In testing.
Hwasong-11S (KN-23 mod 2)	SRBM			"Some" launchers	In testing.
Hwasong-12Hwasong-12 mod 1	IRBM		5000–6000 km^[61]	10+ launchers	In testing.
Hwasong-14KN-20	ICBM^[62]		10,000+ km		Successfully tested in July 2017.
Hwasong-15KN-22	ICBM^[63]		13,000 km^[64]		Successfully tested in November 2017.^[65]
Hwasong-16b	IRBM^[66]		600-650 km^[67]		Successfully tested in April 2024.A solid-fuel IRBM in North Korean missile arsenal.
Hwasong-17KN-28	ICBM		>13,000 km		Successfully tested in March 2022.^[68]
Hwasong-18	ICBM				Successfully tested in April 2023.^[69] First solid-fuel ICBM in North Korean missile arsenal
KN-18	SRBM		450+ km		Scud-C variant that carries a Maneuverable reentry vehicle. Tested May 2017.^[70] ^[71]
KN-21	SRBM		250+ km		Scud-B/Hwasong-5 variant with maneuvering capabilities. Tested April 2017.^[72]
KN-25	SRBM/MLRS		380 km		"Super-large multiple rocket launcher," viewed as an SRBM by U.S. assessment.^[73] 30 tracked chassis and another 9 truck chassis are known to have been made for total of 216 guided rockets.^[74]
Pukguksong-2 KN-15	MRBM		1200 km^[75]		Operational and deployed to northern border in missile bases where Hwasong-7 is deployed.
Scud-ER	MRBM		1,000 km^[76] ^[77] ^[78]	"Some" launchers	Recently upgraded with new guidance and electronics.^[79]

Warheads

North Korean missiles can serve to deliver various types of warheads, including WMD. It is possible that up to three Rodong-1 missiles are fitted with nuclear warheads.^[80] In a similar manner to the initial Chinese nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons are being stored separately, and would only be mounted on missiles after an order of the supreme commander (Kim Jong Un). Despite the claims by numerous media that North Korea has not yet created nuclear warheads small enough to be fit in a missile, reports surfaced in April 2009, according to which North Korea has miniaturized warheads, capable of being mounted on its missiles.^[81] The most suitable nuclear weapons delivery system is the Rodong-1, which has been successfully tested many times.

North Korea possesses a large chemical weapons stockpile, including powerful agents such as tabun, sarin, soman, VX gas and others. Little is known about the biological weapons stockpiles. They are probably limited, as North Koreans consider them much more dangerous to handle, therefore posing a threat to their own soldiers.

North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to produce a re-entry vehicle, without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon accurately from an ICBM.^[82] However, a crude and highly-inaccurate blunt body reentry vehicle could be used in early missiles.^[36]

North Korea has been upgrading warheads for their Scud-derived ballistic missiles, with maneuverable reentry vehicle capability, in order to increase accuracy and evasion of ballistic missile defence systems such as THAAD.^[41]

Exports

Several countries, including Egypt, Vietnam, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or components, or received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production.^{[83] [84]}

See also

• North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
• North Korean missile tests
• List of states with nuclear weapons

References

Sources

• Book: The International Institute for Strategic Studies . The Military Balance 2024 . 15 February 2023 . Routledge . London . 978-1-032-78004-7 .
• Book: Pinkston, Daniel A. . The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program . February 2008 . Strategic Studies Institute, US Army . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20140826113522/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477526.pdf . 2014-08-26 .
• United States Defense Intelligence Agency . North Korea Military Power . 2021 . 978-0-16-095606-5.

Further reading

• Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat . Markus Schiller . RAND Corporation . TR-1268-TSF . 978-0-8330-7621-2 . 2012 . 19 January 2013.
• Reuters - A look at North Korea's missile arsenal
• Bermudez, Joseph S. (2001). Shield of the Great Leader. The Armed Forces of North Korea, The Armed Forces of Asia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. .
• Homer T. Hodge, North Korea's Military Strategy, Parameters (journal), Spring 2003, pp. 68–81
• Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: First Ballistic Missiles, 1979-1989".
• James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
• Zaloga, Steven; Illustrated by Jim Laurier and Lee Ray (2006). Scud Ballistic Missile Launch Systems 1955–2005. Osprey Publishing. .
• http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB842.pdf

External links

• KPA Equipment Holdings
• CIA World Factbook
• FAS
• Profile of Frog-7 published by the United States Army Center of Military History

Notes and References

1. Web site: North Korean military takes oath of loyalty . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20160917072918/https://www.enca.com/world/north-korean-military-takes-oath-loyalty . 2016-09-17 .
2. News: North Korea promotes unknown general to oversee missile development . . October 14, 2020 . Elizabeth . Shim . Kim Jong Gil, a military general with a three-star rank, was mentioned on Pyongyang's Korea Central Television on Wednesday. KCTV said the relatively unknown official is the commander of the Korean People's Army Strategic Force.
3. Web site: 30 August 2017 . Kim Jong Un Guides Strategic Ballistic Rocket Launching Drill of KPA Strategic Force . KCNA Watch.
4. Web site: Kim Jong-un Makes 1st Public Speech . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20120418101911/http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/16/2012041600655.html . 2012-04-18.
5. Web site: Internal Server Error.
6. Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat . Markus Schiller . RAND Corporation . TR-1268-TSF . 978-0-8330-7621-2 . 2012 . 19 January 2013 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20121205010548/http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1268.html . 5 December 2012 .
7. Web site: Marcus . Jonathan . BBC News - New ICBM missiles at North Korea parade 'fake' . Bbc.co.uk . 2012-04-27 . 2012-10-09 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20120824074219/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17867174 . 2012-08-24 .
8. Web site: U.N. Report Suggest N. Korean Parade Missiles Possibly Fakes | Defense News . https://archive.today/20130121220445/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120630/DEFREG03/306300005/U-N-Report-Suggest-N-Korean-Parade-Missiles-Possibly-Fakes . dead . January 21, 2013 . defensenews.com . 2012-10-05 . 2012-10-09.
9. News: The Associated Press . North Korean missiles dismissed as fakes - World - CBC News . Cbc.ca . 2012-04-26 . 2012-10-09 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20120615081342/http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/04/26/north-korea-missile-analysts-fake.html . 2012-06-15 .
10. Missile diplomacy: North Korea enhances tactical weapons as nuclear talks stall . Dominguez . Gabriel . IHS . Jane's Defence Weekly . 17 September 2019 . 23 September 2019.
11. https://www.38north.org/2019/05/melleman050819/ North Korea’s Newest Ballistic Missile: A Preliminary Assessment
12. https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiependdepetris090519/ Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles Into Perspective
13. https://www.38north.org/2019/10/melleman100919/ North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation
14. Web site: S. Korean Defense Ministry Releases 2020 White Paper.
15. News: . Undeclared North Korea: The Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base . November 12, 2018 . Joseph . Bermudez . Victor . Cha . Lisa . Collins . Although occasionally and incorrectly referred to as an “underground missile storage” facility, it is a forward Hwasong-5/-6 missile operating base subordinate to the Strategic Force of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), which is responsible for all ballistic missile units..
16. Web site: Chiha-ri Missile Base. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1 April 2003. 28 February 2021.
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19. Web site: Shin'gye Missile Base. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1 March 2003. 28 February 2021.
20. Web site: Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility. Joseph Bermudez. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 5 May 2020. 28 February 2021.
21. Web site: North Korea's Hodo Peninsula Training Area. Joseph Bermudez. Sun Young Ahn. 38 North. 5 August 2016. 28 February 2021.
22. Web site: Undeclared North Korea: The Yusang-ni Missile Operating Base. Joseph Bermudez. Victor Cha. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 9 May 2019. 28 February 2021.
23. News: North Korea Is Expanding Missile Base With Eye Toward U.S., Experts Warn. Choe Sang-Hun. The New York Times. 6 December 2018. 28 February 2021.
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25. Web site: The Sino-ri Missile Operating Base and Strategic Force Facilities. Joseph Bermudez. Victor Cha. Lisa Collins. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 21 January 2019. 28 February 2021.
26. Web site: Undeclared North Korea: The Sino-ri Missile Operating Base and Strategic Force Facilities. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Lisa Collins. 21 January 2019 . 2023-04-28.
27. Web site: No. 301 Factory. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1 March 2003. 28 February 2021.
28. Web site: North Korean Missile Base at Yeongjeo-dong. Dave Schmerler. Arms Control Wonk. 6 December 2018. 28 February 2021.
29. Web site: December 2019 Update: The Magunpo Solid Rocket Motor Test Facility. Joseph Bermudez. Victor Cha. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 13 December 2019. 28 February 2021.
30. Web site: December 2019 Update: Chamjin-ni Vertical Engine Test Stand. Joseph Bermudez. Victor Cha. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 19 December 2019. 28 February 2021.
31. Web site: North digs silos for missiles in Mt. Paektu area . . 10 October 2013 . 2 April 2014 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20140407074629/http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2978649 . 7 April 2014 .
32. News: North Korea: Test Stand for Vertical Launch of Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles Spotted . Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. . U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies . . 28 October 2014 . 4 November 2014 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20141104171238/http://38north.org/2014/10/jbermudez102814/ . 4 November 2014 .
33. News: North Korea fires submarine-launched ballistic missile towards Japan. 26 July 2017. Reuters. 24 Aug 2016.
34. Web site: Twitter. mobile.twitter.com. 13 July 2017.
35. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat . National Air and Space Intelligence Center . Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency . NASIC-1031-0985-09 . April 2009 . 20 February 2013 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20130203051545/http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/NASIC2009.pdf . 3 February 2013 .
36. The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems . John Schilling, Henry (Long) Kan . US-Korea Institute at SAIS . 2015 . 30 April 2015 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20160404215013/http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Delivery-Systems.pdf . 4 April 2016 .
37. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2014/03/05/99/0200000000AEN20140305002300315F.html N. Korea has 100 KN-02 missiles with extended range
38. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130304000893 Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea
39. Web site: Yonhapnews Agency - Mobile. m.yna.co.kr. en. 2017-10-31. 2017-11-07. https://web.archive.org/web/20171107023526/http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160814001351315&site=0300000000&mobile. dead.
40. Web site: Yonhapnews Agency - Mobile. m.yna.co.kr. en. 2017-10-31. 2017-11-07. https://web.archive.org/web/20171107023526/http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20160814001351315&site=0300000000&mobile. dead.
41. Web site: Introducing the KN21, North Korea's New Take on its Oldest Ballistic Missile.
42. https://www.38north.org/2022/01/north-koreas-fifth-and-sixth-rounds-of-january-missile-launches/ North Korea’s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches
43. Web site: (LEAD) N. Korean leader inspects long-range cruise missile launches by 'tactical nuke' units . 13 October 2022 .
44. Web site: Hwasong 5. https://web.archive.org/web/20161227213518/http://astronautix.com/h/hwasong5.html. dead. December 27, 2016.
45. Web site: New N.Korean Missile Poses Fresh Threat.
46. News: North Korea's Newest Missile Appears Similar to Advanced Russian Design. NPR. 8 May 2019. Brumfiel. Geoff.
47. Web site: North Korea Fired at Least One Unidentified Projectile, South Korea Says. 9 May 2019 .
48. Web site: (News Focus) New ballistic missile poses fresh security challenges to S. Korea and beyond: Experts. 26 July 2019.
49. Web site: [2보] 북한 "철도기동미사일연대 검열사격훈련"…김정은 불참. 16 September 2021.
50. Web site: New N.Korean Missile Resembles S.Korea's Hyunmu.
51. Web site: Did NK steal S. Korean missile design?. 21 February 2018.
52. Web site: North Korea's Army Day Military Parade: One New Missile System Unveiled. 38 North. 8 February 2018.
53. News: North Korea stages show of force with new missiles during parade. Reuters. 9 February 2018.
54. Web site: Janes | Latest defence and security news.
55. Web site: 'Three SRBMS launched by N. Korea,' USFK concludes.
56. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-23/ KN-23
57. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/kn-23/ KN-23
58. Web site: 2021-09-15. North Korea tested new train-launched ballistic missile system: state media. 2021-10-01. NK News. en-US.
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60. Web site: [News analysis] N. Korea completes development of new troika of ground-to-ground weaponry.
61. Web site: 北 "신형 중장거리미사일 발사 성공"…김정은 "美본토 타격권"(종합) . 15 May 2017 . 2017-07-03 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20170517001419/http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/nk/2017/05/15/4807080000AKR20170515010854014.HTML?template=2085 . 2017-05-17 .
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65. Web site: North Korea's upgraded missile has a new name. Business Insider. 2017-11-29. 2017-11-30. https://web.archive.org/web/20171130142722/http://www.businessinsider.com/hwasong-15-north-korea-icbm-2017-11. dead.
66. Web site: 2024-04-02 . North Korea says it tested a new hypersonic intermediate-range missile that's easier to hide . 2024-04-05 . AP News . en.
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70. Web site: KN-18 (Scud MaRV).
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