| Unit Name: | Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group |
| Native Name: | Zgrupowanie Stołpecko-Nalibockie |
| Dates: | June 3, 1943–January 17, 1945 |
| Country: | Polish Underground State |
| Allegiance: | Nowogródek District of the Home Army Kampinos Group 25th Infantry Regiment of the Home Army |
| Type: | ground force |
| Garrison: | Naliboki forest Kampinos Forest |
| Notable Commanders: | Kacper Miłaszewski, codenamed Lewald (first commander) Adolf Pilch, codenamed Dolina (last commander) |
The Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group was a partisan unit of the Home Army organized in the Stowbtsy District in the Eastern Borderlands, fighting from 1943 to 1945 in the Nowogródek Voivodeship, during the Warsaw Uprising, and in the Piotrków and Kielce regions.
The Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group originated from the Polish Partisan Unit organized in June 1943 at the . In its initial months, the unit engaged in intensive combat against the Germans, cooperating with Soviet partisans. However, in December 1943, the Soviets deceitfully abducted the battalion command and disarmed most of its subunits. Second Lieutenant Adolf Pilch, codenamed Góra/Dolina, took command of the remnants and, with his superiors' consent, temporarily truced with the Germans. This decision allowed the regrouping and rebuilding of the unit, continuing the fight against the Soviets until the end of June 1944.
In the summer of 1944, the group withdrew from the Naliboki forest and, maneuvering between the shattered German units on the Eastern Front, reached the vicinity of Warsaw. As part of the Kampinos Group, the Naliboki soldiers participated in the Warsaw Uprising, defending Żoliborz and the "Independent Republic of Kampinos." After the defeat at Jaktorów, Dolina and some surviving soldiers crossed the Pilica river and continued fighting the occupier until January 1945.
The Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group was one of the longest-lasting Polish partisan units and the only one to undertake such an extensive combat trail. During its existence, it fought over 230 battles and skirmishes against the Germans, Soviet partisans, and German-collaborating formations. The unit was thrice decimated but managed to regroup each time and continue the fight. Over 19 months, more than 1,950 soldiers passed through the ranks of the group, with around 800 falling in battle or being murdered.
During the period of the Second Polish Republic, the Stowbtsy District was part of the Nowogródek Voivodeship and was located directly along the state border with the Soviet Union. The Neman river flowed through the district, with the Naliboki forest extending along both of its banks. Dense forests particularly covered the eastern and central parts of the district. Poles made up 52.9% of the district's population, while the second-largest ethnic group were Belarusians (39.1%). After the September 1939 defeat, the Stowbtsy district, along with the rest of the eastern territories, came under Soviet occupation. The first cells of the Polish resistance movement emerged in this area as early as autumn 1939. These were mostly grassroots efforts, usually initiated by Polish youth or the intelligentsia. Many of these organizations were dismantled by the NKVD, but some managed to survive until June 1941. Additionally, in early spring 1940, a partisan unit under the command of Corporal Leonard Dąbrowski (a Border Protection Corps officer and resident of Ivyanyets) was formed in the Naliboki forest. In June 1940, Dąbrowski was killed in a battle with a Soviet sweep operation, and his unit was dispersed. However, small groups of surviving partisans continued to fight in the following months, with at least one group enduring until the end of the first Soviet occupation.
After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Stowbtsy District was incorporated into the newly created Reichskommissariat Ostland. Supported by Belarusian Auxiliary Police, the Germans exterminated most of the local Jews and imposed ruthless terror on the Polish population. Meanwhile, the Naliboki forest became a refuge for Red Army soldiers who had escaped from German camps or avoided capture after the defeat in the Battle of Białystok–Minsk, as well as for Jews who had fled from nearby ghettos. At the turn of 1942 and 1943, Soviet officers and commissars who had been transferred from behind the front lines began transforming these scattered groups of survivors into regular partisan units. Major General Vasily Y. Chernyshev, codenamed Platon, led the Baranovichi Partisan Group, while Grigory A. Sidorok, codenamed Dubov (the district secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Ivyanyets), was the commander of the Ivyanyets inter-district center. By late September 1943, the Baranovichi Group numbered 8,795 partisans, and ten months later, this number had grown to nearly 25,000. The Soviet partisans significantly harassed the local population, mass-requisitioning food, clothing, and other property. Often, these "economic operations" took the form of outright robbery, accompanied by beatings, murders, and rapes of women. The Jewish units of Bielski partisans and Symcha Zorin were particularly ruthless in looting the peasants.
Shortly after the start of the German occupation, the structures of the Union of Armed Struggle (renamed the Home Army in February 1942) began to form in the territories of the former Nowogródek Voivodeship. As early as November 1941, the command of the appointed Second Lieutenant Aleksander Warakomski, codenamed Świr, as the commander of the Stowbtsy District (codenamed Słup). Świr quickly established contact with the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Polish Armed Forces living in the area. His close collaborator became Reserve Lieutenant Kacper Miłaszewski, codenamed Lewald, one of the leaders of the local Polish community, who also enjoyed relative trust from the Soviet partisans.
Initially, the activities of the Słup District focused on accumulating supplies of weapons and ammunition and infiltrating the local structures of the Belarusian police and administration. The initiative to organize a Polish partisan unit likely emerged in December 1942 but initially did not gain the approval of the Nowogródek District leadership. Over time, factors such as the increasing number of exposed soldiers and the voluntary or forced enlistment of Polish youth into the ranks of the Soviet partisans contributed to a change in the district command's position. They realized that without creating a Polish armed force, it would be impossible to protect the local population from looting and excesses by the formally allied Soviet units. The massacre of the residents of the village of Naliboki by Soviet partisans on the night of 7/8 May 1943 particularly galvanized the decision to organize a partisan unit.
See main article: Naliboki massacre. On 3 June 1943, the first recruitment into the ranks of the Polish unit took place at the Kul estate deep in the Naliboki forest. On that day, 44 volunteers reported, becoming the nucleus of the future Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group. The local Home Army leadership initially planned for Second Lieutenant Witold Pełczyński, codenamed Dźwig, to command the unit. However, he was wounded by an accidental grenade explosion on the first day. In these circumstances, Lieutenant Kacper Miłaszewski, codenamed Lewald, took command. News of the formation of the Polish unit quickly spread among the local population. Despite accepting only armed and uniformed volunteers, the unit's strength grew to 130 soldiers within ten days. Shortly afterward, a dozen or so volunteer cavalrymen joined the unit under the leadership of Warrant Officer, codenamed Noc, enabling the formation of a mounted patrol.
Given that the Naliboki forest was controlled by a large Soviet partisan group, the formation of a Polish unit would not have been possible without first regulating mutual relations. Initially, the allies demanded that Soviet officers command the unit. They eventually dropped this demand but maintained several other far-reaching conditions, including a prohibition on the unit maintaining contacts with Polish leadership centers in Warsaw and London, a ban on recruiting Poles not from the Nowogródek Voivodeship, tactical subordination of the unit to Soviet command, and the freedom to spread communist propaganda among the soldiers. With the Nowogródek District command's consent, Polish negotiators accepted all Soviet conditions without intending to adhere to them in practice. Furthermore, the Polish delegates effectively concealed their organizational affiliation, leaving the Soviet command unaware until September 1943 that the unit was part of the Home Army and believing it had been formed solely by local Poles.
The details of the cooperation were agreed upon a few days after the unit's formation. The Naliboki forest was divided into Polish and Soviet sectors, where partisans from the other side could not move without valid passes. It was agreed that Polish and Soviet partisans would procure supplies respectively on the western and eastern sides of the 1939 border. The Soviet side promised to agitate the Polish population residing or sheltering in their controlled area to join the Polish unit. Even the unit's name became a matter of negotiation, as the Soviets demanded it be named after Wanda Wasilewska or Felix Dzerzhinsky. Ultimately, they settled on the compromise name Tadeusz Kościuszko Polish Partisan Unit.
The partisan group of the Home Army formed based on the Słup District was called the Stowbtsy Group. The name Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group, which is most frequently found in the literature, emerged only after the war and was not used during the unit's existence.
In the Nowogródek structures of the Home Army, the group was usually referred to as the Polish Partisan Unit. In official district documents, the codenames battalion from 'Słup or battalion no. 330 were also used. In correspondence with the Soviet partisans, the agreed-upon name Tadeusz Kościuszko Polish Partisan Unit or simply Tadeusz Kościuszko Battalion was used.
During the fighting in the Naliboki forest, soldiers of the Stowbtsy Group were commonly referred to as legionnaires. This term was used by the Germans, Soviet partisans, and the local Polish and Belarusian population. After the war, referring to the pseudonym of the group's most famous commander, Lieutenant Adolf Pilch, codenamed Dolina, the informal name Doliniacy was also used.
See main article: Iwieniec Uprising. A few days after the formation of the unit, the Polish command decided to launch an attack on Ivyanyets. This town, elevated during the occupation to the status of a raion capital, was defended by a strong garrison consisting of between 500 and 700 Germans and Belarusian policemen.[1] The aim of the attack was to free the arrested members of the local resistance network and preempt a similar Soviet action. After obtaining approval from the district command, the operation was scheduled for 22 June 1943. However, Polish intelligence soon learned that the Germans had ordered a mass conscription into the and a requisition of horses for the German army on June 19. This presented an excellent opportunity to covertly smuggle armed partisans into the town, leading to the decision to advance the operation by three days. The Polish plans envisaged attacking Ivyanyets both from within and from the outside.
The attack on Ivyanyets, historically known as the Ivyanyets Uprising, began at noon on June 19. In the first phase of the operation, the Polish partisans cut off telephone communication and easily took control of the post office and the economic office. The Belarusian policemen, many of whom were covert members of the Home Army, surrendered relatively quickly. The German gendarmes, however, put up fierce resistance for over two hours, which was only broken by setting the gendarmerie building on fire. Meanwhile, Polish partisans managed to effectively engage two companies of the Luftwaffe stationed in barracks by the Wołma river. Ivyanyets remained free for nearly 18 hours, with Polish soldiers evacuating the town at 6:00 AM on June 20.
The "uprising" ended in complete success. For the loss of three dead and from 6 to 11 wounded, the Polish partisans killed between several dozen to 150 Germans and freed all prisoners, including some Jews. Between 100 and 200 Belarusian policemen joined the Polish unit. The partisans also captured large quantities of weapons, ammunition, food, and other supplies. According to Kazimierz Krajewski, the capture of Ivyanyets was one of the largest armed actions in the history of the Home Army.
The victory at Ivyanyets allowed the Polish unit to increase its numbers to approximately 300 soldiers. Within the following two weeks, this number nearly doubled. Reports indicate that on the eve of the pacification of Naliboki forest, the Polish unit numbered 554 soldiers. Other sources estimate its strength at between 600 and 650 partisans. This growth in numbers enabled the unit to transform into a partisan battalion. By the summer of 1943, its organizational structure was as follows:
The battalion's ranks included soldiers of both Polish and Belarusian nationalities. Additionally, several Jews served in the rear units, although Lieutenant Lewald, remembering the stance of the local Jewish population during the Soviet occupation, agreed to accept only Jews from western or central Poland into the unit. estimated that the battalion's arsenal at that time included: 4 heavy machine guns, 15 light machine guns, 30 submachine guns, approximately 100 ten-shot rifles, about 400 rifles, over 100 pistols and revolvers, several thousand grenades, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Kazimierz Krajewski estimated that on the eve of the pacification of Naliboki forest, the Polish unit had 6 heavy machine guns, 27 light machine guns, 19 submachine guns, 58 ten-shot rifles, 405 rifles, and 105 handguns.
After retreating from Ivyanyets, the Polish unit stopped in, where the aforementioned reorganization was carried out. Upon completion, the battalion moved to the southern part of Naliboki forest, around the village of Bielica and the Drywiezna forest glade. There, they began organizing partisan camps, stockpiling food and clothing, and constructing bunkers and makeshift stables. Lieutenant Lewald also ordered intensive training for the volunteers. Within less than a week, the Polish partisans eliminated Belarusian police posts in Starzyń and Kisłuchy (June 28), Derewno and (June 30), and Zasula and (July 3). They were also preparing an attack on the German garrison in Mir. Relations with the Soviet partisans were amicable during this period. On July 7, soldiers of the 1st Company, along with a group of Soviet partisans, successfully ambushed a column of German vehicles near Wołma, destroying from 5 to 6 vehicles and killing several dozen Germans.
See main article: Operation Hermann. The Ivyanyets Uprising resonated throughout the Nowogródek Voivodeship and greatly alarmed the German command. The occupiers resolved to eliminate the partisan bases in the Naliboki forest at all costs. To this end, they assembled a significant force, numbering up to 60,000 soldiers and policemen, supported by aviation, artillery, and armored units. The anti-partisan operation, codenamed Hermann, was personally led by the SS and Police Leader in Belarus, SS-Brigadeführer Curt von Gottberg. His staff was joined by SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Reichsführer's special representative for combating partisans.
Operation Hermann began on July 13, with the first clashes occurring on the morning of July 20 (Kazimierz Krajewski notes July 15). According to prior arrangements, Polish and Soviet partisans jointly attempted to resist the pacification effort. Initially, the Home Army soldiers effectively defended the Minsk–Novogrudok route passing through the forest and the crossings on the Szura river. On the first day of fighting, they inflicted significant losses on the Germans, killing up to 50. However, on the second day, the Polish command was surprised to discover that the Soviet units, tasked with covering both flanks of the Polish battalion, had abandoned their defensive positions without warning. Years later, some Polish historians and veterans speculated that the Soviets intended to destroy the Polish unit using German hands, deliberately exposing its flanks. However, surviving Soviet documents indicate that under German pressure, a larger part of the Dubov Group panicked and dispersed.Threatened with encirclement, the Home Army battalion was forced to retreat deeper into the forest. Initially, the Polish partisans successfully evaded the German dragnet, although they had to abandon most of their transport during the crossing of the Shubin-German canal. Soon, the unit was pushed into the most inaccessible part of the Naliboki forest, known as the Bare Swamps. With the encirclement tightening and no possibility of continuing open combat, the Polish command was compelled to split the battalion into small groups of from 20 to 25 soldiers and order them to find safety on their own. Most partisans managed to escape the dragnet, but many were killed or captured. Soviet brigades managed to break through to the vicinity of Minsk but suffered heavy losses in the process.
The blockade of the Naliboki forest ended on August 8. The Polish battalion suffered losses of at least 40 killed, several dozen wounded, and over 100 missing. Among the fallen and murdered were the commander of the 1st Company, Cadet Officer Lech, and the commander of the 3rd Company, Staff Sergeant Szary. The latter company, composed mainly of deserters from the Belarusian auxiliary police, suffered the heaviest losses, as many of its soldiers, having escaped encirclement, chose not to return to the partisans. The battalion lost nearly 60% of its weapons, including all heavy machine guns and mortars, as well as its transport and most of its horses. The greatest victims of Operation Hermann, however, were the civilian population. To deprive the partisans of support, the Germans created a "scorched earth" zone within a radius of between 10 and 15 kilometers around the forest. They completely destroyed 60 villages and an undetermined number of individual farmsteads and forester's lodges, killing 4,280 people. Between 21,000 and 25,000 people were sent for forced labor to the Third Reich. The elderly, women, and children were resettled outside the blockade zone.
After the blockade ended, the Polish battalion regrouped around Drywiezna. The soldiers were exhausted from previous battles and were suffering from a severe lack of weapons, food, clothing, and equipment. Due to the lack of radio communication and the peripheral location of the Stowbtsy Center, contact with the district headquarters in Lida was irregular, causing a sense of isolation among the soldiers. Under these circumstances, the morale within the unit was low, with instances of desertion occurring. Nevertheless, the unit was in the process of rebuilding, and volunteers continued to join. Shortly after the blockade ended, a 30-man Home Army detachment from the, led by Cadet Officer Andrzej Kutzner, codenamed Mały, joined the battalion.
Meanwhile, the district command decided to strengthen the battalion's leadership with a few Silent Unseen paratroopers sent from the United Kingdom. At the end of August, Lieutenant, codenamed Grom, joined the unit, followed on September 6 by Lieutenant, codenamed Ikwa, and Second Lieutenant Adolf Pilch, codenamed Góra. The commander of the Słup Center, Lieutenant Świr, instructed Góra to take command of the battalion. Initially, Góra resisted, citing his low rank and unfamiliarity with local conditions. He relented only when Świr agreed to consider his appointment temporary and promised to request an officer with appropriate qualifications from the district command to take over the battalion. Lieutenant Lewald, who had been commanding the unit, was appointed "officer for special assignments", with his main task being to represent the group in contacts with Soviet partisans.
The arrival of the Silent Unseen significantly boosted the battalion's morale. By the end of November, the number of soldiers had risen to about 400. In September and October, the Polish partisans carried out several successful combat operations against the Germans and their Belarusian collaborators. Concurrently, Góra reorganized the battalion. The existing infantry sub-units were restructured into the 1st Assault Company under Second Lieutenant Ikwa and the 2nd Sabotage-Diversion Company under Lieutenant Grom. A new agreement was also reached with the Ivyanyets group of Soviet partisans, under which both sides pledged not to requisition from civilians in the forest-adjacent zone and within a 20-kilometer radius around the Naliboki forest. Preparations began for joint raids on German garrisons in Mir, Starzyna, and Zasula, which ultimately did not materialize. Additionally, Polish partisans established contacts with Alsatians conscripted into the Wehrmacht, who were guarding a section of the Brest–Minsk railway line near Kołosowo. Negotiations led to an agreement for the Alsatians to desert the German army and join the Polish group. However, the agreement was not executed, as the Germans relocated the Alsatians to the Minsk area almost at the last minute. Lieutenant Ikwa
Between June 3 and November 30, 1943, the Polish partisan unit fought between 40 and 52 battles against the Germans and their Belarusian collaborators, destroying three bridges and derailing three trains. Approximately 200 AK soldiers were killed or murdered in the fight against the German occupiers.
On November 6, additional officers from Warsaw arrived at the Polish camp: Major Wacław Pełka, codenamed Wacław, Second Lieutenant Julian Bobrownicki, codenamed Klin, Second Lieutenant Maciej Rzewuski, codenamed Zator, and Cadet Officer Józef Borkowski, codenamed Junosza. With the authority of the district command, Major Pełka took command of the battalion, with Second Lieutenant Góra serving as his deputy. Lieutenant Klin was appointed officer for educational and informational matters. Wacław was an experienced soldier but, as a pre-war staff officer, he had significant difficulties adapting to the specifics of partisan warfare. In particular, he alienated the soldiers with his excessive adherence to regulations and barracks discipline. Additionally, in dealings with Soviet officers, the new commander showed a lack of diplomatic skills.
Despite various minor incidents, relations between the Polish and Soviet partisans had been generally amicable for a long time. However, by the end of October, these relations began to deteriorate. Soviet "whispering propaganda" claimed that the Silent Unseen were actually British spies sent to the Eastern Borderlands with the mission of conducting anti-Soviet activities. Polish soldiers, and even officers, were being persuaded to desert and join the Soviet partisans (Ensign Noc and Sergeant Major Dąb were explicitly encouraged to eliminate their group's commander). Contrary to previous agreements, one Soviet unit incorporated a group of Czechs from the Organization Todt who had defected intending to join the Polish unit. Conversely, the Polish command refused to hand over two Kashubians who, after deserting from the Wehrmacht, had joined the Soviet partisans but then fled to the Polish unit. The Soviet side also reacted very negatively to the celebration of Polish Independence Day organized by the Polish unit in Derewno, as during the ceremony, Lieutenant Świr delivered a speech unequivocally affirming the Eastern Borderlands' belonging to Poland.
A serious incident occurred in the second half of November. On the night of November 17/18, Polish horse reconnaissance received information that Jews were looting in the village of . Ensign Noc immediately mobilized his soldiers and drove the attackers, who turned out to be Soviet partisans from Symcha Zorin's unit (composed mainly of Jews), out of the village. Shortly afterward, ten of Zorin's men arrived at Noc
Due to the deteriorating relations with their allies, the intelligence and counterintelligence of the Stowbtsy Battalion had to start operating against the Soviets as well. Fearing that such operations might openly antagonize the Soviets, Lieutenant Lewald led to the formation of a so-called Wołma Platoon under the command of Corporal Antoni Jankowski. This subunit pretended to be an independent unit, and its main task was to observe the actions of the Soviet partisans and counter any potential anti-Polish actions from their side.
At the end of November, the commander of the Ivyanyets group, Colonel Grigoriy Sidorok, codenamed Dubov, contacted the command of the Polish battalion, announcing that he would appear at the Polish camp on December 1 to address the soldiers. Dubov expected the Poles to concentrate all their units in the main camp at Drywieźno, thus enabling him to speak to as many partisans as possible. Contrary to the warnings of Lieutenant Góra, Major Wacław decided to fulfill all the Soviet colonel's wishes. Units in the field were ordered to return to the camp by dawn on December 1 at the latest. On the day before the announced visit (according to other sources, on November 27), another Soviet liaison appeared in the Polish camp, bringing an invitation for the staff and commanders of the Polish units to a war council organized by Dubov. The briefing, supposedly in connection with German preparations for another anti-partisan operation, was scheduled for November 30. However, since this date coincided with the name day of several officers, Wacław decided that the Polish delegation would set out for the Soviet headquarters early on December 1.
On December 1 at 6:00 AM, a delegation from Drywieźno departed, consisting of Major Wacław, Lieutenant Lewald, Lieutenant Ikwa, Second Lieutenant Zator, Second Lieutenant Klin, Second Lieutenant Waldan (Walenty Parchimowicz, security officer), Cadet Junosza, as well as several other officers and a dozen or so soldiers as escort. Shortly after leaving the camp, the delegation was unexpectedly surrounded by a strong unit of Soviet partisans. All the Poles were disarmed and then escorted to Dubov
Captured Home Army soldiers were taken to Soviet bases deep in the Naliboki forest. Ten officers and organizers of the Polish unit were placed separately in strictly guarded dugouts and subjected to intensive interrogation. After the investigation, the investigative group appointed by General Platon filed a motion to execute all ten prisoners. Eventually, at the demand of Panteleimon Ponomarenko, head of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, Wacław, Lewald, Klin, Grom, and Ikwa were transported by air to the other side of the front on the night of 13/14 January 1944. They were all imprisoned in Moscow's Lubyanka, then sent to Gulags, from which they managed to return only in 1948. The remaining five accused – Waldan, Zator, Cadet Tadeusz Migacz, codenamed Mita, Senior Sergeant Sergiusz Howorka, codenamed Jaszczołd, and Corporal Władysław Skrodzki, codenamed Jan – were executed. In total, the Soviets killed between 30 and 50 abducted soldiers. Among the victims, besides the aforementioned officers, were Cadet Junosza, Corporal Antoni Jankowski, Second Lieutenant Michał Meisner, codenamed Mazur, Second Lieutenant Witold Kryński, codenamed Sibisz, and Lieutenant Ludwik Wierszyłowski, codenamed Ludek. The remaining Poles were incorporated into various Soviet units in groups of 3 or 4 and subjected to close surveillance. General Płaton stated in the letter to Colonel Dubov on 1/2 December 1943:
Comrade 'Dubov'. You conducted the operation excellently. That's very good. I expected it couldn't be executed without a major bloodshed (…). Take the Poles into the units and keep them in groups (without weapons for now) under the command of our commanders. Some should be recruited and sent home. Scoundrels, especially policemen, landowners, settlers, shoot, but quietly so no one knows.Before the disarmament of the battalion, Ensign Noc, who had been receiving vague rumors of the Soviets' aggressive intentions for some time, managed to obtain permission to lead his cavalry squadron "into the field". Upon hearing of the Soviet attack, the ensign immediately directed his unit to Derewno, but the cavalrymen arrived too late to save the infantrymen of Ikwa
On December 3, after a strenuous march through the Islach marshes, the Maladzyechna group led by Second Lieutenant Góra reached the village of Osowo, where they joined Noc
In the first days of December, members of the Home Army embedded in the Belarusian police provided assistance to the Polish partisans. However, this support was temporary and could not change the difficult situation of the unit in the long run. On December 7, soldiers under Góra were attacked in the village of Kunasze by a strong detachment of Soviet partisans. Most of the ammunition was used up in this clash. The number of soldiers decreased to 42 due to losses and the desertion of 16 lancers (12 of whom were later re-enlisted). The soldiers were exhausted from constant escape and almost daily skirmishes, lacking ammunition and essential equipment. Thousands of Soviet partisans were consistently pushing the Poles into territories controlled by the Germans.
The Germans quickly learned of the Polish-Soviet conflict. Soon, through the Polish population, they began sending signals indicating their willingness to conclude a "non-aggression pact" with the Home Army unit. Seeing no alternative, Góra decided, with the consent of the remaining officers, to approach the gendarmerie command in Ivyanyets with a proposal for an armistice. Talks took place on December 9 near the village of Kulczyce. The Germans proposed that the Polish partisans come under their command, which was firmly refused. Góra also rejected the German offer of assistance in case of a Soviet attack. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that both sides would maintain mutual neutrality. The Germans agreed to place a small area about 4 km from Ivyanyets under the control of the Home Army soldiers. Additionally, they provided the Poles with several thousand rounds of ammunition and promised to supply more arms and ammunition in exchange for food deliveries.
The agreement was approved by the command of the Nowogródek District of the Home Army. However, news of Góra
Initially, it was assumed that the truce would last no more than a few days, but it actually remained in effect until almost the end of June 1944. In the short term, the agreement proved beneficial for both sides. After 1 December 1943, Soviet partisans in the Naliboki forest focused on fighting the Home Army, practically giving up more serious actions against the Germans. Meanwhile, by concluding the truce with the Germans, Góra gained the necessary time and resources to rebuild the unit shattered by the Soviets. Upon learning that the Polish group had not been annihilated and was still fighting, 75 to 150 abducted soldiers escaped from the Soviet units over the next few months. New volunteers also continued to join the unit. By mid-January 1944, Góra
Marian Podgóreczny claimed that the Germans were very reluctant to provide Góra
The Polish-German agreement was verbal, and in practice, both sides treated each other with distrust and assumed from the beginning that it was temporary. Góra prohibited his soldiers from maintaining any contacts with the Germans and their Belarusian collaborators without the command's consent. Anti-German actions were not completely abandoned. On Góra
Meanwhile, a regular Polish-Soviet partisan war erupted along the Niemen river. Dubov
Depending on the sources, it is estimated that by the end of June 1944, the soldiers of Góra engaged in 104, over 120, or even more than 160 skirmishes with Soviet partisans. Despite the enemy's clear numerical and armament advantage, the Stowbtsy Group usually emerged defensively from these clashes. This is evidenced by the fact that as a result of the fights between 1 December 1943 and 1 January 1944, Soviet partisans lost approximately 150 killed and around 120 captured and disarmed, while Polish losses amounted to a dozen killed. Kazimierz Krajewski estimated that by the end of June 1944, Góra
One of the most serious clashes between Polish and Soviet partisans occurred on the night of 13/14 May 1944 in Kamień near Ivyanyets. The village, where between 100 and 120 Polish infantrymen from the 1st company were stationed, was attacked by between 700 and 800 Soviet partisans. After a fierce several-hour battle, the attackers were close to victory, but the arrival of Polish reinforcements forced them into a hasty retreat. Both sides suffered serious losses in this skirmish. Between 16 and 21 Polish partisans, including the company commander, Sergeant Józef Zujewski, codenamed Mak, were killed, and another 23 soldiers were wounded. Additionally, 20 residents of Kamień were killed, and the village itself was partially burned down. Soviet losses were estimated at around 80 killed and wounded. After this battle, Dubov
See main article: Operation Tempest and Operation Ostra Brama. Due to the steady increase in the number of partisans, Góra was able to conduct a reorganization of the group by the end of February. The cavalry reconnaissance squadron led by Warrant Officer Noc was transformed into a cavalry squadron, while the infantry was formed into a battalion under the command of Second Lieutenant Witold Pełczyński, codenamed Dźwig. In April, by decision of the district command, the infantry unit was officially named the 1st Battalion of the 78th Słuck Infantry Riflemen Regiment, while the cavalry unit was named the 1st Squadron of the 27th Uhlan Regiment. At the same time, the district command reassigned several officers to the Stowbtsy Group to fill vacant command positions. Among those who joined the group were Lieutenant Jerzy Piestrzyński, codenamed Helski, Second Lieutenant Franciszek Baumgart, codenamed Dan, Second Lieutenant Witold Lenczewski, codenamed Strzała, and Second Lieutenant Mikołaj Stecki, codenamed Nowina. Additionally, Dr. Antoni Banis, codenamed Kleszczyk, reported to Lieutenant Góra and organized a field hospital based in Giliki.Personnel changes also affected the leadership of the Słup Center. On 1 December 1943, the commander of the center, Lieutenant Świr, was abducted by Soviet partisans, but he managed to escape from the prisoner column the same day. However, the district command deemed him compromised and transferred him to the position of commander of the Bór Center in Lida. Lieutenant, codenamed Kula, was appointed as the commander of the Stowbtsy Center. In April 1944, he left Stowbtsy and joined Góra
The competency chaos prevailing at that time in the command of the Vilnius and Nowogródek districts can be illustrated by the fact that Inspector of the Baranavichy Inspectorate, Captain Andrzej Wierzbicki, codenamed Józef, who formally oversaw the Stowbtsy Group, was not informed of Kotwicz
On 22 June 1944, a major Red Army offensive known as Operation Bagration began in Belarus. In a short time, four Soviet fronts almost completely defeated the German Army Group Centre, initiating a rapid westward advance. The Stowbtsy Group, lacking effective communication with the district command, learned about the Red Army's progress through reports from refugees and the sounds of artillery fire. Due to the approaching Soviet forces, the lack of promised maps and guides, and the failure of Major Kotwicz
Before starting the retreat, Góra decided to seize Rakaw, where he intended to mobilize members of the local Home Army network. On the morning of June 29, the town was captured by soldiers of 1st Company under Lieutenant Dan. Without encountering resistance, the Polish partisans disarmed 40 Belarusian policemen and three German gendarmes. They also eliminated the Belarusian police post in nearby Borek. Additionally, they disarmed a Belarusian police unit of over thirty men who arrived from Zaslawye. About 50 policemen who were Home Army members or collaborators joined the Polish group, and around 100 members of the youth organization Young Eagles were mobilized. After completing the action, Dan left Rakaw, taking three German gendarmes as hostages. These events were dubbed the "Rakaw Uprising" by the local population.
On the evening of June 29, Dan reached the Rubieżewicze area, where the main forces of the group had stopped. That same day, Góra
Upon reaching the Baranavichy area, Góra failed to establish contact with Inspector Józef. Due to a lack of time, the mobilization of Home Army members from the Baranavichy and Nyasvizh areas had to be abandoned, and the planned attack on the Kołdyczewo concentration camp was not carried out (it had already been liquidated by the Germans). Without communication with the command, Góra decided to continue marching westward. On July 3, the Stowbtsy Group reached the village of Derewna near Slonim, where they spent the night and the entire following day. Despite efforts, they failed to contact the local Home Army command. Only a group of about 20 Home Army members led by Cadet Officer Józef Bylewski, codename Grom, joined the group. Shortly before, a messenger from Captain Józef finally reached Góra, but the orders he delivered, which involved conducting sabotage operations in the Baranavichy and Nyasvizh counties, were already outdated. On July 5, the group resumed their westward march, crossing the unguarded bridge over the Shchara river the same day. After crossing the Shchara, wagons with civilian refugees gradually began to detach from the group. On July 6, the Polish units encountered a strong unit of Russian-speaking collaborators in Rościewicze. Both sides parted ways without a single shot. Six days later, Germans detained one of the Polish patrols in the village of Pruszanka Stara. Envoys were sent to the gendarmes, informing them that the Polish group was an anti-Bolshevik formation and threatening force if the detainees were not released. The Germans yielded to this threat, and the partisans were freed.
On the evening of July 15, the Stowbtsy Group crossed the Bug river near Dzierzb in Sokołów County, entering the territory of the General Government. The next day, a solemn field mass was held on the meadows near Dzierzb. After the service, Góra gave a speech to the soldiers, announcing the end of the truce with the Germans. This news caused great enthusiasm among the gathered. Upon hearing of the truce's end, the 2nd squadron cavalrymen independently executed three German gendarmes captured in Rakaw. That same day, the Naliboki soldiers also attacked a German car entering Dzierzb, killing its four occupants.
The march from Dzierzb resumed on July 17. The group moved into Węgrów County, reaching Kałęczyn the next day, where they stayed until July 21. During the march through Podlachia and Mazovia, attempts were made to contact the Home Army command. Local commanders, however, either were unwilling or unable to help, and seeking higher-level contacts for too long was risky due to the rapid advance of the Red Army. Góra and his staff had to independently decide on further steps. Most officers opposed the idea of demobilizing the group and settling soldiers in Podlachia villages. The proposal to move to the Świętokrzyskie Mountains was deemed impractical. Ultimately, they decided to attempt moving to the Kampinos Forest near Warsaw.
On July 24, Góra
During the 27-day march, the Stowbtsy Group covered a distance of several hundred kilometers, crossing the Niemen, Shchara, and Bug rivers. Human and equipment losses were minimal. This success was due to Góra
After a short stop in Okunin, the group resumed their march and, slipping between enemy columns, reached the market square in Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki late in the afternoon of July 25. The confused Germans did not open fire, but blocked the nearby bridge over the Vistula as a precaution. Negotiations soon began. The Polish group was represented by a delegation consisting of Lieutenant Kula, Second Lieutenant Dan, Lieutenant Aleksander Wolski, codenamed Jastrząb, and Warrant Officer Stefan Andrzejewski, codenamed Wyżeł. The German side was represented by the commander of the Modlin Fortress Dispersed Units Assembly Point, Colonel H. von Biber, and his adjutant, Major Jaster von Valdan.
The conversation lasted about half an hour. At the outset, Kula informed the Germans that they were dealing with the allied Polish Legion, which was fighting Bolshevism alongside the Wehrmacht. He simultaneously requested permission to cross the bridge and asked for supplies and forage for the unit. In response, Colonel von Biber demanded the Polish delegates present documents verifying their claims. Meanwhile, the Germans prepared for a possible fight. Several armored vehicles approached the bridge area, and the guards took combat positions. Lieutenant Góra, who remained with the main forces of the group, also ordered combat readiness. Ultimately, bloodshed was avoided, as the German officers accepted Kula
Upon arrival in Dziekanów Polski, the numbers and organizational structure of the Stowbtsy Group were as follows:
On 26 July 1944, the group comprised 861 officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. The armament included 7 grenade launchers, 11 heavy machine guns, 41 light and heavy machine guns, 43 ten-shot rifles, 53 submachine guns, 627 rifles, 137 pistols, 794 grenades, and 195,500 rounds of ammunition. Additionally, the group had 589 horses, 320 saddles, 185 wagons, and 8 tachankas.
Early in the morning of July 26, Góra rode a bicycle to Warsaw, hoping to establish contact with the Home Army leadership. However, the trip to the capital ended in complete failure. Although Góra accidentally met his fellow Silent Unseen, codenamed Pług, on the street, Borys, in response to Góra
On July 26 or 27, Szymon established contact with the commander of Warsaw County Subdistrict, Major, codenamed Bronisław. In his initial reaction, Bronisław ordered the disarmament of Góra
The decision of the Home Army High Command was motivated solely by political reasons. On the eve of the planned uprising, the leadership of the underground army deliberately refrained from using the well-armed and battle-hardened group, fearing that its presence near Warsaw would hinder cooperation with the Red Army. Furthermore, the order, which later described as crazy and insane,[2] effectively doomed the Stowbtsy Group to destruction, as the soldiers from the Eastern Borderlands had no chance of breaking through several hundred kilometers into the German rear. It has not yet been established who personally was behind the issuance of this order (it was given only verbally). According to Kazimierz Krajewski, the author or authors of this order should be sought among the officers of the Home Army High Command who supported a compromise with the Soviet Union.
Shaken by the content of the order, Góra told Szymon that he could not carry it out. Instead, he proposed that he and his entire group submit to his command. Szymon quickly seized upon this proposal. He shared Góra
After taking command of Góra
In the last days of July, Lieutenant Kula separated from the group. Due to contracting dysentery, he went to Warsaw for treatment, where he was caught by the outbreak of the uprising.
On August 1 at 3:00 PM, Captain Szymon received the order from the commander of the Warsaw District of the Home Army to start the uprising in the capital and its outskirts. Given that this happened just two hours before the designated start time, the scattered and not fully mobilized forces of the VIII Region had no chance to complete their concentration and strike their main target, which was the, by the deadline. Ultimately, only the partially mobilized 1st Battalion of the Kampinos forces took part in the first attack on the airfield. The main forces of the VIII Region completed their concentration in the area of Hill 103 in in the night of August 1/2.The second attack began around 4:00 AM on August 2. At that time, 984 Home Army soldiers attacked, including infantry from Lieutenant Dźwig
See main article: Insurgent attacks on the Bielany airfield.
While the main forces of the VIII Region were storming the airfield, the dismounted squadron of the 27th Uhlan Regiment attempted to block the Warsaw–Modlin road. In ambushes near Pieńków and, the Naliboki uhlans killed between 34 and 41 Germans and destroyed 17 vehicles. Their own losses were limited to one killed and two wounded. However, lacking anti-tank weapons, the uhlans had to withdraw when German tanks appeared on the road.
After the unsuccessful attack on the airfield, the VIII Region forces withdrew deeper into the Kampinos Forest, to the area of the villages of Wiersze, Truskawka, Janówek, and Krogulec. On August 3, a German company was surprised and destroyed near Truskawka. For the price of relatively small losses, the Polish soldiers killed nearly 70 Germans and captured several more. The Naliboki soldiers (infantry from the 1st and 3rd Companies and uhlans from the 3rd Squadron) played a decisive role in this clash. Additionally, on the same day, the uhlans from the 2nd Squadron fought a victorious skirmish with a small Wehrmacht unit conducting requisitions in the Kampinos villages. These victories significantly boosted the morale of the Kampinos Home Army units, which had been shaken by the earlier defeat at the Bielany airfield.
On August 3, the Palmiry-Młociny Regiment of the Home Army was formed from the Kampinos units of the VIII Region and the units of the Stowbtsy Group. The severely wounded Szymon handed over command of the regiment during combat operations to Lieutenant Pilch. Szymon reserved assigning combat tasks and overall leadership for himself. At Szymon
In the evening of August 7, the units of the Palmiry-Młociny Regiment attacked German outposts along the road connecting Leszno and Babice. Witold
In the following days, the Naliboki units continued to fight with the Germans. On August 8, enemy tanks attacked the positions of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons in the Buda and Truskawka area. Two days later, Lieutenant Dan
See main article: Insurgent attacks on Warszawa Gdańska railway station. The Home Army command hoped that a strong partisan group from the Kampinos Forest would be able to come to the aid of insurgent Warsaw. The first orders in this matter reached Captain Szymon as early as August 8. However, due to the lack of weapons and ammunition and organizational difficulties, Szymon delayed sending his units to Warsaw.
By order of August 8, Szymon confirmed the transfer of combat command of the forces of the VIII Region to Dolina, simultaneously entrusting him with the task of integrating all Home Army units in the forest into one group. However, this task proved impossible due to jurisdictional and ambition disputes among the Home Army officers present in the forest. Captain, codenamed Serb, who arrived in the forest in early August with nearly 160 soldiers from the III Region of the Żoliborz Subdistrict, refused to subordinate to the VIII Region command. On August 11, Inspector of the Skierniewice Home Army Inspectorate, Lieutenant Colonel, codenamed Wiktor or Victor, arrived at the headquarters of the Palmiry-Młociny Regiment in Wiersze, who, on behalf of the commander of the, Lieutenant Colonel, codenamed Roman, attempted to subordinate all Kampinos units to himself. Victor and Roman referred primarily to pre-uprising guidelines from the Home Army Headquarters, which stipulated that all partisan units arriving from other areas were to subordinate themselves to the local commander (Wiersze was on the Hajduki territory). However, Szymon and Dolina, pointing to orders received from the Home Army Headquarters a few days earlier, firmly refused to comply with Victor
The insurgent command sent increasingly alarming orders to the Kampinos Group. Under these circumstances, on the evening of August 15, a well-armed relief force set out for Warsaw. Its core was a battalion of over 450 soldiers from the Palmiry-Młociny Regiment, led by the former commander of the Naliboki infantry, Lieutenant Witold. Most of the battalion's soldiers also came from the Stowbtsy Group, though, given the prospect of urban fighting, some companies were partly assigned Warsaw command staff and supplemented with soldiers from the city or its suburbs. The relief force, which included Captain Serb
On August 20, there were already six companies from the Kampinos Group in Żoliborz, numbering from 750 to 940 well-armed soldiers. The insurgent command decided to use the forest soldiers to break through the German barrier separating the Old Town from Żoliborz, centered around the Warszawa Gdańska railway station and the nearby circumferential railway line. This task was extremely difficult, as the station and tracks were defended by numerous German defensive positions, reinforced by bunkers and protected by barbed wire entanglements. The defenders were additionally supported by an armored train, and the tracks' foreground was flanked from the west and east by German artillery and machine gun fire from the nearby Chemical Institute, Buraków, Citadel, Traugutt Fort and Romuald Traugutt Park. The Polish units, on the other hand, did not have heavy weapons, and their command had a very vague idea of the enemy's numbers and positions. The forest soldiers were unfamiliar with the future battlefield and had no experience in urban warfare. The commander of insurgent Żoliborz, Lieutenant Colonel, codenamed Żywiciel, did not agree to assign them local guides. Abolishing the previous organizational division into Witold
By the end of August 1944, Kampinos Group had liberated the eastern and central areas of the Kampinos Forest from German occupation (areas inhabited by several thousand people). Under the control of the partisans were the villages of Ławy, Łubiec, Roztoka, Kiścinne, Krogulec, Wędziszew, Brzozówka, Truskawka, Janówek, Pociecha, Zaborów Leśny, and Wiersze. The area liberated by the Home Army soldiers was called the "Independent Republic of Kampinos". Its informal capital was Wiersze, where the headquarters of the group was located.
After over a thousand soldiers moved to Żoliborz, only about 500 armed partisans remained in the forest. The only larger operational unit with real combat value was the squadron of Uhlans under Captain Nieczaj. In the second half of August, the Naliboki cavalrymen intensively patrolled the borders of the "Independent Republic of Kampinos", conducting numerous raids and ambushes. Their activity kept the Germans under the mistaken impression that there was a large partisan group in the Kampinos Forest. As a result, the enemy did not attempt to destroy Kampinos Group during its greatest weakness, limiting themselves to cautious offensive actions in the Brzozówka and Janówek areas (August 22). Kazimierz Krajewski believed that in this way, the soldiers of the Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group saved the insurgent action in the Kampinos Forest for the second time.
On August 24, Major Okoń returned to Wiersze. He brought with him an order signed by General Pełczyński, confirming that all Home Army units in the Kampinos Forest were now under his command. According to this order, the primary task of the forest units was to receive drops from Allied aviation and organize regular deliveries of weapons, ammunition, food, and equipment for the fighting capital. In the following weeks, Okoń strictly adhered to these conservative guidelines, not deciding to undertake more serious sabotage actions behind the German lines fighting in Warsaw. Only thanks to the initiative of Dolina and other younger officers were several offensive actions organized between September 3 and 27, usually of local importance. Particularly successful were the raids on the subunits of the collaborative Kaminski Brigade quartered in Truskaw and Marianów (the first raid led by Dolina, the second by Nieczaj). Hundreds of Russians were killed, and large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment were captured. As a result of these defeats, the notorious Kaminski Brigade, known for numerous war crimes, had to be withdrawn from the vicinity of Warsaw. A significant success was also the attack on the sawmill in Piaski Królewskie led by Dolina. Additionally, Nieczaj
See main article: Raid on Truskaw. On September 27, the Germans launched a large-scale anti-partisan operation in the Kampinos Forest, codenamed Sternschnuppe (English: Falling Star). Following Major Okoń
However, many Home Army soldiers, including several intact units, managed to escape from the encirclement near Jaktorów. Lieutenant Dolina, with an improvised unit of over 50 men, broke through two German skirmish lines and then reached the nearby . At least 140 uhlans from the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons also broke through the encirclement in a fierce cavalry charge. Additionally, about 50 soldiers from the 3rd Squadron, which covered the charge, managed to escape from the encirclement. Some survivors reached the Mariańska Forest and joined Dolina
See main article: Battle of Jaktorów.
Summarizing the participation of the Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group in the Warsaw Uprising, historians point out that in terms of numbers and quality, its soldiers formed the core of the insurgent forces in the Kampinos Forest, both in the first days of August 1944 and after the formation of Kampinos Group. Without their participation, the uprising in the Kampinos Forest would likely have ended within a few days, as it did in other areas of the Warsaw County Subdistrict. Dolina
After the defeat at Jaktorów, about 200 soldiers from Kampinos Group managed to reach the Mariańska Forest, including around 70 infantrymen. Command over the remnants was taken by Lieutenant Dolina. Contrary to earlier plans, the lieutenant decided to stay in the forest for a while to gather as many soldiers as possible who were making their way towards the Świętokrzyskie Mountains on their own. Thanks to this decision, several dozen more survivors from Jaktorów were able to join the unit. Increased German activity soon forced Dolina to retreat across the Pilica river. The crossing was made on the night of October 2/3 near Nowe Miasto (between Lubocz and Dąbrowa). For nearly a day, the unit hid in the vicinity of Nowe Miasto, awaiting the expected arrival of Lieutenant Lawa
During the stop in the Przysucha forests, Dolina partially disbanded his unit, leaving the wounded and sick under the care of the local population. He himself, along with 80 cavalrymen, returned around October 10 across the Pilica river to gather more precise information about the scale of the defeat of Kampinos Group. On October 14, Dolina
On October 24, Dolina
After midnight on October 28, Dolina
At that time, the 25th Home Army Infantry Regiment numbered about 1,200 soldiers and was the only such large partisan unit of the Home Army in the Kielce region. Due to the fact that the regiment operated directly behind the front lines and in an area lacking larger forest complexes, it was impossible to avoid heavy fighting with the Germans in the long run. On November 4, Major Leśniak
After the battle at Boków, the unit withdrew to the forests near Radoszyce, where they set up an all-day rest. On November 7, Polish scouts reported that the Germans were bringing significant forces into the area. Dolina and other officers then proposed to the regiment's commander an immediate move to the forests south of the Końskie–Kielce road. Leśniak, wanting to allow the soldiers a longer rest, agreed only to a move to the area of the villages of Niebo and Piekło near Końskie. They set up a rest stop there for several hours, then on the afternoon of November 8, the 25th Infantry Regiment set off westward. Leśniak intended to return to the Opoczno forests, but while crossing the road near Wincentów, the unit came under heavy enemy fire. Panic broke out in the column, and only a counterattack by the Kampinos Battalion, which engaged the German machine gun nests, allowed the regiment to continue its retreat. In the ensuing chaos, some units became scattered, and during the crossing of the road and subsequent passage through the swamps, almost 50% of the transport and a significant amount of weapons were lost. In the early morning hours of November 9, the unit, reduced to just under 300 soldiers, reached Niemojewskie Hills. During the evening briefing, Major Leśniak decided to disband the 25th Infantry Regiment. He also commended the Kampinos Battalion for their exemplary conduct in the recent battles.
After the disbandment of the 25th Infantry Regiment, Dolina partially dissolved his battalion. All infantrymen, as well as sick and wounded lancers, were demobilized. The unit, henceforth known as the Independent Dolina Uhlan Squadron, was reduced to 60 cavalrymen (all armed with machine guns). Organizationally, the unit remained divided into two platoons, commanded by Second Lieutenant Dąbrowa and Sergeant Antoni Burdziełowski, codenamed Wir.
The squadron's operational area was heavily saturated with enemy units, forcing Dolina
On 12 January 1945, the Red Army launched a large-scale offensive known as the Vistula–Oder offensive. The German defenses along the Vistula line were quickly broken. On January 17, while stationed near Modrzew, Dolina
Kazimierz Krajewski reports that Dolina
The 25th Home Army Infantry Regiment was not the only partisan group in which soldiers from the Stowbtsy Group, who survived the defeat at Jaktorów, fought. 66 soldiers from the Kampinos Group, including 43 from the Naliboki, joined the ranks of the II Battalion of the 3rd Home Army Legions Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Antoni Heda, codenamed Szary. Under Szary
Dolina
After the war, some soldiers of the Stowbtsy Group became involved in anti-communist underground activities. Cadet Officer Józef Mioduszewski, codenamed Kłos/Zawieja, organized a partisan cavalry squadron, which continued fighting under the Self-Defense Movement of the Home Army and the Nation until the end of 1945. Dolina
During the Stalinist period, former soldiers of the Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group were persecuted by the security apparatus of the Polish People's Republic. Two Dolina
Many soldiers of the Stowbtsy-Naliboki Group remained in exile after the war. Among them were numerous officers: Adolf Pilch, Witold Pełczyński, Franciszek Rybka, Zygmunt Koc, Jarosław Gąsiewski, Jan Jakubowski, and Józef Niedźwiecki.
The military effort of the Stowbtsy Group was either ignored or distorted by official historiography and the mass media during the Polish People's Republic. Accusations of collaboration and avoiding combat with the Germans were made against Lieutenant Pilch and his soldiers in books and articles published as late as the 1980s.[5] According to Marian Podgóreczny, the history of the Stowbtsy Group remained largely forgotten and underappreciated even after the political breakthrough of 1989.