States parties to the Rome Statute explained

The states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court are those sovereign states that have ratified, or have otherwise become party to, the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court, an international court that has jurisdiction over certain international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes that are committed by nationals of states parties or within the territory of states parties. States parties are legally obligated to co-operate with the Court when it requires, such as in arresting and transferring indicted persons or providing access to evidence and witnesses. States parties are entitled to participate and vote in proceedings of the Assembly of States Parties, which is the Court's governing body. Such proceedings include the election of such officials as judges and the Prosecutor, the approval of the Court's budget, and the adoption of amendments to the Rome Statute.

States parties

There are 125 states parties to the Rome Statute.[1]

State partySignedRatified or accededEntry into forceA1[2] A2[3] A3[4] A4[5] A5[6] A6[7] A7[8]
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatified
In forceIn forceRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatified
In force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatified
In forceIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatified
In forceIn forceRatified
Ratified
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In force
In force
In forceIn forceRatified
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatified
In forceIn forceIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In force
In forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In force
In forceIn force
In forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn force
In forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn forceRatified
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn force
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force
In forceIn force
RatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatifiedRatified
In forceIn forceRatifiedIn forceIn forceIn forceIn force

Implementing legislation

The Rome Statute obliges states parties to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes, including the arrest and surrender of suspects.[9] Part 9 of the Statute requires all states parties to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part”.[10]

Under the Rome Statute's complementarity principle, the Court only has jurisdiction over cases where the relevant state is unwilling or unable to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute the case itself. Therefore, many states parties have implemented national legislation to provide for the investigation and prosecution of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court.[11]

As of April 2006, the following states had enacted or drafted implementing legislation:[12]

StatesComplementarity legislationCo-operation legislation
Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, United KingdomEnactedEnacted
Colombia, Congo, Serbia, MontenegroEnactedDraft
Burundi, Costa Rica, Mali, Niger, PortugalEnactedNone
France, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, SwitzerlandDraftEnacted
Austria, Japan, Latvia, RomaniaNoneEnacted
Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Samoa, Senegal, Uganda, Uruguay, ZambiaDraftDraft
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Panama, VenezuelaDraftNone
MexicoNoneDraft
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Fiji, the Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Liberia, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, North Macedonia, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-LesteNoneNone

Timeline of signatures and ratifications/accessions

DateSignatures
31 December 199872
31 December 199993
31 December 2000139
DateRatifications/accessionsRemaining signatories
31 December 1998align=center 0align=center 72
31 December 1999687
31 December 200027112
31 December 20014892
31 December 20028755
31 December 20039251
31 December 20049746
31 December 200510043
31 December 2006104align=center rowspan=241
31 December 2007105
31 December 200810840
31 December 200911038
31 December 201011434
31 December 2011120align=center rowspan=232
31 December 2012121
31 December 2013align=center rowspan=2122align=center rowspan=431
31 December 2014
31 December 2015123
31 December 2016124
31 December 2017123align=center rowspan=232
31 December 2018123
31 December 201912333
31 December 202312432

Regional groups and minimum voting requirements

The number of states parties from the several United Nations regional groups has an influence on the regional minimum voting requirements during elections of judges. Paragraph 20(b) of the procedure for the nomination and election of judges of the Court[13] states that each Party must vote for at least as many candidates from a regional group as would be required to bring the number of judges from that group to two. If, however, more than 16 states parties belong to the group, this target is increased to three.

The following table lists how many states parties there are from each regional group After the accession of the Maldives on 1 December 2011, the Asia–Pacific Group became the last regional group to reach the threshold size of 17 members, just in time to increase the minimum voting requirement for this group in the 2011 election.[14] Since then, the target for the regional minimum voting requirement has remained at three for all regional groups. This has resulted in at least three judges from each regional group sitting on the bench except during the term from 2020 to 2023, when there were only two judges from the Asia–Pacific group. Because only a single candidate from that group was nominated in the 2020 election, no minimum voting requirement was applied for the group, and the one nominee was not elected.

GroupNumber of states parties
33
19
19
28
25

Withdrawal

Article 127 of the Rome Statute allows for states to withdraw from the ICC. Withdrawal takes effect one year after notification of the depositary, and has no effect on prosecution that has already started. As of March 2018 four states have given formal notice of their intention to withdraw from the statute,[1] although two rescinded the notification before it came into effect.

State partySignedRatified or accededEntry into forceWithdrawal notifiedWithdrawal effectiveWithdrawal rescinded

Several states have argued that the ICC is a tool of Western imperialism, only punishing leaders from small, weak states while ignoring crimes committed by richer and more powerful states.[15] [16] [17] This sentiment has been expressed particularly by African states, 34 of which are members of the ICC, due to a perceived disproportionate focus of the Court on Africa. Nine out of the ten situations which the ICC has investigated were in African countries.[18] [19]

In June 2009, several African states, including Comoros, Djibouti, and Senegal, called on African states parties to withdraw en masse from the statute in protest against the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.[20] In September 2013, Kenya's National Assembly passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC in protest against the ICC prosecution of Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta (both charged before coming into office).[21] A mass withdrawal from the ICC by African member states in response to the trial of Kenyan authorities was discussed at a special summit of the African Union in October.[22] The summit concluded that serving heads of state should not be put on trial, and that the Kenyan cases should be deferred.[23] However, the summit did not endorse the proposal for a mass withdrawal due to lack of support for the idea.[24] In November the ICC's Assembly of State Parties responded by agreeing to consider proposed amendments to the Rome Statute to address the AU's concerns.[25]

In October–November 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia all notified the UNSG of their intention to withdraw from the ICC. Burundi was the subject of an ongoing preliminary investigation by the ICC at the time.[26] South Africa's exit followed its refusal to execute an ICC warrant for Sudan's al-Bashir when he was in the country. Following The Gambia's presidential election later that year, which ended the long rule of Yahya Jammeh, The Gambia rescinded its withdrawal notification.[1] The constitutionality of South Africa's notice was challenged by the Democratic Alliance opposition party, which argued that the approval of parliament was required and not sought. The High Court of South Africa ruled in February 2017 that the government's notification was not legal, and it was required to revoke the notice effective 7 March 2017.[1] A parliamentary bill on ICC withdrawal was subsequently withdrawn by the government.[27] The governing African National Congress party continued to support withdrawing,[28] and in 2019 a new bill was put before Parliament to withdraw from the Statute,[29] though this was also withdrawn in March 2023.[30] Following the issuance of ICC arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova of Russia in March 2023, due to the deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia during the Russian invasion of Ukraine,[31] South African president Cyril Ramaphosa declared that his country had decided to withdraw from the treaty to allow Putin to visit their country without risk of arrest for the upcoming 2023 BRICS summit hosted in South Africa. However, it was subsequently clarified that such a decision had not been made.[32] [33] [34]

On March 14, 2018, Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippine President who was under preliminary examination by the ICC for his controversial war on drugs campaign, announced that the country would withdraw from the Rome Statute.[35] He argued that while the Statute was ratified by the Senate of the Philippines in 2011, it was never published in the Official Gazette of the Philippines, a requirement for penal laws (of which the Rome Statute subscribes as such) to take effect. Hence, he claimed that the Philippines was never a State Party ab initio. Additionally, he stated that the ICC was being utilized as a political tool against weak targets such as the Philippines. The United Nations received the official notification of withdrawal on March 17, 2018;[36] one year later (March 17, 2019), by rule, the Philippines' withdrawal became official. The legal validity of the withdrawal was challenged at the Supreme Court of the Philippines, was dismissed in a unanimous decision for being "moot and academic" two years after the country's official withdrawal from the tribunal. Bongbong Marcos, Duterte's successor as President, has stated that the country "has no intention of rejoining the ICC".[37] However, the Philippines government has also confirmed that it would extradite Duterte to the ICC if the matter is transferred to Interpol.[38]

Acceptance of jurisdiction

Pursuant to article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a state that is not a party to the Statute may, "by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question." Even if the state that does so is not a State Party to the Statute, the relevant provisions of the statute would still be applicable on the accepting state, but only on an ad hoc basis.

To date, the Court has received six article 12(3) declarations. Additionally, a declaration was submitted in December 2013 by the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt seeking to accept jurisdiction on behalf of Egypt. However, the Office of the Prosecutor found that as the party has lost power following the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état that July, it did not have the authority to make the declaration.[39] [40]

= Declaration has been deemed invalid by the Office of the Prosecutor.

Signatories which have not ratified

Of the 139 states that had signed the Rome Statute, 29 have not ratified.[1]

= States which have declared that they no longer intend to ratify the treaty

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state that has signed but not ratified a treaty is obliged to refrain from "acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the treaty. However, these obligations do not continue if the state has "made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty".[42] Four signatory states (Israel, Russia, Sudan, and the United States) have informed the UN Secretary General that they no longer intend to become parties to the Rome Statute, and as such have no legal obligations arising from their signature.

Bahrain

The government of Bahrain originally announced in May 2006 that it would ratify the Rome Statute in the session ending in July 2006.[43] By December 2006, the ratification had not yet been completed, but the Coalition for the International Criminal Court said they expected ratification in 2007.[44]

Israel

Israel voted against the adoption of the Rome Statute but later signed it for a short period. In 2002, Israel notified the UN Secretary General that it no longer intended to become a party to the Rome Statute, and as such, it has no legal obligations arising from their signature of the statute.[45]

Israel states that it has "deep sympathy" with the goals of the Court. However, it has concerns that political pressure on the Court would lead it to reinterpret international law or to "invent new crimes". It cites the inclusion of "the transfer of parts of the civilian population of an occupying power into occupied territory" as a war crime as an example of this, whilst at the same time disagrees with the exclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking. Israel sees the powers given to the prosecutor as excessive and the geographical appointment of judges as disadvantaging Israel which was prevented from joining any of the UN Regional Groups.[46]

Kuwait

At a conference in 2007, the Kuwaiti Bar Association and the Secretary of the National Assembly of Kuwait, Hussein Al-Hereti, called for Kuwait to join the Court.[47]

Russia

Russia signed the Rome Statute in 2000. On 14 November 2016 the ICC published a report on its preliminary investigation of the Russo-Ukrainian War which found that "the situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually amounts to an on-going state of occupation" and that "information, such as reported shelling by both States of military positions of the other, and the detention of Russian military personnel by Ukraine, and vice-versa, points to direct military engagement between Russian armed forces and Ukrainian government forces that would suggest the existence of an international armed conflict in the context of armed hostilities in eastern Ukraine".[48] In response, a presidential decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin approved "sending the Secretary General of the United Nations notice of the intention of the Russian Federation to no longer be a party to the Rome Statute".[49] [50] Formal notice was given on 30 November 2016.[51]

Sudan

Sudan signed the Rome Statute in 2000. In 2005 the ICC opened an investigation into the war in Darfur, a region of Sudan. Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, was indicted in 2009.On 26 August 2008, Sudan notified the UN Secretary General that it no longer intended to ratify the treaty and therefore no longer bears any legal obligations arising from its signature.[1] Following the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, Sadiq al-Mahdi a former Prime Minister of Sudan who backs the opposition, called for Sudan to join the ICC.[52]

On 4 August 2021, the Sudanese government approved unanimously a draft bill to join the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.[53]

Thailand

Former Senator Kraisak Choonhavan called in November 2006 for Thailand to ratify the Rome Statute and to accept retrospective jurisdiction, so that former premier Thaksin Shinawatra could be investigated for crimes against humanity connected to 2,500 alleged extrajudicial killings carried out in 2003 against suspected drug dealers.[54]

United States

See main article: United States and the International Criminal Court.

The United States signed the Rome Statute in December 2000 (under President Bill Clinton), but Clinton decided not to submit the treaty to the United States Senate for ratification, stating: "I will not, and do not recommend that my successor [George W. Bush] submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."[55] Opponents of the ICC in the U.S. Senate are "skeptical of new international institutions and still jealously protective of American sovereignty"; before the Rome Statute, opposition to the ICC was largely headed by Republican Senator Jesse Helms.[56] On May 6, 2002, the Bush administration stated that the U.S. did not intend to become a state party to the ICC; in a letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that "the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty," and that "the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000."[57] This letter is sometimes called the "unsigning" of the treaty, but legal opinions on its actual legal effects differ,[58] with some scholars arguing that the president does not have the power to unilaterally "unsign" treaties.[59]

The United States "adopted a hostile stance towards the Court throughout most of the Bush presidency."[60] In 2002, Congress enacted the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which was signed into law on August 2, 2002; the "overriding purpose of the ASPA was to inhibit the U.S. government from supporting the ICC."[60] Major provisions of the ASPA blocked U.S. funding of the ICC and required the U.S. "to enter into agreements with all ICC signatory states to shield American citizens abroad from ICC jurisdiction, under the auspices of Article 98 of the Rome Statute," which bars the ICC "from prosecuting individuals located on the territory of an ICC member state, where such action by the Court would cause the member state to violate the terms of any other bilateral or multilateral treaty to which it is a party."[60] Traditionally, Article 98 was used in relation to traditional status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and status of mission agreements (SOMAs), in which nations hosting U.S. military personnel by invitation agreed to immunize them from prosecution in foreign courts.[60] The Bush administration, supported by opponents of the ICC in Congress, adopted a new strategy of aggressively pursuing Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs), "which guarantee immunity from ICC prosecution for all American citizens in the country with which the agreement is concluded" rather than just U.S. military forces.[60] "Under the original ASPA, nations who refused to conclude BIAs with the United States were subject to sanctions, including the loss of military aid (though these provisions have since been repealed)."[60] As of December 2006, the U.S. State Department reported that it had signed 102 BIAs.[61] In 2002, the United States threatened to veto the renewal of all United Nations peacekeeping missions unless its troops were granted immunity from prosecution by the Court.[62] In a compromise move, the Security Council passed Resolution 1422 on 12 July 2002, granting immunity to personnel from ICC non-states parties involved in United Nations established or authorized missions for a renewable twelve-month period.[62] This was renewed for twelve months in 2003 but the Security Council refused to renew the exemption again in 2004, after pictures emerged of US troops abusing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and the US withdrew its demand.[63]

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. did not take moves to ratify the Rome Statute, but did adopt a "cautious, case-by-case approach to supporting the ICC" by supporting cases before the ICC. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. encouraged "effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice."[60] U.S. steps in support of the ICC undertaken under the Obama administration included participating in the annual Assembly of States Parties as an observer; using the U.S.'s permanent seat on the UN Security Council to support the referral of cases to the ICC (including Libya in 2011); "sharing intelligence on fugitives and providing other substantial in-kind support" to the ICC; and expanding the War Crimes Rewards Program."[60]

The first Trump administration strained relations with the ICC, stating it would revoke visas for any ICC staff seeking to investigate Americans for war crimes. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that such revocations could be applied to any staff involved with investigating war crimes committed by Israel or other allied nations as well.[64]

Yemen

On 24 March 2007, the Yemeni parliament voted to ratify the Rome Statute.[65] [66] However, some MPs claim that this vote breached parliamentary rules, and demanded another vote. In that further vote, the ratification was retracted.[67]

Non-party, non-signatory states

The deadline for signing the Rome Statute expired following 31 December 2000. States that did not sign before that date have to accede to the Statute in a single step.

Of all the states that are members of the United Nations, observers in the United Nations General Assembly, or otherwise recognized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as states with full treaty-making capacities, there are 41 which have neither signed nor acceded to the Statute:

Additionally, in accordance with practice and declarations filed with the Secretary-General, the Rome Statute is not in force in the following dependent territories:

China

The People's Republic of China has opposed the Court, on the basis that it goes against the sovereignty of nation states, that the principle of complementarity gives the Court the ability to judge a nation's court system, that war crimes jurisdiction covers internal as well as international conflicts, that the Court's jurisdiction covers peacetime crimes against humanity, that the inclusion of the crime of aggression weakens the role of the UN Security Council, and that the Prosecutor's right to initiate prosecutions may open the Court to political influence.[68]

India

The government of India has consistently opposed the Court. It abstained in the vote adopting the statute in 1998, saying it objected to the broad definition adopted of crimes against humanity; the rights given to the UN Security Council to refer and delay investigations and bind non-states parties; and the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction not being explicitly criminalized.[69] Other anxieties about the Court concern how the principle of complementarity would be applied to the Indian criminal justice system, the inclusion of war crimes for non-international conflicts, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate prosecutions.[70]

Indonesia

Indonesia has stated that it supports the adoption of the Rome Statute, and that “universal participation should be the cornerstone of the International Criminal Court”.[71] In 2004, the President of Indonesia adopted a National Plan of Action on Human Rights, which states that Indonesia intends to ratify the Rome Statute in 2008.[71] This was confirmed in 2007 by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda and the head of the Indonesian People's Representative Council's Committee on Security and International Affairs, Theo L. Sambuaga.[72] In May 2013, Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro stated that the government needed "more time to carefully and thoroughly review the pros and cons of the ratification".[73]

Iraq

In February 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government decided to ratify the Rome Statute. However, two weeks later they reversed this decision,[74] a move that the Coalition for the International Criminal Court claimed was due to pressure from the United States.[75]

Lebanon

In March 2009, Lebanese Justice Minister said the government had decided not to join for now. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court claimed this was due in part to "intense pressure" from the United States, who feared it could result in the prosecution of Israelis in a future conflict.[76] Following the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war which triggered clashes between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, in April 2024 Lebanon's cabinet decided to submit a declaration to the ICC accepting the court's jurisdiction over crimes committed on Lebanese territory since 7 October 2023. However, the following month this decision was reversed, and the declaration was not submitted.[77]

Malaysia

Malaysia submitted an instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on 4 March 2019, which was to enter into force on 1 June.[78] However, on 29 April 2019, Malaysia submitted a notice withdrawing its instrument of accession effective immediately to the Secretary General of the United Nations, preventing it from acceding.[79] Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad explained that the withdrawal was due to concerns over its constitutionality as well as possible infringement of the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers.[80]

Nepal

On 25 July 2006, the Nepalese House of Representatives directed the government to ratify the RomeStatute. Under Nepalese law, this motion is compulsory for the Executive.[81]

Following a resolution by Parliament requesting that the government ratify the Statute, Narahari Acharya, Ministry of Law, Justice, Constituent Assembly and Parliamentary Affairs of Nepal, said in March 2015 that it had "formed a taskforce to conduct a study about the process". However, he said that it was "possible only after promulgating the new constitution", which was being debated by the 2nd Nepalese Constituent Assembly.[82] [83]

Pakistan

Pakistan has supported the aims of the International Court and voted for the Rome Statute in 1998. However, Pakistan has not signed the agreement on the basis of several objections, including the fact that the Statute does not provide for reservations upon ratification or accession, the inclusion of provisional arrest, and the lack of immunity for heads of state. In addition, Pakistan (one of the largest suppliers of UN peacekeepers) has, like the United States, expressed reservations about the potential use of politically motivated charges against peacekeepers.[84]

South Sudan

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir Mayardit said in 2013 that the country would not join the ICC.[85]

Turkey

Turkey is currently a candidate country to join the European Union, which has required progress on human rights issues in order to continue with accession talks. Part of this has included pressure, but not a requirement, on Turkey to join the Court which is supported under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.[86] Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in October 2004 that Turkey would "soon" ratify the Rome Statute,[87] and the Turkish constitution was amended in 2004 to explicitly allow nationals to be surrendered to the Court.[88] However, in January 2008, the Erdoğan government reversed its position, deciding to shelve accession because of concerns it could undermine efforts against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).[89]

See also

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . 2024-10-26 . 2024-10-26.
  2. Web site: Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . 2018-09-29 . 2018-09-29.
  3. Web site: Amendments on the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . 2019-09-26 . 2019-09-26.
  4. Web site: Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters 10.c: Amendment to article 124 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . . 2019-05-17 . 2019-05-17.
  5. Web site: CHAPTER XVIII, PENAL MATTERS 10. d Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Weapons which use microbial or other biological agents, or toxins). . 2020-07-15 . 2020-07-16.
  6. Web site: CHAPTER XVIII, PENAL MATTERS 10. e Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments undetectable by x-rays in the human body) . . 2020-07-15 . 2020-07-16.
  7. Web site: CHAPTER XVIII, PENAL MATTERS 10. f Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Blinding laser weapons) . . 2020-07-15 . 2020-07-16.
  8. Web site: CHAPTER XVIII, PENAL MATTERS 10. g Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Intentionally using starvation of civilians) . . 2024-08-25 . 2024-08-25.
  9. Amnesty International, Implementation . Accessed 2007-01-23. See also Article 86 of the Rome Statute
  10. https://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/9.htm Part 9
  11. See Article 17 of the Rome Statute
  12. Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Summary of draft and enacted implementing legislation. Accessed 2007-01-23.
  13. Web site: Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6. . 10 September 2004 . 22 July 2024 . live. http://web.archive.org/web/20240415064515/https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sites/asp/files/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP3-Res-06-ENG.pdf. 15 April 2024.
  14. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/EJ2011/NV-Election-Judges-2011-MVR1-ENG.pdf Note verbale regarding the change of minimum voting requirement for Asia-Pacific states
  15. Web site: ICC AND AFRICA - International Criminal Court and African Sovereignty. 5 May 2016. 3 March 2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20160303231227/http://www.africanholocaust.net/news_ah/icc_and_africa.html. dead.
  16. https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-africa-icc-idAFJOE70T01R20110130 Reuters
  17. Book: The European Union's Africa Policies. 9781409400981. 5 May 2016. Sicurelli. Daniela. 2010. Ashgate Publishing .
  18. Africa and the International Criminal Court: A drag net that catches only small fish?, Nehanda Radio, By William Muchayi, 24 September 2013, http://nehandaradio.com/2013/09/24/africa-and-the-international-criminal-court-a-drag-net-that-catches-only-small-fish/
  19. http://www.france24.com/en/20120315-lubanga-kony-icc-africans-international-justice-hague-syria-congo Europe - From Lubanga to Kony, is the ICC only after Africans?
  20. https://web.archive.org/web/20090610164558/http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-06-08-voa30.cfm African ICC Members Mull Withdrawal Over Bashir Indictment
  21. Web site: Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from ICC. 2013-09-05. 2013-09-11. BBC.
  22. Web site: African Union summit on ICC pullout over Ruto trial. 2013-09-20. 2013-09-23. BBC News.
  23. Web site: Africans urge ICC not to try heads of state. 2021-09-21. www.aljazeera.com. en.
  24. Web site: African Union Countries Rally Around Kenyan President, But Won't Withdraw From The ICC. 2013-10-12. 2013-10-12. Fortin. Jacey. International Business Times.
  25. Web site: Win for Africa as Kenya agenda enters ICC Assembly. Kaberia . Judie. 2013-11-20 . Capital News . 2013-11-23.
  26. Web site: Burundi. 2016-12-05. International Criminal Court.
  27. Web site: South Africa: DA Welcomes Withdrawal of the Rome Statute Repeal Bill. 2017-03-14 . James . Selfe . allAfrica . 2017-03-16.
  28. Web site: South Africa's ruling party supports ICC exit ahead of al-Bashir ruling. 2017-07-05 . Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban . Africanews . 2017-07-06.
  29. Web site: South Africa Revives International Criminal Court Withdrawal Plan. 2019-10-30. 2019-11-10. . Nkululeko . Ncana .
  30. Web site: Government withdraws International Crimes Bill. 2023-03-15. 2023-03-17. Andisiwe. Makinana . SowetanLIVE .
  31. Web site: Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova . 19 March 2023 . International Criminal Court . en . 17 March 2023 . 18 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230318191350/https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-against-president-vladimir-putin . live .
  32. News: S Africa backtracks on quitting ICC, blames communications error . Al Jazeera Media Network . 26 April 2023.
  33. News: Bartlett . Kate . South Africa's President Walks Back Vow to Leave ICC . Voice of America . 26 April 2023.
  34. Web site: Explainer: What does the ICC arrest warrant mean for Putin? . Anthony . Deutsch . Stephanie . van den Berg . 20 March 2023 . 23 March 2023 . www.reuters.com.
  35. Web site: Philippines formally informs UN of ICC withdrawal. 2018-03-16. 2018-03-17. The Philippine Star.
  36. News: Calyag. Keith. Duterte's claim on Rome Statute ratification 'grossly incorrect'. 21 March 2018. Sun Star Manila. 21 March 2018. The United Nations said Monday, March 19, that it received the official notification of the Philippines' decision but "the withdrawal shall take effect for the Philippines one year after the date of receipt, i.e., on March 17, 2019.".
  37. Web site: 'Philippines has no intention of rejoining the ICC': Marcos Jr. 2022-08-01. 2022-08-06. Al Jazeera.
  38. News: Philippines says it will cooperate if ICC seeks Duterte’s custody over drug killings. 13 November 2024. The Associated Press. Jim. Gomez.
  39. Web site: ICC Weekly Update #208. 2014-04-21. 2016-05-25. International Criminal Court.
  40. Web site: The determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the communication received in relation to Egypt. 2014-05-08. 2016-05-25. International Criminal Court.
  41. Web site: Declarations Art. 12(3). 2015-02-01. International Criminal Court.
  42. Part II §1 Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
  43. http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=3482 The ratification and implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in Bahrain
  44. http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/Story.asp?Article=165154&Sn=BNEW&IssueID=29276 Rights push for key court pact
  45. The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Ratifications & Declarations. Accessed 2006-12-04.
  46. Web site: Israel and the International Criminal Court . Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 30 June 2002 . https://archive.today/20140805065536/http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2002/Pages/Israel%20and%20the%20International%20Criminal%20Court.aspx . 5 August 2014 . dead.
  47. http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTgxOTI3NDY1OA== Lawyers urge Kuwait to become ICC member
  48. Web site: Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016. 2016-11-14. 2017-08-27. International Criminal Court.
  49. Web site: Распоряжение Президента Российской Федерации от 16.11.2016 № 361-рп. 2016-11-26. 2016-11-26. President of Russia.
  50. Web site: Russia to Withdraw From the International Criminal Court. 2016-11-16. 2016-11-26. The Moscow Times.
  51. Web site: Reference: C.N.886.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification). 2016-11-30. 2016-11-30. United Nations.
  52. Web site: Opposition demands Sudan join ICC as talks held on civilian rule. Al Jazeera. 2019-04-27. 2019-04-27.
  53. Web site: Sudan takes 1st step towards joining International Criminal Court . Al Jazeera . 4 August 2021 .
  54. http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=114443 War on drugs returns to bite Thaksin
  55. News: Clinton's statement on war crimes court. BBC News. 2000-12-31.
  56. Thomas Omestad, "The Brief for a World Court: A permanent war-crimes tribunal is coming, but will it have teeth?", U.S. News & World Report (September 28, 1997).
  57. Web site: International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan . . May 6, 2002 . John R. . Bolton .
  58. The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Bush Administration's Approach and a Way Forward Under the Obama Administration . Elise . Keppler . Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium . 2009 . Berkeley Law . https://bjil.typepad.com/publicist/2009/09/kepplerpublicistvol2.html.
  59. Luke A. . McLaurin . Can the President 'Unsign' a Treaty? A Constitutional Inquiry" . 84 . 7 . . January 2006.
  60. Web site: dead . Caitlin . Lambert . The Evolving US Policy Toward the ICC . https://web.archive.org/web/20190122225324/https://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/the-evolving-us-policy-towards-the-icc/ . 2019-01-22 . International Justice Project . March 4, 2014 .
  61. Web site: Coalition for the International Criminal Court . Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements. https://web.archive.org/web/20061011140208/http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf . 2006-10-11 .
  62. Human Rights Watch, "The ICC and the Security Council: Resolution 1422". Accessed 2007-01-11.
  63. BBC News, 20 March 2006. Q&A: International Criminal Court. Accessed 2007-01-11.
  64. News: Trump admin to ban entry of International Criminal Court investigators. NBC News. 2019-03-15. January 25, 2020.
  65. gulfnews.com, 26 March 2007. “Yemen becomes fourth Arab country to ratify ICC statute ”. Accessed 27 March 2007.
  66. Amnesty International, 27 March 2007. Amnesty International urges Yemen to complete the ratification of the Rome Statute. Accessed 2007-04-01.
  67. Almotamar.net, 9 April 2007. “http://www.almotamar.net/en/2330.htm”. Accessed 2021-05-19.
  68. Jianping . Lu . Zhixiang . Wang . 2005-07-06 . China's Attitude Towards the ICC . Journal of International Criminal Justice . . 3 . 3 . 608–620 . 10.1093/jicj/mqi056 .
  69. https://web.archive.org/web/19991006060837/http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/ICC/ICC_Adoption_July_17_1998.html Explanation of vote on the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court
  70. Usha . Ramanathan . 2005-06-21 . India and the ICC . Journal of International Criminal Justice . . 3 . 3 . 627–634 . 10.1093/jicj/mqi055 .
  71. Amnesty International, Fact sheet: Indonesia and the International Criminal Court. DOC, HTML. Accessed 2007-01-23.
  72. http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20070210.B08&irec=7 RI to join global criminal court
  73. Web site: Govt officially rejects Rome Statute. Aritonang. Margareth. 2013-05-21. 2013-07-09. The Jakarta Post.
  74. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/03/52ea521c-4b82-4f8c-8611-ca137c3606ed.html Iraq Pulls Out Of International Criminal Court
  75. http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines05/0808-06.htm Groups Urge Iraq to Join International Criminal Court
  76. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=1&article_id=99992 Justice campaigners say US urged Lebanon not to join International Criminal Court
  77. Web site: Lebanon backtracks on ICC jurisdiction to probe alleged war crimes. 2024-05-29. Reuters.
  78. Web site: Depositary Notification - Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Malaysia: Accession . United Nations Treaty Collection . 2019-03-04 . 2019-05-18.
  79. Web site: Depositary Notification - Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Malaysia: Withdrawal of the Instrument of Accession . United Nations Treaty Collection . 2019-05-15 . 2019-05-16.
  80. Web site: Malaysia withdraws from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. hermesauto. 2019-04-05. The Straits Times. en. 2019-05-01 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20190406024218/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-withdraws-from-the-rome-statute . Apr 6, 2019 .
  81. Web site: dead . Asian Parliamentarians' Consultation on the Universality of the International Criminal Court . https://web.archive.org/web/20070927051334/http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/Final%20Document%20MANILA.pdf . 16 August 2006 . 2007-01-23 . Sep 27, 2007 . Parliamentarians for Global Action .
  82. Web site: Govt to ratify Rome Statute soon: Minister. 2015-03-17. 2015-04-03. . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20150407061043/http://www.myrepublica.com/politics/item/17343-govt-to-ratify-rome-statute-soon-minister.html . Apr 7, 2015 .
  83. Web site: Wait for consensus cannot exceed two months: Acharya. 2015-03-21. 2015-04-03. The Himalayan Times. 2017-07-01. https://web.archive.org/web/20170701185724/http://thehimalayantimes.com/rssReference.php?headline=Wait+for+consensus+cannot+exceed+two+months%3A+Acharya&NewsID=448729. dead.
  84. Web site: https://web.archive.org/web/20121130070125/http://www.amicc.org/docs/Pakistan1422Stmt12June03.pdf. Akram, Munir. Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, to the Security Council on the occasion of renewal of Resolution 1422 regarding International Criminal Court. 30 November 2012. 12 June 2003. American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC).
  85. Web site: South Sudan's President Says 'Never' to ICC. 2013-05-23. 2015-04-03. Hannah. McNeish. Voice of America.
  86. http://www.amicc.org/docs/EUCommonPos6_03.pdf Council Common Position on the International Criminal Court
  87. http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=794 Turkey, EU and the International Criminal Court
  88. http://www.abig.org.tr/images/constitutional%2520amendments.doc Constitutional Amendments
  89. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=130916 Turkey shelves accession to world criminal court