Litigants: | Sprint PCS v. La Cañada Flintridge |
Courtseal: | Seal of the United States Courts, Ninth Judicial Circuit.svg |
Arguedate: | October 19, |
Argueyear: | 2005 |
Decidedate: | January 17, |
Decideyear: | 2006 |
Fullname: | Sprint PCS, L.P. v. City of La Cañada Flintridge |
Citations: | 435 F.3d 993 (2006), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1032 |
Prior: | Summary judgment for defendants |
Subsequent: | Rehearing en banc denied, 448 F.3d 1067 (2006) |
Holding: | A city cannot deny a telecommunications company a permit to construct and to install a wireless antenna based on aesthetic considerations. |
Majority: | O'Scannlin |
Joinmajority: | Hall, Paez |
Lawsapplied: | California Public Utility Code § 7901; 47 USC § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). |
Sprint PCS v. La Cañada Flintridge, 435 F. 3d 993 (9th Cir. 2006), was a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that determined whether a city could, consistent with California and Federal law, deny a telecommunications company a permit to construct and to install a wireless antenna based on aesthetic considerations.
In October 2001, the city of La Cañada Flintridge enacted Ordinance 324, that described four criteria that applicants must satisfy in order to receive a Public Right-of-Way Above Ground Construction permit:
Sprint applied for 5 permits not long after the city enacted the ordinance and was granted two, denied two, and withdrew one.
The contested permits involved one for a wireless facility along Figueroa St. in December 2001, and another along Descanso Dr. in July 2002 that Sprint intended to construct. Following a series of appeals through the city's Public Works and Traffic Commission, Sprint plead its case to the city council which subsequently denied the permits on the following grounds:
Subsequently, Sprint sued the city in United States District Court where a summary judgment was ruled in favor of the city.
The court rejected La Cañada's view that aesthetic reasons are substantial evidence to support a denial of permit. The court rejected this reasoning, citing the California Public Utility Code § 7901 only granted local authority the right to control how roads "are accessed," not how they look.
In addition, the city also argued that the Telecom Act (47 United States Code § 332(c)(7)(A)) because it provided that:
[E]xcept as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this Chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.
However, the court interpreted this to mean simply that local laws must be respected. As such, "if the local law itself is invalid—for example, because it conflicts with state law—then subsection (c)(7)(A) will not save it. If the Telecom Act intended to grant such authority to local laws—even those that are preempted by state laws—it might have preserved the authority of "State and local government[s]," rather than the disjunctive."