| Document Name: | Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929 |
| Date Created: | March 1930 |
| Purpose: | Investigation of the causes of the 1929 Palestine riots |
The Shaw Report, officially the Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929, commonly known as the Shaw Commission, was the result of a British commission of inquiry, led by Sir Walter Shaw, established to investigate the violent rioting in Palestine in late August 1929. The commission's report was issued in March 1930 and led to the establishment of the Hope Simpson Enquiry in May 1930.
While the violence was the direct result of an ongoing dispute over the Jews' ability to worship freely at the Western Wall, the Commission concluded that the conflict was not religious in nature, and that the holy site had become a "symbol of racial pride and ambition."[1] It determind that the cause of the violent outbreak was "racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future."[2] They explained this in the context of increased Jewish immigration and land purchases, which were threatening to produce a significant Arab landless class. This was later reiterated in the Hope Simpson Enquiry and subsequent Passfield white paper, both which called for limited Jewish immigration to Palestine.
The British Commission of Inquiry was chaired by Sir Walter Shaw, a distinguished jurist, and consisting of three members of the British parliament, Sir Henry Betterton (Conservative), R. Hopkin Morris (Liberal) and Henry Snell (Labour).[3] The aim of the Commission was to look into the reasons for the violent rioting in Palestine in late August 1929, which caused the deaths of 243 Jews and Arabs.The commission of enquiry took public evidence for several weeks, from the first hearing on 25 October to 29 December, hearing 120 witnesses in public testimony, and 20 behind closed doors. Though hearing the claims of both sides, the Commission made its recommendations primarily on the basis of material submitted by Mandatory officials[4]
The Commission addressed two aspects of the disturbances, the immediate nature of the riots and the causes behind them. In the words of Naomi Cohen:
‘Delving beneath the immediate causes – i.e., the Western Wall dispute, inflammatory publications on both sides, the enlargement of the Jewish Agency, inadequate forces to maintain order, the report called attention to the underlying causes of friction in England’s wartime pledges and in the anti-Jewish hostility that had resulted from the political and economic frustrations of the Arabs. It went on to criticise the immigration and land-purchase policies that, it said, gave Jews unfair advantages. The commission also recommended that the British take greater care in protecting the rights and understanding the aspirations of the Arabs. The Shaw report was a blow to Zionists everywhere,’[5]
It found that the purchase of lands by Jewish Companies had been legal and fair to the tenants, but, at the same time, concluded that there was substance to the Arab claim that Jewish land purchase did constitute a present danger to the Arabs' national survival, since highly productive land was being bought, suggesting that 'immigrants would not be content to occupy undeveloped areas', with the consequence that 'the economic pressure upon the Arab population was likely to increase'[6]
With regard to the conflict arising from the land settlement and purchase problem, it concluded that 'taking Palestine as a whole, the country cannot support a larger agricultural population than it at present carries unless methods of farming undergo a radical change'.[7]
The conclusions of the Commission, especially regarding the riots themselves, were as follows.[8] [Material not in brackets is verbatim][9]
The Commission recommended that the Government reconsider its policies as to Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. This led directly to the Hope Simpson Royal Commission in 1930.
The main victims of the rioting were Orthodox Jews, however the Orthodox community took a decision to boycott the Commission. According to the report (p. 169), all sides were eager to cooperate, and there was no shortage of testimony or evidence.
(i) His Majesty's government should issue a clear statement of the policy they intend to pursue in Palestine. The value of this statement would be greatly enhanced if it defined the meaning they attached to the passages in the Mandate safeguarding the rights of non-Jewish communities, and if it laid down more explicit directives on such vital issues as land and immigration.
(ii) Immigration policy should be clearly defined, and its administration reviewed "with the object of preventing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926" Machinery should be devised through which non-Jewish interests could be consulted on the subject of immigration.
(iii) A scientific enquiry should be made into the possibilities of land development in Palestine, having regard to "the certain natural increase in the present rural population." Meanwhile, the "tendency towards the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked."
(iv) While making no formal recommendations on constitutional development, the commission observed that the difficulties of the administration were greatly aggravated by the absence of any measure of self-government.
The report includes a 12-page "Note of Reservations" written by Lord Henry Snell.[11] While accepting much of the report's findings, he challenges some points and makes a number of additional criticisms and recommendations. The following is a list of some of them.
Mr. Snell placed a much higher degree of responsibility on the shoulders of the Muslim spiritual and political leaders, including the Mufti and the Arab Executive. He also emphasized that the violence did not represent the will of the majority of Arabs, and that many took great risks to protect Jewish lives.[12] Furthermore, he agreed that the "animosity and hostility toward the Jews were the fundamental cause of the outbreak," but he blamed this attitude on the campaign of propaganda and incitement, and not on the economic situation.[13]
Mr. Snell also voiced additional criticisms of the British government in Palestine. First, while acknowledging that "the general question whether in a country of racial division one race should be supplied with arms by the Government for possible use against another is admittedly a difficult one," he questioned the decision to allow Arabs to gather en masse with clubs and sticks while disarming the Jewish congregants in Jerusalem, given the police’s inability to protect them. Second, he criticized the Palestinian Government "for not having issued an official communiqué denying that the Jews had designs on the Moslem Holy Places.”[14]
Notably, he questioned the report's conclusions regarding Jewish land procurement and immigration. He argued,
What is required in Palestine is, I believe, less a change of policy in these matters than a change of mind on the part of the Arab population, who have been encouraged to believe that they have suffered a great wrong and that the immigrant Jew constitutes a permanent menace to their livelihood and future. I am convinced that these fears are exaggerated and that on any long view of the situation the Arab people stand to gain rather than to lose from Jewish enterprise. There is no doubt in my mind that, in spite of errors of judgment which may have resulted in hardship to individual Arabs, Jewish activities have increased the prosperity of Palestine, have raised the standard of life of the Arab worker and have laid the foundations on which may be based the future progress of the two communities and their development into one State.His commentary on the land problem led him to conclude that "progress in Palestine--by which I mean the joint progress of the two peoples--is to be looked for not along the lines of political concession but rather through social and economic reconstruction and the establishment of public security."[15] In this respect, he held that the Palestine Government should be administratively and financially responsible for ensuring that no Arabs went landless.[16]
He also spoke to the need of Jewish leaders to help alleviate the Arab's concerns and misapprehensions.[17]