Republics of Russia explained

Republics
Map:Republics of Russia (labeled).svgupright=2
Caption:Republics of Russia
Category:Federated state
Territory:Russian Federation
Current Number:21
Population Range:Smallest: Altai, 206,195
Largest: Bashkortostan, 4,072,102
Area Range:Smallest: Ingushetia, 3123sqkm
Largest: Sakha, 3083523sqkm
Government:Republican government
Subdivision:Districts, cities and towns of republic significance

The republics are one type of federal subject of the Russian Federation.21 republics are internationally recognized as part of Russia; another is under its de facto control. The original republics were created as nation states for ethnic minorities. The indigenous ethnicity that gives its name to the republic is called the titular nationality. However, due to centuries of Russian migration, a titular nationality may not be a majority of its republic's population. By 2017, the autonomous status of all republics was formally abolished, making the republics politically equivalent to the other federal subjects of Russia.

Formed in the early 20th century by Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, republics were intended to be nominally independent regions of Soviet Russia with the right to self-determination. Lenin's conciliatory stance towards Russia's minorities made them allies in the Russian Civil War and with the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 the regions became autonomous republics, albeit subordinate to a union republic. While officially autonomous, the autonomies of these administrative units varied throughout the history of the Soviet Union but largely remained under the control of the central government. The 1980s saw an increase in the demand of autonomy as the Soviet Union began large scale reforms of its centralized system. In 1990, most of the autonomous republics declared their sovereignty. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Russia became independent. The current republics were established with the signing of the Federation Treaty in 1992, which gave them substantial rights and autonomy.

Russia is an asymmetrical federation in that republics have their own constitutions, official languages, and national anthems, but other subjects do not. The republics also originally had more powers devolved to them, though actual power varied between republics, depending largely upon their economic importance. Through the signing of bilateral treaties with the federal government, republics gained extensive authority over their economies, internal policies, and even foreign relations in the 1990s. However, after the turn of the century, Vladimir Putin's centralization reforms steadily eradicated the autonomy of the republics with the exception of Chechnya. The bilateral agreements were abolished and in practice all power now rests with the federal government. Since the termination of the final bilateral treaty in 2017, some commentators consider Russia to no longer be a federation.[1] [2]

In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea from Ukraine, incorporating the territory as the Republic of Crimea. However, it remains internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia declared the annexation of four partially-occupied Ukrainian provinces (oblasts), including the territory that had been under the control of the break-away Donetsk and Luhansk republics since 2014, and claimed the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces as Russian republics. These also remain internationally recognized as part of Ukraine.

History

The republics were established in early Soviet Russia after the collapse of the Russian Empire. On 15 November 1917, Vladimir Lenin issued the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, giving Russia's minorities the right to self-determination. This declaration, however, was never truly meant to grant minorities the right to independence and was only used to garner support among minority groups for the fledgling Soviet state in the ensuing Russian Civil War.[3] Attempts to create independent states using Lenin's declaration were suppressed throughout the civil war by the Bolsheviks. When the Soviet Union was formally created on 30 December 1922, the minorities of the country were relegated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), which had less power than the union republics and were subordinate to them. In the aftermath of the civil war the Bolsheviks began a process of delimitation in order to draw the borders of the country. Through Joseph Stalin's theory on nationality, borders were drawn to create national homelands for various recognized ethnic groups. Early republics like the Kazakh ASSR and the Turkestan ASSR in Central Asia were dissolved and split up to create new union republics. With delimitation came the policy of indigenization which encouraged the de-Russification of the country and promotion of minority languages and culture.[4] This policy also affected ethnic Russians and was particularly enforced in ASSRs where indigenous people were already a minority in their own homeland, like the Buryat ASSR.[5] Language and culture flourished and ultimately institutionalized ethnicity in the state apparatus of the country. Despite this, the Bolsheviks worked to isolate the country's new republics by surrounding them within Russian territory for fear of them seeking independence. In 1925 the Bashkir ASSR lost its border with the future Kazakh SSR with the creation of the so-called "Orenburg corridor", thereby enclaving the entire Volga region.[6] The Komi-Zyryan Autonomous Oblast lost access to the Barents Sea and became an enclave on 15 July 1929 prior to being upgraded to the Komi ASSR in 1936.[7]

By the 1930s, the mood shifted as the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin stopped enforcing indigenization and began purging non-Russians from government and intelligentsia. Thus, a period of Russification set in.[4] Russian became mandatory in all areas of non-Russian ethnicity and the Cyrillic script became compulsory for all languages of the Soviet Union. The constitution stated that the ASSRs had power to enforce their own policies within their territory, but in practice the ASSRs and their titular nationalities were some of the most affected by Stalin's purges and were strictly controlled by Moscow. From 1937, the "bourgeois nationalists" became the "enemy of the Russian people" and indigenization was abolished. On 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, forcing it in to the Second World War, and advanced deep in to Russian territory. In response, Stalin abolished the Volga German ASSR on 7 September 1941 and exiled the Volga Germans to Central Asia and Siberia.[8] When the Soviets gained the upper hand and began recapturing territory in 1943, many minorities of the country began to be seen as German collaborators by Stalin and were accused of treason, particularly in southern Russia.[9] Between 1943 and 1945, ethnic Balkars, Chechens, Crimean Tatars,[10] Ingush, and Kalmyks were deported en masse from the region to remote parts of the country. Immediately after the deportations the Soviet government passed decrees that liquidated the Kalmyk ASSR on 27 December 1943, the Crimean ASSR on 23 February 1944,[11] the Checheno-Ingush ASSR on 7 March 1944, and renamed the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR the Kabardian ASSR on 8 April 1944.[12] After Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, the new government of Nikita Khrushchev sought to undo his controversial legacy. During his Secret speech on 25 February 1956 Khrushchev rehabilitated Russia's minorities. The Kabardino-Balkar ASSR[8] and the Checheno-Ingush ASSR were restored on 9 January 1957 while the Kalmyk ASSR was restored on 29 July 1958. The government, however, refused to restore the Volga German ASSR and the Crimean ASSR, the latter of which was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR on 19 February 1954.[11] The autonomies of the ASSRs varied greatly throughout the history of the Soviet Union but Russification would nevertheless continue unabated and internal Russian migration to the ASSRs would result in various indigenous people becoming minorities in their own republics. At the same time, the number of ASSRs grew; the Karelian ASSR was formed on 6 July 1956 after being a union republic from 1940 while the partially recognized state of Tuva was annexed by the Soviets on 11 October 1944 and became the Tuvan ASSR on 10 October 1961.[13] By the 1980s General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of glasnost began a period of revitalization of minority culture in the ASSRs. From 1989, Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the Russian SFSR, led by Boris Yeltsin, were locked in a power struggle. Yeltsin sought support from the ASSRs by promising more devolved powers and to build a federation "from the ground up". On 12 June 1990, the Russian SFSR issued a Declaration of State Sovereignty, proclaiming Russia a sovereign state whose laws take priority over Soviet ones.[14] The following month Yeltsin told the ASSRs to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow" during a speech in Kazan, Tatar ASSR.These events prompted the ASSRs to assert themselves against a now weakened Soviet Union. Throughout 1990 and 1991, most of the ASSRs followed Russia's lead and issued "declarations of sovereignty", elevating their statuses to that of union republics within a federal Russia. The Dagestan ASSR and Mordovian ASSR were the only republics that did not proclaim sovereignty.[15]

In the final year of the Soviet Union, negotiations were underway for a new treaty to restructure the country in to a loose confederation. Gorbachev invited the ASSRs to be participants in the drafting of the treaty, thereby recognizing them as equal to the union republics.[16] However, a coup attempt in August 1991 derailed the negotiations and the union republics began to declare their independence throughout the year.[16] The Soviet Union collapsed on 26 December 1991 and the position of the ASSRs became uncertain. By law, the ASSRs did not have the right to secede from the Soviet Union like the union republics did but the question of independence from Russia nevertheless became a topic of discussion in some of the ASSRs. The declarations of sovereignty adopted by the ASSRs were divided on the topic of secession. Some advocated the integrity of the Russian Federation, others were muted on the subject, while others like the Komi ASSR, Mari ASSR,[17] and Tuvan ASSR[18] reserved the right to self-determination. Yeltsin was an avid supporter of national sovereignty and recognized the independence of the union republics in what was called a "parade of sovereignties". In regards to the ASSRs, however, Yeltsin did not support secession and tried to prevent them from declaring independence. The Checheno-Ingush ASSR, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, unilaterally declared independence on 1 November 1991[19] and Yeltsin would attempt to retake it on 11 December 1994, beginning the First Chechen War.[20] When the Tatar ASSR held a referendum on whether to declare independence on 21 March 1992, he had the ballot declared illegal by the Constitutional Court.[21]

On 31 March 1992, every subject of Russia except the Tatar ASSR and the de facto state of Chechnya signed the Treaty of Federation with the government of Russia, solidifying its federal structure and Boris Yeltsin became the country's first president.[22] The ASSRs were dissolved and became the modern day republics. The number of republics increased dramatically as the autonomous oblasts of Adygea, Gorno-Altai, Khakassia, and Karachay-Cherkessia were elevated to full republics,[23] while the Ingush portion of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR refused to be part of the breakaway state and rejoined Russia as the Republic of Ingushetia on 4 June 1992.[24] The Republic of Tatarstan demanded its own agreement to preserve its autonomy within the Russian Federation and on 15 February 1994, Moscow and Kazan signed a power-sharing deal, in which the latter was granted a high degree of autonomy.[2] 45 other regions, including the other republics, would go on to sign autonomy agreements with the federal center.[25] By the mid 1990s, the overly complex structure of the various bilateral agreements between regional governments and Moscow sparked a call for reform.[25] The constitution of Russia was the supreme law of the country, but in practice, the power-sharing agreements superseded it while the poor oversight of regional affairs left the republics to be governed by authoritarian leaders who ruled for personal benefit.[26] Meanwhile, the war in Chechnya entered a stalemate as Russian forces were unable to wrest control of the republic despite capturing the capital Grozny on 8 February 1995 and killing Dudayev months later in an airstrike.[27] Faced with a demoralized army and universal public opposition to the war, Yeltsin was forced to sign the Khasavyurt Accord with Chechnya on 30 August 1996 and eventually withdrew troops.[28] A year later Chechnya and Russia signed the Moscow Peace Treaty, ending Russia's attempts to retake the republic.[29] As the decade drew to a close, the fallout from the failed Chechen war and the subsequent financial crisis in 1998 resulted in Yeltsin resigning on 31 December 1999.[30] Yeltsin declared Vladimir Putin as interim president and his successor. Despite preserving the republic's de facto independence following the war, Chechnya's new president Aslan Maskhadov proved incapable of fixing the republic's devastated economy and maintaining order as the territory became increasingly lawless and a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism.[31] Using this lawlessness extremists invaded neighboring Dagestan and bombed various apartment blocks in Russia, resulted in Putin sending troops into Chechnya again on 1 October 1999. Chechen resistance quickly fell apart in the face of a federal blitzkrieg and indiscriminate bombing campaign as troops captured Grozny on 6 February 2000 and pushed rebels in to the mountains.[32] Moscow imposed direct rule on Chechnya on 9 June 2000[33] and the territory was officially reintegrated in to the Russian Federation as the Chechen Republic on 24 March 2003.[34]

Putin would participate in the 26 March 2000 election on the promise of completely restructuring the federal system and restoring the authority of the central government.[35] The power-sharing agreements began to gradually expire or be terminated and after 2003 only Tatarstan and Bashkortostan continued to negotiate on their treaties' extensions.[25] Bashkortostan's power-sharing treaty expired on 7 July 2005,[36] leaving Tatarstan as the sole republic to maintain its autonomy, which was renewed on 11 July 2007.[37] After an attack by Chechen separatists at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, Putin abolished direct elections for governors and assumed the power to personally appoint and dismiss them.[38] Throughout the decade, influential regional leaders like Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan[39] and Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan,[40] who were adamant on extending their bilateral agreements with Moscow, were dismissed, removing the last vestiges of regional autonomy from the 1990s. On 24 July 2017, Tatarstan's power-sharing agreement with Moscow expired, making it the last republic to lose its special status. After the agreement's termination, some commentators expressed the view that Russia ceased to be a federation.[1] [2] In 2022, Russia's ethnic republics suffered heavy losses in the invasion of Ukraine.[41]

Constitutional status

Republics differ from other federal subjects in that they have the right to establish their own official language,[42] have their own constitution, and have a national anthem. Other federal subjects, such as krais and oblasts, are not explicitly given this right. During Boris Yeltsin's presidency, the republics were the first subjects to be granted extensive power from the federal government, and were often given preferential treatment over other subjects, which has led to Russia being characterized as an "asymmetrical federation".[43] The Treaty of Federation signed on 31 March 1992 stipulated that the republics were "sovereign states" that had expanded rights over natural resources, external trade, and internal budgets.[44] The signing of bilateral treaties with the republics would grant them additional powers, however, the amount of autonomy given differed by republic and was mainly based on their economic wealth rather than ethnic composition.[45] Sakha, for example, was granted more control over its resources, being able to keep most of its revenue and sell and receive its profits independently due to its vast diamond deposits. North Ossetia on the other hand, a poorer republic, was mainly granted more control over defense and internal security due to its location in the restive North Caucasus.[46] Tatarstan and Bashkortostan had the authority to establish their own foreign relations and conduct agreements with foreign governments. This has led to criticism from oblasts and krais. After the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the current constitution was adopted but the republics were no longer classified as "sovereign states" and all subjects of the federation were declared equal, though maintaining the validity of the bilateral agreements.

In theory, the constitution of Russia was the ultimate authority over the republics, but the power-sharing treaties held greater weight in practice. Republics often created their own laws which contradicted the constitution. Yeltsin, however, made little effort to rein in renegade laws, preferring to turn a blind eye to violations in exchange for political loyalty. Vladimir Putin's election on 26 March 2000 began a period of extensive reforms to centralize authority with the federal government and bring all laws in line with the constitution.[47] His first act as president was the creation of federal districts on 18 May 2000, which were tasked with exerting federal control over the country's subjects.[48] Putin later established the so-called "Kozak Commission" in June 2001 to examine the division of powers between the government and regions. The Commission's recommendations focused mainly on minimizing the basis of regional autonomy and transferring lucrative powers meant for the republics to the federal government. Centralization of power would continue as the republics gradually lost more and more autonomy to the federal government, leading the European Parliament to conclude that Russia functions as a unitary state despite officially being a federation.[49] On 29 December 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law banning the leaders of the republics from holding the title of 'president'.[50] Tatarstan, however, resisted attempts to abolish its presidential post and remained the only republic to maintain the title.[51] Putin subsequently signed a law forcing Tatarstan to abolish its title by June 2022.[52] On 19 June 2018, a bill was passed that elevated the status of the Russian language at the expense of other official languages in the republics.[53] The bill authorized the abolition of mandatory minority language classes in schools and for voluntary teaching to be reduced to two hours a week.[54]

Chechnya is the sole exception to Putin's centralization efforts. With the republic's reentry into Russia after the Second Chechen War, Chechnya was given broad autonomy in exchange for remaining within the country. At the end of the war, Putin bought the loyalty of local elites and granted Chechnya the right to manage its own affairs in dealing with separatists and governing itself outside of Russian control in a process called "Chechenization".[55] With the appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov by Putin to lead the republic in 2007, the independence of Chechnya has grown significantly. The Russian government gives Chechnya generous subsidies in exchange for loyalty and maintaining security in the region.[56] Observers have noted Putin's reluctance or inability to exert control over Kadyrov's rule for fear it could trigger another conflict.[57] Chechnya under Kadyrov operates outside of Russian law,[58] has its own independent security force,[59] and conducts its own de facto foreign policy.[60] This has led to Chechnya being characterized as a "state within a state".[61]

There are secessionist movements in most republics, but these are generally not very strong. The constitution makes no mention on whether a republic can legally secede from the Russian Federation. However, the Constitutional Court of Russia ruled after the unilateral secession of Chechnya in 1991 that the republics do not have the right to secede and are inalienable parts of the country.[62] Despite this, some republican constitutions in the 1990s had articles giving them the right to become independent. This included Tuva, whose constitution had an article explicitly giving it the right to secede. However, following Putin's centralization reforms in the early 2000s, these articles were subsequently dropped. The Kabardino-Balkar Republic, for example, adopted a new constitution in 2001 which prevents the republic from existing independently of the Russian Federation. After Russia's annexation of Crimea, the State Duma adopted a law making it illegal to advocate for the secession of any region on 5 July 2014.[63]

Status of southeast Ukraine

See also: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, Political status of Crimea and Russian annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. On 18 March 2014, Russia annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea of Ukraine after a referendum.[64] The peninsula subsequently became the Republic of Crimea, the 22nd republic of Russia. However, Ukraine and most of the international community do not recognize Crimea's annexation[65] and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 declared the referendum to be invalid.[66]

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and conquered large swaths of southern and eastern Ukraine. As early as March leaders in both the Luhansk People's Republic[67] and Donetsk People's Republic[68] expressed their wish to join Russia, originally once Russia captured all their claimed territory. However, after sudden Ukrainian gains in the east in September 2022, the republics organised a series of referendums on joining Russia, in which an overwhelming majority reportedly supported annexation.[69] On 30 September 2022, Putin formally announced the annexation of the two republics and also of two Ukrainian oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.[70] The referendums were condemned internationally – the European Union and G7 rejected them as illegal[71] while the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the annexations as a violation of the UN Charter.[72]

Republics

NameMapDomestic namesCapitalTitular population & change 2010 - 2021Russian population & change 2010 - 2021Population (2021)[73]
Area
Republic of AdygeaRussian: Республика Адыгея ()
Adyghe; Adygei: Адыгэ Республик ()

Maykop

Russian: Майкоп
Adyghe; Adygei: Мыекъуапэ ()

data-sort-value="257" 64.4%
0.8%

496,934

Altai RepublicRussian: Республика Алтай ()
Southern Altai: Алтай Республика ()
Kazakh: Алтай Республикасы ()

Gorno-Altaysk

Russian: Горно-Алтайск
Southern Altai: Улалу ()
Kazakh: Горно-Алтайск ()

data-sort-value="370" 53.7%
2.9%

210,924

Republic of BashkortostanRussian: Республика Башкортостан ()
Bashkir: Башҡортостан Республикаһы ()

Ufa

Russian: Уфа
Bashkir: Өфө ()

data-sort-value="315" 37.5%
1.4%

4,091,423

Republic of BuryatiaRussian: Республика Бурятия ()
Buriat: Буряад Улас ()

Ulan-Ude

Russian: Улан-Удэ
Buriat: Улаан Үдэ ()

data-sort-value="325" 64.0%
2.1%

978,588

Chechen RepublicRussian: Чеченская Республика ()
Chechen: Нохчийн Республика ()

Grozny

Russian: Грозный
Chechen: Соьлжа-ГӀала ()

data-sort-value="964" 1.2%
0.7%

1,510,824

Chuvash RepublicRussian: Чувашская Республика ()
Chuvash: Чӑваш Республики ()

Cheboksary

Russian: Чебоксары
Chuvash: Шупашкар ()

data-sort-value="577" 30.7%
3.8%

1,186,909

Republic of DagestanRussian: Республика Дагестан ()

Makhachkala

Russian: Махачкала

data-sort-value="961"

Thirteen indigenous nationalities (96.1%) 0.0%

3.3%
0.3%

3,182,054

Republic of IngushetiaRussian: Республика Ингушетия ()
Ingush: ГӀалгӀай Мохк ()

Magas

Russian: Магас
Ingush: Магас ()

data-sort-value="964" 0.7%
0.1%

509,541

Kabardino-Balkar RepublicRussian: Кабардино-Балкарская Республика ()
Kabardian: Къэбэрдей-Балъкъэр Республикэ ()
Karachay-Balkar: Къабарты-Малкъар Республика ()

Nalchik

Russian: Нальчик
Kabardian: Налщӏэч ()
Karachay-Balkar: Нальчик ()

data-sort-value="571" 19.8%
2.7%

904,200

Republic of KalmykiaRussian: Республика Калмыкия ()
Kalmyk; Oirat: Хальмг Таңһч ()

Elista

Russian: Элиста
Kalmyk; Oirat: Элст ()

data-sort-value="625" 25.7%
4.5%

267,133

Karachay-Cherkess RepublicRussian: Карачаево-Черкесская Республика ()

Cherkessk

Russian: Черкесск ()

data-sort-value="571" 27.5%
4.1%

469,865

Republic of KareliaRussian: Республика Карелия ()
Karelian: Karjalan tazavaldu

Petrozavodsk

Russian: Петрозаводск
Karelian: Petroskoi

data-sort-value="055" 86.4%
4.2%

533,121

Republic of KhakassiaRussian: Республика Хакасия ()
Khakas: Хакас Республиказы (Xakas Respublikazı)

Abakan

Russian: Абакан
Khakas

Абахан (Abaxan)

data-sort-value="127" 82.1%
0.4%

534,795

Komi RepublicRussian: Республика Коми ()
Komi: Коми Республика ()

Syktyvkar

Russian: Сыктывкар
Komi: Сыктывкар ()

data-sort-value="223" 69.7%
4.6%

737,853

Mari El RepublicRussian: Республика Марий Эл ()
Мары Эл Республик ()
Марий Эл Республик ()

Yoshkar-Ola

Russian: Йошкар-Ола ()
Йошкар-Ола ()
Йошкар-Ола ()

data-sort-value="401" 52.5%
5.1%

677,097

Republic of MordoviaRussian: Республика Мордовия ()
Erzya: Мордовия Республикась ()
Moksha: Мордовия Pеспубликась ()

Saransk

Russian: Саранск
Erzya: Саран ош ()
Moksha: Саранош ()

data-sort-value="371" 54.1%
0.7%

783,552

Republic of North Ossetia–AlaniaRussian: Республика Северная Осетия–Алания ()
Ossetian; Ossetic: Республикӕ Цӕгат Ирыстон–Алани ()

Vladikavkaz

Russian: Владикавказ
Ossetian; Ossetic: Дзӕуджыхъӕу ()

data-sort-value="681" 18.9%
1.9%

687,357

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)Russian: Республика Саха (Якутия) ()
Yakut: Саха Өрөспүүбүлүкэтэ ()

Yakutsk

Russian: Якутск ()
Yakut: Дьокуускай ()

data-sort-value="552" 32.6%
5.2%

995,686

Republic of TatarstanRussian: Республика Татарстан ()
Tatar: Татарстан Республикасы ()

Kazan

Russian: Казань
Tatar: Казан ()

data-sort-value="536" 40.3%
0.6%

4,004,809

Republic of TuvaRussian: Республика Тува ()
Tuvinian: Тыва Республика ()

Kyzyl

Russian: Кызыл
Tuvinian: Кызыл ()

data-sort-value="887" 10.1%
6.2%

336,651

Udmurt RepublicRussian: Удмуртская Республика ()
Udmurt: Удмурт Элькун ()

Izhevsk

Russian: Ижевск
Udmurt: Ижкар ()

data-sort-value="206" 67.7%
5.5%

1,452,914

Proposed republics

See main article: Proposed federal subjects of Russia.

Entities in Russia

In response to the apparent federal inequality, in which the republics were given special privileges during the early years of Yeltsin's tenure at the expense of other subjects, Eduard Rossel, then governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast and advocate of equal rights for all subjects, attempted to transform his oblast into the Ural Republic on 1 July 1993 in order to receive the same benefits. Initially supportive, Yeltsin later dissolved the republic and fired Rossel on 9 November 1993. The only other attempt to formally create a republic occurred in Vologda Oblast when authorities declared their wish to create a "Vologda Republic" on 14 May 1993. This declaration, however, was ignored by Moscow and eventually faded from public consciousness. Other attempts to unilaterally create a republic never materialized. These included a "Pomor Republic" in Arkhangelsk Oblast, a "Southern Urals Republic" in Chelyabinsk Oblast, a "Chukotka Republic" in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug,[74] a "Yenisei Republic" in Irkutsk Oblast, a "Leningrad Republic" in Leningrad Oblast, a "Nenets Republic" in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug,[75] a "Siberian Republic" in Novosibirsk Oblast, a "Primorsky Republic" in Primorsky Krai, a "Neva Republic" in the city of Saint Petersburg, and a republic consisting of eleven regions in western Russia centered around Oryol Oblast.

Other attempts to create republics came in the form of splitting up already existing territories. After the Soviet Union's collapse, a proposal was put forth to split the Karachay-Cherkess Republic into multiple smaller republics. The idea was rejected by referendum on 28 March 1992. A similar proposal occurred in the Republic of Mordovia to divide it to separate Erzyan and Mokshan homelands. The proposal was rejected in 1995.[76]

Entities outside Russia

Abkhazia

After the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia secured the de facto independence of Abkhazia from Georgia and promptly recognized it. Georgian officials have expressed worry that Russia will seek to absorb the region. On 25 November 2014, Abkhazia signed a treaty integrating its economy and military with Russia,[77] which Georgia described as a step to "toward de facto annexation".[78] However, the proposal to join Russia has little to no support among Abkhazia's political elite or the general public,[79] with many of the former expressing their view that Abkhazia is different situationally from nearby South Ossetia.[80] Despite this, Abkhazia relies entirely on Russia for financial support and much of its state structure is highly integrated with Russia; it uses the Russian ruble, its foreign policy is coordinated with Russia, and a majority of its citizens have Russian passports.[81] On 12 November 2020, Abkhazia and Russia signed a new integration agreement expanding on their previous one from 2014, which Georgia condemned as another step toward annexation.[82] The new agreement envisioned further harmonization of Abkhazia with Russian law and was criticized within the region for risking the loss of Abkhazia's sovereignty, which the government denied.[83]

South Ossetia

See main article: Proposed Russian annexation of South Ossetia. After the Soviet Union's collapse South Ossetia sought to break away from Georgia and become independent. On 19 January 1992 a referendum was held. Ostensibly, 99.9% of voters approved independence, but the results were not recognized internationally.[84] [85] A second question asking for unification with Russia also ostensibly passed at about 99.9%. Similar to Abkhazia, South Ossetia had its independence secured and recognized by Russia in 2008. However, unlike Abkhazia, officials in both Russia and South Ossetia have repeatedly expressed their wish to see South Ossetia join Russia.[86] An opinion poll conducted in 2010 showed that over 80% of people supported integration with Russia.[87] On 18 March 2015 South Ossetia signed a treaty integrating the region's economy and military with Russia, identical to the one signed by Abkhazia.[88] The treaty was condemned by Georgia as an "actual annexation" of the region.[89] Later that year South Ossetian president Leonid Tibilov said he was preparing a referendum to join Russia.[90] However, such a referendum never took place due to Russia's refusal to endorse the proposal.[91] Instead a referendum was held on 9 April 2017 to change South Ossetia's official name to "Republic of South Ossetia–The State of Alania" to mirror its northern counterpart North Ossetia, officially the "Republic of North Ossetia–Alania", implying future unification.[92]

On 30 March 2022 the government of South Ossetia announced it would revive attempts to hold a referendum on joining Russia.[93] Officials expressed hope of finishing the legal process to hold the referendum by April 10, however, it is unknown whether Russia will again reject the proposal or not.[79] On 13 May 2022 outgoing president Anatoly Bibilov signed a decree authorizing a referendum on annexation by July 17.[94] However, Alan Gagloyev, who defeated Bibilov in an election, expressed skepticism, saying that while he does not oppose the referendum, he believes there should first be a "signal" from Russia.[95] Gagloyev promptly scrapped the referendum pending talks with Russia on integration.[96]

Transnistria

See main article: Proposed Russian annexation of Transnistria. Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, had long sought to rejoin Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After proclaiming independence and fighting a war against Moldova with the help of Russia in 1992, the region has remained under Russian occupation. Transnistria made multiple appeals to integrate with Russia, which the latter has consistently ignored. In a 2006 referendum an overwhelming majority of people voted in favor of its accession to Russia, though these results could not be independently confirmed.[97] After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Transnistria appealed to Russia to join it.[98] There is still some hope inside Transnistria for Russia to annex the region.[99] Despite ignoring Transnistria's appeals for accession, the region enjoys Russian support and is highly dependent on it. Over 200,000 Transnistrian citizens own a Russian passport[100] and many prefer to leave the region and work in Russia.[101] Russia provides gas at bargain prices, pays the pensions of its residents, and allocates funds to build infrastructure.[102] A Russian military garrison operates in Transnistria ostensibly as a peacekeeping force.[103] Moldova for its part rejects any attempt by Transnistria to secede and join Russia and insists on the withdrawal of all Russian troops from the region.[104] With Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 a Russian general said they planned to create a land bridge connecting to Transnistria.[105] The region has also suffered significant trade losses due to the invasion of Ukraine and has become more reliant on trade with the European Union.

Sources

Notes and References

  1. Web site: No Longer the Russian Federation: A Look at Tartarstan. Avdaliani. Emil. 2017-08-14. Georgia Today. 2019-03-06. 7 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20190307112629/http://georgiatoday.ge/news/7285/No-Longer-the-Russian-Federation:-A-Look-at-Tartarstan. dead.
  2. Web site: Russia revoking Tatarstan's autonomy. 2017-08-09. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. en. 2019-03-07.
  3. Mälksoo. Lauri. April 2017. Soviet Approach to Right of Peoples to Self-Determination. History of International Law 2017. 7–8. ResearchGate.
  4. Web site: Korenizatsiya: The Soviet Nationalities Policy for Recognised Minorities. Greenacre. Liam. 2016-08-23. Liam's Look at History. 2019-03-06.
  5. Bazarova. Vladimirovna. 2013. On the problems of indigenization in the national autonomies of Eastern Siberia in the 1920s – 1930s. Power. ru. 21. 176. CyberLeninka.
  6. Web site: Podobed. Pavlo. 28 March 2019. Idel-Ural: Polyethnic Volcano of the Russian Federation. dead. https://web.archive.org/web/20210127035823/https://prometheus.ngo/idel-ural-polyethnic-volcano-of-the-russian-federation/. 27 January 2021. 19 June 2020. Prometheus Security Environment Research Center. uk.
  7. Web site: 1 June 2020. Komi and imperial policy in the Arctic. 19 June 2020. Free Idel-Ural. en-US.
  8. Web site: September 1991. Punished Peoples" of the Soviet Union: The Continuing Legacy of Stalin's Deportations. 19 June 2020. Human Rights Watch. 11–74.
  9. Statiev. Alexander. 2005. The Nature of Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance, 1942–44: The North Caucasus, the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic, and Crimea. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 6. 2. 285–318. 10.1353/kri.2005.0029. 161159084. ResearchGate.
  10. Web site: Pohl. Otto. 2000. The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars. 19 June 2020.
  11. Web site: July 2005. Transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine. 19 June 2020. International Committee for Crimea.
  12. Web site: Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 8, 1944 "On the resettlement of Balkars living in the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and on the renaming of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic". 19 June 2020. Library USSR. ru.
  13. Toomas. Alatalu. 1992. Tuva: A State Reawakens. Soviet Studies. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 44. 5. 881–895. 10.1080/09668139208412051. 0038-5859. 152275.
  14. Web site: Woodruff. David. 12 June 1990. Russian republic declares sovereignty. 17 June 2020. UPI. en.
  15. Zamyatin. Konstantin. 2013. Sovereignisation and State Languages: Early Formation of Language Policy of Russia's Finno-Ugric Republics in the Conditions of the USSR Disintegration. Finnish-Ugric Communications. 36. 132. University of Helsinki.
  16. Starovoitova. Galina. 1997. Sovereignty After Empire: Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union. Peaceworks. 19. 5–11. United States Institute of Peace.
  17. Web site: 6 January 2010. Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Mari SSR. 5 June 2020. Pashkov Library. ru. The Mari SSR reserves the right to self-determination and change its state and legal status..
  18. Web site: Bairovich. Chimit-Dorzhu. 31 May 2012. Adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Soviet Republic of Tuva. 5 June 2020. Tuva Asia. ru. The Soviet Republic of Tuva confirms its right to self-determination, exercised on the basis of a popular referendum of the republic's population..
  19. Web site: Dzhokhar Dudayev: Lone wolf of Grozny. Higgins. Andrew. 1995-01-22. The Independent. en. 2019-03-06.
  20. News: The Chechen wars murdered Russian democracy in its cradle. Muratov. Dmitry. 2014-12-12. The Guardian. 2019-03-06. en-GB. 0261-3077.
  21. News: Tatarstan Votes for Self-Rule Repudiating Russia and Yeltsin. Shapiro. Margaret. 1992-03-23. The Washington Post. 2019-03-06.
  22. News: Tatarstan, the Last Region to Lose Its Special Status Under Putin. Smirnova. Lena. 2017-07-24. The Moscow Times. 2017-08-07. en.
  23. Law. 1535-1. 3 July 1991. On the Procedures of the Transformation of Adyghe, Gorno-Altai, Karachay-Cherkess, and Khakas Autonomous Oblasts into the Soviet Socialist Republics of the RSFSR. ru.
  24. Web site: Ingushetia Abandoned. Pakhomenko. Varvara. 2009-08-16. Open Democracy. 2019-04-30.
  25. Chuman. Mizuki. The Rise and Fall of Power-Sharing Treaties Between Center and Regions in Post-Soviet Russia. Demokratizatsiya. 135–146.
  26. Web site: Nations in Transit: Russia. 2005. Freedom House. 2019-03-06. The vast majority of governors were corrupt, ruling their regions as tyrants for their personal benefit and that of their closest allies.. 7 March 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20190307173824/https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2005/russia. dead.
  27. Web site: Arslanbenzer. Hakan. 2019-11-14. Dzhokhar Dudayev: Fighting for a free Chechnya. 2020-06-23. Daily Sabah. en.
  28. Web site: Fuller. Liz. 30 August 2006. Khasavyurt Accords Failed To Preclude A Second War. 2020-06-23. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. en.
  29. News: Stanley. Alessandra. 1997-05-13. Yeltsin Signs Peace Treaty With Chechnya. en-US. The New York Times. 2020-06-23. 0362-4331.
  30. Web site: Sinelschikova. Yekaterina. 2019-12-31. How Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first president, resigned. 2020-06-23. Russia Beyond. en-US.
  31. News: 2005-03-09. Aslan Maskhadov. en-GB. The Telegraph. https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1485209/Aslan-Maskhadov.html . 12 January 2022 . subscription . live. 2020-06-24. 0307-1235.
  32. News: Russians Capture Grozny. Williams. Daniel. 2000-02-07. The Washington Post. 2019-04-30.
  33. News: Hoffman. David. 9 June 2000. Putin Lays Direct Rule on Chechnya. 24 June 2020. The Washington Post.
  34. News: Aris. Ben. 2003-03-24. Boycott call in Chechen poll ignored. https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1425501/Boycott-call-in-Chechen-poll-ignored.html. 12 January 2022. subscription. live. 2020-06-24. The Telegraph. 0307-1235.
  35. News: Russian Regions Wary as Putin Tightens Control. Bohlen. Celestine. 2000-03-09. The New York Times. 2019-03-06. en-US. 0362-4331.
  36. Turner. Cassandra. 2018. We Never Said We're Independent: Natural Resources, Nationalism, and the Fight for Political Autonomy in Russia's Regions. BA thesis. University of Mississippi. 49.
  37. Web site: Federation Council Backs Power-Sharing Bill. 2007-07-11. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2017-09-03.
  38. News: The Devolution of Russian Federalism. Shtepa. Vadim. 2017-04-04. Jamestown. en-US. 2019-03-06.
  39. Web site: Mintimer Shaimiev Steps Down as President of Tatarstan. Malashenko. Alexey. 2010-01-25. Carnegie Moscow Center. en. 2019-05-07.
  40. News: Russian Regional Strongman to Retire. Barry. Ellen. 2010-07-13. The New York Times. 2019-03-08. en-US. 0362-4331.
  41. News: Latypova . Leyla . Ethnic Minorities Hit Hardest By Russia's Mobilization, Activists Say . The Moscow Times . 27 September 2022.
  42. Article 68 of the Constitution of Russia
  43. Solnick. Steven. 29 May 1996. Asymmetries in Russian Federation Bargaining. The National Council for Soviet and East European Research.
  44. Solnick. Steven. 1996-05-30. Center-Periphery Bargaining in Russia: Assessing Prospects of Federal Stability. The National Council for Soviet and East European Research. 4.
  45. Alexander. James. 2004. Federal Reforms in Russia: Putin's Challenge to the Republics. https://web.archive.org/web/20190509231747/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f04a/aa04ab1a484dc019cbbc913785070a44f377.pdf. dead. 2019-05-09. Demokratizatsiya. 12. 2. 237. 10.3200/DEMO.12.2.233-263. 32677267. Semantic Scholar.
  46. Drobizheva. Leokadia. April 1998. Power Sharing in the Russian Federation: the View from the Center and from the Republics. Preventing of Deadly Conflicts. 12.
  47. Sharafutdinova. Gulnaz. 2013. Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism: The Decline in Regional Power under Putin. 43664325. Comparative Politics. 45. 3. 357–376. 10.5129/001041512X13815255435013.
  48. News: Russian Federal Districts as Instrument of Moscow's Internal Colonization. Shtepa. Vadim. 2018-07-16. Jamestown. en-US. 2019-05-07.
  49. Russel. Martin. 2015-10-20. Russia's constitutional structure: Federal in form, unitary in function. European Parliamentary Research Service.
  50. Web site: 29 December 2010. Medvedev forbade the heads of subjects to be called presidents. 25 March 2022. NewsRU. ru.
  51. Web site: Tatarstan Vote Seen As Test For Russian Regional 'President'. 2015-09-15. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. en. 2019-05-07.
  52. Web site: Voroshilov. Denis. 21 December 2021. Putin signed a law banning the heads of regions from being called presidents. 21 December 2021. RBC. ru.
  53. Hauer. Neil. 2018-08-01. Putin's Plan to Russify the Caucasus. Foreign Affairs. 2018-08-26.
  54. Web site: A Common Language: Russia's 'Ethnic' Republics See Language Bill As Existential Threat. Coalson. Robert. Lyubimov. Dmitry. 2018-06-20. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. en. 2018-06-21. Alpaut. Ramazan.
  55. Matejova. Miriam. 2013. Russian "Chechenization" and the Prospects for a Lasting Peace in Chechnya. International Journal on World Peace. 30. 11–12. ResearchGate.
  56. News: Schwirtz. Michael. 8 October 2011. Russian Anger Grows Over Chechnya Subsidies. en-US. The New York Times. 9 June 2021. 0362-4331.
  57. Web site: Bullough. Oliver. 23 September 2015. Putin's closest ally – and his biggest liability. 9 June 2021. The Guardian. en. 0261-3077.
  58. Web site: Arutunyan. Anna. 25 April 2017. Why Putin won't get tough on Kadyrov. 9 June 2021. European Council on Foreign Relations. en-GB.
  59. Web site: Bowen. Andrew. 15 June 2015. Kadyrovtsy: "Vladimir Putin's Combat Infantry" and Ramzan Kadyrov's Henchmen. 9 June 2021. The Interpreter.
  60. Halbach. Uwe. 2018. Chechnya's Status within the Russian Federation: Ramzan Kadyrov's Private State and Vladimir Putin's Federal "Power Vertical". Foundation Science and Politics. 5. German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
  61. Zimnitskaya. Hanna. 2012. A State within a State: the Case of Chechnya. International Studies Honors Projects. Macalester College.
  62. Web site: How 'separatists' are prosecuted in Russia: Independent lawyers on one of Russia's most controversial statutes. Guillory. Sean. 2016-09-21. Meduza. 2019-05-07.
  63. Web site: Russia broadens anti-incitement law to include separatism. 2014-07-05. The Times of Israel. en-US. 2019-05-07.
  64. News: Putin signs Crimea treaty as Ukraine serviceman dies in attack. Gutterman. Steve. 2014-03-18. Reuters. 2019-05-08. Polityuk. Pavel. en.
  65. News: Red Square rally hails Vladimir Putin after Crimea accession. Luhn. Alec. 2014-03-18. The Guardian. 2019-05-08. en-GB. 0261-3077.
  66. News: U.N. General Assembly declares Crimea secession vote invalid. Charbonneau. Louis. 2014-03-27. Reuters. 2019-05-08. Donath. Mirjam. en.
  67. News: 27 March 2022. Ukrainian rebel region Luhansk may vote to join Russia. Reuters. 31 March 2022.
  68. News: Russia-backed Donetsk Republic may consider joining Russia – leader. Conor. Humphries. Mark. Trevelyan. Reuters. 29 March 2022.
  69. Web site: Picheta. Rob. 27 September 2022. Russian forces have staged illegal 'referendums' in Ukraine. What comes next?. 1 October 2022. CNN.
  70. News: 30 September 2022. Putin says Russia has 'four new regions' as he announces annexation of Ukrainian territory. Reuters. 1 October 2022.
  71. Web site: 30 September 2022. West condemns Russia's 'illegal' annexation of Ukraine provinces. 1 October 2022. Al Jazeera.
  72. Web site: 29 September 2022. Ukraine: UN Secretary-General condemns Russia annexation plan. 1 October 2022. United Nations.
  73. Web site: National composition of the population. Federal State Statistics Service. ru. 12 January 2023.
  74. Web site: 25 years ago Chukotka withdrew from the Magadan Region. 29 September 2017. Vesma Today. 31 October 2019.
  75. Web site: Nenets Republic – It Sounds Weird. Kolguyev. Georgy. 2005-11-17. Nyaryana Vynder. ru. 2019-05-10.
  76. Book: Taagepera, Rein. The Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State. Routledge. 2013. 978-0-415-91977-7. New York. A proposal to divide Mordovia into Erzyan and Mokshan parts was rejected, 628-34 (Mokshin 1995)..
  77. News: Herszenhorn. David. 25 November 2014. Pact Tightens Russian Ties With Abkhazia. The New York Times. 30 March 2022 . 0362-4331.
  78. Web site: Harding. Luke. 25 November 2014. Georgia angered by Russia-Abkhazia military agreement. 30 March 2022. The Guardian.
  79. Web site: 30 March 2022. South Ossetia to hold referendum to join Russia in future – report. 30 March 2022. The Jerusalem Post.
  80. Web site: Waal. Thomas de. 16 July 2019. Abkhazia and the Danger of 'Ossetianization'. 31 March 2022. The Moscow Times.
  81. Web site: Tkemaladze. Tamar. 14 February 2021. Abkhazia Is Not Crimea but Everything Is Set to Become It. 31 March 2022. Modern Diplomacy.
  82. Web site: 25 November 2020. Georgia condemns adoption of program on creation of common socio-economic space between Russia, occupied Abkhazia. 31 March 2022. Agenda.
  83. Web site: Avdaliani. Emil. 18 February 2021. A Fateful Step Towards Annexation. 2022-03-31. Center for European Policy Analysis.
  84. Web site: Civil.Ge | S.Ossetia Sets Repeat Independence Referendum. 2023-02-18. old.civil.ge.
  85. News: South Ossetians vote for independence . The Guardian . . 13 November 2006.
  86. News: Tony. Halpin. Kremlin announces that South Ossetia will join 'one united Russian state'. The Times. 30 August 2008. 30 March 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20080903215639/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4635843.ece . 3 September 2008.
  87. News: Toal. Gerard. O'Loughlin. John. 20 March 2014. How people in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria feel about annexation by Russia. The Washington Post. 30 March 2022.
  88. Web site: 18 March 2015. Putin signs treaty integrating South Ossetia into Russia. 30 March 2022. Al Jazeera America.
  89. News: Moscow, Tskhinvali Sign 'Integration Treaty'. https://web.archive.org/web/20150402124916/http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28143. dead. 2 April 2015. Civil Georgia. 18 March 2015. 30 March 2022.
  90. Web site: 29 December 2015. Breakaway Tskhinvali proposes name change New name emphasizes South Ossetia as part of Russia. 30 March 2022. Agenda.
  91. Web site: Fuller. Liz. 8 February 2017. South Ossetia Referendum On Name Change Steers Clear Of Thornier Unification Issue. 30 March 2022 . Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  92. Web site: Tamkin. Emily. 10 April 2017. An Occupied Region's Referendum Brings Georgia New Iteration of Old Challenges. subscription. 30 March 2022. Foreign Policy.
  93. News: 30 March 2022. Breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia plans to join Russia. The Globe and Mail. 30 March 2022.
  94. Web site: 13 May 2022. Breakaway region of Georgia to hold referendum on joining Russia. 13 May 2022. The Guardian.
  95. Web site: Fabbro. Robin. Shoshiashvili. Tata. 13 May 2022. South Ossetia to hold Russian annexation referendum on 17 July. 13 May 2022. OC Media.
  96. Web site: 31 May 2022. South Ossetia shelves plan for referendum to join Russia. 21 June 2022. DW.
  97. Web site: 18 September 2006. Trans-Dniester Votes for Independence and Russian Accession. 31 March 2022. DW.
  98. News: 18 March 2014 . Moldova's Trans-Dniester region pleads to join Russia. BBC News. 31 March 2022.
  99. News: Where's Transnistria? And why do people there hope Russia will annex them next?. Nina. Porzucki. Public Radio International. 24 March 2014. 6 June 2021. 6 June 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210606115803/https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-03-24/wheres-transnistria-and-why-do-people-there-hope-russia-will-annex-them-next. live.
  100. Web site: Kolstø. Pål. 11 June 2014. Transnistria is a bridge too far for Russia. 31 March 2022. Open Democracy.
  101. Web site: Lungu. Karina. 1 September 2016. Transnistria: From entropy to exodus. 31 March 2022. European Council on Foreign Relations.
  102. Web site: Mondello. Mauro. 18 April 2022. Near Ukraine, a Breakaway Russian Republic Plows On. 24 April 2022. New Lines Magazine.
  103. Web site: Coakley. Amanda. 11 February 2022. Ukraine crisis 'very sensitive' for Russia-backed breakaway state. 31 March 2022. Al Jazeera.
  104. Web site: Transnistria: The breakaway region torn between Moldova, Russia and the EU. 2022-04-01. Middle East Eye. en.
  105. Web site: Cole. Brendan. 22 April 2022. Russia targets Moldova invasion next as they seek land corridor via Ukraine. 22 April 2022. Newsweek.