Hwasong-7 Explained

Hwasong-7
Type:Medium-range ballistic missile
Origin:North Korea
Is Ranged:yes
Is Explosive:yes
Is Missile:yes
Service:1998−Present[1]
Used By:See operators
Production Date:1990–present[2]
Length:15.6m (51.2feet)[3]
Diameter:1.25m (04.1feet)
Filling:
  • Conventional
  • Possibly nuclear
Filling Weight:NaNkg (-2,147,483,648lb) (est.)
Vehicle Range:NaNkm (-2,147,483,648miles) (est.)[4]
Guidance:Inertial
Propellant:TM-185 (20% gasoline 80% kerosene) / AK-27I (27% 73% )[5]
Altitude:160km (100miles) if in lofted trajectory which reduces the operating range to 650km (400miles)
Accuracy:NaNm (-2,147,483,648feet) CEP

The Hwasong-7 (; spelled Hwaseong-7 in South Korea, lit. Mars Type 7), also known as Nodong-1 (Hangul: Korean: 로동(North),노동(South) 1호; Hanja: Korean: 蘆洞 1號), is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles.[6] US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile,[7] as well as the Iranian Shahab-3.[8] [9] Western designations for the Hwasong-7 include: Nodong, Rodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-D, Nodong-A, and Nodong-1.[10]

Overview

It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea.[11]

The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial. It is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of 1250mm and a length of 15600mm.[3]

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere. It can only be fueled when vertical, therefore it cannot be fueled before transport as is normal for modern missiles.[3] Its range is estimated as 900 km (960 mi) with a 1,000 kg payload[3] to a range of between 1,000 km to 1,500 km.[1] North Korea test-fired three Hwasong-7 missiles consecutively on 5 September 2016 and they all flew for about 1000 km, landing in the Japan air defense identification zone.

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of one or two kilometers.[12] With GPS guidance, accuracy is believed to be between 190m (620feet) and . North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles[13] and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.[14]

The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7. Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.

Pakistan, however, suffered with repeated failure initially due to flawed design [15] given in exchange but succeeded in reevaluating the missile's conceptual design and its electronic system in 1998 through reverse engineering. The Ghauri (missile) was later (independently) developed by Kahuta Research Labs and eventually entered in to active military service in 2003.It is believed that it is redesigned/ reverse engineered model of Rodong-1.

A few Hwasong-7 missiles were launched in the 2006 North Korean missile test, and a further two in a 2014 test over a range of 650 km.[16] [17]

Although it has an estimated range of 1000-, launches in March 2014 flew only 650km (400miles). Their range was shortened by firing at a higher launch angle. The missiles flew to an altitude of 160 km (100 mi) at Mach 7. U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to 40 km high.[4]

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three consecutive Rodong-1 missiles into the Sea of Japan and at a range of about 1,000 km.[18] This marked the Rodong-1 as a credible and matured missile suitable for operational deployment since its first successful launch in 1993. The United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea's missile launches.[19]

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.[20]

Operators

Current

Unconfirmed

Failed bids

See also

Bibliography

External links

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Kim . Dueyon . Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs . The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation . 5 November 2024 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160618044352/http://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-and-ballistic-missile-programs/ . 18 June 2016 . 1 July 2013.
  2. Web site: Egypt's Missile Efforts Succeed with Help from North Korea. 1996. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. dead. https://web.archive.org/web/20160123045225/http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/miss.html. 2016-01-23.
  3. Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat . Markus Schiller . RAND Corporation . TR-1268-TSF . 978-0-8330-7621-2 . 2012 . 19 January 2013.
  4. News: NK's March missile test aimed at evading interceptor systems: sources . 6 November 2024 . Yonhap News Agency . 19 June 2014.
  5. Web site: No-Dong 1 - North Korea . Federation of American Scientists . 6 November 2024.
  6. Web site: South Korea's military to increase number of Hyunmoo missiles, says report | Jane's 360 . 2017-07-13 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20170730112920/http://www.janes.com/article/62967/south-korea-s-military-to-increase-number-of-hyunmoo-missiles-says-report . 2017-07-30 .
  7. Web site: 2016-09-22. North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation. 2021-03-06. 38 North. en.
  8. Web site: Brügge . Norbert . The North-Korean/Iranian Nodong-Shahab missile family . 30 June 2020 . 2 May 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160910011622/https://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Nodong/index.htm . 10 September 2016.
  9. Book: U.S. Department of Defense . Proliferation: Threat and Response . 2001 . DIANE Publishing . 38 . 1-4289-8085-7.
  10. Book: Cordesman . Anthony H. . Hess . Ashley . The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Missile, DPRK and ROK Nuclear Forces, and External Nuclear Forces . 2013 . Rowman & Littlefield . 978-1-4422-2520-6 . 10 . en.
  11. Book: Bluth. Christoph. Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. July 31, 2011. Potomac Books Inc.. 9781597975773. 17 March 2017.
  12. The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems . John Schilling, Henry (Long) Kan . US-Korea Institute at SAIS . 2015 . 30 April 2015 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20150413010356/http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NKNF_Delivery-Systems.pdf . 13 April 2015 .
  13. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130304000893 Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea
  14. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat . National Air and Space Intelligence Center . Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency . NASIC-1031-0985-09 . April 2009 .
  15. https://www.defensenews.com/article/20121128/DEFREG03/311280005/Pakistan-Test-Fires-Medium-Range-Ballistic-Missile/
  16. News: North Korea test-fires 'ballistic' missiles . BBC . 26 March 2014 . 26 March 2014.
  17. News: North Korea Launches Two Midrange Missiles . Choe Sang-Hun . New York Times . 25 March 2014 . 31 March 2014.
  18. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/05/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles/ North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles; Japan calls it 'serious threat'
  19. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/un-council-condemns-n/3078518.html UN council condemns N Korea missile launches, vows new measures
  20. News: Shift in THAAD site in S. Korea nothing to solve controversies . https://web.archive.org/web/20160805200603/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-08/04/c_135564043.htm . dead . August 5, 2016 . Yoo Seungki . Xinhua . 4 August 2016 . 4 August 2016.
  21. Web site: Hinz . Fabian . After half a century Egypt’s Scuds soldier on . Military Balance Blog . International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) . 6 November 2024 . en . 16 June 2023.
  22. Book: Cordesman . Anthony H. . Nerguizian . Aram . Popescu . Inout C. . Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War . 2008 . Bloomsbury Publishing USA . 978-0-313-35521-9 . 204−205 . en.