Refraction networking explained
Refraction networking, also known as decoy routing, is a research anti-censorship approach that would allow users to circumvent a censor without using any individual proxy servers.[1] Instead, it implements proxy functionality at the core of partner networks, such as those of Internet service providers, outside the censored country. These networks would discreetly provide censorship circumvention for "any connection that passes through their networks."[2] This prevents censors from selectively blocking proxy servers and makes censorship more expensive, in a strategy similar to collateral freedom.[3] [4] [5]
The approach was independently invented by teams at the University of Michigan, the University of Illinois, and Raytheon BBN Technologies. There are five existing protocols: Telex,[6] TapDance,[7] Cirripede,[8] Curveball,[9] and Rebound.[10] These teams are now working together to develop and deploy refraction networking with support from the U.S. Department of State.
See also
References
- Web site: Refraction Networking. 2020-12-06. refraction.network.
- Frolov. Sergey. Douglas. Fred. Scott. Will. McDonald. Allison. VanderSloot. Benjamin. Hynes. Rod. Kruger. Adam. Kallitsis. Michalis. Robinson. David G.. Schultze. Steve. Borisov. Nikita. 2017. An ISP-Scale Deployment of TapDance. en.
- News: Braga. Matthew. 2017-08-16. In fight for free speech, researchers test anti-censorship tool built into the internet's core CBC News. en-US. CBC. 2020-12-06.
- Web site: 2020-01-29. $1M grant to develop secure, high-capacity research network at U-M. 2020-12-06. Michigan Engineering. en-US.
- Web site: 2017-08-25. 'Clever' TapDance approach to web censorship that works at ISP level. 2020-12-06. Naked Security. en-US.
- Web site: Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure USENIX. 2020-12-06. www.usenix.org.
- Book: Wustrow. Eric. Swanson. Colleen M.. Halderman. J. Alex. 2014. TapDance: End-to-Middle Anticensorship without Flow Blocking. en. 159–174. 978-1-931971-15-7.
- Book: Houmansadr. Amir. Nguyen. Giang T.K.. Caesar. Matthew. Borisov. Nikita. Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security . Cirripede . 2011-10-17. https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046730. CCS '11. Chicago, Illinois, USA. Association for Computing Machinery. 187–200. 10.1145/2046707.2046730. 978-1-4503-0948-6. 11019789.
- Web site: Decoy Routing: Toward Unblockable Internet Communication USENIX. 2020-12-06. www.usenix.org.
- Book: Ellard. D.. Jones. C.. Manfredi. V.. Strayer. W. T.. Thapa. B.. Welie. M. Van. Jackson. A.. 2015 IEEE 40th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN) . Rebound: Decoy routing on asymmetric routes via error messages . https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7366287. 2015. 91–99. 10.1109/LCN.2015.7366287. 978-1-4673-6770-7. 12887876.
External links