| Litigants: | Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. |
| Arguedate: | January 7 |
| Argueyear: | 2002 |
| Decidedate: | March 19 |
| Decideyear: | 2002 |
| Fullname: | Ragsdale, et al. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. |
| Usvol: | 535 |
| Uspage: | 81 |
| Parallelcitations: | 122 S. Ct. 1155; 152 L. Ed. 2d 167 |
| Docket: | 00-6029 |
| Prior: | 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000); cert. granted, . |
| Holding: | 29 CFR 825.700(a) is contrary to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and beyond authority of the Secretary of Labor. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reverse and remanded. |
| Majority: | Kennedy |
| Joinmajority: | Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas |
| Dissent: | O'Connor |
| Joindissent: | Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer |
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), is a U.S. labor law case, concerning the scope of federal preemption against state law for labor rights.[1]
Ragsdale claimed her job was unjustly terminated. The Department of Labor had a penalty to make employers notify employees of the rules for securing more generous family or medical leave, than existed under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees employees 12 weeks unpaid leave.
The Supreme Court held by five to four that the FMLA precluded the right of the Department of Labor to draft penalty rules.
Justice O'Connor dissented (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer) holding that nothing prevented the rule, and it was the Department of Labor's job to enforce the law.