Conflict: | Raghoji's Southern Campaign |
Place: | Tiruchirappalli,Damalcherry,Malthan,Tamil Nadu,Maharashtra,Karnataka |
Partof: | Later Mughal-Maratha Wars |
Date: | 1740-1752 |
Combatant1: | Maratha Empire |
Combatant2: | Carnatic Sultanate Hyderabad State French |
Commander1: | Raghoji Fateh Singh Murari Rao Balaji Baji Rao Sadashivrao Bhau Shamsher Bahadur I Jankoji Rao Scindia |
Commander2: | Dost Ali Khan Hussain Ali Khan Mir Asad Chanda Sahib Bara Sahib Raza sahib Nizam-ul-Mulk Nasir Jung Bussy Salabat Jung Janoji Nimbalkar |
Result: | Maratha Empire Victory |
Nizam-ul-Mulk established his authority in Karnataka, while Chanda Saheb rose to prominence. Shahu appointed Raghuji Bhonsle and Fateh Singh to collect tribute from Karnataka and protect the Tanjore region against Chanda Saheb. Raghuji and Fateh Singh advanced on Arcot, where Dost Ali Khan fell fighting the Marathas. His son, Safdar Ali, sought refuge in Vellore, and the valuables of the Nawab were sent to Pondicherry.[1] [2] [3]
Raghuji and Safdar Ali formed a secret pact. Raghuji besieged Trichinopoly, leading to the fall of Chanda Saheb's brother, Bara Saheb, who was killed in combat. Trichinopoly surrendered to Raghuji, and Chanda Saheb along with his son, Abid Ali, was taken prisoner to Harsapur. This conquest established Raghuji's prominence. Kurar Rao Chorpade was appointed to oversee Trichinopoly. However, conflicts between the Peshwa and Raghuji allowed the Nizam to recapture Trichinopoly. Chanda Saheb was transferred to Satara, while Raghuji and Babuji Naik returned to Karnataka. Muzaffar Jang and Anvaruddin defeated Babuji Naik near Basawapattam, and Sadashivrao Bhau succeeded in Karnataka.
Nizam-ul-Hulk's death allowed Chanda Saheb to escape from Satara and attempt to reclaim Trichinopoly, but he failed. Raghuji, who had strong relations with the French, reached the gates of Pondicherry, where French Governor Dumas refused to pay tribute. Raghuji concluded an agreement with the French and returned to the Maratha capital.
The conflict between the Marathas and the Nizam continued, culminating in the Maratha-NizaM war of 1751-52. Raghuji's initial successes, including defeating Nasir Jung and ravaging Nizam’s territory, were followed by a treaty at Singwa, which restored the fort of Trimbak to the Nizam.
Raghuji's southern campaigns had a mixed impact: while they enhanced Maratha prestige and secured religious freedom for Hindus in Karnataka, they were financially burdensome for Raghuji. French commerce suffered, English trade was affected, and the region experienced significant ravaging and plundering. From 1750 to 1760, the involvement of French and English powers increased their influence in India, leading to a web of intrigues in the Court of Satara.
Senapati took a northwestern route, enduring significant hardships during the march. Despite these challenges, the Festes successfully levied tribute from the rulers of Mysore and Arcot. In October 1727, sent a letter to Kanhoji Bhosale requesting him to halt the invasion of the Nizam-ul-Mulk's territory in the Deccan.
In 1737, Shahu himself began an expedition into Karnataka. However, lacking the necessary authority to command armies and the personal valor required for success, he could only advance as far as Miraj over two years.
In 1739, Shahu sent Raghoji Bhonsle and Fateh eh Singh Bhonale to collect tribute from the southern principalities, stipulating that half of the proceeds be used for their expenses and the other half be sent to the treasury at Satara. The Mughal emperor had assigned five states in Karnataka to Baja Tahu for this purpose.
The Festus struggled to control older Sardars like Fateh Singh and Raghoji, as well as the Pratinidhi and Babuji Naik. These figures often persuaded Shabu to make decisions contrary to his policies. Baji Rao's successes against the Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Imperial armies in Halva and Bundelkhand only fueled the jealousy of Shahu's court advisors. When Bajirao's northern successes reached a climax, his opponents, including Raghoji, Babuji Naik, Hurar Rao Horpade, and others led by Fateh Singh, urged Shabu to focus on conquering the south. Babuji Naik, who had claims on Karnataka based on a Baulat grant, supported the expedition.
By 1725, opposition had become serious, prompting Shahu to seek a compromise between Pratinidhi and the Peshwa. During the 1725 attack, Fateh Singh agreed to join Bajirao's expedition at Shahu's request, but the Maratha army suffered significant losses. Following this, Pratinidhi and Raghoji Bhonsle opposed Baji Rao. Although Baji Rao had a good relationship with Babuji Naik, he did not abandon the other leaders. Fateh Singh, being Shabu's adopted son, was also greatly valued. Despite this, Pratinidhi and Raghoji I sided with Fateh Singh, strengthening his party. The Sardars opposed the Peshwa, leading Shabu to avoid troubling Fateh Singh or involving himself in his affairs.
Muslim dominance in the south began to stir jealousy among the Marathas. Leaders like Safdar Ali and Chanda Saheb were extorting high tributes from Hindu rulers. Tanjore, however, managed to survive by making appropriate submissions and had grown larger than ever. The new ruler of Tanjore, Pratap Singh, had recently suffered at the hands of both Safdar Ali and Chanda Saheb. After the fall of Jinji, the Mughals rapidly expanded their control over southeastern India. The Mughal deputy, Dued Aban, had made Sadaatullah Khan the governor of Karnataka, tasked with enforcing Mughal authority. At the time of Raghuji's expedition, the entire southeastern peninsula was under the Mughal suzerainty.
Chanda Saheb had seized Trichinopoly in 1735 and subsequently focused on Tanjore and Arcot. The Nawab of Arcot, Dost Ali Khan, and his son-in-law, Chanda Sahib, with the assistance of French Governor Jumas of Pondicherry, were actively involved in these efforts.
See main article: Battle of Damalcherry Pass. In early 1740, the Marathas advanced into the Carnatic, and by April had devastated parts of the Arcot province. On May 15, Pondicherry received reports that a large Maratha cavalry force, estimated between 40,000 and 50,000, had moved towards Kandanur. After extorting 60,000 to 70,000 rupees from local inhabitants, they proceeded to Cuddapah, burning villages and plundering the countryside. This led the local population to seek refuge in fortified cities and with the French at Pondicherry. Even the Nawab of Arcot's wives and female relatives were sent there for safety. In response, Nawab Dost Ali Khan attempted to expel the Marathas and confronted them at the Damalcherry pass on May 20. A fierce battle followed, resulting in the deaths of NawabDost Ali Khan and his son Hussain Ali, and the capture of Mir Asad. Around this time, news of Baji Rao’s death reached the region, prompting Raghoji I and Babuji Naik to hasten to Satara to secure Babuji Naik's appointment as the new Peshwa.[4] [5] [6]
See main article: Siege of Trichinopoly (1741). During the initial invasion, Chanda Sahib, the leader of Trichinopoly, had fortified the city with ample grain supplies, believing it would withstand the Maratha forces indefinitely. However, upon his return from Pondicherry, he made the critical error of selling the grain and even considered expanding his territories, sending his brother to Madura. This left Trichinopoly vulnerable and ill-prepared for the Marathas' advance. Seizing the opportunity, Raghoji I, leading the Marathas, swiftly moved towards Trichinopoly, viewing this as the ideal moment to strike.[7]
Despite the unexpected turn of events, Chanda Sahib remained resolute in defending his city. He called upon his brother, Bara Sahib, for aid. Bara Sahib responded with an army of 3,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry, but the Marathas, well-informed of his approach, intercepted him with a superior force of 20,000. In the ensuing battle, Bara Sahib was killed, and his loss severely impacted his troops, who faltered in his absence.
Chanda Sahib's resolve was severely tested as he found himself increasingly isolated and short on resources. The prolonged siege and dwindling supplies eventually forced him into surrender. After more than three months of relentless assault, he opened the gates of Trichinopoly on March 21st, accepting the harsh terms imposed by the Marathas. Following his surrender, Chanda Sahib was taken as a prisoner to Satara, while the Marathas appointed Murari Rao as the new governor, solidifying their control over the region.
After the defeat and death of Dost Ali Khan and the capture of Trichinopoly, the French found themselves in a precarious position, reminiscent of the situation in 1677 A.D. following Shivaji's defeat of Sher Khan Lodi. In 1740, Pondicherry was better fortified than before, but French Governor Dumas was acutely aware of his vulnerabilities. To prepare for any potential threat, he reinforced the western fortifications of Pondicherry.[8]
Dumas received news about the recent treaty clauses between Raghuji and Safdar Ali and used this information strategically. Despite being threatened by Raghuji, who demanded tribute which Dumas refused to pay, the situation became more complicated when Dost Ali's widow, along with her children and treasure, arrived at Pondicherry seeking refuge on May 25, 1740. Opening the gates to them could provoke the Marathas, while denying them entry might anger Safdar Ali, who would likely hold the French responsible. Ultimately, Dumas chose to shelter the Nawab’s family to avoid disgrace and maintain good relations with them. Safdar Ali thanked Dumas in a letter dated July 8, 1740.
Dumas, aware of the impending Maratha return to the Karnatak after the rains, worked diligently on strengthening Pondicherry's defenses and supported Chanda Saheb’s efforts to defend his capital. He also gathered information about the situation in Trichinopoly.
During the Siege of Trichinopoly (1741), Raghuji began correspondence with Dumas. In a letter dated January 10, 1741, Raghuji accused Dumas of ignoring his previous letters and suspected the French of aiding his enemies. He threatened to attack the French settlement, though he later deferred action based on recommendations that the French were trustworthy. Raghuji reminded Dumas that the French owed tribute amounting to sixty lakh rupees and demanded the surrender of Chanda Saheb's family and their treasure. The French settlement faced the threat of a fate similar to Bassein, recently captured by the Marathas.
Dumas responded by rejecting Raghuji's claim for tribute, asserting the French were under French royal protection and that they would defend Pondicherry fiercely. He assured that the French would fight valiantly if attacked and reported that Bassein was not defended by French forces.
On February 3, 1741, Raghuji reiterated his demands in another letter, threatening the French and advising them to send an envoy to negotiate. Raghuji sent Gopal Anand to Pondicherry with full powers to negotiate. Despite the threats, Dumas maintained his composure and continued to fortify the settlement. He received the Maratha envoy and showed him the French defenses and preparations. Impressed by the French readiness and the governor's resolve, the Maratha general decided to withdraw his forces rather than attack. The French settlement was not subjected to a direct attack but was blockaded for eight months until the arrival of Bourdonnais ended the blockade.
This situation reached Shahu, who criticized Raghuji for not achieving his objectives. The incident with the French envoy and the bottles of wine was interpreted as a sign of Raghuji's failure to secure victory. Despite the apparent diplomatic success of Dumas and the French, historians recognize that Dumas was well-prepared and could have effectively resisted a serious attack. Raghuji's decision to withdraw may have been influenced by his declining health; a letter from his subordinate mentioned his severe rheumatism and deteriorating condition.
Raghuji eventually handed over Trichinopoly to Fateh Singh, who appointed a new commander, while Dumas's defiance earned him accolades and recognition from various figures, including the Emperor of Delhi. After Dumas resigned, Dupleix succeeded him and sought to capitalize on the situation by supporting Chanda Saheb's claim to the throne. Dupleix financed Chanda Saheb’s release from captivity, aiming to secure greater influence and security for the French in India.
Chanda Sahib was moved to the Maratha capital but remained a prisoner under harsh conditions. Efforts for his release continued, with the condition of restoring Trichinopoly to Hindu rule being one of the stipulations. Chanda Saheb's fate remained uncertain as negotiations and conditions for his release were subject to ongoing diplomatic and financial pressures.
Dupleix sought to aid Chanda Saheb in his own way. On his recommendation, the Council of Pondicherry took an interest in securing Chanda Saheb's release. In July 1747, Chanda Saheb sent two letters: one to the Governor of Pondicherry and another to the diarist, A. Pillai. The letters mentioned that Dupleix had promised a ransom of three lakhs for his release and that ten thousand rupees would be given to Jayaram Pandit if he successfully transported Chanda Saheb safely to Arcot.
During this period, the French were under threat from English attacks, and Dupleix was keen on Chanda Saheb’s release to bolster French defenses. Dupleix and Chanda Saheb’s relatives took measures to secure his freedom, but Dupleix struggled to guarantee the Marathas' ransom collection. He had announced his intention to support Chanda Saheb and sought the Council’s approval for a one lakh rupee loan, confident it would be repaid from Chanda Saheb’s future gratitude. However, the loan was not provided, and Dupleix’s plans to install Chanda Saheb on the Arcot throne were stalled.
Despite ongoing correspondence between Dupleix, Chanda Saheb, and Raghuji, and Dupleix’s offer to stand as a guarantor for Chanda Saheb’s liabilities, funds were not forthcoming. Dupleix promised three lakh rupees for Chanda Saheb’s military expenses, but no money was actually advanced. Dupleix guaranteed the Marathas that Chanda Saheb’s promises would be honored after he claimed the throne. Shahu urged Dupleix to press Chanda Saheb to fulfill his commitments. Dupleix managed to reduce the initial demand from sixteen lakhs to two lakhs. By early 1748, Chanda Saheb was released and allowed to leave Satara, thanks to Dupleix's intervention.
The French and English engaged in mutual conflicts from 1750 to 1760. The English supported Mohammad Ali and the King of Tanjore, while the French assisted the Marathas, leading to the conquest of Tanjore by the Marathas. The English were unable to intervene effectively. After French Commander Lally’s plunder of Tanjore, the English sent an army only then. In this conflict, the Maratha leader Jankoji fought bravely for the English.
Chanda Saheb’s presence at Satara strengthened French-Maratha relations. The French victory at Adyar in 1746 impressed Maratha leaders, and Raghuji invited Dupleix to join Maratha expeditions. Despite declining assistance from Chanda Sahib and his failure to secure Tanjore or Trichinopoly, the French continued efforts to reduce English influence in the Deccan. The Marathas were unhelpful in the French struggle against external enemies despite their promises.
After Chanda Saheb’s death in June 1752, Dupleix attempted to install Chanda Saheb’s son, Raja Saheb, as the Nawab of Arcot. Raja Saheb proved ineffective, prompting Dupleix to offer the position to Hurtaza Ali Khan, the Killedar of Vellore, who had previously betrayed and murdered Safdar Ali Khan, the former Nawab of Karnatak.
See main article: Siege of Trichinopoly (1743). After deposing Muhammed Saadatullah Khan II in Arcot, the Nizam marched toward Trichinopoly. On March 14, 1743, he arrived with a vast force, including 200,000 sepoys, 80,000 sowars, 150 war elephants, and 200 elephant-mounted artillery pieces. The Nizam set up a camp near Trichinopoly Fort and demanded the surrender of Maratha Governor Murari Rao. Murari Rao, equipped with 4,000 sepoys, 2,000 sowars, and a substantial array of artillery, chose to defend the fort.
The Nizam laid siege to the fort, positioning his troops and artillery around the outer enclosures and blocking the gateways. Despite this, Murari Rao's defenders managed to repel the Nizam's forces initially, using cannonballs, bullets, and grenades to defend the fort. The Nizam aimed to win by attrition, avoiding direct confrontation and hoping to outlast Murari Rao's resistance.
Murari Rao could not expect reinforcements from the Maratha Empire, as Emperor Shahu I was preoccupied with campaigns in Delhi, Bengal, and Odisha. Internal disputes between Maratha general Raghoji I Bhonsle and Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao further weakened the Maratha position, contributing to the eventual disintegration of the empire.
Faced with this untenable situation, Murari Rao eventually surrendered on August 29, 1743. The terms of the surrender granted him governance of the hill-fort of Penukonda and a payment of 200,000 rupees. The fall of Trichinopoly and the capture of Madurai ended Maratha dominance in the Carnatic region and reestablished Nizam authority over the Deccan. According to the agreement, any future control of Trichinopoly would require a payment of 10,000,000 rupees to the Nizam. However, the Dalavayi could not meet this financial demand due to existing heavy tributary taxes, including a previous payment of 50,000,000 rupees to Maratha ruler Raghoji. In October 1743, the Nizam returned to Golconda.
From 1744 to 1746, the Maratha Empire, under Emperor Shahu I, launched two expeditions to extend their influence over the Carnatic region. The first expedition, led by Babuji Naik of Baramati, ended in defeat when he faced Anwaruddin Khan of Arcot and Muzaffar Jung, who were acting on behalf of the Nizam. In 1746, a second attempt was made, this time led by Babuji Naik and Fateh Singh Bhonsle of Akkalkot. Despite their efforts, they failed to capture Trichinopoly and were again defeated by the Nizam's forces. Later in 1746, under Peshwa Balaji Bajirao, the Marathas launched another military campaign led by Sadashivrao Bhau. This expedition successfully captured the region, overcoming resistance from the Nizam's army led by Nasir Jung. However, Maratha control over the Carnatic was short-lived, as the region soon became a battleground for the French and British East India Companies, who ultimately divided it between themselves.[9]
Bussy and his advisers, despitetemporarily conciliating the Peshwa, harbored intentions of diminishing his influence. Ramdaspant, a key figure at the Nizam's Court, played a crucial role in this plan. Although outwardly friendly, Ramdaspant orchestrated actions against the Peshwa. On April 22, 1751, Ramdaspant seized a treasure intended for the Peshwa near Aurangabad, a breach of the friendly understanding between them. The Peshwa's frustration grew as the explanations offered were deemed unsatisfactory.
To maintain the element of surprise, Bussy and Ramdaspant sent Janoji Nimbalkar to Poona under the guise of negotiating peace, while secretly preparing for an attack. The Peshwa, however, saw through this ploy, prepared for any eventuality, and remained vigilant.
By October 1751, Bussy had reorganized Salabat Jang's forces, establishing a stronghold in Aurangabad. He trained and paid his troops well, achieving remarkable military efficiency. This development increased Bussy's influence, with Salabat Jang growing increasingly apprehensive. Bussy secured control of key districts in the northeast, known as the Northern Sarkars, managed by French agents.
In November 1751, conflict erupted between the Marathas and the Nizam's forces. The Peshwa, having vacated Poona, retreated towards Ahmadnagar. Bussy advanced from Aurangabad, causing destruction in Maratha territories. The Peshwa employed guerrilla tactics, destroying his own villages to deny the enemy resources and avoiding direct confrontations with Bussy’s artillery. Despite Bussy’s efforts to capture Poona, his progress was limited.
On November 21, during the Peshwa’s religious observances, Bussy’s artillery created chaos, forcing the Peshwa to flee and resulting in the capture of his religious materials. The battle near Malthan on November 27 saw Saiyad Lashkar Khan suffer a severe defeat. The Marathas, led by Raghoji I, counterattacked, and the Mughals retreated.
Realizing he was unable to effectively counter the Maratha tactics, Bussy sought peace. Negotiations began near Pargaon, leading to the Treaty of Singwa on January 6, 1752. The treaty restored the status quo, and Konher Trimbak Ekbote was honored for his service.
The underlying disputes between the states, particularly over the authority in the Deccan, remained unresolved. In April 1752, Ghazi-ud-din’s departure from Delhi to support the Peshwa caused Salabat Jang to flee to Hyderabad. During this period, Bussy’s troops mutinied, killing their paymaster Ramdaspant. This mutiny weakened Bussy’s position, and the Peshwa, alongside Ghazi-ud-din’s forces, sought to exploit the situation.
Ghazi-ud-din’s sudden death on October 16, 1752, disrupted plans and led to a resurgence of Maratha forces. Surrounded near Bhalki, Bussy’s forces faced significant challenges, and the Marathas inflicted heavy losses. The Treaty of Bhalki was signed on November 24, 1752, resulting in the cession of western Berar and other territories to the Marathas, a boundary that largely remains today.
After the treaty, Bussy and the Peshwa engaged in amicable discussions. The Peshwa invited Bussy to serve him, but Bussy declined, marking the end of his hostility towards the Marathas.
The Marathas established a strong presence in Karnataka largely due to Raghuji's efforts. During this period, Raghuji, Fateh Singh, and Murari Rao Ghorpade were the principal leaders. Raghuji's superior war tactics and shrewd policies were instrumental in capturing Trichinopoly and Arcot, making Raghuji and his allies the key figures in those regions, while the other two leaders were sidelined.
Raghuji demonstrated exceptional military strategy in these campaigns. However, his achievements in Karnataka were undermined by the negligence of Babu and the rivalries among the Peshwa, who did not support Babuji Naik. Consequently, the Nizam sought to limit Raghuji's influence in Karnataka to preserve the victories won. Additionally, Raghuji's focus shifted towards the eastern region, leading to a decline in Haratha influence in the Deccan due to the rise of Hyder Ali. Raghuji was unable to consolidate his gains in Karnataka because he had to leave for Bengal in 1744, leaving the situation in Karnataka unresolved. His son Janoji I, who was sent in his stead, did not succeed in improving the situation.
During his southern campaigns, Raghuji aimed to maintain good relations with the English. He assured them that the Harathas would not attack Fort St. George and sent gifts as a gesture of friendship. The English reciprocated by acknowledging his accomplishments, including the capture of Trichinopoly, and sent gifts to both Raghuji and Fateh Singh.
Despite attempts by Dubast Venkatachalan to incite hostility between the Marathas and the English, Raghuji managed to renew the alliance that began under King Shivaji. The Marathas ensured the protection of English settlements in the south as promised to the people of Devanar-pattanam.
The Nawab, facing financial pressure, sought assistance from European powers to help meet his obligations to the Marathas. He had requested three lakh pagas from them and anticipated their support in paying this sum. Chanda Saheb also intended to seek English support and, if unsuccessful, might have turned to the Marathas for help.
Locally, the Hindus welcomed Raghuji's arrival in Karnataka as a liberation. When the Hizem had entered the province, a sacred idol had been seized by the Mohammedans. The people had petitioned Aliwardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal, for its return but were asked for a substantial sum of money, which they could not afford. Thus, they were hopeful that Raghuji’s intervention would restore the idol to their temple and revive their religious practices.
Raghuji’s southern campaigns, though enhancing the prestige of the Marathas and earning them name and fame, were financially disastrous. The devastation caused was severe and often excessive, and the wealth acquired was significantly less than anticipated. As a result, despite their extensive efforts, the Marathas found the campaign to be a financial failure.
French commerce was heavily impacted by the Maratha depredations, and English trade also suffered due to Maratha incursions into the Karnatak. Investment in the region decreased as Madras merchants were barred from procuring cloth from Salem, and the increase in customs duties in Madras led to a diversion of goods from Bengal to Hadras instead of St. Thome. This disruption hindered the import of cotton and yarn, and the country was severely ravaged and plundered as a result of the Maratha attacks.
The Maratha incursion into the south also drew the French and English into wars between 1750 and 1760. Both sides supported various South Indian rulers against each other, increasing their own power and prestige in the region. French resistance to Raghuji earned them recognition from local Indian powers such as Chanda Saheb, the Nizam, and the Marathas. Consequently, these Indian powers sought European assistance to suppress their rivals, which eventually facilitated the English in establishing their dominance in India. The involvement of these European powers was driven by the complex party politics among Indian rulers.
Initially, the relationship between the Marathas and the French was purely commercial. However, by 1740, the French had strengthened their position in India, and Indian princes began to look to them for protection. The French gained further prestige during the Maratha invasion of Arcot (1740-41), and Dumas’s resistance to Raghuji earned him commendations from both the Nizam and the Emperor. This Maratha expansion into the south thus provided an opportunity for the French to increase their influence in India.
The Karnatak region became a complex web of intrigue and conflict, involving numerous powers such as the French, English, Nizam, Marathas, and Mysore, along with internal strife including the machinations of Sahu’s queens and the activities of Murari Rao Ghorpade. These factors, combined with the Nizam’s efforts to curb Raghuji’s influence and the ambitions of local leaders like Fateh Singh and Babuji Naik, complicated the situation further.
The Maratha campaigns in the south, led by Raghuji and Fateh Singh in 1741, showcased their military prowess and gallantry. They faced challenges from the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Karnatak rulers, the English, the French, and various smaller states and zamindars. Ultimately, these campaigns allowed Raghuji Bhonsle to establish a significant influence over Raja Shahu, comparable to the authority enjoyed by Bajirao Peshwa.