In game theory, the price of stability (PoS) of a game is the ratio between the best objective function value of one of its equilibria and that of an optimal outcome. The PoS is relevant for games in which there is some objective authority that can influence the players a bit, and maybe help them converge to a good Nash equilibrium. When measuring how efficient a Nash equilibrium is in a specific game we often also talk about the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the ratio between the worst objective function value of one of its equilibria and that of an optimal outcome.
Another way of expressing PoS is:
PoS=
valueofbestNashequilibrium | |
valueofoptimalsolution |
, PoS\geq0.
In particular, if the optimal solution is a Nash equilibrium, then the PoS is 1.
In the following prisoner’s dilemma game, since there is a single equilibrium
(B,R)
Left | Right | ||
---|---|---|---|
Top | (2,2) | (0,3) | |
Bottom | (3,0) | (1,1) |
(T,L)
(B,R)
Left | Right | ||
---|---|---|---|
Top | (2,1) | (0,0) | |
Bottom | (0,0) | (5,10) |
The price of stability was first studied by A. Schulz and N. Stier-Moses while the term was coined by E. Anshelevich et al. Schulz and Stier-Moses focused on equilibria in a selfish routing game in which edges have capacities. Anshelevich et al. studied network design games and showed that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the price of stability of this game is at most the nth harmonic number in directed graphs. For undirected graphs Anshelevich and others presented a tight bound on the price of stability of 4/3 for a single source and two players case. Jian Li has proved that for undirected graphs with a distinguished destination to which all players must connect the price of stability of the Shapely network design game is
O(logn/loglogn)
n
n
Network design games have a very natural motivation for the Price of Stability.In these games, the Price of Anarchy can be much worse than the Price of Stability.
Consider the following game.
n
i
si
ti
G=(V,E)
Pi
si
ti
G
ci
ne
e
stylede(ne)=
ce | |
ne |
styleCi(S)=
\sum | |
e\inPi |
ce | |
ne |
styleSC(S)=\sumiCi(S)=\sumene
ce | |
ne |
=\sumece
The price of anarchy can be
\Omega(n)
Consider two different equilibria in this game. If everyone shares the
1+\varepsilon
1+\varepsilon
n
1
1+\varepsilon
Here is a pathological game in the same spirit for the Price of Stability, instead.Consider
n
si
t
The optimal strategy is for everyone to share the
1+\varepsilon
1+\varepsilon
style | 1+\varepsilon |
n |
style | 1 |
n |
style | 1 |
n-1 |
style1+
1 | |
2 |
+ … +
1 | |
n |
=Hn
Hn
n
\Theta(logn)
Note that by design, network design games are congestion games.Therefore, they admit a potential function
style\Phi=\sume
ne | |
\sum | |
i=1 |
ce | |
i |
Theorem. [Theorem 19.13 from Reference 1] Suppose there exist constants
A
B
S
A ⋅ SC(S)\leq\Phi(S)\leqB ⋅ SC(S).
B/A
Proof. The global minimum
NE
\Phi
SC(NE)\leq1/A ⋅ \Phi(NE)\leq1/A ⋅ \Phi(OPT)\leqB/A ⋅ SC(OPT).
Now recall that the social cost was defined as the sum of costs over edges, so
\Phi(S)=\sume
ne | |
\sum | |
i=1 |
ce | |
i |
=\sumece
H | |
ne |
\leq\sumeceHn=Hn ⋅ SC(S).
We trivially have
A=1
B=Hn
O(logn/loglogn)