Rogers Commission Report Explained

The Rogers Commission Report was written by a Presidential Commission charged with investigating the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster during its 10th mission, STS-51-L. The report, released and submitted to President Ronald Reagan on June 9, 1986, determined both the cause of the disaster that took place 73 seconds after liftoff, and urged NASA to improve and install new safety features on the shuttles and in its organizational handling of future missions.

Commission members

• William P. Rogers, chairman and former United States Secretary of State (under Richard Nixon) and United States Attorney General (under Dwight Eisenhower)
• Neil Armstrong (vice-chairman), retired astronaut and first human to walk on the Moon (Apollo 11)
• David Campion Acheson, diplomat and son of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson
• Eugene E. Covert, aeronautics expert and former Chief Scientist of the U.S. Air Force
• Richard P. Feynman, theoretical physicist and winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physics
• Robert B. Hotz, editor, Aviation Week and Space Technology
• Donald J. Kutyna, Air Force general with experience in ICBMs and shuttle management
• Sally K. Ride, engineer, astrophysicist and first female American astronaut in space, flew on Challenger as part of missions STS-7 and STS-41-G. Later, she served on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
• Robert W. Rummel, Trans World Airlines executive and aviation consultant to NASA
• Joseph F. Sutter, Boeing senior vice president and engineering program director on the Boeing 747 aircraft
• Arthur B. C. Walker, Jr, solar physicist and Stanford University professor
• Albert D. Wheelon, physicist and developer of Central Intelligence Agency's aerial surveillance program
• Charles E. (Chuck) Yeager, retired Air Force general and the first person to break the sound barrier in level flight
• Alton G. Keel, Jr., executive director of the commission

Commission witnesses

Day 1, February 6, 1986^[1]

• Dr. William R. Graham, Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Jesse W. Moore, Associate Administrator for space flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and chairman, 51L Data Design and Analysis Test Task Force
• Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, National space transportation systems program, Johnson Space Center
  • • Dr. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, Shuttle Projects office, Marshall Space Flight Center Robert Sieck, Director of Shuttle operations, Kennedy Space Center Richard G. Smith, Director, Kennedy Space Center
• Thomas L. Moser, Director, Engineering, Johnson Space Center
• Richard H. Kohrs, Deputy Manager, National Space transportation systems program, Johnson Space Center

Day 2, February 7, 1986^[2]

• Marv Jones
  • Stanley Klein, FBI Jesse W. Moore, Associate Administrator for space flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and chairman, 51L Data Design and Analysis Test Task Force
• Arnold Aldrich, Manager, National Space Transportation Systems Program, Johnson Space Center

Day 3, February 10, 1986

• Mr L. Michael Weeks, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA
• Irvin Davids, Shuttle propulsion Division
• Lawrence B. Mulloy, project manager, solid rocket boosters, Marshall Space Flight Center

Day 4, February 11, 1986

• William R. Graham, Acting Administrator of NASA
• Jesse W. Moore, Associate Administrator for space Flight, NASA
• Lawrence B. Mulloy, Project Manager, Solid Rocket Boosters, Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA
• Richard C. Cook
• Michael B. Mann, Chief, STS Resources Analysis Branch, Office of The Comptroller, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• Mr. David Winterhalter, Acting Director, Shuttle Propulsion Group, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Day 5, February 13, 1986

• • • • • Dick Kohrs, Deputy Manager, NST Program office, Johnson Space Center Charlie Stevenson, Photographic Team Analysis, Kennedy Space Center William R. Lucas Jesse W. Moore Milton Silveira
    • Horace Lamberth Jim Harrington T. Jack Lee, Deputy Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Head, Marshall Contingency Investigative Team
    • Mr. George Hardy Rick Bachtol T. Moser, Head, Failure Scenario Team, Johnson Space Center

Day 6, February 14, 1986

• • Larry Mulloy Jerry E. Mason, Senior Vice President, Wasatch Operations, Morton Thiokol
• Robert Lund, Morton Thiokol, Inc.
• Roger Boisjoly, Structures Section, Morton Thiokol, Inc.
• Arnold Thompson, Design Engineer, Morton Thiokol, Inc.
• Allan J. McDonald, Morton Thiokol, Inc.

Day 7, February 25, 1986

• Allan J. McDonald, Manager, SRM Project, Morton-Thiokol, Inc.
• Jerry E. Mason, Senior Vice President, Wasatch Division, Morton-Thiokol, Inc.
• Roger Boisjoly, Seal Task Force, Thiokol
  • • Arnie Thompson, Supervisor, Structures, Thiokol Robert Lund, Vice President, Engineering, Thiokol Joe Kilminster, Vice President, Shuttle Project, Huntsville
• Brian G. Russell

Day 8, February 26, 1986

• Larry Mulloy, Manager, Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Program, Marshall Space Flight Center
• George C. Hardy, Deputy Director, Science and Engineering, Marshall Space Flight Center
• Stanley Reinarz, Manager, Marshall Shuttle projects Office
• Dr. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, Marshall Shuttle Projects Office
• Charles Stevenson, Ice Team member
• B. K. Davis, Ice Team member
• Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Kolczynski, Commander, Detachment 11, 2d Weather Squadron, Patrick Air Force Base

Day 9, February 27, 1986

• Charles Stevenson
  • B.K. Davis Lieutenant Colonel Edward Kolczynski
• Rocco Petrone, President, Space Transportation Systems Division, North American Space Operations, Rockwell International
• Al Martin, Site Director, Launch Support Operations, Kennedy Space Center, Rockwell International
  • • Bob Glaysher, Vice President and Program Manager, Orbiter Operations Support, Rockwell International Martin Cioffoletti, Vice President, Space Transportation Systems Integration, Rockwell International Arnie Aldrich, Manager, National Space Transportation Systems, Johnson Space Center
• William R. Lucas, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama
• Jesse W. Moore, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters
• Dick G. Smith, Director, Kennedy Space Center
• Gene Thomas, Director, Launch and Landing Operations, Kennedy Space Center
• Ben Powers, Engineer, Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center

Day 10, March 7, 1986

• Colonel Edward O'Connor Jr., USAF, Director of Operations, 6655TH ASTG, ESMC
  • Robert Lang, Shuttle Operations, Mechanical Systems Division, Kennedy Space Center Carver Kennedy, Director, VAB Operations, Morton-Thiokol, Inc.
    • Bill Barsh, Engineering Manager, External Tank/Solid Rocket Booster Operations, Lockheed Space Operations Company, KSC Thomas L. Moser, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Dr. J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for Engineering, Marshall Space Flight Center
    • T. Jack Lee, Deputy Director, MSFC Gary Coultas, Assistant Manager, Orbiter Projects, Johnson Space Center George Hopson, Director, Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center

Day 11, March 21, 1986

• • • James R. Thompson Jr., Vice Chairman, STS 51L, Data and Design and Analyst Task force, Cape Canaveral, Florida Colonel Edward O'Connor Jr., Chairman, Search, Recovery and Reconstruction, Cape Canaveral, Florida Dan M. Germany, Chairman, photo and television support team, Cape Canaveral, and Deputy Manager, Space Station Project Office, Johnson Flight Space Center, Houston, Texas
• Charles Stevenson
• George McDonough
• John Erickson
  • J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for Engineering, Marshall Space Flight Center Harold N. Scofield, Chief, Control Systems Division, Marshall Space Flight Center
• Robert S. Ryan, Chief, Structural Dynamics Division Systems Dynamics Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center
• Garry M. Lyles, Propulsion Analysis Branch, Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center
• Fredrick D. Bachtel, Thermal Engineering Branch, Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center

Day 12, April 3, 1986

• George Abbey, Director of Flight Crew Operations
• John Young, Chief, Astronaut Office
• Paul J. Weitz, Deputy Chief, Astronaut Office
• Bob Crippen, astronaut
• Hank Hartsfield, astronuat
• Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly, Associate Administrator for space flight
• Arnold D. Aldrich, manager of the space transportation systems
• Clifford E. Charlesworth, director of space operations

Day 13, May 3, 1986

• Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, Solid Rocket Booster Project Office
  • Lawrence O. Wear, Manager, Solid Rocket Motor Project, Marshall Space Flight Center Brian G. Russell, Program Manager, Department of solid rocket motor and Final Assembly
• Robert Ebeling, Department of solid rocket motor igniter and Final Assembly
• J.C. Kilminster, Vice President, Space Booster Programs
• Roger Boisjoly, Seal Task Force, Morton Thiokol, Inc.
• George B. Hardy, Deputy Director, Science and Engineering, former Manager, Solid Rocket Booster office
• James E. Kingsbury, Science and Engineering
• Robert G. Eudy, former Chief Engineer, Solid Rocket Motor, Office of Associate Director For Engineering
• John O. Miller, Technical Assistant To Solid Rocket Motor Manager
• William L. Ray, Solid Rocket Motor Branch, Propulsion Division, Engineering Directorate
• L. Michael Weeks, Associate Administrator, (technical) for space flight, NASA
• Glynn S. Lunney, former Manager, National Space Transportation Systems Program Office
• John R. Stocker, Assistant General counsel, corporate offices, Rockwell International, corporation

Findings

The commission found that the immediate cause of the Challenger accident was a failure in the O-rings sealing the aft field joint on the right solid rocket booster, causing pressurized hot gases and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and contact the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure. The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a design flaw, as their performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low temperature on the day of launch.^[3]

"An accident rooted in history"

More broadly, the report also determined the contributing causes of the accident. Most salient was the failure of both NASA and its contractor, Morton Thiokol, to respond adequately to the design flaw. The Commission found that as early as 1977, NASA managers had not only known about the flawed O-ring, but that it had the potential for catastrophe. This led the Rogers Commission to conclude that the Challenger disaster was "an accident rooted in history".^[4]

Flawed launch decision

The report also strongly criticized the decision-making process that led to the launch of Challenger, saying that it was seriously flawed. Morton Thiokol called a meeting the night before the launch to raise concerns over the forecast temperature in regards to the O-rings. During the meeting, Morton Thiokol's engineers issued a recommendation "not to launch below 53F", the previous lowest temperature of a launch (STS-51C, a year earlier). The NASA managers challenged this and after a 30 minute offline caucus, Morton Thiokol's senior management overruled their engineers' decision and gave the launch the go-ahead. The concerns were not communicated beyond the Level III Flight Readiness Review (FRR). It is certain that even though members of higher FRR teams knew about the issues, there were plenty of members who could have stopped the launch but decided not to. This was done in large part because of the management structure at NASA and the lack of major checks and balances, which proved to be fatal in this scenario.^[5] The report concluded that:

Role of Richard Feynman

Notes and References

1. Web site: Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident . June 30, 2023.
2. Web site: Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident . June 30, 2023.
3. Web site: Rogers Commission report. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. 72. 1. 1986.
4. Web site: Rogers Commission report . Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident . 1 . 1986 .
5. United States Government Accountability Office