Pooling equilibrium explained
A pooling equilibrium in game theory is an equilibrium outcome of a signaling game.[1] [2]
In a signaling game, players send actions called "signals" to other players. These signals are based on privately held information, which is not known to others in the game.[3] These actions do reveal a player's "type" to other players, who then choose their strategies accordingly. In a pooling equilibrium, all types of a given sender send the same signal. Some senders represent their true type, while others correctly mimic the type of others, having no incentive to differentiate themselves. As a result, the receiver acts as if they have received no information, maximizing their utility according to their prior beliefs.
See also
Notes and References
- Ellison, Glenn. "Game Theory 14.122: Handout #l Finding PBE in Signaling Games", Microeconomic Theory II. MIT OpenCourseWare.
- https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100336941#:~:text=An%20equilibrium%20in%20which%20agents,choosing%20the%20same%20insurance%20contract pooling equilibrium
- Bergstrom . Carl T. . Számadó . Szabolcs . Lachmann . Michael . 2002-11-29 . Johnstone . R. A. . Dall . S. R. X. . Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games . Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences . en . 357 . 1427 . 1595–1606 . 10.1098/rstb.2002.1068 . 0962-8436 . 1693066 . 12495516.
