People's Revolutionary Party (Vietnam) Explained

People's Revolutionary Party
Native Name:Đảng Nhân dân Cách mạng Việt Nam
Merged:Communist Party of Vietnam
Ideology:Socialism
Country:Vietnam
Governing Body:Central Office for South Vietnam
Leader1 Name:Vo Chi Cong
Leader1 Title:Chairman
Leader2 Name:Nguyen Van Linh
Leader2 Title:General Secretary
National:National Liberation Front

The People's Revolutionary Party of Vietnam (PRP; Vietnamese: Đảng Nhân dân Cách mạng Việt Nam) was a political party in South Vietnam established in 1962, being the counter-part of the Workers' Party of Vietnam in the Southern half of the Vietnamese territory to provide formal political leadership for the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong movement) countering the French-associated State of Vietnam and subsequently the US-backed Republic of Vietnam regimes. In 1976, following the communists' victory and the overthrowing of the South Vietnamese regime, the party was merged with the Workers' Party of Vietnam in North Vietnam to form the modern Communist Party of Vietnam.

The PRP was founded on January 1, 1962. Its foundation was publicly announced by Radio Hanoi on January 18, 1962.[1] [2] The stated goals of the party was to combat imperialism, feudalism and colonialism. PRP was not an explicitly communist party, but according to the January 18 Radio Hanoi broadcast, it represented the Marxist–Leninists in South Vietnam. PRP was led by a Central Committee, often referred to as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The smallest organizational unit of PRP was the cell. 1-7 cells constituted a chi bo, the street or hamlet level organization of the party. PRP was the leading force in the National Liberation Front (Vietcong). Both at national and local levels PRP committees led the NLF work. In the Central Committee there were three main responsibilities, Military Commissar (coordinating the relations with the North Vietnamese Army), NLF control and general administration.[2] [1] Võ Chí Công was party chairman.[3]

Notes and References

  1. [P. J. Honey|Honey, P. J..]
  2. Blood, Jake. The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War. Routledge, 2005. p. 87-88
  3. http://pro.corbis.com/search/Enlargement.aspx?CID=isg&mediauid={96996C87-992B-4648-BA60-76D3C8EFF068} Photo Display of Viet Cong Leaders