People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force Explained

Unit Name:People's Liberation Army
Strategic Support Force
March:Chinese: 《我们是刀尖,我们是铁拳》
Commander1 Label:Commander
Commander2 Label:Political Commissar
Commander3 Label:Chief of Staff
Identification Symbol Label:Badge
Identification Symbol 2 Label:Sleeve insignia

The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force was a service branch of the People's Liberation Army that existed from December 2015 to April 2024.

With an aim to improve the army's ability to fight what China terms "informationized conflicts" and enhance the PLA's power projection capabilities in space and cyberspace, the PLASSF was a force purportedly designed to break stovepipes in the intelligence sharing and coordination departments of the different branches.[1]

On April 19, 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent arms: the People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force, the People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force and the People's Liberation Army Information Support Force.[2]

History

At the 2015 China Victory Day Parade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping announced sweeping reforms to the structure of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the state security apparatus. On 22 December 2015, the Chinese PLA newsletter, Liberation Army Daily, reported that as part of the joint military exercises taking place that same year, strategic and logistical support forces were included in those exercises along with Intelligence and other high-profile units among the Central Military Commission.

On 31 December 2015, the PLA Strategic Support Force held its first annual meeting at the Bayi Building in Beijing.[3] In attendance were the CMC leadership and leaders of the PLA Ground Force and Rocket Force. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping was also in attendance, giving out military flags and instructional speeches, along with CMC Vice Chairmen and CCP Political Department members Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang. Fan Changlong read out the CMC's orders and decisions issued by Chairman Xi on the formation of the PLA's leadership and forces, while Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang presided over the meeting.

On 1 January 2016, the next day, Yang Yujun of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued a statement on the new Strategic Support Force describing it as formed by the "functional integration" of various support forces that are strategic, basic, and supportive. Another expert, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the PLA Navy, noted:

Specifically, the objectives of the strategic support force were to include:

Unlike the PLA Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force is more dedicated to 5th Generation Information Warfare and is structured to engage in the information space, with emphasis on electronic countermeasures, network offense and defense, satellite management, and some of the functions of logistical supply and dispatch. It also responsible for influence operations, cyberwarfare, and electronic warfare.[4]

On 24 July 2019, the government white paper "China's National Defense in a New Era" published by the State Council Information Office stated:

In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved in a reorganization.[5]

Organizational structure

The PLASSF leadership and administrative officials were stationed at their headquarters in the Haidian District of Beijing; the functional departments and leadership of the subordinate units were stationed here. The PLASSF oversaw all units responsible for psychological warfare, information warfare, space warfare, cyberwarfare, and electronic warfare operations formerly under the former General Staff Department.[6]

This included the cyber espionage capabilities of the former Third Department, the electronic support measures from the former Fourth Department, and the space-based ISR systems and Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau and Satellite Main Station, General Political Department, and General Armaments Department, including the launch, telemetry, tracking, and control facilities and research and development organizations.

Functional departments

General Staff Department

The General Staff Department was under the direction of Admiral Li Shangfu, Chief of Staff. His Deputy Chiefs of Staff were Major General Sun Bo and Major General Zhang Minghua. Subordinated to the General Staff Department was the PLASSF Xingcheng "Rehabilitation" Center.

Political Work Department

The Political Work Department was under the direction of Lieutenant General Feng Jianhua. His Deputy Directors were Major General Chen Jinrong and Major General Huang Qiusheng. Subordinated to the Political Department was the Political Bureau.

Disciplinary Inspection Commission

Also called the PLASSF Supervisory Commission, the Disciplinary Inspection Commission was led by Lieutenant General Yang Xiaoxiang, Secretary. The role of the Disciplinary Inspection Commission was to conduct surveillance and conduct "disciplinary inspections" on PLASSF members in accordance with Article 68 of the March 2018 "Supervision Law" passed by the 13th National People's Congress. The position of Secretary was originally held by Deputy Political Commissar Lu Jiancheng (20162019). Subordinated to the Disciplinary Inspection Commission was the Disciplinary Inspection Service.

Space Systems Department

See also: Space force and space warfare.

Stationed at the Haidian District of Beijing, the PLASSF Space Systems Department (SSD) was the consolidation of all PLA's space-based C4ISR systems. As of 2018 it was headed by Lieutenant General Shang Hong, with Lieutenant General Kang Chunyuan acting as political commissar. The Space Systems Department also oversaw all of the space launch bases including:

On 19 April 2024, the Space Systems Department was reorganised as the independent People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force.

Network Systems Department

See also: Cyber force and Chinese cyberwarfare.

The (NSD) was the integration of all PLA information and cyberwarfare capabilities and is believed to have taken over many of the capabilities previously held by the Third and Fourth Departments of the PLA. As of 2018 it was headed by Lieutenant General Zheng Junjie, with Lieutenant General Chai Shaoling as political commissar, both of whom were also serving members of the 13th National People's Congress.

List of military bases under the NSD:

On 19 April 2024, the Network Systems Department was reorganised as the independent People's Liberation Army Information Support Force.

Directly subordinate units

Stationed at No. 9 Anxiang Beili, Deshengmen Wai, Chaoyang District of Beijing, it was founded in 1971 as the 514th Hospital of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 1997, it became the General Hospital of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In March 1999, it was redesignated as the 306th PLA Hospital. After the 2015 reforms, the Strategic Support Force assumed authority over this hospital. The hospital Dean is Major General Gu Jianwen and its Political Commissar is Major General Zhang Yucai.

PLASSF universities

As for the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, they are tasked with conducting launch monitoring, tracking and measurement, as well as launch recovery.

Unit 63790 - 27th Experimental Training Base / Xichang Satellite Launch Center

Headquartered on the Hangtian North Road of Xichang City in the Sichuan Province. It is also home to the Wenchang Aerospace Launch Site.

Unit 63880 - 33rd Experimental Training Base / Luoyang Electronic Equipment Test Center

Stationed at Luoyang in the Henan Province, Base 33 serves as the metrology and instrument measurement center. They also conduct Astronomical mapping and surveying. This base is the most restricted bases in China and was off limits to foreigners until the 1980s during the decommission of various military installations. However, it is still in use and under the control of the CMC Equipment Development Department.

Ranks

Officers

Enlisted

Notes and References

  1. News: Ni . Adam . May 29, 2019 . The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Update 2019 . 16 July 2021 . Jamestown Foundation.
  2. Web site: Chinese PLA embraces a new system of services and arms: Defense spokesperson - China Military . 2024-04-20 . eng.chinamil.com.cn.
  3. Book: Pollpeter, Kevin . The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations . Chase . Michael . Heginbotham . Eric . 2017 . . 978-0-8330-9872-6 . en . 10.7249/rr2058 . free.
  4. Web site: 26 November 2022 . China intensifies disinformation, cyberattacks on Taiwan: report . 2022-11-25 . . en-GB.
  5. News: 2024-04-19 . Xi Orders China’s Biggest Military Reorganization Since 2015 . 2024-04-19 . . en.
  6. https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/pla-strategic-support-force-the-information-umbrella-for-chinas-military/ PLA Strategic Support Force: The 'Information Umbrella' for China's Military
  7. Web site: 3 May 2018. Public Bidding Announcement for the Finalist Project of Hardware and Electrical Engineering of the 61726 Troops (中国人民解放军61726部队五金机电入围项目公开招标公告) . live. https://web.archive.org/web/20200914204505/http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/cggg/dfgg/gkzb/201805/t20180503_9872558.htm. 14 September 2020. 14 September 2020. China Government Procurement Network (中国政府采购网).
  8. News: 5 December 2013. Critical Node: Taiwan's Cyber Defense and Chinese Cyber-Espionage . live. https://web.archive.org/web/20200422035628/https://jamestown.org/program/critical-node-taiwans-cyber-defense-and-chinese-cyber-espionage/. 22 April 2020. 14 September 2020. Jamestown .
  9. Web site: 14 September 2020. How does Taiwan respond to China's gray zone actions (Liao Hongxiang) . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20200914204504/https://tw.appledaily.com/forum/20200912/QV5ZFS4WVFC6VI5EYJXB6WYI4U/ . 14 September 2020. 14 September 2020. Apple Daily.
  10. Book: Lindsay. Jon R. . China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain . Cheung. Tai Ming. Reveron. Derek S. . 2015. Oxford University Press. 978-0-19-020127-2. en .
  11. Stokes. Mark A.. Lin. Jenny. Hsiao. Russell . 11 November 2011 . The Chinese People's Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure. . https://web.archive.org/web/20200915010159/https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf#page=10. 15 September 2020 .
  12. Web site: 9 March 2015 . China's attack on Taiwan's Internet base camp hides in Wuhan University (中國對台網攻大本營 藏身武漢大學) . live. https://web.archive.org/web/20181212063557/http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/861206. 12 December 2018. 15 September 2020. Liberty Times (Taiwan) .
  13. Web site: Military secrets revealed by Xi Jinping's circular (習近平通令透露的軍事機密) . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20161112144545/http://news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20160825/s00022/1472091515819 . 12 November 2016 . 24 August 2016 . Ming Pao (Hong Kong) .
  14. News: Beauchamp-Mustafaga . Nathan . Drun . Jessica . Exploring Chinese Military Thinking on Social Media Manipulation Against Taiwan . China Brief . . 15 April 2021.
  15. Web site: Kania . Elsa . 2017-02-15 . The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3) . 2023-12-09 . Global Taiwan Institute . en-US.
  16. Web site: Burton . Rachel . 25 September 2018 . The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Leadership and Structure . .