Order of battle at the Battle of Trafalgar explained

The Battle of Trafalgar was fought between British and Franco-Spanish fleets on 21 October 1805. A force of 27 British ships of the line faced 33 allied ships. Both forces were formed in two columns; the British sailed parallel, the allied one following the other.

The Battle of Trafalgar was fought by sailing vessels and therefore cannot be understood in substance except as the manoeuvring of sailing vessels according to the principles of sailing. Without understanding the importance of wind and weather, especially wind direction, the modern can make no sense of the manoeuvring. Once those principles are understood, the plan of battle unfolds in a transparent fashion. The plan is included here as well as its general applicability to real events.

Real battles do not always develop according to plan, or exactly according to plan. Commanding officers usually are empowered to respond to the battlefield situation as it develops. Such concepts as "sailing order" and "battle order" are constructs. In a column of ships sailing anywhere the first ship forward was Number 1, the second, Number 2, etc. The battle order was based on planned order of attack. Ships were assigned places in these orders by the commander, sometimes temporarily or even extemporaneously.

Nelson used the order that was best momentarily. In stormy weather or other adverse conditions the commanders might not be able to control the order. "Nelson's fleet" was not a fixed entity; ships were continually joining or leaving his fleet for various reasons: for example, was in the docks being repaired after four years at sea, including the chase of Villeneuve and was daily expected to re-join the fleet, where her Captain, Richard Goodwin Keats was to be Nelson’s second, but she was not repaired in time.[1] The complements of the ships also were variable. The early historians of the battle were not sure of what they were, nor did they know exactly what the casualties were. The roster lists of the ships before sailing were generally used. Afterward there were plenty of reports.

The numbers and orders of this article are based on the figures of modern scholars for the most part. There is general disagreement on the exact order and the exact numbers, but, on the whole, the different estimates are close to each other and can probably be taken as accurate within a few per cent. An effort is made to keep consistency between the tables and the graph.

The plan of battle from a sailor's point of view

The constraints of sailing and sailing vessels

The combined French-Spanish fleet left Cadiz harbour in a loose line and turned to the south along the coast of Andalusia, headed for Naples through the Straits of Gibraltar. They were taking advantage of the north-westerly wind which was blowing on the starboard (right) rear quarter, nearly amidships, pushing them along at a slow rate and causing a swell (waves) perpendicular to the wind direction. It struck the ships from the side, causing them to roll and ruining their stability as gun platforms. The column had a predetermined order, which was necessary for sailing, to prevent some ships from getting between the wind and other ships, "stealing" their wind and running the risk of collision.

The same wind that was moving the French and Spanish south was also bringing the British north. A sail is basically an airfoil. When full it is curved in such a way as to create a sideways "lift," or force perpendicular to its surface, one component of which is actually against the general direction of the wind. A sailing vessel can thus sail "into the wind." A keel prevents the ship from "slipping," or sliding sideways along the wind. The sails "are full;" that is, fully curved, only at certain angles to the wind direction. The angle is adjustable via "sheets," or lines, which generally have to be winched from the deck. The force required is high,[2] giving rise to the idea that one is "hauling" the ship into the wind, and therefore the ship is "close-hauled." When not full, the sails flap uselessly in the wind, or "luff." The sailors must then change the angle, or "trim the sails," until they fill.

A square rigged ship cannot sail within 6 points (67.5 degrees) either side of the wind. If the wind is coming from the north, the closest it could sail would be ENE or WNW. In order to travel in that direction, it must "fall off," or move to an angle with the wind on one side or the other, a "tack." A ship tacks back and forth against the wind, or "beats," each tack earning it some "headway". However, because of the huge distance a square-rigger had to travel before it could fill its sails again, tacking would only be done in a dire emergency; where speed of manoeuvre outweighed the enormous risk of being caught in irons. By far the most common way of working to windward was wearing round (gybing).

In addition, sailing with the wind directly aft ("abaft") or directly on either side ("abeam") was difficult and inefficient. Sails with the wind in those directions do not fill. The wind must be allowed only from the quarters. At those angles the sails fill and there is a component of force in the desired direction. If the wind is directly abeam, the ship must fall off or close up. The ship may sail on either side of a wind directly astern. A manoeuvre similar to coming about is used to move the wind from one side to another: wearing. The helm is put over, the sails go limp, they are adjusted to fill on the other side. The ship does not have to rotate as far, so the manoeuvre is less disruptive.

Wind is everything to a sailing vessel. It cannot move anywhere without it (is "becalmed"). If the wind is too great the sails may have to be shortened to present less area, a procedure call "reefing." In a storm the ship must sail close to the wind or have it close astern. As the waves are generally coming in with the wind, a ship sailing close into the wind generally cuts them perpendicularly and only pitches; i.e., drops into the troughs and rises on the crests. A ship with the storm wind abeam is struck longitudinally and rolls treacherously, running a risk of capsizing. To avoid that risk the captain must run before the wind. All directions are evaluated with regard to the wind. The side of a ship toward the wind is called the "weather" or "upwind" side; away, the "lee" or "downwind" side (refer to Windward and leeward).

Much has been made of the tactics of various great sailing captains, but the greatest constraints come from wind direction and relative position. The captain of a steam vessel has considerably more freedom to take his ship where he wishes to take it, but the tactics of a sailing captain are to a large extent already predetermined by nature. To get to any point the sailing captain must plot a course taking wind direction into consideration. He must have judgement and skill, and is evaluated by the men on that skill.

Nelson's plan of battle

Nelson's battle plan is revealed on a surviving "memorandum" to his captains scrawled on a sheet of paper. The memorandum was meant to be official, as it is signed "Nelson and Bronte"[3] and dated "Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805," which was 12 days before the battle on the 21st.[4] Nelson and his fleet were patrolling off Cadiz, waiting the exit of a combined French and Spanish fleet. He knew better than to attack a heavily fortified harbour, the most heavily fortified in Spain. Meanwhile Nelson was staying out of sight and out of reach.

Sailing ships were not amenable, compared to modern ships, to this type of combat; they moved in slow motion at the mercy of wind and wave. A fleet of ships could deliver the most fire without risking hitting one of their own when it was sailing broadside in a line to the enemy, hence the designation "ship-of-the-line" for heavy ships of 50 or more guns. In variable weather, the manoeuvring required to set up a line could cost "... such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost ...." While the attackers were manoeuvring, the targets might escape. Nelson therefore, had his fleet sail in order of battle.

In order "to make the business decisive," Nelson would attack on sight, going directly for the enemy line. This tactic was not standard, but neither was it new or unusual. The plan was revealed to one of Nelson’s favourite captains, Richard Goodwin Keats, in an animated conversation while the two were walking in Nelson’s garden at Merton just weeks earlier.[5] [6] It did have a drawback. Only the front of the attacking column could engage. Nelson's 27 ships-of-the-line would attack in two columns. If they succeeded in breaking the enemy line, they could then take on the enemy piecemeal.

The general orders from Nelson were to "make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed." If individual ships were momentarily lost in the confusion, they could do no better, said Nelson, than to pull alongside an enemy and fight broadside.

Once the enemy was in sight, the British fleet would form two columns. The double column would be sailing with the wind on one side, the windward or weather side. The columns were thus described as the "weather column" or the "lee column." Nelson would take command of the weather column while his "second-in-command" would take the other. The second could act independently. However, at that time Nelson did not know which side would be the weather side. That detail could not be decided until they were on the expected final approach. At that time the second half of the single line would sail along the leeward side of the first.

As they sailed, the wind could be anywhere on the weather side, from bow to stern. It could not be from a disallowed direction. If, reasoned Nelson, the enemy fleet was first seen to windward, it was probably extended so that the van (front) could not help whatever was behind it. Such a scenario implies the enemy stretched across Nelson's port bow quarter moving anticlockwise, but he did not know where the wind would be. His column would either be able to fetch[7] the enemy column or not. If not, the opportunity was lost; they would have to fall off to leeward, wear, and come up on the other side, by which time the hoped-for battle would be only a pursuit.

If they could fetch the enemy on the current tack, they were to turn to port perpendicular to the enemy column (or near it). The lee column would now be facing the enemy's rear. Taking a bearing on the 12th ship from the end, they were to sail through to it, while the weather column sailed through to the centre. The 20 ships to the front were to be ignored. Nelson hoped to destroy all the ships to the rear before the enemy's van could wear round and join the battle. They were hoping to capture Villeneuve, whom they supposed to be in the centre. If the enemy van tacked or wore in an effort to stage a rescue, the British fleet would station itself between them and the captured and disabled ships, and defeat them in further battle.

If on the other hand the enemy fleet was first seen off the lee side; that is, off the starboard bow, the British would be in the strongest position. Turning to starboard they could glide downwind to the enemy and strike him wherever they pleased. Nelson seems to have believed the enemy line would have the same direction of travel, anticlockwise around the British line. Thus the lee line would act by the same instructions, turning to starboard, sail through to the 12th ship from the end.

As luck would have it, in the real battle, the enemy appeared to the lee. However, they were sailing clockwise around the British fleet, forcing the weather column to attack their rear. The real situation changed rapidly as the enemy column reacted but the direct attack on the centre and doubling of the column were planned and resulted in victory.

Matching the plan to the real battle

The French and Spanish were crowded into Cadiz Harbour, protected by shore batteries. Nelson entertained briefly a proposal to sail up to the entrance to the harbour and saturate it with the new Congreve Rocket, setting the enemy ships on fire. That is exactly what Villeneuve was hoping they would do. He believed the combined fire of shore and ship was the best chance of destroying Nelson. He delayed, hoping to exploit any impetuosity and impatience the younger commander might evidence.

Nelson's link to the enemy was an unobtrusive line of spy ships. The enemy saw only the first in line observing them at a distance. That ship was in signal range of another, which was in range of another, all the way back to Nelson, wherever he happened to be.

Higher-level decisions were being made by Napoleon, who could not wait indefinitely for the opportunity to invade Britain, and who had switched his attention to war on the continent, especially Austria and Italy. He needed Villeneuve in the Mediterranean and issued an order to sail out of Cadiz immediately.

Napoleon however, was not as skilled in naval matters and imagined that a fleet of 40 or so large vessels could leave port in an instant. It could take a considerable time for that many ships to get out of port, even under the best conditions. Moreover, they could not do so without favourable winds. If the winds were fickle, progress would be even slower and if the winds were contrary, the whole operation would be impossible.

British fleet

The table below shows the British vessels as they were deployed just prior to engagement. HMS Africa, somewhat detached to the north due to a combination of weather and a missed signal during the night, was supposed to have been fourth from last, in the lee column. The rest of the ships-of-the-line were divided into two columns, with the weather column forming the northern flank and the lee column the southern flank. The enemy line had been sailing north to south in front of the wind. Just as the battle was beginning they turned individually anticlockwise, wore ship, and came into the wind, hoping to bear down on Nelson. The order of British ships in the table is the one of that moment. Prior to closing with the enemy, they were in a single line, and after engagement, the ships manoeuvred to assume the best firing positions. The British fleet of the battle consisted of 33 warships, 27 of which were ships of the line.[8] During the battle the frigates (which had been the force observing Cadiz) and smaller vessels acted in support to the fleet, relaying messages and towing ships but did not engage. When Collingwood took command after Nelson's death he transferred to Euralyus as his own flagship, the Royal Sovereign, was badly damaged.

+British fleet [9]
align= center rowspan=2 Ship align= center rowspan=2 Type align= center rowspan=2 Guns align= center rowspan=2 Fleet align= center rowspan=2 Const-
ruction
align= center rowspan=2 Commanded by align= center rowspan=2 Complement align= center colspan=4 Casualties
align= center Killed align= center Wounded align= center Totalalign= center %
Attacking the Head of the Franco-Spanish Fleet
align= left Africaalign= left 2-deckeralign= center 64align= center align= center align= left Capt Henry Digbyalign= center 498align= right 8align= right 44 align= right 52 align= right 10%
Weather column
align= left Victory[10] align= left 3-deckeralign= center 104align= center align= center align= left Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson
Capt Thomas Masterman Hardy
align= center 821
nominal 850
align= right 57 align= right 102 align= right 159 align= right 19%
align= left Téméraire align= left 3-decker align= center 98align= center align= center align= left Capt Eliab Harveyalign= center 718[11]
nominal 750
align= right 47 align= right 76 align= right 123 align= right 17%
align= left Neptunealign= left 3-decker align= center 98align= center align= center align= left Capt Thomas Fremantlealign= center 741align= right 10 align= right 34 align= right 44 align= right 6%
align= left Leviathanalign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Henry William Bayntunalign= center 623align= right 4 align= right 22 align= right 26 align= right 4%
align= left Conqueroralign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Israel Pellewalign= center 573align= right 3 align= right 9 align= right 12 align= right 2%
align= left Britanniaalign= left 3-decker align= center 100align= center align= center align= left Rear-Admiral Lord Northesk
Capt Charles Bullen
align= center 854align= right 10 align= right 42 align= right 52 align= right 6%
align= left Agamemnonalign= left 2-decker align= center 64align= center align= center align= left Capt Sir Edward Berryalign= center 498align= right 2 align= right 8 align= right 10 align= right 2%
align= left Ajaxalign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Lieut John Pilford (acting captain)align= center 702align= right 2 align= right 10 align= right 12 align= right 2%
align= left Orionalign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Edward Codringtonalign= center 541align= right 1 align= right 23 align= right 24 align= right 4%
align= left Minotauralign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Charles Mansfieldalign= center 625align= right 3 align= right 22 align= right 25 align= right 4%
align= left Spartiatealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Sir Francis Laforeyalign= center 620align= right 3 align= right 22 align= right 25 align= right 4%
Lee column
align= left Royal Sovereignalign= left 3-decker align= center 100align= center align= center align= left Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood
Capt Edward Rotheram
align= center 826align= right 47 align= right 94 align= right 141 align= right 17%
align= left Belleislealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt William Hargoodalign= center 728align= right 33 align= right 94 align= right 127 align= right 17%
align= left Mars align= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt George Duff
Lieut William Hennah
align= center 615align= right 27 align= right 71 align= right 98 align= right 16%
align= left Tonnantalign= left 2-decker align= center 80align= center align= center align= left Capt Charles Tyleralign= center 688align= right 26 align= right 50 align= right 76 align= right 11%
align= left Bellerophon align= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt John Cooke
Lieut William Pryce Cumby
align= center 522align= right 28 align= right 127 align= right 155 align= right 30%
align= left Colossusalign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt James Nicoll Morrisalign= center 571align= right 40align= right 160 align= right 200 align= right 35%
align= left Achillealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Richard Kingalign= center 619align= right 13 align= right 59 align= right 72 align= right 12%
align= left Revengealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Robert Moorsomalign= center 598align= right 28 align= right 51 align= right 79 align= right 13%
align= left Polyphemusalign= left 2-decker align= center 64align= center align= center align= left Capt Robert Redmillalign= center 484align= right 2 align= right 4 align= right 6 align= right 1%
align= left Swiftsurealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt William Rutherfurdalign= center 570align= right 9 align= right 8 align= right 17 align= right 3%
align= left Dreadnoughtalign= left 3-deckeralign= center 98 align= center align= center align= left Capt John Connalign= center 725align= right 7 align= right 26 align= right 33 align= right 5%
align= left Defiancealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt Philip Durhamalign= center 577align= right 17 align= right 53 align= right 70 align= right 12%
align= left Thundereralign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Lieut John Stockham (acting captain)align= center 611align= right 4 align= right 12 align= right 16 align= right 3%
align= left Defencealign= left 2-decker align= center 74align= center align= center align= left Capt George Hopealign= center 599align= right 7 align= right 29 align= right 36 align= right 6%
align= left Princealign= left 3-decker align= center 98align= center align= center align= left Capt Richard Grindallalign= center 735align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
Attached
align= left Euryalusalign= left Frigatealign= center 36align= center align= center align= left Capt Henry Blackwoodalign= center 262align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
align= left Naiadalign= left Frigate align= center 38align= center align= center align= left Capt Thomas Dundasalign= center 333align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
align= left Phoebealign= left Frigate align= center 36align= center align= center align= left Capt Thomas Bladen Capelalign= center 256align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
align= left Siriusalign= left Frigate align= center 36align= center align= center align= left Capt William Prowsealign= center 273align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
align= left Picklealign= left Schooneralign= center 8align= center align= center align= left Lieut John Richards La Penotièrealign= center 42align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%
align= left Entreprenantealign= left Cutteralign= center 10align= center align= center align= left Lieut Robert Youngalign= center 41 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0%

Franco-Spanish fleet

Just before the engagement the French and Spanish ships of the line had been sailing north to south. After wearing, the order of sailing was reversed, so that the former head was now the rear. During the battle itself the entire line broke into small units and individual ships. The combined fleet consisted of 40 vessels with 18 French ships of the line and 15 Spanish ships of the line.

+Ships of the French-Spanish fleet
align= center rowspan=2 Shipalign= center rowspan=2 Typealign= center rowspan=2 Gunsalign= center rowspan=2 Fleetalign= center rowspan=2 Const-
ruction
align= center rowspan=2 Commanded byalign= center rowspan=2 Complementalign= center colspan=4 Casualtiesalign= center rowspan=2 Fatealign= center rowspan=2 Killed in wreck
align= center Killedalign= center Woundedalign= center Totalalign= center %
align= left Neptuno2-deckeralign= center 80align= center align= center align= left Capt Don H. Cayetano Valdés y Floresalign= center 800align= right 37align= right 47 align= right 84 align= right 11% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct
align= right few
align= left Scipionalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Charles Berrenger[12] align= center 755align= right 17 align= right 22 align= right 39 align= right 5% align= left Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
align= right
align= left Rayo align= left 3-decker align= center 100 align= center align= center align= left Commodore Don Enrique MacDonnellalign= center 830 align= right 4 align= right 14 align= right 18 align= right 2% Escaped
Surrendered 23 Oct
(to HMS Donegal)
Foundered 26 Oct
align= right many
align= left Formidable align= left 2-decker align= center 80 align= center align= center align= left Rear-Admiral Pierre Dumanoir Le Pelley
Capt Jean-Marie Letellier
align= center 840align= right 22 align= right 45 align= right 67 align= right 8% align= left Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
align= right
align= left Duguay-Trouinalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Claude Touffetalign= center 755align= right 20[13] align= right 24 align= right 44 align= right 6% align= left Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
align= right
align= left Mont Blancalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Guillaume-Jean-Noël de Lavillegrisalign= center 755 align= right 20 align= right 20 align= right 40 align= right 5% align= left Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
align= right
align= left San Francisco de Asis align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Luis Antonio Flórezalign= center 657align= right 5 align= right 12 align= right 17 align= right 3% align= left Escaped, wrecked 23 Octalign= right none
align= left San Agustin align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Felipe Jado Cagigalalign= center 711align= right 181[14] align= right 201 align= right 382 align= right 54% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Abandoned and burnt 28 Oct
align= right
align= left Hérosalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Cmdr Jean-Baptiste-Joseph-René Poulain[15] align= center 690align= right 12 align= right 24 align= right 36 align= right 5% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Nuestra Señora de la Santísima Trinidadalign= left 4-decker align= center 136 align= center align= center align= left Rear-Admiral Báltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros
Capt Don Francisco Javier de Uriarte y Borja
align= center 1048align= right 216 align= right 116[16] align= right 332 align= right 32% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct
align= right few
align= left Bucentaurealign= left 2-decker align= center 80 align= center align= center align= left align= center 888align= right 197 align= right 85 align= right 282 align= right 32% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Wrecked 23 Oct
align= right 400
on Indomptable
align= left Neptune align= left 2-decker align= center 80 align= center align= center align= left Commodore Esprit-Tranquille Maistralalign= center 888align= right 15 align= right 39 align= right 54 align= right 6% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Redoutable align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Jean Jacques Etienne Lucasalign= center 643 (nominal 550-600)align= right 300align= right 222 align= right 522 align= right 81% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct
align= right many
172 ?
align= left San Leandroalign= left 2-decker align= center 64 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don José Quevedoalign= center 606 align= right 8 align= right 22 align= right 30 align= right 5% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left San Justo align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Miguel María Gastón de Iriartealign= center 694 align= right 0 align= right 7 align= right 7 align= right 1% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Santa Anaalign= left 3-decker align= center 112 align= center align= center align= left align= center 1189
1053 nominal
align= right 95align= right 137 align= right 232 align= right 20% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
align= right
align= left Indomptablealign= left 2-decker align= center 80 align= center align= center align= left Capt Jean Joseph Hubertalign= center 887 align= right 20 align= right 30 align= right 50 align= right 6% align= left Escaped
Wrecked 24 Oct
align= right 657
align= left Fougueux[17] align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Louis Alexis Baudoinalign= center 755align= right 60 align= right 75 align= right 135align= right 18% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Wrecked 22 Oct
align= right 502 (84% casualties)
align= left Intrépidealign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Louis-Antoine-Cyprien Infernetalign= center 745 align= right 80 align= right 162 align= right 242align= right 32% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Evacuated, blown up 24 Oct
align= right
align= left Monarcaalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Teodoro de Argumosaalign= center 667 align= right 101 align= right 154 align= right 255 align= right 38% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 22 Oct
Sunk 31 Oct
align= right
align= left Plutonalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Commodore Julien Cosmao-Kerjulienalign= center 755align= right 60 align= right 132 align= right =loss 192 align= right 25% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Bahama align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Commodore Don Dionisio Alcalá Galianoalign= center 690 align= right 75 align= right 66 align= right 141 align= right 20% align= left Captured 21 Octalign= right
align= left Aigle align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Pierre-Paulin Gourrègealign= center 755 align= right 70 align= right 100 align= right 170align= right 23% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Wrecked 23 Oct
align= right 330
align= left Montañésalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Francisco Alsedo y Bustamantealign= center 715 align= right 20 align= right 29 align= right 49 align= right 7% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Algésirasalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Rear-Admiral Charles-René Magon de Médine
Cmdr Laurent Tourneur
align= center 755 align= right 77 align= right 142 align= right 219 align= right 29% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
align= right
align= left Argonautaalign= left 2-decker align= center 80 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Antonio Parejaalign= center 798 align= right 100 align= right 203 align= right 303 align= right 38% align= left Captured, scuttled 21 Octalign= right
align= left Swiftsurealign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Charles-Eusèbe Lhospitalier de la Villemadrinalign= center 755[18] align= right 68 align= right 123 align= right 191 align= right 25% align= left Captured 21 Octalign= right
align= left Argonautealign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Jacques Épron-Desjardinsalign= center 755align= right 55 align= right 132 align= right 187 align= right 25% align= left Escapedalign= right
San Ildefonsoalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Don Jose Ramón de Vargas y Varáezalign= center 716 align= right 34 align= right 148 align= right 182 align= right 25% align= left Captured 21 Octalign= right
align= left Achille align= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Louis-Gabriel Deniéportalign= center 755align= right 480 align= right ? align= right 480 align= right 64% align= left Surrendered, blew up 21 Octalign= right
align= left Principe de Asturiasalign= left 3-decker align= center 112 align= center align= center align= left Admiral Don Federico Carlos Gravina
Rear-admiral Don Antonio de Escaño
Commodore Don Ángel Rafael de Hore
align= center 1113 align= right 54 align= right 109 align= right 163 align= right 15% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Berwickalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Capt Jean-Gilles Filhol de Camasalign= center 755align= right 75 align= right 125 align= right 200 align= right 26% align= left Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 22 Oct
align= right 622
align= left San Juan Nepomucenoalign= left 2-decker align= center 74 align= center align= center align= left Commodore Don Cosmé Damián Churruca y Elorzaalign= center 693align= right 103 align= right 151align= right 254 align= right 37% align= left Captured 21 Octalign= right
Attached
align= left Cornélie align= left Frigate align= center 40 align= center align= center align= left Capt André-Jules-François de Martinengalign= center ? align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Hermionealign= left Frigate align= center 40 align= center align= center align= left Capt Jean-Michel Mahéalign= center ? align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Hortensealign= left Frigate align= center 40 align= center align= center align= left align= center ? align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Rhinalign= left Frigate align= center 40 align= center align= center align= left Capt Michel Chesneaualign= center ? align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Thémisalign= left Frigate align= center 40 align= center align= center align= left Capt Nicolas-Joseph-Pierre Juganalign= center ? align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Furetalign= left Brigalign= center 18 align= center align= center align= left Lieut Pierre-Antoine-Toussaint Dumayalign= center 130 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right
align= left Argusalign= left Brig align= center 16 align= center align= center align= left Lieut Yves-Francois Taillard[19] align= center 110 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0 align= right 0% align= left Escapedalign= right

Losses

Below is a graph of the percentage of casualties plotted for each ship along the three battle columns. The graph is a construct only. The losses were incurred throughout the entire battle and after, most while the ships were not actually in that order. The order in the graph is shown as a convenience.

Three columns and a separate ship are shown on the horizontal axis, which represents units of conventional distance between ship positions. All units are assumed to be the same. There are three origin points, one for the beginning of each column and the Africa, which was not in the three.

The vertical axis shows percentage of casualties per ship. For example, casualties for the Victory are plotted at 20%. A casualty is someone who was known to have been wounded, someone who was known to have been killed, or someone missing in action and presumed drowned. The percentage is the ratio of casualties to ship's complement multiplied by 100. Casualties continued over the next few weeks as enemy crews rebelled, retook their ships, and were subdued. The graph covers only the main battle on the first day.

Bibliography

External links

Notes and References

  1. Book: Hannah . 124.
  2. "the sailing of these vessels was a constant manual labour with skilled work that required balance, timing, and strength"
  3. Nelson was the Duke of Bronte; he signed much of his official correspondence with this conceit.
  4. Web site: Nelson's Trafalgar Memorandum . Learning English Timeline . British Library . 12 December 2019 .
  5. Book: Nicolas . N. H. . The Despatches and letters of Vice admiral Lord Viscount Nelson . 2011 . Cambridge University press . Cambridge . vol 7, 241, note 9.
  6. Book: Hannah . 116.
  7. Bring it within the allowed angles for close-hauling.
  8. Web site: [//www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/features/trafalgar-day/battle-of-trafalgar The Battle of Trafalgar 1805 ]. Royal Navy . 16 December 2019 .
  9. [#refBroadside|Broadside]
  10. ,
  11. has 755.
  12. Dictionnaire des capitaines de vaisseau de Napoléon, Danielle & Bernard Quintin, SPM, 2003,
  13. has 12.
  14. has 184.
  15. Fond Marine, p.331
  16. has 205 killed and 108 wounded
  17. ,
  18. Adkin The Trafalgar Companion p384
  19. Encyclopedia: Yves-Francois Taillard . Three Decks Forum . 2020 .