Operación Soberanía (Operation Sovereignty) was a planned Argentine military invasion of Chile due to the Beagle conflict. The invasion was initiated on 22 December 1978 but was halted after a few hours and Argentine forces retreated from the conflict zone without a fight. Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile has not been established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border.[1] [2]
In 1971 Chile and Argentina agreed to binding arbitration by an international tribunal, under the auspices of the British Government, to settle the boundary dispute. On 22 May 1977 the British Government announced the decision, which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile.
On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a boundary consistent with Argentine claims.[3] [4] [5] [6]
According to Argentine sources, after the Argentine repudiation of the arbitration award in January 1978, the invasion plans were given different names depending on the planning level and phase.[7] Also, the targets of the invasion changed according to the political situation and to the information about the Chilean defense effort: the target being first only the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands, then the "little" Evout, Hoorn, Deceit and Barnevelt islands, then both groups of islands. Finally, on Friday 15 December 1978 Argentina's President Jorge Videla signed the order to invade on 21 December 1978 at 04:30 as the beginning of the invasion, but it was postponed to the next day because of the bad weather conditions in the landing zone.
At the time of the crisis, the Argentine military was substantially larger than that of Chile; in addition, the Chilean regime was more politically isolated and had suffered deteriorating relations with its main suppliers of arms. The Chilean military, however, had the advantage of defending difficult terrain, as well as being a more professional force,[8] [9] [10] [11] while decades of intervention by the Argentine armed forces in day-to-day politics had degraded their professional skills.[12]
There was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean regime's human rights record, with the United States expressing particular concern after Orlando Letelier's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C., though the U.S. helped install the Pinochet administration initially. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment, later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.[13] [14] 16 Northrop F-5's were delivered to Chile before the embargo took effect, but they arrived without any armament.[15] In 1980 Chile was excluded from UNITAS joint naval maneuvers because of human rights violations.[16] [17] Germany,[18] Austria[19] and the United Kingdom[20] the traditional supplier of the Chilean Armed Forces, did not supply weapons to Chile.
In 1974 the Argentine Navy incorporated two modern Type 209 submarines, and, complementing two older GUPPY submarines, and .[21]
In 1978, the United States extended the Kennedy amendment to Argentina as well because of its human rights record,[22] which led to the Armed Forces purchases shifting to Europe: France, Germany, and Austria exported weapons to Argentina even during the critical phase of the Beagle conflict, as Argentina had already rejected the international binding Arbitral Award. In December 1978, when the outbreak of war appeared unavoidable, the German shipbuilding and engineering works Blohm + Voss and the Argentine Junta agreed to the building of four destroyers.[23] In November 1978 France delivered two corvettes to Argentina, originally built for the apartheid Regime in South Africa. The corvettes, Good Hope and Transvaal, could not be delivered because of anti-apartheid embargoes; in Argentina they were renamed and . United States President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) would later improve relations to Argentina due to their military support for Nicaragua's Contras.[24] (See Operation Charly).
The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to the Argentine junta. On 19 September 1977 (built and completed in the UK) sailed to Argentina from the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness; on 28 November 1981 (built in Argentina, completed in the UK) sailed from Portsmouth.[25]
An overview of both countries' defense spending:[26]
| 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chile | |||||||
| defense spending* | 487 | 566 | 713 | 951 | 1,128 | 949 | |
| percentage of the GNP | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 5.2 | ||
| Argentina | |||||||
| defense spending* | 2,702 | 2,225 | 2,339 | 2,641 | 2,126 | 2,241 | |
| percentage of the GNP | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.0 | ||
The Argentines' numerical advantage was counterbalanced by the following factors:
The Ambassador of the United States in Argentina (1978) Raúl Castro described the attitude of the Argentine military towards a possible war with the following:
No Argentine official documents or statements concerning the planning of the war of aggression[31] against Chile have been released. But so many individual accounts exist among the Argentine ranks that the existence of a plan has not been disputed.
The Argentine Government planned to first occupy the islands around Cape Horn and then, in a second phase, either to stop or continue hostilities according to the Chilean reaction.[32] Argentina had already drafted a declaration of war. An Argentine complaint in the UN Security Council over Chile's military occupation of the disputed islands was to precede the attack.
Rubén Madrid Murúa in "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", ("Memorial del Ejército de Chile", Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, S. 54-55),[33] stated that the Argentine General Staff planned the operation under the name "Planeamiento Conjunto de Operaciones Previstas contra Chile".
The Argentines planned amphibious landings to seize the islands southwards of the Beagle Channel, along with massive land-based attacks:
| + Resources and mission of Argentine Forces for the phases 1 and 2 according to Alberto Gianola Otamendi | |||||
| GT 42.1 | GT 42.2 | GT 42.3 | V Army Corps | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mission |
|
|
|
| |
| Resources | Men
Ships
Airplanes
| Men
Ships
Airplanes
| Men
Ships
Airplanes
| Men
Ships
Airplanes
|
The Second Army Corps under the command of Leopoldo Galtieri would protect the north of Argentina from a potential Brazilian attack and its II Brigada de Caballería blindada would protect the Argentine region of Río Mayo in Chubut Province from a possible Chilean attack.
The Argentine Armed Forces expected between 30,000 and 50,000 dead in the course of the war.[34] [35] [36]
Argentina solicited a Peruvian attack in Chile's north, but Peru rejected this demand and ordered only a partial mobilization.[37]
For the postwar phase of the operation, the Argentine Navy prepared political instructions to be followed in the southern zone after the disputed islands were under Argentinian sovereignty. They defined the new border, navigation rights for Chilean ships, instructions in case of confrontations with the Chilean Navy, dealing with injured personnel, prisoners of war, etc.
There was no surprise factor, since the Chilean military kept movements of the Argentine fleet under surveillance and monitored the build-up of Argentine troops. Chilean troops were deployed along the border, ready to meet any invaders.
Chile planted mines in certain areas along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru.[38] and dynamited some mountain passes.
Parts of route 9-CH between Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales were selected to serve as extra airstrips in the case of an invasion.[39] A defensive position was built up the narrowest part of Brunswick Peninsula to avoid or delay an Argentine capture of Punta Arenas.[39] In contrast to the defensive war planned by the Chilean Army in Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales, the Chilean army had plans for an attack to invade the Argentine part of Tierra del Fuego, but control of the island of Tierra del Fuego was considered a secondary goal since its control was believed to depend on the outcome of the clash of the navies.[39]
The combat-ready Chilean fleet sailed on 22 December 1978 from the fjords of Hoste Island to frustrate an Argentine landing. Rear Admiral Raúl López, Chief of the Chilean fleet, kept silent as to whether he would simply wait or initiate an attack on the enemy navy.[40]
Chilean biochemist Eugenio Berríos is reported to have worked on a plan to poison the water supply of Buenos Aires in the event of war.[41] [42]
On D-day, a severe storm impeded Argentine operations in the disputed area. Meanwhile, Pope John Paul II, alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to both capitals. Six hours before landing, the Argentine fleet turned back and Operation Soberanía was called off.[43]
Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile or only waited at the border for the result of the naval combat cannot be established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border[44] [45] which would be inconsistent with the two-phase war plan.
Alejandro Luis Corbacho, in "Predicting the probability of war during brinkmanship crisis: The Beagle and the Malvinas conflicts" https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016843 considers the reasons for cancelling the operation (p. 45):
On p. 46:
Unlike the prelude to the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, from the beginning of Operation Soberanía there were no critical misconceptions on Argentina's side about Chile's commitment to defend its territory: the entire Chilean Navy was in the disputed area, an unequivocal fact at Cape Horn.[46] As stated by David R. Mares in "Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America":[47]
Although it had called off the operation, the Argentine government never gave up on the use of military force to pressure Chile.[47] After the invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982, the Argentine junta planned the military occupation of the disputed islands in the Beagle channel, as stated by Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, chief of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands war, in an interview with the Argentine magazine Perfil:
Augusto Pinochet foresaw a long and bloody war, a kind of partisan war:
Argentine Falklands War veteran Martín Balza, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army (1991–1999), caused a stir in 2003 when he declared his conviction that in 1978, Chile would have won the war had it broken out.[48]
…Yo de esto hablé una vez con un teniente coronel que era jefe de un regimiento en la cordillera y que cuenta que sus patrullas cruzaron la frontera y entraron en Chile…
(Transl.:«I spoke once about this with a colonel-lieutenant who was a detachment chief in the mountains, and he told me that his patrols crossed the border and entered Chile…»)
«… las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto …»
(Transl.:«…the direct negotiations are the only peaceful manner to resolve the conflict …»)
«Al no llegar a un acuerdo entre ambos países, comienza durante las diversas negociaciones, la tercera fase de su maniobra, pasando a una estrategia de la disuasión directa, efectuando para lo anterior actitudes de amedrentamiento, desplazamientos de fuerzas y aumento sistemático de las violaciones a los espacios aéreos y marítimos chilenos.»:
(Transl.:«As the two nations didn't agree [to change the award], the third phase of the [Argentine] plan began, coming to a strategy of direct dissuasion, with intimidation, strong-arm tactics and a systematic air and maritime Chilean space violations»)
...that Chile had a significant defender’s advantage, given the professional quality of Chilean troops and well-developed supply and communications lines.
"Chile, nevertheless, benefits from considerable advantages in the far south, including good ports, control over the Strait of Magellan, as well as the Fuegian and Patagonian channels, branching off laterally from the strait, which gives Chile geographical and logistical advantages in the Drake Passage."
"Umgekehrt hätte für Chile positiv zu Buche geschlagen die von militärischen Fachleuten als allgemein höher bewertete Kampfkraft der chilenischen Streitkräfte."
(translation:
"On the other hand, in accordance with the military experts, Chile was benefited of the higher combat strength of the armed forces")
La Républica Argentina es, sin duda, el estado más rico de Sud América, su marina es más fuerte en número y en calidad de buques que la de Chile, posee elementos de guerra para armar un ejército de 300.000 hombres y en sus arsenales y depósitos militares, se ha gastado y se gasta sin reparar en cifras con tal de que se hayen provistos de armamento de último modelo; pero en este país se carece de homogeneidad de población que caracteriza a Chile ... donde es unánime la exaltación patriótica y donde ha podido formarse un Ejército, que los oficiales alemanes proclaman comparable en su organización y cualidades al mejor de Europa (See Pedro Santos Martínez, "Documentos Diplomáticos sobre historia argentina, 1850–1954"), Tomo V: 1890–1909. Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Históricas "Cuyo", Mendoza, 2002,, pág. 124, documento nr.:368
"Estoy convencido [that Chile would have won the war], por razones que he expuesto en mis libros "Dejo constancia" (2001) y "Malvinas, gesta e incompetencia" (2003). Ahí expreso cuál era la situación de las Fuerzas Armadas, fundamentalmente del Ejército, en 1982.... [En 1978] Chile estaba en unas inmejorables condiciones, porque la defensa es muy fuerte, sobre todo cuando se puede actuar mediante la dinámica propia, que no margina reacciones ofensivas dentro de la concepción defensiva."
«The 1976 Arms Export Control Act, proposed by Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), began to limit presidential ability to transfer weapons to other nations by giving the United States Congress veto power over sales and extending the notification period to 30 days. Against the wishes of the Ford administration, several countries were placed under even tighter restrictions based on their human rights records. Such was the case with Chile in 1976 under Public Law 94-329. This legislation, commonly referred to as the Kennedy Amendment, prohibited security assistance, military training, and arms sales to Gen Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military regime in Chile» cited from US Code, vol. 22, sec. 2370 (1976).
«… en el mismo mes de junio de 1981, la Argentina adquirió 57 tanques austríacos, operación que generó los recelos del lado chileno, pues en 1980 el mismo país proveedor de esos tanques les negó a los militares trasandinos la compra de 100 unidades …»
(Transl.:«on juni 1981 Argentina bought 57 austrian tanks, this operation arouse suspicion on the Chilean side because 1980 Austria refused to sell 100 tanks to Chile»)
"The union convenor at the East Kilbride plant indicated that the engines were all rusting away anyway, because they have been left packed in crates and left outside the warehouse ever since the overhaul work had been completed in 1975".The relations between Chile and UK has been also seriously damaged by the Sheila Cassidy affair, the use of British made planes during the Coup d'État and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. In October 1981, under Margaret Thatcher, the UK announced its first significant arms sale with the sale of the and the naval tanker .
Si Chile adoptaba una actitud estratégica defensiva y Argentina hubiese tenido que adoptar una actitud ofensiva, Chile estaba en unas inmejorables condiciones, porque la defensa es muy fuerte, sobre todo cuando se puede actuar mediante la dinámica propia, que no margina reacciones ofensivas dentro de la concepción defensiva.
(Transl.:«»)
"In the Malvinas dispute, the United States and Great Britain failed to signal deterrence credibly. In the Beagle Channel dispute, however, Chile successfully signaled its willingness to follow through, and Argentina rightly understood that the costs of all-out war were too high."