Ukraine and weapons of mass destruction explained

Ukraine, formerly a republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1922–1991, once hosted Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems on its territory.[1] The former Soviet Union had its nuclear program expanded to only four of its republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. After its dissolution in 1991, Ukraine became the third largest nuclear power in the world and held about one third of the former Soviet nuclear weapons, delivery system, and significant knowledge of its design and production.[2] Ukraine inherited about 130 UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totaling approximately 1,700 nuclear warheads remained on Ukrainian territory.[3]

While all these weapons were located on Ukrainian territory, Russia controlled the launch sequence and maintained operational control of the nuclear warheads and its weapons system.[4] In 1994, Ukraine agreed to transfer these weapons to Russia and became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for assurances from Russia, the United States and United Kingdom to respect the Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the existing borders.[5] [6] The decision by Ukraine to give up the nuclear weapons was debated when Russia, one of the parties of the agreement, invaded Ukraine.

Ukrainian nuclear arsenal after dissolution of the Soviet Union

See also: Strategic missile forces museum in Ukraine and Poltava Museum of Long-Range and Strategic Aviation.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine held about one-third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world at the time, as well as significant means of its design and production.[7] 130 UR-100N/RS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totalling approximately 1,700 warheads remained on Ukrainian territory.[8] [9] [10]

Forty of the underground launch silos for the RT-23 ICBMs had been installed around the city of Pervomaisk in the Mykolaiv Oblast, the home of the 46th Rocket Division of the 43rd Rocket Army of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. The individual silos were scattered across the general area and often located on fields, surrounded by a fence and guarded. A group of nine or ten silos was connected to a common, underground Unified Command Post manned by several military officers.

As a republic in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the base for the following nuclear force units:

Budapest Memorandum

See main article: Budapest Memorandum. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine in 1990 stated that Ukraine would not accept, acquire, or produce nuclear weapons, and its government declared on 24 October 1991 that Ukraine would be a non-nuclear-weapon state.[12]

On December 5, 1994 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States signed a memorandum to provide Ukraine with security assurances in connection with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The four parties signed the memorandum, containing a preamble and six paragraphs. The memorandum reads as follows:[13]

France and China's commitments

France and China also provided Ukraine with assurances similar to the Budapest Memorandum, but with some significant differences. For instance, France's pledge does not contain the promises laid out in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, to refer any aggression to the UN Security Council, nor to consult in the event of a question regarding the commitments.[14]

China's pledge takes a different form entirely, dating from December 4, and reading as follows:[15]

Thus, China's pledge, similar to France's, does not pledge to involve UN or consultative mechanisms in case of crisis. However, it does pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Russian invasion and nuclear weapons

Russian forces withdrew nuclear weapons and delivery systems from the Crimean peninsula after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in the mid-1990s, with the exception of some nuclear-capable ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in accordance with agreements with Ukraine.[16] After annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, which the UN General Assembly rejected as invalid,[17] the Government of Ukraine in 2014 reaffirmed its 1994 decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.[18] Meanwhile, the Russian Federation again re-deployed nuclear-capable weapons to the peninsula, including S-300 antiaircraft missiles, and later Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[19] [20] In 2020, a Ukrainian NSDC official stated that Russia had done work on Soviet nuclear-weapons storage facility Feodosiia-13 in Krasnokamianka (Kyzyltash), and had added new tunnels to a nuclear submarine base at Balaklava.[21]

Soon after the annexation of Crimea, Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, told USA Today that Ukraine may have to arm themselves with their own nuclear weapons if the United States and other world leaders do not hold up their end of the agreement. He said, "We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement. Now, there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake."[22] He also said that, "In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons, people don't invade you."[23] On December 13, 2014 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated that he did not want Ukraine to become a nuclear power again.[24]

During the subsequent invasion of Ukraine Russia started using their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a potential military intervention by other countries. In July 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia has the right to defend Crimea using nuclear weapons,[25] and in March 2015 president Putin said that during the invasion of Crimea he had been prepared to put nuclear forces on alert.[26] Around the same time, a Russian foreign ministry official said that Russia had the right to deploy nuclear arms to the peninsula, which is internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.[27]

Debates about Ukrainian renuclearization

In 1993, international relations theorist and University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer predicted that a Ukraine without a nuclear deterrent was likely to be subjected to aggression by Russia.[28]

However, Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukrainian scholar at Harvard argued that the denuclearization of Ukraine was not a mistake and that it was unclear whether Ukraine would be better off as a nuclear state. She argued that the deterrent value of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was questionable. While Ukraine had "administrative control" of the weapons delivery systems, it would have needed 12 to 18 months to establish full operational control, and Ukraine would have faced sanctions from the West and likely retaliation from Russia. Moreover, Ukraine had no nuclear weapons program and would have struggled to replace nuclear weapons once their service life expired. Instead, by agreeing to give up the nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensations and the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum.[29]

Andreas Umland, an analyst from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, assessed that giving up its nuclear weapons had been a mistake by Ukraine, as breaking the Budapest Memorandum would have only limited consequences for Russia. He argued that states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could not rely on security assurances, but could only ensure their sovereignty by having a nuclear deterrent of their own.[30] Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Umland along with Hugo von Essen, reiterated that Russia's actions had weakened the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty significantly. They argued that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was only possible because Russia was kept fundamentally safe by its own nuclear arsenal, whereas Ukraine had made a mistake by giving up its own nuclear weapons.[31]

On April 15, 2021, Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Melnyk said that if Ukraine is not allowed to join NATO, his country might have to reconsider its status as a non-nuclear weapon state to guarantee its defense.[32] [33] In February 2022, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky renewed such sentiments, suggesting that Ukraine could view the Budapest Memorandum as invalid should its security assurances not be met.[34]

As of 2022 only three Ukrainian political parties supported bringing back nuclear weapons: Svoboda,[35] Radical Party of Oleh Liashko,[36] and the National Corps.[37]

In April 2023, former US president Bill Clinton expressed regret at pressuring Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons, in light of the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War from 2022.[38]

Further reading

External links

Notes and References

  1. Nohlen, D & Stöver, P (2010) Elections in Europe: A data handbook, p1976
  2. News: Dahlburg. Decemb. Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal. LA Times. April 15, 2014.
  3. Norris. Robert S.. 23624674. The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago. January–February 1992. Arms Control Today. Arms Control Association. 22. 1. 24–31.
  4. News: Nuclear Weapons . Hanley . Jeremy . UK Parliament . Hansard . June 22, 1993 . Column 154 . September 9, 2018 . The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jeremy Hanley): ... Some weapons are also possessed by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but these are controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States..
  5. Book: Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats . Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons : nonproliferation incentives and disincentives . William C. Martel . 88–104 . Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy . Psychology Press . 1998 . 9780714648569 . August 6, 2014 . There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs)..
  6. Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button? . Alexander A. Pikayev . The Nonproliferation Review . 1 . 3 . Spring–Summer 1994 . 31–46 . 10.1080/10736709408436550 . https://web.archive.org/web/20140808054400/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/pikaye13.pdf . August 8, 2014.
  7. News: Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal. Dahlburg. Decemb. LA Times. April 15, 2014.
  8. Norris. Robert S.. January–February 1992. The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago. Arms Control Today. Arms Control Association. 22. 1. 24–31. 23624674.
  9. Book: Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. William C. Martel. Psychology Press. 1998. 9780714648569. Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy. 88–104. Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons : nonproliferation incentives and disincentives. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).. 6 August 2014.
  10. Alexander A. Pikayev. Spring–Summer 1994. Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?. The Nonproliferation Review. 1. 3. 31–46. 10.1080/10736709408436550. 6 August 2014.
  11. Michael Holm, 46th Missile Division
  12. Kobasa, Askold I. (December 1995). A Strategic-Military Analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Naval Postgraduate School. p. 23. Retrieved 25 January 2024.
  13. Web site: Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . December 12, 2014 . United Nations Treaty Collection.
  14. Web site: Page K-8, Full text in French of France's Security Assurance to Ukraine.
  15. Web site: Letter dated 12 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, from UN Office of Disarmament Affairs.
  16. Web site: Kristensen. Hans. 2014-12-18. Rumors about Nuclear Weapons in Crimea. 2021-08-24. Federation of American Scientists. en-US.
  17. https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region
  18. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/25/joint-statement-united-states-and-ukraine Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine
  19. Web site: Sharkov. Damien. 2015-07-22. Russia Reported to be Stationing Supersonic Bombers in Crimea. 2021-08-24. Newsweek. en.
  20. Web site: Axe. David. 2020-02-03. Why Is Russia Stationing TU-22m3 Backfire Bombers in Crimea?. 2021-08-24. news.yahoo.com. en-US.
  21. Web site: 2020-11-15. Possible deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Crimea to endanger whole Europe – NSDC. 2021-08-24. Unian. en.
  22. Web site: Ukraine May Have to Go Nuclear, Says Kiev Lawmaker. Dorell. Oren. USA Today. April 15, 2014.
  23. Web site: Koren. Marina. The Ukraine Crisis Is Unsettling Decades-Old Nuclear-Weapons Agreements. April 15, 2014.
  24. http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/239730.html Ukraine has no ambitions to become nuclear power again – Poroshenko
  25. Web site: Keck. Zachary. 2014-07-11. Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea. 2021-08-24. The Diplomat. en-US.
  26. News: 2015-03-15. Ukraine conflict: Putin 'was ready for nuclear alert'. en-GB. BBC News. 2021-08-24.
  27. Web site: 2015-03-12. Russia declares right to deploy nuclear weapons to Crimea. 2021-08-24. ann.az. en.
  28. The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrenthttps://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf retrieved 23/01/2022
  29. Budjeryn. Mariana. September 1, 2016. Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?. World Affairs. en. 179. 2. 9–20. 10.1177/0043820016673777. 151341589. 0043-8200.
  30. The Ukraine Example: Nuclear Disarmament Doesn't Pay . World Affairs . 2016 . Umland . Andreas . 178 . 4 . 45–49 . 24888130 . PDF . 2023-06-30 .
  31. Web site: Umland . Andreas . Essen . Hugo von . Putin's War Is a Death Blow to Nuclear Nonproliferation . Foreign Policy . 2022-03-21 . 2023-06-30.
  32. Web site: Ukraine mulls nuclear arms if NATO membership not impending: Envoy. Daily Sabah. April 15, 2021.
  33. Web site: Ukrainischer Botschafter: "Wir brauchen militärische Unterstützung" . Ukrainian Ambassador: "We need military support" . www.deutschlandfunk.de . April 15, 2021 . 20 March 2022.
  34. Web site: Zelensky: Ukraine may reconsider its nuclear status. February 19, 2022. UAWire.
  35. Olszański . Tadeusz A. . Svoboda Party – The New Phenomenon on the Ukrainian Right-Wing Scene . Centre for Eastern Studies . 4 July 2011 . OSW Commentary . 56 . 6 . 27 September 2013.
  36. News: Ukraine election: What to look for. BBC News. 24 October 2014. 29 November 2017.
  37. News: Volunteer battalion Azov members and former members create National Corps political party. Interfax-Ukraine. 14 October 2016. 5 December 2017. (Ukrainian language version)
  38. Web site: Tara Subramaniam, Brad Lendon, Aditi Sangal, Adrienne Vogt, Mike Hayes, Maureen Chowdhury and Tori B. Powell . 2023-04-05 . Former US President Clinton suggested Russia would not have invaded Ukraine if Kyiv still had nuclear weapons . 2023-12-25 . CNN . en.

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