Nadan v R | |
Court: | Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
Full Name: | Frank Nadan v The King |
Date Decided: | 25 February 1926 |
Citations: | [1926] UKPC 13, [1926] AC 482 |
Judges: | The Lord Chancellor, Lord Dunedin, Lord Shaw, Lord Phillimore, Lord Blanesburgh |
Number Of Judges: | 5 |
Decision By: | The Lord Chancellor |
Keywords: | Royal prerogative, jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
Nadan v R[1] is a key ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in determining the competence of the Parliament of Canada with respect to the restrictions laid out in the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, and whether it possessed extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In 1875, the Parliament of Canada established the Supreme Court of Canada as a general court of appeal. This did not, however, bar rulings from the various provincial courts of appeal from being appealed directly to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.[2] In 1888, Parliament enacted a provision to abolish appeals in criminal cases to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,[3] which was later incorporated as s 1025 of the Criminal Code:
In 1924, Frank Nadan, working for his employer (a British Columbia common carrier), was transporting intoxicating liquor from Alberta to Montana, which was subject to a prohibition on alcohol. Near Coleman, Alberta, he was arrested by the Alberta Provincial Police for:
He was convicted on both counts, and appealed these convictions to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta. Those appeals were dismissed, but the court gave leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The respondent presented a petition to the Council, asking that the appeals be quashed because they were barred under s. 1025. Leave was granted for the attorneys-general of Alberta and Canada to intervene.
The appeals were dismissed, but the Privy Council took the occasion to discuss the competence of the Canadian Parliament to abolish criminal appeals to them.
On the final question as to whether to recommend special leave to appeal, the Board noted that it was settled practice that, in criminal cases, it would intervene only where substantial and grave injustice had been done by:
The present cases did not fall within this exceptional category. Accordingly, dismissal was recommended for these appeals.
After the passage of the Statute of Westminster 1931, the Parliament of Canada abolished criminal appeals to the Privy Council again in 1933,[8] and that measure was upheld by the Privy Council in British Coal Corporation v. the King.[9] It was followed by the abolition of civil appeals in 1949,[10] after the Privy Council affirmed that Parliament also had the right to do so.[11]
Jacqueline D. Krikorian, "British Imperial Politics and Judicial Independence: The Judicial Committee's Decision in the Canadian Case Nadan v. The King," Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politiqueVol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 291-332.