| Is Missile: | yes |
| Hwasong-10 (Musudan)[1] | |
| Type: | Ballistic missile, Mobile IRBM |
| Used By: | Korean People's Army Strategic Force, possibly Iran |
| Manufacturer: | North Korea |
| Propellant: | Hypergolic combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel, and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as oxidizer |
| Service: | Successful test on 22 June 2016 |
| Engine: | Liquid-propellant rocket (same or derived from R-27 R-29) |
| Length: | 12m |
| Diameter: | 1.5m |
| Vehicle Range: | 3,000–4,000 km (est.)[2] |
| Filling: |
|
| Filling Weight: | 650–1,250 kg (est.)[3] |
| Guidance: | Inertial guidance |
| Accuracy: | 1,600 m Circular error probable[4] |
| Launch Platform: | MAZ-based vehicle |
| Context: | north |
| Korean name | |
| Headercolor: | green |
| Hangul: | 《화성-10》형 (무수단) |
| Hanja: | |
| Rr: | Hwaseong-10 |
| Mr: | Hwasŏng-10 |
The Hwasong-10, also known by the names BM-25 and Musudan, is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Hwasong-10 was first revealed to the international community in a military parade on 10 October 2010 celebrating the Workers' Party of Korea's 65th anniversary, although experts believe these were mock-ups of the missile.[5] Hwasong-10 resembles the shape of the Soviet Union's R-27 Zyb submarine-launched missile, but is slightly longer.[5] It is based on the R-27, which uses a 4D10 engine propelled by unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO). These propellants are much more advanced than the kerosene compounds used in North Korea's Scuds and Nodong missiles.[4]
Since April 2016 the Hwasong-10 has been tested a number of times, with two apparent partial successes and a number of failures. The Hwasong-10 was not shown in the April 2017 and February 2018 military parades, suggesting that the design had not been deployed.
Assuming a range of 3,200 km, the Musudan could hit any target in East Asia (including US military bases in Guam and Okinawa).[6] The North Korean inventory of the missile is less than 50 launchers.[7]
In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea invited the Makeyev Design Bureau's ballistic missile designers and engineers to develop this missile, based on the R-27 Zyb. In 1992, a large contract between Korea Yon’gwang Trading Company and Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau of Miass, Russia was signed. The agreement stated that Russian engineers would go to the DPRK and assist in the development of the Zyb Space Launch Vehicle (SLV).[6]
It was decided that, as the Korean People's Army's MAZ-547A/MAZ-7916 Transporter erector launcher could carry 20 tonnes, and the R-27 Zyb was only 14.2 tonnes, the R-27 Zyb's fuel/oxidizer tank could be extended by approximately 2 metres.[5] Additionally, the warhead was reduced from a three-warhead MIRV to a single warhead.
The actual rocket design is a liquid fuel rocket, generally believed to use a hypergolic combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel, and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as oxidizer.[5] Once the fuel/oxidizer combination are fed into the missile, it could maintain a 'ready to launch' condition for several days, or even weeks, like the R-27 SLBM, in moderate ambient temperatures. A fueled Hwasong-10 would not have the structural strength to be safely land transported, so would have to be fueled at the launch site.[5]
It was originally believed that the rocket motors of Hwasong-10 were the same as those within the second stage of the Taepodong-2, which North Korea unsuccessfully test fired in 2006.[8] However analysis of the Unha-3 launch, believed to be based on the Taepodong-2, showed that the second stage did not use the same fuel as the R-27, and is probably based on Nodong rocket technology.[5]
Before its test flight it was believed that there was a possibility that the Hwasong-10 would use the Nodong's kerosene and corrosion inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) propellants, reducing the missile's range by about half.[5] [9]
However it is unlikely that North Korea uses IRFNA propellants which would reduce its range by about half, after the experts acknowledged that the 22 June 2016 test could have had a range of 3,150 km if the missile was not launched in the lofted trajectory.[10]
See main article: Khorramshahr (missile). North Korea sold a version of this missile to Iran under the designation BM-25. The number 25 represents the missile range (2500 km).[11] [12] [6] [13] The Iranian designation is Khorramshahr, and it was unveiled and test-fired in September 2017.[14] [15] [16] Earlier test firing occurred in January 2017.[17] According to IISS expert Dempsey, the missile looks very similar to Hwasong-10.[18] [19] It carries 1800 kg payload over 2000 km[20] (Iran claims it has decreased missile size over the initial version, thus reducing propellant mass and range).[21] Such a range covers targets not only in Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but even NATO members Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, if fired from Western Iran.[21] Iran claims it can carry multiple warheads, most likely a reference to submunitions.[22]
| Attempt | Date | Location | Pre-launch announcement / detection | Outcome | Additional Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reports of the test is imminent surfaced on just a day before.[23] | Failure | Both United States and South Korea "detected and tracked" the missile followed by the confirmation of launch failure. South Korea further claims the missile in this test deviated from a "normal" trajectory.[24] North Korea kept silent on the test despite the day is the 104th anniversary of the birthday of Kim Il Sung. | ||
| 2 | North Eastern Coast | None | Failure | Crashed a few seconds after liftoff. North Korea kept silent on the test.[25] [26] | |
| 3 | None | Failure | According to United States sources, the missiles went an estimated 200 meters off the launchpad. North Korea kept silent on the test. | ||
| 4 | None | Failure | Missile exploded on site. North Korea kept silent on the test.[27] | ||
| 5 | None | Success (North Korea) / Failure (South Korea & United States authorities) | Missile crashed at 150 km away from the site. First successful Hwasong-10 missile test that safely launched from the launch site but still exploded in the midway.[28] [29] North Korea did not respond until after the 6th launch which hails the twin missile test was a success. Although initial reports suggested that this test was a failure due to a relative short distance and the missile did explode in mid air, at least one US missile expert suggested otherwise. David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program suggested that the North could have intentionally terminated its flight early to keep it from flying over Japan after launching it at a normal angle because the distance of flight at 150 km, corresponds roughly to burnout of the Hwasong-10 engines.[30] | ||
| 6 | None | Success (North Korea) / Partial Success (South Korea & United States) | South Korea, US and Japan eventually confirmed that the missile reached an apogee of about 1,000 km and landed in Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) at about 400 km away from the launch site. South Korea originally skeptical of the test as success because the missile did not reach a minimum of 500 km to be considered as an IRBM. However, with the subsequent analysis, experts agreed that the about 1,000 km apogee is intended for the missile to fly at a steeper angle than would be ideal that could reach its maximum range of 3,500 km or more as a deliberate attempt to avoid Japanese airspace.[31] North Korea have hailed the twin test in 22 Jun 2016 as a 'complete success'in the state-owned TV channel KCNA with mentioning the missile accurately landed in the targeted waters 400 km away after flying to the maximum altitude of 1,413. 6 km along the planned flight orbit. North Korea confirms this missile as "Hwasong-10"The extract is re-uploaded in YouTube. Kim Jong Un reiterate that "We have the sure capability to attack in an overall and practical way the Americans in the Pacific operation theatre.".[32] However, there are missile experts who are skeptical of Hwasong-10 being able to hit Guam with a 650 kg payload with the estimated range of 3,150 km.They have added that Hwasong-10 at this configuration will need to have their warhead reduced to below 500 kg in order to reach Guam, which is about slightly further than 3,400 km away from North Korea. | ||
| 7 (Alleged) | None | Failure (South Korea & United States) | Intermediate Ballistic Missile launch failure detected by US military without elaborate details, which is believed to be a Hwasong-10 missile.[33] [34] North Korea is silent on this report. On 26 Oct 2016 however, Washington Post carried a report from an analysis from Jeffrey Lewis who raised that there is 50% chance which the North Korea might have actually tested their domestic ICBM (Western intelligence sources named this missile as KN-08) based on the burn scars evidence taken from satellite imagery to be bigger than any other Musudan (Hwasong-10) tests. He concluded that this test has damaged the launch vehicle without flight.[35] In the same report, Jeffery Lewis has also stated not to place full trust on the U.S. agency StratCom for identifying missile. He had cited the track of StratCom which has misidentified the three missiles launched last month by identifying them initially as short-range Rodongs, subsequently medium-range Musudans which turned out to be extended-range Scud missiles. Jeffery Lewis is nonproliferation expert and director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). The news is also reported by other media agencies, including Yonhap.[36] [37] | ||
| 8 (Alleged) | None | Failure (South Korea & United States) | Intermediate Ballistic Missile launch failure again detected by US military without elaborate details, which is again believed to be a Hwasong-10 missile.[38] The launch just took place hours before the final US Presidential Election 2016 debates starts and the North Korea is silent on this report. On 26 Oct 2016 however, Washington Post carried a report from an analysis from Jeffrey Lewis who raised that there is 50% chance which the North Korea might have actually tested their domestic ICBM (Western intelligence sources named this missile as KN-08) based on the burn scars evidence taken from satellite imagery to be bigger than any other Musudan (Hwasong-10) tests. However, the missile in 20 Oct 2016 test could have fly for a short distance before things went wrong as compared to the test in 15 Oct 2016 which damaged the launch vehicle instead. In the same report, Jeffery Lewis has also stated not to place full trust on the U.S. agency StratCom for identifying missile. He had cited the track of StratCom which has misidentified the three missiles launched last month by identifying them initially as short-range Rodongs, subsequently medium-range Musudans which turned out to be extended-range Scud missiles. Jeffery Lewis is nonproliferation expert and director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). The news is also reported by other media agencies, including Yonhap. | ||
Currently, North Korea is also working on land based nuclear deterrents that are of Intercontinental range, such as KN-08, KN-14 (Upgraded version of KN-08). It is also working a sea-based nuclear deterrent, such as Pukkuksong-1 SLBM.
North Korea is confirmed to have successfully launched a KN-11 missile in a full test flight in a lofted trajectory and expecting KN-11 to be operationally deployed as early as before 2017 by South Korea military source in 25 Aug 2016.[39]
In May 2017 North Korea successfully tested a new missile, the Hwasong-12, with a similar range to the Hwasong-10. A new missile had been displayed in the April 2017 military parade on the Hwasong-10 mobile launcher, and the Hwasong-12 may be intended to replace the Hwasong-10 which has been shown unreliable during its test programme.[40] [41] The Hwasong-10 was not shown in the February 2018 military parade, suggesting again that the design had not been deployed.[42]
Section 25 of this leaked cable (written before the 10 October 2010 appearance of the missile)[48] says:
Russia said that during its presentations in Moscow and itscomments thus far during the current talks, the U.S. hasdiscussed the BM-25 as an existing system. Russia questionedthe basis for this assumption and asked for any facts theU.S. had to provide its existence such as launches, photos,etc. For Russia, the BM-25 is a mysterious missile. NorthKorea has not conducted any tests of this missile, but theU.S. has said that North Korea transferred 19 of thesemissiles to Iran. It is hard for Russia to follow the logictrail on this. Since Russia has not seen any evidence ofthis missile being developed or tested, it is hard for Russiato imagine that Iran would buy an untested system. Russiadoes not understand how a deal would be made for an untestedmissile. References to the missile's existence are more inthe domain of political literature than technical fact. Inshort, for Russia, there is a question about the existence ofthis system.
Iran displayed the Khorramshahr missile 22 September 2017, claiming its range to be 1240 miles.[49]
