In decision theory, a multi-attribute utility function is used to represent the preferences of an agent over bundles of goods either under conditions of certainty about the results of any potential choice, or under conditions of uncertainty.
A person has to decide between two or more options. The decision is based on the attributes of the options.
The simplest case is when there is only one attribute, e.g.: money. It is usually assumed that all people prefer more money to less money; hence, the problem in this case is trivial: select the option that gives you more money.
In reality, there are two or more attributes. For example, a person has to select between two employment options: option A gives him $12K per month and 20 days of vacation, while option B gives him $15K per month and only 10 days of vacation. The person has to decide between (12K,20) and (15K,10). Different people may have different preferences. Under certain conditions, a person's preferences can be represented by a numeric function. The article ordinal utility describes some properties of such functions and some ways by which they can be calculated.
Another consideration that might complicate the decision problem is uncertainty. Although there are at least four sources of uncertainty - the attribute outcomes, and a decisionmaker's fuzziness about: a) the specific shapes of the individual attribute utility functions, b) the aggregating constants' values, and c) whether the attribute utility functions are additive, these terms being addressed presently - uncertainty henceforth means only randomness in attribute levels. This uncertainty complication exists even when there is a single attribute, e.g.: money. For example, option A might be a lottery with 50% chance to win $2, while option B is to win $1 for sure. The person has to decide between the lottery <2:0.5> and the lottery <1:1>. Again, different people may have different preferences. Again, under certain conditions the preferences can be represented by a numeric function. Such functions are called cardinal utility functions. The article Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem describes some ways by which they can be calculated.
The most general situation is that there are both multiple attributes and uncertainty. For example, option A may be a lottery with a 50% chance to win two apples and two bananas, while option B is to win two bananas for sure. The decision is between <(2,2):(0.5,0.5)> and <(2,0):(1,0)>. The preferences here can be represented by cardinal utility functions which take several variables (the attributes). Such functions are the focus of the current article.
The goal is to calculate a utility function
u(x1,...,xn)
u
EA[u(x1,...,xn)]>EB[u(x1,...,xn)]
If the number of possible bundles is finite, u can be constructed directly as explained by von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM): order the bundles from least preferred to most preferred, assign utility 0 to the former and utility 1 to the latter, and assign to each bundle in between a utility equal to the probability of an equivalent lottery.
If the number of bundles is infinite, one option is to start by ignoring the randomness, and assess an ordinal utility function
v(x1,...,xn)
v
v(x1,...,xn)>v(y1,...,yn)
This function, in effect, converts the multi-attribute problem to a single-attribute problem: the attribute is
v
u
Note that u must be a positive monotone transformation of v. This means that there is a monotonically increasing function
r:R\toR
u(x1,...,xn)=r(v(x1,...,xn))
The problem with this approach is that it is not easy to assess the function r. When assessing a single-attribute cardinal utility function using VNM, we ask questions such as: "What probability to win $2 is equivalent to $1?". So to assess the function r, we have to ask a question such as: "What probability to win 2 units of value is equivalent to 1 value?". The latter question is much harder to answer than the former, since it involves "value", which is an abstract quantity.
A possible solution is to calculate n one-dimensional cardinal utility functions - one for each attribute. For example, suppose there are two attributes: apples (
x1
x2
u(x1,0)
u(99,x2)
Then, for every bundle
(x1',x2')
(x1,0)
(99,x2)
Often, certain independence properties between attributes can be used to make the construction of a utility function easier. Some such independence properties are described below.
The strongest independence property is called additive independence. Two attributes, 1 and 2, are called additive independent, if the preference between two lotteries (defined as joint probability distributions on the two attributes) depends only on their marginal probability distributions (the marginal PD on attribute 1 and the marginal PD on attribute 2).
This means, for example, that the following two lotteries are equivalent:
L
(x1,x2)
(y1,y2)
M
(x1,y2)
(y1,x2)
x1
y1
x2
y2
A fundamental result in utility theory is that, two attributes are additive-independent, if and only if their two-attribute utility function is additive and has the form:
u(x1,x2)=u1(x1)+u2(x2)
PROOF:
\longrightarrow
If the attributes are additive-independent, then the lotteries
L
M
EL[u]=EM[u]
u(x1,x2)+u(y1,y2)=u(x1,y2)+u(y1,x2)
xi
yi
y1
y2
u(y1,y2)=0
u1(x1)=u(x1,y2)
u2(x2)=u(y1,x2)
u(x1,x2)=u1(x1)+u2(x2)
\longleftarrow
If the function u is additive, then by the rules of expectation, for every lottery
L
EL[u(x1,x2)]=EL[u1(x1)]+EL[u2(x2)]
L
This result generalizes to any number of attributes: if preferences over lotteries on attributes 1,...,n depend only on their marginal probability distributions, then the n-attribute utility function is additive:
u(x1,...,xn)=
n{k | |
\sum | |
i |
ui(xi)}
u
ui
[0,1]
ki
Much of the work in additive utility theory has been done by Peter C. Fishburn.
A slightly weaker independence property is utility independence. Attribute 1 is utility-independent of attribute 2, if the conditional preferences on lotteries on attribute 1 given a constant value of attribute 2, do not depend on that constant value.
This means, for example, that the preference between a lottery
<(x1,x2):(y1,x2)>
<(x'1,x2):(y'1,x2)>
x2
Note that utility independence (in contrast to additive independence) is not symmetric: it is possible that attribute 1 is utility-independent of attribute 2 and not vice versa.
If attribute 1 is utility-independent of attribute 2, then the utility function for every value of attribute 2 is a linear transformation of the utility function for every other value of attribute 2. Hence it can be written as:
u(x1,x2)=c1(x2)+c2(x2) ⋅ u(x1,x
0) | |
2 |
0 | |
x | |
2 |
u(x1,x2)=d1(x1)+d2(x1) ⋅
0,x | |
u(x | |
2) |
If the attributes are mutually utility independent, then the utility function u has the following multi-linear form:
u(x1,x2)=u1(x1)+u2(x2)+k ⋅ u1(x1) ⋅ u2(x2)
k
k=0
k ≠ 0
[ku(x1,x2)+1]=[ku1(x1)+1] ⋅ [ku2(x2)+1]
where each term is a linear transformation
k ⋅ +1
These results can be generalized to any number of attributes. Given attributes 1,...,n, if any subset of the attributes is utility-independent of its complement, then the n-attribute utility function is multi-linear and has one of the following forms:
1+ku(x1,...,xn)=
n{1+k | |
\prod | |
i=1 |
kiui(xi)}
u
ui
[0,1]
ki
[0,1]
k
(-1,0)
(0,infty)
k\to0
It is useful to compare three different concepts related to independence of attributes: Additive-independence (AI), Utility-independence (UI) and Preferential-independence (PI).
AI and UI both concern preferences on lotteries and are explained above. PI concerns preferences on sure outcomes and is explained in the article on ordinal utility.
Their implication order is as follows:
AI ⇒ UI ⇒ PI
AI is a symmetric relation (if attribute 1 is AI of attribute 2 then attribute 2 is AI of attribute 1), while UI and PI are not.
AI implies mutual UI. The opposite is, in general, not true; it is true only if
k=0
x1,x2,y1,y2
L
M
k
UI implies PI. The opposite is, in general, not true. But if:
then all attributes are mutually UI. Moreover, in that case there is a simple relation between the cardinal utility function
u
v
u
u(x1,...,xn)=v(x1,...,xn)
u(x1,...,xn)=[exp(R ⋅ v(x1,...,xn))-1]/[exp(R)-1]
R ≠ 0
PROOF: It is sufficient to prove that u has constant absolute risk aversion with respect to the value v.
n\geq3
v(x1,...,xn)=\sum
n | |
i=1 |
{λivi(xi)}
x1,z1
y1
<x1:z1>
(w2,...,wn)
(y1,w)\sim<(x1,w):(z1,w)>
λ1v1(y1)+
n{λ | |
\sum | |
i |
vi(wi)}\sim<λ1v1(x1)+
n{λ | |
\sum | |
i |
vi(wi)}:λ1v1(z1)+
n{λ | |
\sum | |
i |
vi(wi)}>
n{λ | |
\sum | |
i |
vi(wi)}