Mitchell Green Explained

Mitchell Green is a professor of philosophy at the University of Connecticut,^[1] where he sits on the steering committee of the Cognitive Science program^[2] and the executive committee of the Graduate School. He is editor-in-chief of the journal Philosophia.

Research work

His research focuses on philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and pragmatics.^[3] He made influential contributions to speech act theory, the evolutionary biology of communication, to the study of empathy, self-knowledge,^[4] self-expression and attitude ascription, and to the epistemology of fiction. His account of communication as self-expression,^[5] develops the idea that communication is best understood as a tool for signalling and showing our internal mental states.^[6] Green's influential research has been celebrated by a special issue of the international journal Grazer Philosophische Studien, titled Sources of Meaning. Themes from Mitchell S. Green,^{[7] [8]} edited by J. Michel, and by a special issue of the journal Organon Filozofia (vol. 28, 2021), titled The Origins of Meaning and the Nature of Speech Acts, edited by M. Witek.

Green previously held a professor position at the University of Virginia (from 1993 to 2013),^[9] and currently runs an MOOC at Coursera.^{[10] [11]} He has held fellowships from the National Science Foundation,^[12] the National Humanities Center,^[13] the Center for Contemplative Mind in Society,^[14] and the American Council of Learned Societies.^[15] He has held visiting research positions at Singapore Management University (2008), the University of Muenster (2015), and was a Mercator Fellow at the Ruhr University Bochum, in the Emmy Noether Research Group (2020–21).

Publications

Books

• The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge Routledge, 2017.
• Self-Expression, Oxford University Press, 2007 ^{[16] [17]}
• Engaging Philosophy: A Brief Introduction, Hackett Publishing Company, 2006. .
• Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person, edited with John Williams, including eleven previously unpublished essays. Oxford University Press, 2007); ^[18]

Encyclopedia articles

• 'Speech Acts,’ in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Orig. 2007; revisions 2014.)

Highly cited articles

• Green . Mitchell . II—Mitchell Green: Perceiving Emotions . Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume . 1 June 2010 . 84 . 1 . 45–61 . 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00185.x .
• Green . Mitchell S. . Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States . Mind & Language . April 2009 . 24 . 2 . 139–163 . 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01357.x .
• Green . Mitchell S. . Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature . Canadian Journal of Philosophy . September 2007 . 37 . 3 . 419–447 . 10.1353/cjp.2007.0021 .
• Green . Mitchell S. . Illocutionary Force And Semantic Content . Linguistics and Philosophy . 2000 . 23 . 5 . 435–473 . 10.1023/A:1005642421177 .
• Green . Mitchell S. . Direct Reference and Implicature . Philosophical Studies . 1998 . 91 . 1 . 61–90 . 10.1023/A:1004212614842 .
• Green . Mitchell S. . Quantity, volubility, and some varieties of discourse . Linguistics and Philosophy . February 1995 . 18 . 1 . 83–112 . 10.1007/BF00984962 .
• Belnap . Nuel . Green . Mitchell . Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line . Philosophical Perspectives . 1994 . 8 . 365–388 . 10.2307/2214178 . 2214178 .
• Green . Mitchell . Imagery, expression, and metaphor . Philosophical Studies . January 2017 . 174 . 1 . 33–46 . 10.1007/s11098-015-0607-x .
• Marsili . Neri . Green . Mitchell . Assertion: A (partly) social speech act . Journal of Pragmatics . August 2021 . 181 . 17–28 . 10.1016/j.pragma.2021.03.016 .

Notes and References

1. Web site: Mitch Green Philosophy Department . University of Connecticut . 2 June 2020.
2. Web site: 2019-01-16 . Cognitive Science Program Steering Committee Cognitive Science Program . 2022-04-30 . en-US.
3. Michel . Jan G. . Editor's Introduction: From Signaling and Expression to Conversation and Fiction . Grazer Philosophische Studien . 12 September 2019 . 96 . 3 . 293–294 . 10.1163/18756735-09603001 . 219252310 . free .
4. Web site: Know Thyself: The Philosophy of Self-Knowledge . UConn Today . 7 August 2018.
5. Book: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283781.001.0001 . Self-Expression . 2007 . Green . Mitchell S. . 978-0-19-928378-1 .
6. Eriksson . John . 2009 . Review of Self-Expression . The Philosophical Quarterly . 59 . 235 . 375–379 . 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.618_7.x . 40208613 .
7. Web site: Grazer Philosophische Studien Volume 96 Issue 3: Special Issue: Sources of Meaning. Themes from Mitchell S. Green, edited by Jan G. Michel (2019) . 2022-05-01 . Brill . en-US.
8. Web site: Baxter . Donald . 2019-10-04 . Special Issue on Mitchell Green Philosophy Department . 2022-05-01 . en-US.
9. Web site: Epic Undertaking: U.VA. Profeesor Aims to Strengthen Teaching of High School Philosophy . 31 August 2010 . University of Virginia.
10. Web site: Mitchell Green, Instructor . 2022-04-30 . Coursera . en.
11. Web site: Weinberg . Justin . Bringing the Philosophy of Self-Knowledge to the Public with a MOOC . Daily Nous . 7 August 2018.
12. Web site: 2013-05-15 . Mitchell Green, Philosopher of Language, Mind, Joins UConn Faculty . 2022-07-20 . UConn Today . en-US.
13. Web site: Mitchell S. Green, 2001–2002 . 2022-07-20 . National Humanities Center . en-US.
14. Web site: Contemplative Practice Fellowships – The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society . 2022-07-20 . en-US.
15. Web site: Mitchell S. Green . 2022-07-20 . ACLS . en-US.
16. Eriksson . John . Review of Self-Expression . The Philosophical Quarterly . 2009 . 59 . 235 . 375–379 . 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.618_7.x . 40208613 .
17. Jenkins . Phil . Mitchell S. Green, Self-Expression . Philosophy in Review . 2009 . 29 . 1 . 32–34 .
18. Stephen . Hetherington . Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person . Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews . 16 August 2007 . en.