Coup d'état explained

A coup d'état (; in French ku deta/;),[1] or simply a coup, is typically an illegal and overt attempt by a military organization or other government elites to unseat an incumbent leadership.[2] [3] A self-coup is when a leader, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means.

By one estimate, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, half of which were successful. Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups, though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.

Many factors may lead to the occurrence of a coup, as well as determine the success or failure of a coup. Once a coup is underway, coup success is driven by coup-makers' ability to get others to believe that the coup attempt will be successful.[4] The number of successful coups has decreased over time. Failed coups in authoritarian systems are likely to strengthen the power of the authoritarian ruler.[5] [6] The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups, a phenomenon referred to as the "coup trap".[7]

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military and the fragmenting of military and security agencies. However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military.

Etymology

The term comes from French French: coup d'État, literally meaning a 'stroke of state' or 'blow of state'.[8] [9] [10] In French, the word French: État (in French eta/) is capitalized when it denotes a sovereign political entity.[11]

Although the concept of a coup d'état has featured in politics since antiquity, the phrase is of relatively recent coinage.[12] It did not appear within an English text before the 19th century except when used in the translation of a French source, there being no simple phrase in English to convey the contextualized idea of a 'knockout blow to the existing administration within a state'.

One early use within text translated from French was in 1785 in a printed translation of a letter from a French merchant, commenting on an arbitrary decree, or French: arrêt, issued by the French king restricting the import of British wool.[13] What may be its first published use within a text composed in English is an editor's note in the London Morning Chronicle,1804, reporting the arrest by Napoleon in France, of Moreau, Berthier, Masséna, and Bernadotte: "There was a report in circulation yesterday of a sort of coup d'état having taken place in France, in consequence of some formidable conspiracy against the existing government."

In the British press, the phrase came to be used to describe the various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police, the French: [[Gendarmerie|Gens d'Armes d'Elite]]|italic=no, who executed the Duke of Enghien: "the actors in torture, the distributors of the poisoning draughts, and the secret executioners of those unfortunate individuals or families, whom Bonaparte's measures of safety require to remove. In what revolutionary tyrants call grand[s] coups d'état, as butchering, or poisoning, or drowning, en masse, they are exclusively employed."[14]

Related terms

Soft coup

See main article: Soft coup and Nonviolent revolution. A soft coup, sometimes referred to as a silent coup or a bloodless coup, is an illegal overthrow of a government, but unlike a regular coup d'état it is achieved without the use of force or violence.[15]

Palace coup

A palace coup or palace revolution is a coup in which one faction within the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling group.[16] Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.[17] The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest. Palace coups were common in Imperial China.[18] They have also occurred among the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,[19] and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.[20] The majority of Russian tsars between 1725 and 1801 were either overthrown or usurped power in palace coups.[21]

Putsch

The term putsch ([pʊtʃ], from Swiss German for 'knock'), denotes the political-military actions of an unsuccessful minority reactionary coup.[22] [23] The term was initially coined for the Swiss German; Alemannic; Alsatian: [[Züriputsch]] of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. It was also used for attempted coups in Weimar Germany, such as the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Küstrin Putsch, and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch.[24]

The 1934 Night of the Long Knives was Hitler's purge to eliminate opponents, particularly the paramilitary faction led by Ernst Röhm, but Nazi propaganda justified it as preventing a supposed putsch planned or attempted by Röhm. The Nazi term German: Röhm-Putsch is still used by Germans to describe the event, often with quotation marks as the 'so-called Röhm Putsch'.[25]

The 1961 Algiers putsch and the 1991 August Putsch also use the term.

The 2023 Wagner Group rebellion has also been described as a putsch, mostly as a thematic parallel comparing Russian President Vladimir Putin to Hitler, and Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin to Röhm.[26] [27]

Spanish; Castilian: Pronunciamiento and Spanish; Castilian: cuartelazo

Spanish; Castilian: Pronunciamiento is a term of Spanish origin for a type of French: coup d'état. Specifically the Spanish; Castilian: pronunciamiento is the formal declaration deposing the previous government and justifying the installation of the new government by the Spanish; Castilian: golpe de estado. One author distinguishes a coup, in which a military or political faction takes power for itself, from a Spanish; Castilian: pronunciamiento, in which the military deposes the existing government and hands over power to a new, ostensibly civilian government.[28]

A "barracks revolt" or Spanish; Castilian: cuartelazo is another type of military revolt, from the Spanish term Spanish; Castilian: cuartel ('quarter' or 'barracks'), in which the mutiny of specific military garrisons sparks a larger military revolt against the government.[29]

Other

Other types of actual or attempted seizures of power are sometimes called "coups with adjectives". The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, analytical, and political implications.

Revolution, rebellion

While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started spontaneously by larger groups of uncoordinated people.[33] The distinction between a revolution and a coup not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by its plotters to feign democratic legitimacy.[34] [35]

Prevalence and history

According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful. They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%." Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia. Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.

A number of political science datasets document coup attempts around the world and over time, generally starting in the post-World War II period. Major examples include the Global Instances of Coups dataset, the Coups & Political Instability dataset by the Center of Systemic Peace, the Coup d'etat Project by the Cline Center, the Colpus coup dataset, and the Coups and Agency Mechanism dataset. A 2023 study argued that major coup datasets tend to over-rely on international news sources to gather their information, potentially biasing the types of events included.[36] Its findings show that while such a strategy is sufficient for gathering information on successful and failed coups, attempts to gather data on coup plots and rumors require a greater consultation of regional and local-specific sources.

Outcomes

Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.[37] [38] A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:

The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes. New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year after the coup than existed in the year before the coup. One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership. Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.

Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,[40] [41] [42] though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.[43] Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.[44]

Predictors

A 2003 review of the academic literature found that the following factors influenced coups:

The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.[46]

Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.

Oftentimes, military spending is an indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place. Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.

Coup trap

The accumulation of previous coups is a strong predictor of future coups,[47] [48] a phenomenon called the coup trap.[49] A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the coup trap and reduces cycles of political instability.

Regime type and polarization

Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than very authoritarian states or democratic states.[50] A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.[51] A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.[52] A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."[53] Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.[54] A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.[55] A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.[56] A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.[57] One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.[58]

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.[59] [60] [61]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.

A 2019 study found that when a country's politics is polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.[62]

A 2023 study found that civilian elites are more likely to be associated with instigating military coups while civilians embedded in social networks are more likely to be associated with consolidating military coups.[63]

Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and armed conflicts

A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the following logic for why this is:However, two 2016 studies found that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face a coup.[64] [65]

A 2019 study found that states that had recently signed civil war peace agreements were much more likely to experience coups, in particular when those agreements contained provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.[66]

Popular opposition and regional rebellions

Research suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the state apparatus to coordinate coups.[67]

A 2019 study found that regional rebellions made coups by the military more likely.[68]

Economy, development, and resource factors

A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries".[69] The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.

A 2020 study found that elections had a two-sided impact on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economic expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of coup attempts.[70]

A 2021 study found that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced risk of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.[71]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century study found that coup frequency does not vary with development levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.

Coup-proofing

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.[72] It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,[73] and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.[74] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring.[75] [76] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,[77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[83] One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fear that their military will stage a coup or allow a domestic uprising to proceed uninterrupted – as a consequence, authoritarian rulers have incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the military.[84]

A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[85] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.

According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.[86] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[87] Coup-proofing is more likely in former French colonies.[88]

A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.[89] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".[90]

In their 2022 book Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found that political-military fusion, where the ruling party is highly interlinked with the military and created the administrative structures of the military from its inception, is extremely effective at preventing military coups. For example, the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, and never instigated a military coup even after large-scale policy failures (i.e. the Great Leap Forward) or the extreme political instability of the Cultural Revolution.[91]

Impact

Democracy

Research suggests that coups promoting democratization in staunchly authoritarian regimes have become less likely to end in democracy over time, and that the positive influence has strengthened since the end of the Cold War.[92] [93]

A 2014 study found that "coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise".[94] The authors argue that coup attempts can have this consequence because leaders of successful coups have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish political legitimacy and economic growth, while leaders who stay in power after failed coup attempts see it as a sign that they must enact meaningful reforms to remain in power. A 2014 study found that 40% of post-Cold War coups were successful. The authors argue that this may be due to the incentives created by international pressure. A 2016 study found that democracies were installed in 12% of Cold War coups and 40% of the post-Cold War coups. A 2020 study found that coups tended to lead to increases in state repression, not reductions.[95]

According to a 2020 study, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival."[96]

According to legal scholar Ilya Somin a coup to forcibly overthrow a democratic government might be sometimes justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined,

Repression and counter-coups

According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the prevailing existing government to violently purge the army after a coup has been foiled. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-coup" by soldiers who are afraid they will be next. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial attempt, governments usually resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.[97]

Some research suggests that increased repression and violence typically follow both successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.[98] However, some tentative analysis by political scientist Jay Ulfelder finds no clear pattern of deterioration in human rights practices in wake of failed coups in post-Cold War era.[99]

Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the Coup d'état of December Twelfth in South Korea.

A 2017 study finds that the use of state broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali's 2012 coup did not elevate explicit approval for the regime.[100]

According to a 2019 study, coup attempts lead to a reduction in physical integrity rights.[101]

International response

The international community tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 study finds that "coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."[102] Another 2015 study shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.[103] A third 2015 study finds that Western states react strongest against coups of possible democratic and human rights abuses. A 2016 study shows that the international donor community in the post-Cold War period penalizes coups by reducing foreign aid.[104] The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.

Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 study finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.[105]

A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a significant effect in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.[106]

According to a 2020 study, coups increase the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.[107]

Current leaders who assumed power via coups

Leaders are arranged in chronological order by the dates they assumed power, and categorized by the continents their countries are in.

Asia

PositionPost-coup leaderDeposed leaderCountryEventDate
Rahmon Nabiyev
Abdrabbuh Mansur HadiHouthi takeover in Yemen

Africa

See also: Coup Belt.

PositionPost-coup leaderDeposed leaderCountryEventDate
Robert Mugabe
PresidentKais SaiedHichem Mechichi Tunisia2021 Tunisian self-coup
Chairman of the National Committee Mamady DoumbouyaAlpha Condé Guinea2021 Guinean coup d'état
President of the Patriotic Movement Ibrahim Traoré Burkina Faso
President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the HomelandAbdourahamane TchianiMohamed Bazoum Niger2023 Nigerien coup d'état
Head of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of InstitutionsBrice Clotaire Oligui NguemaAli Bongo Ondimba Gabon2023 Gabonese coup d'état

See also

Further reading

External links

Notes and References

  1. Web site: coup d'état . . 4 April 2022 . 29 November 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20211129220715/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27%C3%A9tat . live .
  2. Powell . Jonathan M. . Thyne . Clayton L. . 2011-03-01 . Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset . Journal of Peace Research . Preprint . en . 48 . 2 . 249–259 . 10.1177/0022343310397436 . 0022-3433 . 9066792 . 2022-06-20 . To summarize, our definition of a coup attempt includes illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive... Coups may be undertaken by any elite who is part of the state apparatus. These can include non-civilian members of the military and security services, or civilian members of government. . 27 May 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220527051928/https://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/powell-thyne-JPR-2011.pdf . live.
  3. Chin . John J . Carter . David B . Wright . Joseph G . 2021 . The Varieties of Coups D'état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset . International Studies Quarterly . 65 . 4 . 1040–1051 . 10.1093/isq/sqab058 . 0020-8833 . A coup d ́etat occurs whenever the incumbent ruling regime or regime leader is ousted from power (or a presumptive regime leader is prevented from taking power) as a result of concrete, observable, and unconstitutional actions by one or more civilian members of the incumbent ruling regime and/or one or more members of the military or security apparatus.
  4. Book: Singh, Naunihal . Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups . 2014 . JHU Press . 978-1-4214-1336-5 . en.
  5. Timoneda . Joan C. . Escribà-Folch . Abel . Chin . John . 2023 . The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships . British Journal of Political Science . en . 53 . 3 . 878–901 . 10.1017/S0007123422000655 . 257479041 . 0007-1234 . 21 July 2023 . 31 July 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230731171605/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/rush-to-personalize-power-concentration-after-failed-coups-in-dictatorships/C0828C76D7C2EAE1EAC912F929E62EC3 . live . 10230/57138 . free .
  6. Web site: Habtom . Naman Karl-Thomas . 2023-07-21 . When Failed Coups Strengthen Leaders . War on the Rocks . en-US . 21 July 2023 . 29 July 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230729115031/https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/when-failed-coups-strengthen-leaders/ . live .
  7. Londregan . John B. . Poole . Keith T. . 1990 . Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power . World Politics . 42 . 2 . 151–183 . 10.2307/2010462 . 1086-3338 . 2010462 . 153454233.
  8. Web site: Coup d'état . https://web.archive.org/web/20151106083058/http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coup-d%27%C3%A9tat . 6 November 2015 . 12 January 2019 . Oxford Dictionaries . dmy-all .
  9. Web site: Coup d'état . Merriam Webster . 18 August 2017 . https://web.archive.org/web/20170818174900/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup+d%27%C3%A9tat . live .
  10. Web site: July 15, 2016 . Turkey Coup . February 5, 2021 . Merriam Webster . 11 January 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210111113731/https://www.merriam-webster.com/news-trend-watch/turkey-coup-20160715 . live .
  11. Web site: Banque de dépannage linguistique – état . https://archive.today/20120701102722/http://66.46.185.79/bdl/gabarit_bdl.asp?t1=1&id=1285&D=%C9tat . 1 July 2012 . 12 December 2012 . Office québécois de la langue française . dmy-all.
  12. Julius Caesar's civil war, 5 January 49 BC.
  13. Norfolk Chronicle, 13 August 1785: "It is thought here by some, that it is a Coup d'Etat played off as a prelude to a disagreeable after-piece. But I can confidently assure you, that the above-mentioned French: arrêt was promulgated in consequence of innumerable complaints and murmurs which have found their way to the ears of the Sovereign. Our merchants contend, that they experience the greatest difficulties in trading with the English".
  14. News: unk . . Canterbury . 16 October 1804 . 2.
  15. Marsteintredet. Leiv. Malamud. Andrés. November 2020. Coup with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research?. Political Studies. en. 68. 4. 1014–1035. 10.1177/0032321719888857. 210147416. 0032-3217. 4 January 2023. 13 December 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20221213023750/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032321719888857. live. 10451/40441. free.
  16. Book: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351131759-16/recognition-governments-peterson. 10.4324/9781351131759-16. Recognition of governments. Routledge Handbook of State Recognition. 2019. Peterson. M.J.. 205–219. 978-1-351-13175-9. 243704806. 4 July 2021. 4 July 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210704194027/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351131759-16/recognition-governments-peterson. live.
  17. Raphael Boleslavsky . Mehdi Shadmehr . Konstantin Sonin . June 2021 . 19 . 3 . 1782–1815. Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup . Journal of the European Economic Association . 10.1093/jeea/jvaa040.
  18. Anita M. Andrew & John A. Rapp, Autocracy and China's Rebel Founding Emperors: Comparing Chairman Mao and Ming Taizu (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 324; Charles O. Hucker, China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture (Stanford University Press: 1975), p. 304.
  19. Patrick Milton, Michael Axworthy & Brendan Simms, Towards A Westphalia for the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 104.
  20. Mats Lundahl, Politics Or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment (Routledge, 2002), p. 321.
  21. Erren. Lorenz. 2016. Feofan Prokopovich's Pravda voli monarshei as Fundamental Law of the Russian Empire. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 17. 2. 333–360. 10.1353/kri.2016.0027. 159803557 . 1538-5000.
  22. Web site: Putsch. 2023-01-04. DWDS – Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. 31 August 2022. de. 4 January 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20230104050446/https://www.dwds.de/wb/Putsch. live.
  23. Book: Pfeifer, Wolfgang . Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen . Etymological Dictionary of German . de . . Berlin . 978-3-05-000626-0 . second . 1993.

    de:Wolfgang Pfeifer (Etymologe)

    .
  24. Web site: Definition of putsch: Did you know? . 16 February 2021 . Merriam Webster . 10 February 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210210192054/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putsch . live .
  25. Web site: Röhm-Putsch . de . Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM), German Historical Museum . 26 March 2016 . 11 August 2014 . https://web.archive.org/web/20140811150155/http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/roehm/ . live .
  26. Web site: Cashman . Richard . Ogryzko . Lesia . Wagner putsch is symptomatic of Russia's ongoing imperial decline . . 6 July 2023 . 29 January 2024.
  27. Web site: Russia's aborted Wagner putsch: How it evolved . . 26 June 2023 . 29 January 2024.
  28. Book: Luttwak, Edward . 1979 . Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook . Harvard University Press . 978-0-674-17547-1.
  29. Little-Siebold, Todd. "Cuartelazo" in Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture, vol. 2, p. 305. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1996.
  30. Web site: Ask the 'Coupologists': Just What Was Jan. 6 Anyway? . Zeitz . Joshua . Althaus . Scott . . 2022-08-19 . 2023-12-28 . We have a set of categories including military coup, dissident coup, rebel coup, palace coup, foreign-backed coup, auto coup and others. So an attempted dissident coup is a coup initiated by a small group of discontents to include ex-military leaders, religious leaders, former government leaders, members of legislatures, parliament and civilians, but does not include security forces or police as they’re organized arms of the government. And certainly by using that label, I am not trying to categorize in any sense the politics of people who are involved. .
  31. Web site: It Was an Attempted Coup: The Cline Center's Coup D'état Project Categorizes the January 6, 2021 Assault on the US Capitol. Cline Center for Advanced Social Research. July 21, 2021. February 4, 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210204105008/https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_jan.27.2021. live.
  32. Book: How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse . Barbara Geddes . Joseph George Wright . Joseph Wright . Erica Frantz . . 978-1-107-11582-8 . 2018 . 285 . where a monarch who had not been directly running the country (in the sense that there was a prime minister and responsible government...) decides to assume all power. Yugoslavia in 1929 was an example of this..
  33. Web site: Coup D'etat. 2023-01-04. Encyclopedia Britannica. en. 8 November 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20211108070731/https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat. live.
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