Meroni doctrine explained

In European Union (EU) law, the Meroni doctrine, which arose from cases C-9/56 and C-10/56 (Meroni v High Authority [1957/1958] ECR 133), relates to the extent to which EU institutions may delegate their tasks to regulatory agencies.^[1] The doctrine is controversial,^[1] notably because it would be anachronistic in view of the growing complexity of EU competences.^[2]

In the view of some,^{[3] [4]} the Meroni doctrine no longer holds since the 2014 European Court of Justice judgement in the UK v Parliament and Council case on the Short Selling Regulation, where the Court upheld most of the provisions that were delegated to the European Securities and Markets Authority by the co-legislators.

Notes and References

1. Book: Lelieveldt. Herman. Princen. Sebastiaan. The Politics of the European Union. limited. 2011. 271. Cambridge University Press. 978-1139498395.
2. Book: Hatzopoulos, Vassilis. Regulating Services in the European Union. 2012. Oxford University Press. 978-0199572663. 325.
3. van Rijsbergen, Marloes & Scholten, Mira. (2014). The ESMA-Short Selling Case: Erecting a New Delegation Doctrine in the EU upon the Meroni-Romano Remnants. Legal Issues of Economic Integration. 41. 389–406.
4. Web site: The legal limits to 'agencification' in the EU? Case C-270/12 UK v Parliament and Council. 27 January 2014.