| Mark Mizruchi | |
| Birth Name: | Mark Sheldon Mizruchi |
| Birth Date: | 10 December 1953 |
| Fields: | Sociology |
| Workplaces: | University of Michigan, Columbia University |
| Education: | Washington University in St. Louis (B.A., 1975), State University of New York at Stony Brook (PhD, 1980) |
| Doctoral Advisor: | Michael Schwartz[1] |
| Known For: | social network analysis and organizational theory |
| Awards: | 2011 Guggenheim Foundation Fellow, 1988–1993 National Science Foundation Presidential Young Investigator Award |
| Spouses: | )--> |
| Partners: | )--> |
Mark Sheldon Mizruchi (born December 10, 1953) is the Robert Cooley Angell Collegiate Professor of Sociology and Barger Family Professor of Organizational Studies at the University of Michigan. He also holds an appointment as Professor of Management and Organizations at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business. His research has focused on the political activity of the U.S. corporate elite over the 20th and 21st centuries.[2] He was influential in the development of social network analysis, and has published research in the fields of organizational theory, economic sociology, and political sociology.
Mizruchi received his A.B. from Washington University in St. Louis in 1975 and his M.A. and PhD from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in 1980, both in sociology. From 1980 to 1987 he was a statistical consultant in the computing center of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx, becoming an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry (biostatistics). In 1987 he moved to Columbia University, first as Assistant and then as Associate Professor of Sociology. In 1991 he moved to the University of Michigan as Professor of Sociology, with a courtesy appointment as Professor of Business Administration. He was named Barger Family Professor in 2012 and Robert Cooley Angell Collegiate Professor of Sociology in 2014.[3]
Mizruchi's work has centered on, first, the changing ownership and control of the largest U.S. corporations, and, second, corporate political action. His key theoretical work has been explaining the sources of unity and conflict among U.S. big business.[4] When do firms, modeled as independent agents in most social scientific analysis, collaborate to achieve common goals? This line of research addresses a long-standing question about the nature of the corporation: who controls the corporation when ownership is widely dispersed among shareholders? Can managers act in their own interest, and what forces prevent them from doing so?
To address these questions, Mizruchi has empirically focused on relationships between firms arising from corporate board relationships. Many corporate board members serve on more than one corporate board, creating Interlocking directorates that allow for the diffusion of ideas; Mizruchi has investigated how this interlock network has evolved, and the role that it plays in coordinating action. Not all interlocks, however, are created equal. He shows that through the twentieth century, representatives from financial institutions played a central role in the interlock network.[5] Through these network ties, banks were able to monitor firms' behavior, with significant financial consequences. However, his later work demonstrated recent declines in the centrality of banks. This thesis is expanded in his latest book, which highlights the growing fracturing of the U.S. corporate elite over the past forty years, and suggests broad consequences for the governance of the U.S. economy.[6]