Liwa al-Tafuf explained

Liwa al-Tafuf
Native Name:لواء الطفوف
Native Name Lang:ar
Founding Leader:Qasim Muslih
Active:2014-Present
Split From:Liwa Ali al-Akbar
Allegiance: Popular Mobilization Forces
Ideology:
Status:active
Allies:
Opponents:

Liwa al-Tafuf also known as the 13th PMF Brigade is a brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq which split from Liwa Ali al-Akbar in 2014 and was associated with the Imam Husayn Shrine and has participated in the War in Iraq, mostly against the Islamic State, which includes the recapturing of al-Ba'aj and the Battle of Al-Qa'im in 2017.[1]

History

The group was established in 2014 after splitting from the 11th PMF Briagde, Liwa Ali al-Akbar under the guise of Qasim Muslih as the leader of the brigade and tried to remain "legitimate" as a "true" atabat (shrine) but the group fell into the administrative influence of Kata'ib Hezbollah's founder, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The group became well-known for taking old armored vehicles from old tanks graveyards and returning them, with ingenious new modifications, to service.[2]

The group has allied with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and answers to the group with Kata'ib Hezbollah.[3] Though the group is considered pro-Iranian, it doesn't view itself as full allies with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and has built a better relationship with the local Sunni Muslim populations in Iraq than most of the other PMF Brigades and pro-Iranian militias.[4] [5]

The group has helped smuggled Iranian goods and commerce with Kata'ib Hezbollah, where both basically control it, in the al-Qaimal-Bukamal border crossing to Syria which was supposedly used to help others battle the Islamic State in Syria during the Syrian civil war.[6] Though some of the goods are supplies to groups, Liwa al-Tafuf and other groups help enable the cross-border drug trade with Iraq and Syria.[7]

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Al-Tamimi . Aymenn Jawad . 2019-02-15 . Liwa al-Tafuf of the Hashd: Interview . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20240730051545/https://aymennjawad.org/2019/02/liwa-al-tafuf-of-the-hashd-interview . 2024-07-30 . 2024-07-30 . . en.
  2. Web site: Knights . Michael . 2024-02-03 . Profile: Liwa al-Tafuf (13th PMF Brigade) . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20240514160236/https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-al-tafuf-13th-pmf-brigade . 2024-05-14 . 2024-07-30 . . en.
  3. Web site: Carter . Brian . Soltani . Amin . Moore . Johanna . Tyson . Kathryn . 2024-02-03 . Iran Update, February 3, 2024 . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20240730051007/https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iran%20Update%2C%20February%203%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf . 2024-07-30 . PDF . 2024-07-30 . . PDF.
  4. The Islamic State on the Rocks, Iranian-Backed Militias on the Rise . Hasan . Harith . Khaddour . Kheder . 2020 . . 12–15 . 2024-07-30 . https://web.archive.org/web/20240730052209/https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24299.6 . 2024-07-30 . live.
  5. Web site: Kerr . Malcolm H. . The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier . 2024-07-30 . XCEPT . en.
  6. Immanent Conflict, Without Imminent War: LOCAL ACTORS AND FOREIGN POWERS ARE SCRABBLING FOR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA . Malmvig . Helle . Dreyer . Jakob . 2020 . Danish Institute for International Studies . 2024-07-30 . https://web.archive.org/web/20240730051119/https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21358 . 2024-07-30 . live.
  7. Web site: Haid . Haid . 2022-05-25 . To stem Iraq’s drug trade, rein in the militias that enable it . 2024-07-30 . Al-Arab.