Law and Justice explained

Law and Justice
Native Name:Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
Logo Upright:0.6
Abbreviation:PiS
Chairman:Jarosław Kaczyński
Founders:Lech Kaczyński[1]
Jarosław Kaczyński
Headquarters: 84/86, 02-018 Warsaw
Position: Right-wing[2]
Membership: 48,000 (2023)[3]
National:United Right
European:European Conservatives and Reformists Party
Europarl:European Conservatives and Reformists
Colours: Blue White Red[4]
Seats1 Title:Sejm
Seats2 Title:Senate
Seats3 Title:European Parliament
Seats4 Title:Regional assemblies
Seats5 Title:Voivodes
Seats6 Title:Voivodeship Marshals
Seats7 Title:City Presidents
Country:Poland

Law and Justice (pl|Prawo i Sprawiedliwość pronounced as /pl/, PiS) is a right-wing populist and national-conservative political party in Poland. The party is a member of European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Its chairman had been Jarosław Kaczyński since 18 January 2003.

It was founded in 2001 by Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński as a direct successor of the Centre Agreement after it split from the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). It won the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, after which Lech became the president of Poland. It headed a parliamentary coalition with the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland between 2005 and the 2007 election. It placed second and they remained in the parliamentary opposition until 2015. It regained the presidency in the 2015 election, and later won a majority of seats in the parliamentary election. They retained the positions following the 2019 and 2020 election, but lost their majority following the 2023 Polish parliamentary election.

During its foundation, it sought to position itself as a centrist Christian democratic party, although shortly after, it adopted more culturally and socially conservative views and began their shift to the right. Under Kaczyński's national-conservative and law and order agenda, PiS embraced economic interventionism.[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] It has also pursued close relations with the Catholic Church, although in 2011, the Catholic-nationalist faction split off to form United Poland.[10] During the 2010s, it also adopted right-wing populist positions. After regaining power, PiS gained popularity with more populist and social policies.[11]

It is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists,[12] and on national-level, it heads the United Right coalition. It currently holds 190 seats in the Sejm and 34 in the Senate.

It has attracted widespread international criticism and domestic protest movements for allegedly dismantling liberal-democratic checks and balances.[13]

History

Formation

The party was created on a wave of popularity gained by Lech Kaczyński while heading the Polish Ministry of Justice (June 2000 to July 2001) in the AWS-led government, although local committees began appearing from 22 March 2001. The AWS itself was created from a diverse array of many small political parties. In the 2001 general election, PiS gained 44 (of 460) seats in the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) with 9.5% of votes. In 2002, Lech Kaczyński was elected mayor of Warsaw. He handed the party leadership to his twin brother Jarosław in 2003.[14]

In coalition government: 2005–2007

In the 2005 general election, PiS took first place with 27.0% of votes, which gave it 155 out of 460 seats in the Sejm and 49 out of 100 seats in the Senate. It was almost universally expected that the two largest parties, PiS and Civic Platform (PO), would form a coalition government. The putative coalition parties had a falling out, however, related to a fierce contest for the Polish presidency. In the end, Lech Kaczyński won the second round of the presidential election on 23 October 2005 with 54.0% of the vote, ahead of Donald Tusk, the PO candidate.

After the 2005 elections, Jarosław should have become prime minister. However, in order to improve his brother's chances of winning the presidential election (the first round of which was scheduled two weeks after the parliamentary election), PiS formed a minority government headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as prime minister, an arrangement that eventually turned out to be unworkable. In July 2006, PiS formed a right-wing coalition government with the agrarian populist Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland and the nationalist League of Polish Families, headed by Jarosław Kaczyński. Association with these parties, on the margins of Polish politics, severely affected the reputation of PiS. When accusations of corruption and sexual harassment against Andrzej Lepper, the leader of Self-Defence, surfaced, PiS chose to end the coalition and called for new elections.

In opposition: 2007–2015

In the 2007 general election, PiS managed to secure 32.1% of votes. Although an improvement over its showing from 2005, the results were nevertheless a defeat for the party, as Civic Platform (PO) gathered 41.5%. The party won 166 out of 460 seats in the Sejm and 39 seats in Poland's Senate.

On 10 April 2010, its former leader Lech Kaczyński died in the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash.[15] Jarosław Kaczyński became the sole leader of the party. He was the presidential candidate in the 2010 elections. In the 2010 election, Jarosław gathered 46.99% of the vote, losing to Civic Platform candidate Bronislaw Komorowski, who won with 53.01%.[16] [17]

In majority government: 2015–2023

The party won the 2015 parliamentary election, this time with an outright majority—something no Polish party had done since the fall of communism. In the normal course of events, this should have made Jarosław Kaczyński prime minister for a second time. However, Beata Szydło, perceived as being somewhat more moderate than Kaczyński, had been tapped as PiS's candidate for prime minister.[18] [19]

The party supported controversial reforms carried out by the Hungarian Fidesz party, with Jarosław Kaczyński declaring in 2011 that "a day will come when we have a Budapest in Warsaw".[20] PiS's 2015 victory prompted creation of a cross-party opposition movement, the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD).[21] Law and Justice has Proposed 2017 judicial reforms, which according to the party were meant to improve efficiency of the justice system, sparked protest as they were seen as undermining judicial independence. While these reforms were initially unexpectedly vetoed by President Duda, he later signed them into law.[22] In 2017, the European Union began an Article 7 infringement procedure against Poland due to a "clear risk of a serious breach" in the rule of law and fundamental values of the European Union.[23]

The party has caused what constitutional law scholar Wojciech Sadurski termed a "constitutional breakdown"[24] by packing the Constitutional Court with its supporters, undermining parliamentary procedure, and reducing the president's and prime minister's offices in favour of power being wielded extra-constitutionally by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński.[25] After eliminating constitutional checks, the government then moved to curtail the activities of NGOs and independent media, restrict freedom of speech and assembly, and reduce the qualifications required for civil service jobs in order to fill these positions with party loyalists.[25] [26] The media law was changed to give the governing party control of the state media, which was turned into a partisan outlet, with dissenting journalists fired from their jobs.[25] [27] Due to these political changes, Poland has been termed an "illiberal democracy",[28] [29] "plebiscitarian authoritarianism", or "velvet dictatorship with a façade of democracy".[30]

The party won reelection in the 2019 parliamentary election. With 44% of the popular vote, Law and Justice received the highest vote share by any party since Poland returned to democracy in 1989, but lost its majority in the Senate.[31]

In opposition: 2023–present

The United Right alliance placed first for the third straight election and won a plurality of seats but fell short of a Sejm majority. The opposition, consisting of the Civic Coalition, Third Way, and The Left, achieved a combined total vote of 54%, managing to form a majority coalition government.[32] [33] Although PiS would be unable to govern on its own, the Polish president Andrzej Duda stated his intention to re-appoint the incumbent Mateusz Morawiecki as prime minister due to the existing albeit unofficial convention of nominating a member of the winning party.[34] The four opposition parties criticized Duda's decision as a delay tactic. The opposition parties subsequently signed a coalition agreement on 10 November, de facto taking over control of the Sejm, and agreed to nominate former prime minister and European Council President Donald Tusk as their candidate.[35] Morawiecki's new cabinet, dubbed "two-week government" and "zombie government" by the media due to its anticipated short-livedness, was sworn in on 27 November 2023.[36] As expected, the Morawiecki's government was defeated in the Sejm on 11 December 2023, effectively ending its tenure.

Breakaways

In January 2010, a breakaway faction led by Jerzy Polaczek split from the party to form Poland Plus. Its seven members of the Sejm came from the centrist, economically liberal wing of the party. On 24 September 2010, the group was disbanded, with most of its Sejm members, including Polaczek, returning to Law and Justice.

On 16 November 2010, MPs Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska, Elżbieta Jakubiak and Paweł Poncyljusz, and MEPs Adam Bielan and Michał Kamiński formed a new political group, Poland Comes First (Polska jest Najważniejsza).[37] Kamiński said that the Law and Justice party had been taken over by far-right extremists. The breakaway party formed following dissatisfaction with the direction and leadership of Kaczyński.[38]

On 4 November 2011, MEPs Zbigniew Ziobro, Jacek Kurski, and Tadeusz Cymański were ejected from the party, after Ziobro urged the party to split further into two separate parties – centrist and nationalist – with the three representing the nationalist faction.[39] Ziobro's supporters, most of whom on the right-wing of the party, formed a new group in Parliament called Solidary Poland,[40] leading to their expulsion, too.[41] United Poland was formed as a formally separate party in March 2012, but has not threatened Law and Justice in opinion polls.[42]

United Poland which would later become Sovereign Poland merged with Law and Justice on 12 October 2024 during PiS congress in Przysucha.

Base of support

See also: Poland A and B. Like Civic Platform, but unlike the fringe parties to the right, Law and Justice originated from the anti-communist Solidarity trade union (which is a major cleavage in Polish politics), which was not a theocratic organisation.[43] Solidarity's leadership wanted to back Law and Justice in 2005, but was held back by the union's last experience of party politics, in backing Solidarity Electoral Action.

Today, the party enjoys great support among working class constituencies and union members. Groups that vote for the party include miners, farmers, shopkeepers, unskilled workers, the unemployed, and pensioners. With its left-wing approach toward economics, the party attracts voters who feel that economic liberalisation and European integration have left them behind. The party's core support derives from older, religious people who value conservatism and patriotism. PiS voters are usually located in rural areas and small towns. The strongest region of support is the southeastern part of the country. Voters without a university degree tend to prefer the party more than college-educated voters do.

Regionally, it has more support in regions of Poland that were historically part of western Galicia-Lodomeria and Congress Poland.[44] Since 2015, the borders of support are not as clear as before and party enjoys support in western parts of country, especially these deprived ones. Large cities in all regions are more likely to vote for a more liberal party like PO or .N. Still, PiS receives good support from poor and working class areas in large cities.

Based on this voter profile, Law and Justice forms the core of the conservative post-Solidarity bloc, along with the League of Polish Families and Solidarity Electoral Action, as opposed to liberal conservative post-Solidarity bloc of Civic Platform.[45] The most prominent feature of PiS voters was their emphasis on decommunisation.[46]

Ideology

The ideological roots of Law and Justice go back to the late 1980s to a Christian-democratic and nationalist wing of the Solidarity movement. The party derives from a dissident faction of Solidarity which felt alienated from the economically liberal policies of the post-communist Polish establishment. This faction was centered around Jarosław Kaczyński as well as President Lech Wałęsa, and was powerful, albeit briefly, in the early 1990s when the capitalist transition was in its early stages. However, it suddenly lost all influence when Kaczyński's party, Centre Agreement, failed to reach the newly-established 5% electoral threshold in the 1993 Polish parliamentary election. This led the political movement that would later form PiS to spend the rest of the 1990s with only marginal political influence. It slowly started to re-establish itself in the late 1990s, as this period marked the strongest and most persistent wave of public dissatisfaction with economic liberalism and corruption.[47]

For the first years after its foundation, Law and Justice was characterized as a moderate, single-issue party narrowly focused on the issue of 'law and order', appealing to voters concerned about corruption and high crime rates.[48] In its 2002 assessment of Poland, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate led by the UK government described Law and Justice as "basically a law and order party".[49] In 2003, German political scientist Nikolaus Werz classified Law and Justice as a centrist, law-and-order party that "advocates a strong state, the fight against corruption and the tightening of criminal law". Werz contrasted the moderation of PiS with the radicalism of League of Polish Families, which he described as a nationalist and 'Catholic-fundamentalist' party.[50]

The party then started radicalizing and broadening its program following its victory in the 2005 Polish parliamentary election. In 2006, Chicago Tribune wrote that "President Kaczynski's Law and Justice Party ran on a populist reform platform but veered sharply to the right after its victory". The same year, Polish journalist Krzysztof Bobiński wrote: "When they started out, the Kaczynski brothers were fairly mainstream … but now they've gotten into bed with the League of Polish Families and Samoobrona. They are moving to the right, and it's a pretty intolerant right."[51] The party had undergone a radical ideological change, abandoning its centrist position towards an increasingly populist and nationalist political orientation. This change was also marked by a pivot on the party's position towards the European Union - initially strongly supportive of European integration, PiS became an Eurosceptic party that criticized the EU from nationalist, protectionist, and anti-neoliberal perspectives.[52]

According to Polish political scientists Krzysztof Kowalczyk and Jerzy Sielski, Law and Justice had moved from a single-issue party in 2001 to a staunchly and broadly conservative one by 2006. They noted that by 2006 the party started calling for a "conservative revolution" that would restore traditional values to Poland, and gradually adopted right-wing populist rhetoric characterized by a "somewhat leftist" economical policy to undercut the appeal of far-right anti-capitalist League of Polish Families (LPR), agrarian socialist Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona) and the agrarian Polish People's Party (PSL).[53] The populist pivot of PiS is credited with causing the electoral blowout of Samoobrona and LPR in the 2007 Polish parliamentary election.[54]

Initially, the party was broadly pro-market, although less so than the Civic Platform.[55] It has adopted the social market economy rhetoric similar to that of western European Christian democratic parties. In the 2005 election, the party shifted to the protectionist left on economics. As prime minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz was more economically liberal than the Kaczyńskis, advocating a position closer to Civic Platform.[56] In 2005, Law and Justice made Civic Platform its main ideological opponent despite their previous closeness - Law and Justice posed a difference between Civic Platform's "liberal Poland" and its "social Poland". The former was marked by economic liberalism, austerity, deregulation and "serving the rich". In contrast, Law and Justice stressed its "social" character, pledging policies that would help the poor. The party attacked Civic Platform's flat tax proposal and advocated a much more active role of the state in the economy. Law and Justice also made "an offer to the left", stressing its economically left-wing policies.[57] This pivot led the leader of far-left Samoobrona, Andrzej Lepper, to endorse Lech Kaczyński in the 2005 Polish presidential election, arguing that left-wing voters must vote against the neoliberalism of Civic Platform; Lepper also justified his decision on the basis of Kaczyński's declarations in support of funding social welfare, fighting unemployment and taking a tougher stance towards the European Union.[58]

On foreign policy, PiS is Atlanticist and less supportive of European integration than Civic Platform. The party is soft eurosceptic[59] [60] and opposes a federal Europe, especially the Euro currency. In its campaigns, it emphasises that the European Union should "benefit Poland and not the other way around".[61] It is a member of the anti-federalist European Conservatives and Reformists Party, having previously been a part of the Alliance for Europe of the Nations and, before that, the European People's Party.[62] Although it has some elements of Christian democracy, it is not a Christian democratic party.[63] The party is commonly placed on the right wing to far-right[64] [65] [66] [67] [68] of the political spectrum, although its economic ideology is also classified as left-wing, or left-leaning.

Platform

Economy

The party supports a state-guaranteed minimum social safety net and extensive state intervention in the economy, and argues that a "more socially sensitive and less market-dominated" economic system is necessary. It advocates progressive taxation that would redistribute the wealth from the wealthy to the poor, and it supports a large-scale social housing program. The party promised and implemented tax and welfare benefits to married couples and family. It also adheres to the principles of economic nationalism, postulating state control over key sectors of the economy.[69] It seeks to increase healthcare spending to 6% of the Polish GDP, and nationalize hospital debts.[70] During the 2015 election campaign, it proposed tax rebates related to the number of children in a family, as well as a reduction of the VAT rate (while keeping a variation between individual types of VAT rates). In 2019, the lowest personal income tax threshold was decreased from 18% to 17%.[71]

PiS opposes cutting social welfare spending, and also proposed the introduction of a system of state-guaranteed housing loans. The party also opposes foreign ownership of crucial industries and businesses, and proposed buying back the largest convenience store chain in Poland, Żabka, from its foreign owners.[72] It also supports state provided universal health care.[73] PiS has been also described as statist,[74] [75] [76] protectionist,[77] [78] [79] solidarist,[80] and interventionist.[81] It also holds agrarianist views. Given the redistributive and protectionist agenda of the party as well as its focus on welfare and nationalization, some political scientists classify Law and Justice as economically left-wing.[82] [83] [84] [69] Stephen Park Turner likewise classified it as left-wing.[85] It has also been described as economically left-leaning by the Centre for European Reform,[86] Reuters,[87] and The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics.[88] Political economist Cédric M. Koch wrote that PiS combines "political communitarianism with neo-socialist economic views".[89]

The economic views and policies of Law and Justice derive from the Polish political party Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona) led by Andrzej Lepper. Law and Justice appropriated the economic rhetoric and views of Samoobrona following its complete collapse in the 2007 Polish parliamentary election.[90] Samoobrona is an economically far-left party, much further left than parties of post-communist origin such as the social-democratic Democratic Left Alliance.[91] After Samoobrona and the far-right anti-capitalist League of Polish Families (LPR) formed a coalition with PiS in 2006 in order to prevent the neoliberal Civic Platform from coming to power, Law and Justice managed to claim the voters of both parties by "taking up economically inclusionary discourse from the originally left-wing Self-Defence and outbidding the LPR on cultural conservatism".[89]

Ever since, Law and Justice has been critical of the capitalist transformation in Poland, accusing the 1990s Polish cabinets of 'choosing the wrong path of transformation after the 1989 system change' and leading to 'beneficiaries under such capitalist conditions [having] become undeservedly privileged'.[89] Rakib Ehsan argues that PiS pursues a "brand of ‘red and blue’ politics – social-democratic economics combined with socio-cultural conservatism".[92] Similarly, Polish political scientist Marek M. Kamiński described PiS as "culturally conservative, economically social democratic".[93] Foreign Affairs remarked that the program of PiS "amounts to a very leftist (or, rather, a Catholic socialist) set of economic policies", listing policies such as increasing minimum wage, abolishing short-term job contracts, limiting self-employment contracts abused by employers to avoid benefit payments, decreasing retirement age, increasing family benefits, implementing social payments for large families, and enacting a special tax on foreign banks' assets and foreign big stores.[94]

The party claims to represent the "marginalised vast majority of Poles" who had to bear the costs of capitalist transformation, and states that its main goal is to provide the "common man its fair economic share of societal resources". Law and Justice is highly critical of neoliberalism, describing it as "anti-family" and arguing that neoliberal policies are responsible for social inequality, as well as maximizing profit at the cost of the "ordinary people" and "Catholic values". The party proposes increasing social benefit payments, raising the minimum wage, increasing expenditures on child nutrition and benefits to worse-off families. It also postulates more subsidies and state control of the Polish infrastructure, and expansion of the healthcare and education system. The party also opposes privatization, stating: "We cannot deprive the state of influence and responsibility for the social order, in particular for the weakest social groups whose situation as a result of the transformation has been rapidly deteriorating."[89]

National political structures

PiS has presented a project for constitutional reform including, among others: allowing the president the right to pass laws by decree (when prompted to do so by the Cabinet), a reduction of the number of members of the Sejm and Senat, and removal of constitutional bodies overseeing the media and monetary policy. PiS advocates increased criminal penalties. It postulates aggressive anti-corruption measures (including creation of an Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), open disclosure of the assets of politicians and important public servants), as well as broad and various measures to smooth the working of public institutions.

PiS is a strong supporter of lustration (lustracja), a verification system created ostensibly to combat the influence of the Communist era security apparatus in Polish society. While current lustration laws require the verification of those who serve in public offices, PiS wants to expand the process to include university professors, lawyers, journalists, managers of large companies, and others performing "public functions". Those found to have collaborated with the security service, according to the party, should be forbidden to practice in their professions.

Diplomacy and defence

The party is in favour of strengthening the Polish Army through diminishing bureaucracy and raising military expenditures, especially for modernisation of army equipment. PiS planned to introduce a fully professional army and end conscription by 2012; in August 2008, compulsory military service was abolished in Poland. It is also in favour of participation of Poland in foreign military missions led by the United Nations, NATO and United States, in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.

PiS is eurosceptic,[95] [96] [97] although the party supports integration with the European Union on terms beneficial for Poland. It supports economic integration and tightening cooperation in areas of energy security and military operations, but is sceptical about closer political integration. It is against the formation of a European superstate or federation. PiS is in favour of a strong political and military alliance between Poland and the United States.

In the European Parliament, it is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists, a group founded in 2009 to challenge the prevailing pro-federalist ethos of the European Parliament and address the perceived democratic deficit existing at a European level.

They have frequently expressed anti-German,[98] [99] [100] and anti-Russian stances.[101] [102] [103]

Law and Justice has taken a hardline stance against Russia in its foreign policy since the party's foundation.[104] The party vocally advocated for military aid to Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, but announced it would halt arms transfers in September 2023 following disagreements over the export of Ukrainian grain to Poland.[105] The party has been described as divided between pro-Ukrainian and anti-Ukrainian factions.[106]

Though the PiS government initially advocated a pro-Israel policy, relations with Israel deteriorated following the 2018 Amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance and subsequent diplomatic incidents.[107] In opposition, PiS called for the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador following the World Central Kitchen drone strikes and criticized the 2023 Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip.[108]

The PiS government supported accession of Turkey to the European Union.[109] PiS also advocates for a strong relationship with Hungary under Viktor Orbán, though they diverged over the Russo-Ukrainian War.[110] [111] Law and Justice criticised the Polish government's decision in 2008 to recognise the independence of Kosovo from Serbia.[112]

Social policies

The party's views on social issues are much more traditionalist than those of social conservative parties in other European countries,[113] [114] and its social views reflect those of the Christian right.[115] PiS has been described to hold right-wing populist views.

Family

The party strongly promotes itself as a pro-family party and encourages married couples to have more children. Prior to 2005 elections, it promised to build three million inexpensive housing units as a way to help young couples start a family. Once in government, it passed legislation lengthening parental leaves.

In 2017, the PiS government commenced the so-called "500+" programme under which all parents residing in Poland receive an unconditional monthly payment of 500 PLN for each second and subsequent child (the 500 PLN support for the first child being linked to income). It also revived the idea of a housing programme based on state-supported construction of inexpensive housing units.

Also in 2017, the party's MPs passed a law that bans most retail trade on Sundays on the premise that workers will supposedly spend more time with their families.

Abortion

The party is anti-abortion and supports further restrictions on Poland's abortion laws which are already one of the most restrictive in Europe. PiS opposes abortion resulting from foetal defects[116] which is currently allowed until specific foetal age.

In 2016, PiS supported legislation to ban abortion under all circumstances, and investigate miscarriages. After the black Protests the legislation was withdrawn.[117]

In October 2020, the Constitutional Court ruled that one of three circumstances (foetal defects) is unconstitutional. However, many constitutionalists argue that this judgement is invalid.

The party is against euthanasia and comprehensive sex education. It has proposed a ban of in-vitro fertilisation.

Disability rights

In April 2018, the PiS government announced a PLN 23 billion (EUR 5.5 billion) programme (named "Accessibility+") aimed at reducing barriers for disabled people, to be implemented 2018–2025.[118] [119]

Also in April 2018, parents of disabled adults who required long-term care protested in Sejm over what they considered inadequate state support, in particular, the reduction of support once the child turns 18.[120] [121] As a result, the monthly disability benefit for adults was raised by approx. 15 per cent to PLN 1,000 (approx. EUR 240) and certain non-cash benefits were instituted, although protesters' demands of an additional monthly cash benefit were rejected.

Gay rights

The party opposes the LGBT movement and many of its postulates, in particular same-sex marriages and any other form of legal recognition of same-sex couples. In 2020, Poland was ranked the lowest of any European Union country for LGBT rights by ILGA-Europe.[122] The organisation also highlighted instances of anti-LGBT rhetoric and hate speech by politicians of the ruling party.[123] [124] A 2019 survey by Eurobarometer found that more than two-thirds of LGBT people in Poland believe that prejudice against them has risen in the last five years.[125]

On 21 September 2005, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that "homosexuals should not be isolated, however they should not be school teachers for example. Active homosexuals surely not, in any case", but that homosexuals "should not be discriminated otherwise".[126] He has also stated, "The affirmation of homosexuality will lead to the downfall of civilization. We can't agree to it".[127] Lech Kaczyński, while mayor of Warsaw, refused authorisation for a gay pride march; declaring that it would be obscene and offensive to other people's religious beliefs.[128] He stated, "I am not willing to meet perverts."[129] In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled that the ban of the parade violated Articles 11, 13 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The judgement stated that "The positive obligation of a State to secure genuine and effective respect for freedom of association and assembly was of particular importance to those with unpopular views or belonging to minorities".[130]

In 2016, Beata Szydło's government disbanded the Council for the Prevention of Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance, an advisory body set up in 2011 by then-Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The council monitored, advised and coordinated government action against racism, discrimination and hate crime.[131] [132]

Many local towns, cities,[133] [134] and Voivodeship sejmiks[135] comprising a third of Poland's territory have declared their respective regions as LGBT-free zones with the encouragement of the ruling PiS.[136] [133] Polish President Andrzej Duda, who was the Law and Justice party's candidate for presidency in 2015 and 2020, stated that "LGBT is not people, it's an ideology which is worse than Communism."[137] [138] During his successful 2020 election campaign, he pledged he would ban teaching about LGBT issues in schools;[139] he also proposed changing the constitution to ban LGBT couples from adopting children.[140]

Nationalism

Academic research has characterised Law and Justice as a partially nationalist party, but PiS's leadership rejects this label. Both Kaczyńskis look up for inspirations to the pre-war Sanacja movement with its leader Józef Piłsudski, in contrast to the nationalist Endecja that was led by Piłsudski's political archrival, Roman Dmowski.[141] However, parts of the party, especially the faction around Radio Maryja, are inspired by Dmowski's movement.[142] Polish far-right organisations and parties such as National Revival of Poland, National Movement and Autonomous Nationalists regularly criticise PiS's relative ideological moderation and its politicians for "monopolizing" official political scene by playing on the popular patriotic and religious feelings.[143] [144] [145] However, the party does include several overtly nationalist politicians in senior positions, such as Digital Affairs Minister Adam Andruszkiewicz, the former leader of the All-Polish Youth;[146] and deputy PiS leader and former Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz, the founder of the National-Catholic Movement.[147] It has been also described as national-conservative.[148] [149]

Refugees and economic migrants

PiS opposed the quota system for mass relocation of immigrants proposed by the European Commission to address the 2015 European migrant crisis. This contrasted with the stance of their main political opponents, the Civic Platform, which have signed up to the commission's proposal.[150] Consequently, in the campaign leading to the 2015 Polish parliamentary election, PiS adopted the discourse typical of the populist-right, linking national security with immigration.[151] Following the election, PiS sometimes utilised Islamophobic rhetoric to rally its supporters.[152]

Examples of anti-migration and anti-Islam comments by PiS politicians when discussing the European migrant crisis:[153] in 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński stated that Poland can not accept any refugees because "they could spread infectious diseases."[154] In 2017, the first Deputy Minister of Justice Patryk Jaki stated that "stopping Islamization is his Westerplatte".[155] In 2017, Interior minister of Poland Mariusz Błaszczak stated that he would like to be called "Charles the Hammer who stopped the Muslim invasion of Europe in the 8th century". In 2017, Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Joachim Brudziński stated during the pro-party rally in Siedlce; "if not for us (PiS), they (Muslims) would have built mosques in here (Poland)."[156]

Structure

Internal factions

Law and Justice is divided into many internal factions, but they can be grouped into three main blocs.

The most influential group within PiS is unofficially named "Order of the Centre Agreement". It is led by leader is Jarosław Kaczyński, and its main members are Joachim Brudziński, Adam Lipiński and Mariusz Błaszczak.

The second major group is a radical, religious and hard Eurosceptic right-wing faction focused around Antoni Macierewicz, Beata Szydło that has close views to United Poland party of Zbigniew Ziobro. This faction opts for radical reforms and is supported by Jacek Kurski and Tadeusz Rydzyk.

The third major group is a Christian-democratic, republican and moderate social conservative faction focused around Mateusz Morawiecki, Łukasz Szumowski, Jacek Czaputowicz that has close views to The Republicans party of Adam Bielan. Although not officially a party member, Polish president Andrzej Duda can also be placed in this faction.

Political committee

President:

Vice-presidents:

Treasurer:

Spokesperson:

Party discipline spokesman:

Chairman of the Executive Committee:

President of the Parliamentary Club:

Leadership

No.ImageNameTenure
1.Lech Kaczyński13 June 2001 – 18 January 2003
2.Jarosław Kaczyński18 January 2003
Incumbent

Election results

Presidential

Election yearCandidate1st round2nd round
  1. of overall votes
% of overall vote
  1. of overall votes
% of overall vote
2005Lech Kaczyński4,947,927 33.1 (#2)8,257,468 54.0 (#1)
2010Jarosław Kaczyński6,128,25536.5 (#2)7,919,13447.0 (#2)
2015Andrzej Duda5,179,09234.8 (#1)8,719,28151.5 (#1)
2020Supported Andrzej Duda8,450,51343.5 (#1)10,440,64851.0% (#1)
2025Supported Karol NawrockiTBATBATBATBA

Sejm

ElectionLeaderVotes%Seats+/–Government
2001Lech Kaczyński1,236,787 9.5 (#4)
2005Jarosław Kaczyński3,185,71427.0 (#1) 111
20075,183,47732.1 (#2) 11
20114,295,01629.9 (#2) 9
20155,711,68737.6 (#1) 36
As a part of the United Right coalition, which won 235 seats in total.[157]
20198,051,93543.6 (#1) 6
As a part of the United Right coalition, which won 235 seats in total.
20237,640,854 35.4 (#1) 26
As a part of the United Right coalition, which won 194 seats in total.

Senate

ElectionSeats+/–Majority
2001
As part of the Senate 2001 coalition, which won 15 seats.
2005 49
2007 10
2011 8
2015 30
2019 23
As part of the United Right coalition, which won 48 seats.
2023 9
As part of the United Right coalition, which won 34 seats.

European Parliament

ElectionLeaderVotes%Seats+/–EP Group
2004Jarosław Kaczyński771,85812.67 (#3)UEN
2009Jarosław Kaczyński2,017,60727.40 (#2) 8ECR
2014Jarosław Kaczyński2,246,87031.78 (#2) 0ECR
2019Jarosław Kaczyński6,192,78045.38 (#1) 6ECR
As part of the United Right coalition, that won 27 seats in total.
Jarosław Kaczyński4,253,16936.16 (#2) 3ECR
As part of the United Right coalition, that won 20 seats in total.

Regional assemblies

Election year% of
vote
  1. of
    overall seats won
+/–
200212.1 (#4)
In coalition with Civic Platform as POPiS.
200625.1 (#2) 91
201023.1 (#2) 29
201426.9 (#1) 30
201834.1 (#1) 83
202434.3 (#1) 15

County councils

Election year% of
vote
  1. of
    overall seats won
+/–
200212.1 (#4)
In coalition with Civic Platform as POPiS.
200619.8 (#1) 1194
201017.3 (#2) 157
201423.5 (#1) 429
201830.5 (#1) 600
202430.0 (#1) 34

Mayors

ElectionNo.Change
20022
200677 75
201037 40
2014124 87
2018234 110
2024105 129

Presidents of the Republic of Poland

NameImageFromTo
Lech Kaczyński23 December 200510 April 2010
Andrzej Duda6 August 2015incumbent

Prime Ministers of the Republic of Poland

NameImageFromTo
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz31 October 200514 July 2006
Jarosław Kaczyński14 July 200616 November 2007
Beata Szydło16 November 201511 December 2017
Mateusz Morawiecki11 December 201713 December 2023

Voivodeship Marshals

!Name!Image!Voivodeship!Date vocation
Jarosław StawiarskiLublin Voivodeship21 November 2018
Podkarpackie Voivodeship27 May 2013
Łukasz SmółkaLesser Poland Voivodeship4 July 2024
Renata Janik(Renewal of the Republic of Poland)Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship6 May 2024

See also

General references

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Historia PiS . pl . e-sochaczew.pl . 11 November 2023.
  2. Web site: Hungary far-right party calls for seizing Ukraine's Zakarpattia if Russia wins. Orysia. Hrudka. 28 January 2024. Euromaidan Press.
  3. Web site: PiS nie jest największą partią w Polsce. "Liczy się tylko kartel czterech" . Piotr . Drabik . 1 June 2023 . . pl . "Drugie miejsce należy do Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, które przez 22 lata istnienia mocno ugruntowało się także w terenie. Sekretarz generalny partii Krzysztof Sobolewski przekazał nam, że ugrupowanie rządzące ma ok. 48 tys. członków. - Najwięcej w województwie mazowieckim - dodał. Na pytanie, jak liczebność PiS zmieniła się w ostatnich trzech latach, odpowiedział tylko: - Znacząco wzrosła." . "Second place belongs to Law and Justice, which has also become firmly established on the ground over its 22 years of existence. The party's general secretary Krzysztof Sobolewski told us that the ruling grouping has around 48,000 members. - The largest number in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship," he added. When asked how the size of PiS had changed in the last three years, he replied only: - It has increased significantly.".
  4. Marcin . Fijołek . Republikańska symbolika w logotypie partii politycznej Prawo i Sprawiedliwość . Ekonomia I Nauki Humanistyczne . 19 . 2012 . 9–17 . 10.7862/rz.2012.einh.23 . free .
  5. News: July 21, 2019 . Premier o PiS. "Myśl socjalistyczna również jest dla nas ważna" . pl . . June 6, 2023.
  6. Web site: Turczyn . Andrzej . July 22, 2019 . Mateusz Morawiecki: robotnicza myśl socjalistyczna jest głęboko obecna w filozofii Prawa i Sprawiedliwości . June 24, 2023 . Trybun Broni Palnej . Polish.
  7. Web site: Szeląg . Wojciech . May 24, 2021 . Marek Goliszewski, prezes BCC: Polski Ład wystraszył nawet tych, którzy wspierają PiS . June 24, 2023 . . pl.
  8. Web site: Kołakowska . Agnieszka . October 9, 2019 . In defense of Poland's ruling party . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20191009123343/https://www.politico.eu/article/in-defense-of-poland-ruling-party-law-and-justice-pis/ . October 9, 2019 . June 24, 2023 . Politico.
  9. Web site: Orenstein . Mitchell . July 4, 2018 . Populism with socialist characteristics . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20180704233456/https://jordantimes.com/opinion/mitchell-aorenstein/populism-socialist-characteristics . July 4, 2018 . June 24, 2023 . The Jordan Times.
  10. Bale. Tim. Szczerbiak. Aleks. December 2006. Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland (and why does this matter)?. SEI Working Paper. Sussex European Institute. 91.
  11. News: Santora. Marc. 14 October 2019. In Poland, Nationalism With a Progressive Touch Wins Voters (Published 2019). The New York Times. 20 October 2020.
  12. Book: Nordsieck, Wolfram. Parties and Elections in Europe: Parliamentary Elections and Governments since 1945, European Parliament Elections, Political Orientation and History of Parties. 5 June 2019. BoD – Books on Demand. 9783732292509. en.
    • Licia Cianetti . James Dawson . Seán Hanley . 2018 . Rethinking "democratic backsliding" in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland . East European Politics . 34 . 3 . 243–256 . 10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401 . Over the past decade, a scholarly consensus has emerged that that democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is deteriorating, a trend often subsumed under the label 'backsliding'. ... the new dynamics of backsliding are best illustrated by the one-time democratic front-runners Hungary and Poland. . free.
    • Piotrowski . Grzegorz . 2020 . Civil Society in Illiberal Democracy: The Case of Poland . Politologický časopis – Czech Journal of Political Science . en . XXVII . 2 . 196–214 . 10.5817/PC2020-2-196 . 1211-3247 . 226544116.
    • Sata . Robert . Karolewski . Ireneusz Pawel . 2020 . Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland . East European Politics . 36 . 2 . 206–225 . 10.1080/21599165.2019.1703694 . 213911605 . free. 20.500.14018/13975 . free .
    • Drinóczi . Tímea . Bień-Kacała . Agnieszka . 2019 . Illiberal Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and Poland . German Law Journal . 20 . 8 . 1140–1166 . 10.1017/glj.2019.83 . free.

    Authoritarianism or dictatorship:

    • Book: Ágh . Attila . Declining Democracy in East-Central Europe: The Divide in the EU and Emerging Hard Populism . 2019 . Edward Elgar Publishing . 978-1-78897-473-8 . 175–176 . en.
    • Book: Sadurski . Wojciech . Poland's Constitutional Breakdown . 2019 . Oxford University Press . 978-0-19-884050-3 . 242–266 . en . Illiberal Democracy or Populist Authoritarianism? . 10.1093/oso/9780198840503.003.0009 . none . https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198840503.001.0001/oso-9780198840503-chapter-9.
    • Lendvai-Bainton . Noemi . Szelewa . Dorota . 2020 . Governing new authoritarianism: Populism, nationalism and radical welfare reforms in Hungary and Poland . Social Policy & Administration . 55 . 4 . 559–572 . 10.1111/spol.12642 . free.
    • Fomina . Joanna . Kucharczyk . Jacek . 2016 . Populism and Protest in Poland . Journal of Democracy . 27 . 4 . 58–68 . 10.1353/jod.2016.0062 . 152254870 . The 2015 victory of Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party is an example of the rise of contemporary authoritarian populism... the PiS gained a parliamentary absolute majority; it has since drawn on this majority to dismantle democratic checks and balances. The PiS's policies have led to intensifying xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, and unprecedented polarisation that have engendered deep splits within Polish society and have given rise to social protest movements not seen in Poland since 1989..
    • Markowski . Radoslaw . 2019 . Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015 . Hague Journal on the Rule of Law . en . 11 . 1 . 111–132 . 10.1007/s40803-018-0082-5 . 1876-4053 . 158160832 . free.

    Both:

    • Surowiec . Paweł . Štětka . Václav . 2020 . Introduction: media and illiberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe . East European Politics . 36 . 1 . 1–8 . 10.1080/21599165.2019.1692822 . 212988926 . free.
  13. Web site: Jarosław Kaczyński - życiorys i poglądy . 17 June 2010 . pl . . "Od 2001 roku J. Kaczyński przewodniczył klubowi parlamentarnemu PiS. W 2003 roku został prezesem PiS, zastępując na tej funkcji brata, gdy Lech Kaczyński został prezydentem Warszawy." . "From 2001, J. Kaczyński chaired the Law and Justice parliamentary club. In 2003, he became President of the Law and Justice party, replacing his brother in this position when Lech Kaczyński became Mayor of Warsaw.".
  14. Web site: The 10th anniversary of the Smolensk plane crash . 2024-06-13 . Website of the Republic of Poland . en-GB.
  15. News: 2010-07-04 . Bronislaw Komorowski declared president of Poland . 2024-06-13 . BBC News . en-GB.
  16. Web site: 5 July 2010 . Bronisław Komorowski wins the presidential election in Poland . The official website of the President of the Republic of Poland.
  17. News: Poland Ousts Government as Law & Justice Gains Historic Majority. Bloomberg. 25 October 2015. 25 October 2015.
  18. News: Poland elections: Conservatives secure decisive win. 25 October 2015. 25 October 2015.
  19. Web site: Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt. 9 October 2011 . tvn24.pl.
  20. Karolewski . Ireneusz Paweł . Protest and participation in post-transformation Poland: The case of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (KOD) . Communist and Post-Communist Studies . 2016 . 49 . 3 . 255–267 . 10.1016/j.postcomstud.2016.06.003.
  21. News: 4 July 2018. Chronology: Poland clashes with EU over judicial reforms, rule of law. en. Reuters. 16 July 2020.
  22. Book: Moberg . Andreas . The European Union and the Return of the Nation State: Interdisciplinary European Studies . 2020 . Springer International Publishing . 978-3-030-35005-5 . 59–82 . en . When the Return of the Nation-State Undermines the Rule of Law: Poland, the EU, and Article 7 TEU.
  23. Book: Sadurski . Wojciech . Poland's Constitutional Breakdown . 2019 . Oxford University Press . 978-0-19-884050-3 . en.
  24. Tworzecki . Hubert . Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization . The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science . 2019 . 681 . 1 . 97–119 . 10.1177/0002716218809322. 149662184 . Lacking the two-thirds of majority needed to change the constitution outright, as Hungary’s government had done several years earlier, PiS sought to accomplish the same goal through ordinary legislation. When the Constitutional Tribunal objected, its rulings were ignored until it could be packed with government supporters, some of whom were sworn in by the president—a strong partisan of PiS himself, who made no effort to stand in the government’s way—in a rushed, middle-of-the-night ceremony. The national legislature was likewise turned into a rubber-stamp body through routine side-stepping of parliamentary procedure.. free .
  25. Lendvai-Bainton . Noemi . Szelewa . Dorota . Governing new authoritarianism: Populism, nationalism and radical welfare reforms in Hungary and Poland . Social Policy & Administration . 2020 . 55 . 4 . 559–572 . 10.1111/spol.12642. free .
  26. Book: Zawadzka . Z . Robson . Peter . Schulz . Jennifer L. . Ethnicity, Gender, and Diversity: Law and Justice on TV . Lexington Books . 978-1-4985-7291-0 . 123 . https://books.google.com/books?id=kwKEDwAAQBAJ&q=polish+state+media&pg=PA123 . en . Polish Productions about Polish Problems . 17 December 2018 . On January 7, 2016, the amendment of the Radio and Television Act of December 29, 1992 was signed into law, enabling the conservative government to control the state media..
    Web site: Poland . RSF . . 27 September 2020 . en . Partisan discourse and hate speech are still the rule within state-owned media, which have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces. Their new directors tolerate neither opposition nor neutrality from employees and fire those who refuse to comply.. ; Surowiec . Paweł . Kania-Lundholm . Magdalena . Winiarska-Brodowska . Małgorzata . Towards illiberal conditioning? New politics of media regulations in Poland (2015–2018) . East European Politics . 2020 . 36 . 1 . 27–43 . 10.1080/21599165.2019.1608826. 164430720 .
  27. Piotrowski . Grzegorz . Civil Society in Illiberal Democracy: The Case of Poland . Politologický časopis – Czech Journal of Political Science . 2020 . XXVII . 2 . 196–214 . 10.5817/PC2020-2-196 . 226544116 . en . 1211-3247.
  28. Sata . Robert . Karolewski . Ireneusz Pawel . Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland . East European Politics . 2020 . 36 . 2 . 206–225 . 10.1080/21599165.2019.1703694. 213911605 . free . 20.500.14018/13975 . free .
  29. Book: Ágh . Attila . Declining Democracy in East-Central Europe: The Divide in the EU and Emerging Hard Populism . 2019 . Edward Elgar Publishing . 978-1-78897-473-8 . 175–176 . en.
  30. News: Barteczko. Agnieszka. Krajewski. Adrian. Outright majority for Polish eurosceptics hangs in balance. 26 October 2015 . Reuters. 2022-10-03.
  31. Web site: 15 October 2023 . Opposition wins Polish election, according to exit poll . 15 October 2023 . POLITICO . 15 October 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20231015191532/https://www.politico.eu/article/opposition-wins-polish-election-according-to-exit-poll-poland-kaczynski-duda-tusk-election-rule-of-law/ . live.
  32. Web site: Picheta . Rob . 15 October 2023 . Poland's opposition has path to oust populist ruling party, exit poll shows . 15 October 2023 . CNN . 15 October 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20231015152206/https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/15/europe/poland-election-voting-intl/index.html . live.
  33. Web site: Cienski . Jan . 2023-11-27 . Poland's zombie government shuffles into being . 2023-12-11 . POLITICO . en.
  34. Web site: Easton, Adam . 10 November 2023 . Poland's Tusk-led pro-EU opposition signs deal and waits to govern . 10 November 2023 . BBC.
  35. Web site: Prezydent powoła "rząd dwutygodniowy" . 2023-11-27 . wyborcza.pl . pl.
  36. http://www.thenews.pl/national/?id=143599 Law and Justice breakaway politicians form new 'association'
  37. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/22/conservatives-eu-alliance-michal-kaminski Conservatives' EU alliance in turmoil as Michał Kamiński leaves 'far right' party
  38. News: Opposition party Law and Justice expels critics . . 4 November 2011 . 6 November 2011.
  39. News: Conservative MPs form 'Poland United' breakaway group after dismissals . TheNews.pl . 8 November 2011 . 31 May 2012.
  40. News: MPs axed by Law and Justice opposition . TheNews.pl . 15 November 2011 . 31 May 2012.
  41. News: New Polish conservative party launched . TheNews.pl . 26 March 2012 . 31 May 2012.
  42. Myant et al. (2008), p. 3
  43. Frank Jacobs, "Zombie Borders", The New York Times Opinionator blog, 12 December 2011
  44. Jungerstam-Mulders (2006), p. 104
  45. Jungerstam-Mulders (2006), p. 103
  46. Book: Democratic Systems and Populist Challenges in Europe . Work Package 5 – Deliverable 4 . 2021 . Ben . Crum . Alvaro . Oleart . Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam . 46–47.
  47. Which conservatism? The identity of the Polish Law and Justice party . Adam . Folvarčný . Lubomír . Kopeček . Politics in Central Europe . 1801-3422 . 16 . 1 . 10.2478/pce-2020-0008 . 2020 . 180.
  48. Web site: Poland: Country Assessment . April 2002 . . United Kingdom: Home Office . 7 .
  49. Book: Populismus: Populisten in Übersee und Europa . 30 April 2003 . 978-3-663-11110-8 . Nikolaus Werz .

    de:Nikolaus Werz

    . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften Wiesbaden . 1 . Analysen . 79 . 165–166.
  50. Web site: Poland digs in against tide toward secularism . 23 May 2006 . Chicago Tribune.
  51. Lewis . Paul G. . 2010 . Poland: domestic discord makes for a problematic partner . In: Carbone, Maurizio ed. National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty. . Cheltenham . Edward Elgar . 108–125 .
  52. Book: Partie i ugrupowania parlamentarne III Rzeczypospolitej . 978-83-89706-84-3 . Krzysztof Kowalczyk . Jerzy Sielski . 2006 . Dom Wydawniczy DUET . 229–230 . pl.
  53. Book: Discourse, Hegemony, and Populism in the Visegrád Four . Seongcheol Kim . Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy . Routledge . 2022 . 978-1-003-18600-7 . 213–214.
  54. Book: Tiersky, Ronald . Europe Today: a Twenty-first Century Introduction . Jones, Erik . 2007 . Rowman & Littlefield . Lanham . 978-0-7425-5501-3 . registration . 392 .
  55. Myant et al. (2008), pp. 67–68
  56. Electoral Studies . 26 . 2007 . The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland . Frances . Millard . University of Essex . Colchester . 213. 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.03.001 .
  57. Web site: SLD nie poparł nikogo, Samoobrona za Kaczyńskim . 18 October 2005 . pl . lewica.pl . Grzegorz . Ilnicki.
  58. Myant et al. (2008), p. 88
  59. Book: Szczerbiak, Aleks . Opposing Europe? . Taggart, Paul A. . 2008 . Oxford University Press . Oxford . 978-0-19-925830-7 . 224 .
  60. Maier et al. (2006), p. 374
  61. Jungerstam-Mulders (2006), p. 100
  62. Web site: Chrześcijańska demokracja w Polsce. Sozańska. Dominika. Krakow Academy. core.ac.uk. Polish.
  63. https://www.dw.com/en/polish-media-conflict-pits-government-against-far-right/a-67884162 Polish media conflict pits government against far right Jacek Lepiarz 01/03/2024
  64. https://www.tuc.org.uk/TheRiseoftheFarRight?page=4 The rise of the far right- building a trade union response
  65. https://www.dw.com/en/polish-media-conflict-pits-government-against-far-right/a-67884162 Polish media conflict pits government against far right by Jacek Lepiarz 01/03/2024
  66. https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Routledge_Handbook_of_Far_Right_Extr/UMnOEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Europe+is+now+seeing+conservative+parties+that+have+transformed+into+far-right+parties&pg=PA1997&printsec=frontcover The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe, 2023, Editors: Katherine Kondor, Mark Littler
  67. https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Routledge_Handbook_of_Political_Part/lJ_8EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Far+right+parties+were+by+and+large+marginalised+and+discredited+in+Europe++in+the+aftermath+of+the+Second+World+War&pg=PA126&printsec=frontcover The Routledge Handbook of Political Parties 2023, Editors: Gyda M. Sindre, Neil Carter, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Daniel Keith, P.126
  68. Pariahs or Partners? Patterns of Government Formation with Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-2020 . 2023 . Bielefeld . Verlag . Oliver . Kossack . 10.14361/9783839467152 . 153 . Reihe Edition Politik . Edition Politik . 132 . 978-3-8376-6715-8 . "In socio-economic terms, PiS positioned itself on the left. The party advocated progressive taxation, a large-scale social housing programme, and it promised tax and welfare benefits to married couples and (traditional) families. The party generally favoured a private economy, but it also wanted to keep key sectors under state control (Millard 2010, 131–33).".
  69. Book: Partie i ugrupowania parlamentarne III Rzeczypospolitej . 978-83-89706-84-3 . Krzysztof Kowalczyk . Jerzy Sielski . 2006 . Dom Wydawniczy DUET . 222 . Toruń . pl.
  70. Web site: Favourable tax changes included in the Polish Deal – the Prime Minister took part in a videoconference with entrepreneurs - The Chancellery of the Prime Minister - Gov.pl website. 2021-11-10. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. en-GB.
  71. Web site: Poland could "buy back" biggest convenience store chain from foreign owners, says Kaczyński . 13 October 2022 . Daniel . Tilles . Notes from Poland.
  72. Web site: PiS wygrywa: koniec NFZ, system budżetowy i sieć szpitali? – Polityka zdrowotna. 25 October 2015 . www.rynekzdrowia.pl.
  73. Web site: Wyborcza.pl. wyborcza.pl.
  74. Web site: Petru: Muzealny etatyzm PiS. www.rp.pl.
  75. Web site: Ziemkiewicz krytykuje PiS za etatyzm. Radosław. Kowalski. 20 November 2015. Nasze Miasto.
  76. Web site: Program działań Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Tworzenie szans dla wszystkich. Instytut Sobieskiego. 14 February 2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20160221152745/http://www.sobieski.org.pl/tworzenie-szans-dla-wszystkich/. 21 February 2016. dead.
  77. Web site: Dossier: What PiS would change in the economy . PI Research . Polityka Insight . October 2015 . 14 August 2018.
  78. Web site: Poland's tilt to nationalism is bad for investment. https://web.archive.org/web/20151027144626/http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2015/10/26/polands-tilt-to-nationalism-is-bad-for-investment/. dead. 27 October 2015. Dominic. Elliott. 26 October 2015.
  79. Web site: Marcinkiewicz: Program PiS to przywrócenie solidaryzmu, także w służbie zdrowia. Plus Biznesu. pb.pl. 6 October 2005.
  80. Web site: To łączy rządy PiS z polityką Herberta Hoovera i Franklina D. Roosevelta. 6 December 2016. Business Insider. businessinsider.com.pl. Polish.
  81. Progressive proposals for the turbulent times: How to boost the political, organizational and electoral potential . Andreas . Schieder . László . Andor . Maria . Maltschnig . Ania . Skrzypek . 978-2-930769-78-3 . Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Karl-Renner-Institut . 2022 . Next Left . 13 . 56 . "... following the Polish Law and Justice party, favouring an economically left-wing agenda." .
  82. Queer(in)g Poland in the 21st Century: How Was It at the Beginning of the Millennium? Introduction to This Special Issue on Queer Culture and the LGBTQ+ Movement in Poland . Urszula . Chowaniec . Ewa . Mazierska . Richard . Mole . 1 June 2021 . 19 . Central Europe . 1 . 10.1080/14790963.2021.1920131 . Taylor & Francis . "... Jarosław Kaczynski’s party won the parliamentary election with his party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Peace and Justice), which was economically left-wing, but socially on the right: a mixture which has ensured its continuing political success." . 5.
  83. Authoritarian Populism Index . April 2024 . Andreas Johansson . Heinö .

    sv:Andreas Johansson Heinö

    . Timbro . European Policy Information Center . "Over its eight years in power, PiS eroded democratic structures in Poland. Additionally, the party has articulated a clear nationalism and adopted staunchly conservative positions on various social issues such as LGBTQ rights and abortion rights. In economic policy, the party has positioned itself slightly left of center, consistently investing in welfare, social transfers, and the like." . 247.
  84. Book: The SAGE Handbook of Political Sociology . William . Outhwaite . Stephen . Turner . Stephen Park Turner . "And this makes sense, given that many such parties (e.g. the National Front in France, the Law and Justice Party in Poland) offer platforms combining socially conservative policies on crime and immigration with economically leftist policies on trade and welfare." . 112 . 1 . 978-1-4739-1946-4 . SAGE Publications . 2023.
  85. Web site: Four Questions on the Polish Parliamentary Elections . Agata . Gostyńska-Jakubowska . 10 October 2019 . . "All polling suggests that the current governing party – the socially conservative and economically left-leaning Law and Justice (PiS) party – will remain the largest political bloc.".
  86. Web site: Polish parliament rejects near-total abortion ban after protests . 6 October 2016 . Paweł . Sobczak . Marcin . Goettig . . "Since winning a parliamentary majority last October, the economically left-leaning PiS has appeared firmly in control, thanks to a mix of generous welfare payouts, promises to help poorer Poles and nationalist rhetoric laced with Catholic piety.".
  87. Book: The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics . Adam . Fagan . Petr . Kopecký . 2018 . "The weakening of ex-communist parties in Hungary and Poland coincided with the rise of economically left-leaning but socially conservative parties - Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS), respectively." . 2017 . Routledge . 9780367500092 . 1st.
  88. Varieties of populism and the challenges to Global Constitutionalism: Dangers, promises and implications . Cédric M. . Koch . Global Constitutionalism . 10 . 3 . 2021 . Cambridge University Press . 415–418. 10.1017/S2045381719000455 .
  89. Book: Cienski, Jan . Start-Up Poland: The People Who Transformed an Economy . The University of Chicago Press . Chicago and London . 2018 . 978-0-226-30695-7 . 10.7208/chicago/9780226306957.001.0001 . 54.
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