Land Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo explained

Unit Name:Congolese Army
Native Name:Forces Terrestres
Start Date:1961
Branch:Army
Role:Land warfare
Size:~144,000 troops
Garrison:Kinshasa
Garrison Label:Headquarters
Colors:Blue
Battles:
Commander1:General Fall Sikabwe Asinda
Commander1 Label:FARDC chief of land forces

The Land Forces (French: Forces Terrestres), also called the Congolese Army, are the land warfare component and the largest branch of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).

The current Congolese army has its origins in the Force Publique that was active in the Belgian Congo, which was renamed the Congolese National Army (Armée nationale congolaise, ANC) when the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960. During the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, it was renamed the Armed Forces of Zaire (Forces Armées Zaïroises, FAZ) in 1971 with the country's name change from Congo to Zaire. Under Mobutu's leadership the FAZ was used to put down various rebellions but was deliberately kept weak to prevent any possible coup, resulting in its collapse in the face of Laurent Kabila's AFDL rebel movement during the First Congo War (1996–1997). After Kabila's overthrow of Mobutu the former FAZ troops and various rebels that supported him were in no condition to fight the invasion by Rwandan-backed militant groups during the Second Congo War (1998–2003) and largely collapsed.

The peace agreement signed in 2002 initiated the process of uniting former rebel groups in a national army, the Forces du Terrestres of the FARDC, reorganizing them into multiple brigades. Although some progress has been made the army remains hampered by corruption as well as low and infrequent pay, which led to Land Forces troops committing numerous crimes against civilians. Since the end of the Second Congo War the army remains engaged with dozens of armed rebel groups throughout the country, most notably in the eastern province of North Kivu, near the border with Rwanda. There have also been multiple border clashes between Congolese troops and the Rwandan Army.

History

The land forces are made up of about 14 integrated brigades, of fighters from all the former warring factions which have gone through an brassage integration process (see next paragraph), and a not-publicly known number of non-integrated brigades which remain solely made up from single factions (the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)'s Armee National Congolaise, the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the ex-RCD KML, the ex-Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the armed groups of the Ituri conflict (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri (FRPI) and the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI)) and the Mai-Mai).

It appears that about the same time that Presidential Decree 03/042 of 18 December 2003 established the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), '..all ex-combatants were officially declared as FARDC soldiers and the then FARDC brigades [were to] rest deployed until the order to leave for brassage.[1]

The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the brassage process as its first of three stages.[2] The process consists firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they are sent to orientation centres, run by CONADER, where fighters take the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who choose demobilization receive an initial cash payment of US $110. Those who choose to stay within the FARDC are then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course, which aims to build integrated formations out of factional fighters previously heavily divided along ethnic, political and regional lines. The centres are spread out around the country at Kitona, Kamina, Kisangani, Rumangabo and Nyaleke (within the Virunga National Park) in Nord-Kivu, and Luberizi (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process has suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated. Following the first 18 integrated brigades, the second goal is the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010 when MONUC is anticipated to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.

In February 2008, the current reform plan was described as:[3]

"The short term, 2008–2010, will see the setting in place of a Rapid Reaction Force; the medium term, 2008–2015, with a Covering Force; and finally the long term, 2015–2020, with a Principal Defence Force." He added that the reform plan rests on a programme of synergy based on the four pillars of dissuasion, production, reconstruction and excellence. "The Rapid Reaction Force is expected to focus on dissuasion, through a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions, capable of aiding MONUC to secure the east of the country and to realise constitutional missions," Defence Minister Chikez Diemu said.

Amid the other difficulties in building new armed forces for the DRC, in early 2007 the integration and training process was distorted as the DRC government under Kabila attempted to use it to gain more control over the dissident general Laurent Nkunda. A hastily negotiated verbal agreement in Rwanda saw three government FAC brigades integrated with Nkunda's former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades in what was called mixage. Mixage brought multiple factions into composite brigades, but without the 45-day retraining provided by brassage, and it seems that actually, the process was limited to exchanging battalions between the FAC and Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. Due to Nkunda's troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively gained control of all five brigades - not what the DRC central government had been hoping![4] However, after Nkunda used the mixage brigades to fight the FDLR, strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that 'by 30 August [2007] Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories' (of North Kivu).[5]

Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes[6] and these human rights violations are "regularly" committed by both officers and members of the rank and file. Members of the Army also often strike deals to gain access to resources with the militias they are meant to be fighting.[7]

The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops.[8] The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic."[9] A 2007 disarmament and repatriation study said "army units that have not yet gone through the process of brassage are usually much smaller than what they ought to be. Some non-integrated brigades have only 500 men (and are thus nothing more than a small battalion) whereas some battalions may not even have the size of a normal company (over 100 men)."[10]

In 2015, three hundred FARDC special forces troops were deployed in northern Katanga to prevent inter-ethnic violence between Mbuti and Bantu locals.[11]

Organization

Original structure

See also U.S. State Department, 07KINSHASA452 Congolese Military Proposes Redeployment, Renaming Of Integrated Brigades, 19 April 2007. Like the Force Publique in the Congo Free State, FARDC brigades have been deploying to their areas of operation with their families in tow. 2nd Commando Battalion of the Belgian Paracommando Brigade trained one of the first integrated brigades from January to June 2004.[12] As of 13 September 2006, the Government had established 13 out of the 18 integrated brigades it had planned to create before the elections. (S/2006/759, 21 September 2006, 12) A fourteenth brigade was created by March 2007. (S/2007/156, 20 March 2007, 7)

Updates in 2014

In September 2014, President Kabila reshuffled the command structure and in addition to military regions created three new 'defense zones' which would be subordinated directly to the general staff. The defense zones essentially created a new layer between the general staff and the provincial commanders. The military regions themselves were reorganized and do not correspond with the ones that existed prior to the reshuffle.[38] A Congolese military analyst based in Brussels, Jean-Jacques Wondo, provided an outline of the updated command structure of the FARDC following the shake up of the high command:[39] [40]

Chiefs of staff

Several known officers held the post of chief of land forces staff.

Foreign assistance

A number of outside donor countries are also carrying out separate training programmes for various parts of the Forces du Terrestres (Land Forces). The People's Republic of China has trained Congolese troops at Kamina in Katanga from at least 2004 to 2009,[43] and the Belgian government is training at least one 'rapid reaction' battalion.

When Kabila visited U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington D.C., he also asked the U.S. Government to train a battalion, and as a result, a private contractor, Protection Strategies Incorporated, started training a FARDC light infantry battalion at Camp Base, Kisangani, in February 2010.[44] The unit of 750 Congolese soldiers would become known as the 391st Commando Battalion. The company was supervised by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. The battalion was trained in small unit tactics, communications, medical care, and food production to sustain itself.[45]

However, in 2013, during the M23 rebel advance in eastern Congo, several members of the 391st Commando Battalion were found to have committed mass rape against civilian women fleeing from the warzone, and other atrocities.[46] [47]

Republican Guard

See main article: Republican Guard (Democratic Republic of the Congo). In addition to the other land forces, there is a Republican Guard presidential force, formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but the Head of State.[48] Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005, President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and 'repealed any previous provisions contrary' to that decree. The GR is more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000–15,000 in January 2007), and has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies nearby their bases.

In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, then President Joseph Kabila deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit.[49] At the end of 2005, there were Guards deployed in Mbandaka, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kolwezi, staying many months after the President had left. They are still deployed at Kisangani's Bangoka airport, where they appear to answer to no local commander and have caused trouble with MONUC troops there.

The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but as of January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as being integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.[50]

Equipment

See main article: List of equipment of the Land Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past. The IISS's Military Balance 2007 and Orbat.com's Concise World Armies 2005 give only slightly differing figures however (the figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2007). Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.[51]

100 field guns, ranging from M116 howitzer 75 mm to Type 59 130 mm, and 30 Type 81 MRL

In addition to these 2007 figures, In March 2010, it was reported that the DRC's land forces had ordered US$80 million worth of military equipment from Ukraine which included 20 T-72 main battle tanks, 100 trucks and various small arms.[52] [53] 20 x T-72 have been reported by World Defence Almanac. Tanks have been used in the Kivus in the 2005-9 period.

In February 2014, Ukraine revealed that it had achieved the first export order for the T-64 tank to the DRC Land Forces for 50 T-64BV-1s.[54]

Rank insignia

See main article: Military ranks of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Other forces active in the country

United Nations

There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) had a strength of over 19,000 peacekeepers (including 16,998 military personnel) and has a mission of assisting Congolese authorities maintain security.[55] The UN and foreign military aid missions, the most prominent being EUSEC RD Congo,[56] are attempting to assist the Congolese in rebuilding the armed forces, with major efforts being made in trying to assure regular payment of salaries to armed forces personnel and also in military justice. Retired Canadian Lieutenant General Marc Caron also served for a time as Security Sector Reform advisor to the head of MONUC.[57]

Non and Anti-government Forces

Groups of anti-Rwandan government rebels like the FDLR, and other foreign fighters remain inside the DRC.[58] The FDLR which is the greatest concern, was some 6,000 strong, as of July 2007. By late 2010 the FDLR's strength however was estimated at 2,500.[59]

The other groups are smaller: the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces in the remote area of Mt Rwenzori, and the Burundian Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu—Forces Nationales de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL).

Government Paramilitaries

Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities.[60] There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, says National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children. Obligatory civil service administered through the armed forces was also proposed under the Mobutu regime during the 'radicalisation' programme of December 1974-January 1975; the FAZ was opposed to the measure and the plan 'took several months to die.'[61]

Notes and References

  1. Garrett . Nicholas . Sergiou . Sylvia . Koen Vlassenroot . 2008 . Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo . Journal of Eastern African Studies . Taylor and Francis . 3 . 1 . 9 . 1753-1063 . 10.1080/17531050802682671. 154957722 .
  2. [International Crisis Group]
  3. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/dr_congo.php Retrieved 1 November 2008
  4. Henri Boshoff, The DDR Process in the DRC: a never-ending story, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 July 2007
  5. International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p.13
  6. [Amnesty International]
  7. Autesserre. Séverine. 2008. The Trouble With Congo. Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations. New York. 87. 3. 104–105.
  8. Web site: monuc.org: FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC ::: 20/03/2006 . Monuc.org . 29 September 2008 . https://web.archive.org/web/20071013074649/http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=10375 . 2007-10-13 . live .
  9. News: Only just staying in one piece . The Economist . 42 . 28 July 2007 . 4 August 2007 .
  10. Hans Romkena De Vennhoop Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the DRC, Multi Country Demobilization and Recovery Program, April 2007, p.32
  11. http://virungamountains.blogspot.com/2015/05/special-forces-of-congo-fardc-deployed.html Special Forces of the Congo (FARDC) Deployed in Northern Katanga
  12. http://www.cdomuseum.be/FRANCAIS/12_fr.htm 12_fr.htm
  13. Clement, SSR in the DRC, SSR in Challenging Environments, DCAF, 2009, 92.
  14. MONUC Human Rights report April 2007, paragraph 31 and MONUC via Le Potential Violation des droits de l’homme en RDC: état des lieux de la Monuc, 10 August 2007
  15. [MONUC]
  16. http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=44469 MONUC Human Rights Report via Le Potentiel
  17. MONUC's Nineteenth Report (S/2005/603) dated 26 September 2005, 7
  18. http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=15423 MONUC Human Rights Report July 2007
  19. Quoted from MONUC 21st Report, S/2006/390, 13 June 2006, 9. See also U.S. State Department, 06KINSHASA178, FARDC Second Brigade To Move To North Kivu 2 February 2006
  20. 'Au cours du mois d'avril 2007, des soldats FARDC de la 6ème Brigade Intégrée basée à Jiba -60 km au Nord-Est de Bunia, Ituri-, ont été responsables de 14 cas de viol et de plusieurs cas de mauvais traitements à l'égard de la population locale.' MONUC via Le Potentiel (Kinshasa), Congo-Kinshasa: Violation des droits de l'homme en RDC, 22 June 2007
  21. International Crisis Group, Congo:Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007, p.12
  22. Web site: (French). Retrieved July 2009 . 2013-11-15 . https://web.archive.org/web/20150611021006/http://www.burundi-agnews.info/agnews03032006.htm . 2015-06-11 . live .
  23. Web site: Les Dépęches . Lepotentiel.com . 29 September 2008 . https://web.archive.org/web/20070930155512/http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=33347 . 2007-09-30 . live .
  24. MONUC, Droits de l'Homme: Rapport Mensuel - Mai 2007, paragraph 22
  25. Societecivile.cd, Imminence d'une mutinerie à Luberizi, à l'Est de la RD Congo, dans la Province du Sud Kivu, 23 May 2007
  26. 06KINSHASA1260, 10 August 2006, and Turner, 2007, 139.
  27. [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs]
  28. MONUC via Congo Tribune, Web site: Violation des droits de l'homme en RDC : état des lieux de la Monuc . 2007-08-31 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20070928121554/http://www.congotribune.com/nationale/article.php?article=1802 . 2007-09-28 .
  29. MONUC, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=15189
  30. MONUC, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=14799, paragraph 25
  31. 'Central Africa: A slow road to travel,' Africa Confidential, 11 January 2008, Vol. 49, No.1, p.9
  32. Book: Human Rights Watch. Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human Rights Watch. New York. 2009. 978-1-56432-510-5. 2016-12-04. https://web.archive.org/web/20170623014506/https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0709web.pdf. 2017-06-23. live. . See also U.S. State Department, 08KINSHASA441 : The FARDC 14th Brigade: A Burden to Kabare Residents, 19 May 2008
  33. [MONUC]
  34. See also on 12th and 13th Battalions of 17th Brigade - Congo-Kinshasa: Second Monuc Training Session of FARDC Integrated Brigades Ends(06:Feb'08)
  35. Radio Okapi May 2009, "Nindja : attaques des FDLR, 2 officiers FARDC tués et un disparu"
  36. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-7HW5HT?OpenDocument Reliefweb
  37. Le Potential, Congo-Kinshasa: Rapport de la Monuc pour avril 2007, graves violations des droits de l'homme en RDC via Allafrica.com, 21 May 2007. There is an ambiguous reference to the 'eleventh and twelfth brigades' in the ICG's 31 October 2007 report, 'Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Appendix C, page 25, indicating that these two formations may have been principally raised from the all-Hutu Local Defence Force in North Kivu, revived by Governor Eugene Serufuli, probably during the 2000–2002 period.
  38. https://suluhu.org/2014/09/28/reshuffle-in-the-congolese-army-cui-bono/ Reshuffle in the Congolese army – cui bono?
  39. https://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/27092014-wondo-fardc-reshuffle.png Commanders of defense zones and military zones as of September 2014
  40. Web site: List of general officers appointed to the heads of military units . 2018-03-04 . https://web.archive.org/web/20150110051018/http://ethuin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/20140919_la_liste_des_officiers_gc3a9nc3a9raux_et_supc3a9rieu-rs-nommc3a9s-c3a0-la-tc3aate-des-grandes-unitc3a9s-militaires-forum_des_as_pp-913.pdf . 2015-01-10 . live .
  41. http://gga.org/stories/editions/aif-30-broken-ranks/rogue-army-for-a-fragile-state Rogue army for a failed state
  42. http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/103659 Joseph Kabila meets with security council
  43. See Africa Confidential, 'A multinational road to army reform,' 24 July 2009, p.9, and Reuters, 'Factbox: International efforts at military reform in Congo,' 23 December 2009.
  44. Web site: U.S. Africa Command Home . 2010-08-03 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20110226030732/http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4032&lang=0 . 2011-02-26 . and Protection Strategies Incorporated What's New . Retrieved 3 August 2010. For Kabila request to Bush, see Web site: Cable Viewer . 2011-09-03 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20120318200313/http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/02/10KINSHASA31.html . 2012-03-18 . .
  45. Holland, James (25 January 2017). 750 Congolese Soldiers Graduate from U.S.-led Military Training, Form Light Infantry Battalion . US Army Africa website. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
  46. Orth, Rick (23 May 2013). Stars and Stripes Op-ed: More U.S. can do to reform Congolese military . Enough Project. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
  47. Whitlock, Craig (23 May 2013). U.S.-trained Congolese troops committed rapes and other atrocities, U.N. says . Washington Post. Retrieved 14 December 2014.
  48. [Amnesty International]
  49. ICG February 2006 SSR report
  50. 'Sortie officielle du premier bataillon integre de la Garde Republicaine des FARDC', Xinhua News Agency, 15 September 2006, cited in Amnesty International DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  51. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 291.
  52. https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j39S49Dfrar8U8VBeazKBr8IZbSA AFP: Ukraine to supply tanks, other weapons to DR.Congo
  53. http://news.kievukraine.info/2010/03/ukraine-to-supply-tanks-other-weapons.html KUNB: Ukraine To Supply Tanks, Other Weapons To DR Congo
  54. http://www.armyrecognition.com/february_2014_global_defense_security_news_uk/ukraine_to_supply_a_total_of_50_t-64bv1_main_battle_tanks_to_democratic_republic_of_congo_1302143.html Ukraine to supply a total of 50 T-64BV1 main battle tanks to Democratic Republic of Congo
  55. Web site: MONUSCO Facts and Figures - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo . un.org . 16 October 2011 . https://web.archive.org/web/20111015002326/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml . 2011-10-15 . live .
  56. Web site: EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo . 12 August 2007 . The Council of the European Union.
  57. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, website
  58. [International Crisis Group]
  59. MONUSCO, Over 1800 FDLR armed rebels surrender to MONUSCO in 2010, 3 February 2011
  60. Jacques Ebenga & Thierry N'LanduThe Congolese National Army: In search of an identity, Evolutions and Revolutions, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005
  61. Crawford and Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairiean State, 1985, p.359-360

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