Kurdish–Turkish relations explained

Kurdish–Turkish relations covers the historical relations between Kurds and Turks.

Seljuk Empire

Relations began when Alp Arslan was seeking to pass through Kurdistan in order to conquer Anatolia. Kurds were already Muslim majority, and were a buffer between the Muslim Middle East and the Christian Anatolia and South Caucasus. While preparing for the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, Alp Arslan earned the trust of powerful Kurdish principalities and tribes, and Kurds played a vital role during the Battle of Manzikert, which was as important to Kurds as it was to Turks.[1] The Seljuks under Ahmad Sanjar annexed the many Kurdish principalities, and united them into one large Seljuk province called Kurdistan around 1150, which included Ecbatana (Hamadan), Sinjar, Shahrazur, Dinavar, and Kermanshah.[2]

Ayyubid Sultanate

The Ayyubid dynasty was founded by Shirkuh, a Kurdish retainer of the Zengid prince Nur al-Din. Shirkuh was succeeded by his nephew Saladin. Under Saladin, the Ayyubids fought and defeated the Zengids. They also took control of Damascus, Baalbek, and Homs. Gökböri was the commander of the right wing of the Zengid army, and he broke the Ayyubid left wing before being defeated by Saladin's personal guards. Gökböri switched to the Ayyubid army when it was obvious that the Zengids were going to be defeated.

Ottoman Empire (1299–1922)

The Safavids had control of Eastern Anatolia and had severely persecuted Kurds for being Sunni, which led to Selim I launching a campaign to annex Kurdish lands from the Safavids. Kurds were staunch allies of the Ottomans during the Battle of Chaldiran. The Kurdish forces also played a big role in taking Diyarbakır.[3] The Kurds were known as the "Black Nation" while Oghuz Turks were known as the "Grey Nation".[4] After the Ottomans won Eastern Anatolia, Selim I rewarded the Kurds with tax and military exemptions when needed, as well as semi-autonomous status, which was protected and recognized by the Ottomans. The autonomy lasted from 1514 until the mid-1800s.[5] [6] During 1829–1830, Mahmud II launched reforms which were so nationalistic they inspired the ideology of the Turkish National Movement.[7] There were Kurdish revolts against the Ottomans, however they were not nationalistically motivated and were only against certain state policies.[8] The vast majority of Kurds remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire largely until the Young Turk Revolution, where the Young Turks began enforcing Turkish nationalism, which sparked some ethnically motivated Kurdish revolts, however the revolts were unsuccessful as they were small, poorly coordinated, and did not enjoy much support from Kurds.[9] [10] Abdul Hamid II was a Pan-Islamist who did not differentiate between ethnicities, and with Kurds mostly being Muslims, he was among the most pro-Kurdish of the Ottoman sultans, and in turn he was very loved by Kurds.[11] [12] Kurds also formed the majority of the Hamidiye cavalry.[13] Turks in Anatolia were introduced to nationalism much earlier, while Kurds in Kurdistan were either unaware of it, unable to understand it, or refused to accept it. The rise of nationalism among Turks did influence some Kurds living in Anatolian cities such as Istanbul to form Kurdish nationalism, although it did not gain any support in Kurdistan.[14] Kurds fought for Turks during World War I and remained alongside them after it as well.[15]

Republic of Turkey (1923–present)

Their relations had already began turning negative towards the end of the Ottoman Empire due to İttihadism. After the Ottoman Empire was defeated and the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, the Turkish National Movement revolted against the treaty and fought to recapture lands taken by Western powers. The Kingdom of Kurdistan declared independence from British Iraq and actively supported the Turkish National Movement.[16] Although the Treaty of Sèvres included the creation of a Kurdish state, the vast majority of Kurds rejected it and chose to fight alongside the Turkish National Movement, with the belief that they were fighting to save the caliphate from infidels.[17]

Notes and References

  1. Kürt-Türk İliskilerinde Merkezî İktidar İstisnai, Yerel Yönetimler İse Kuraldır, Ali Fırat. GEÇMİŞTEN GÜNÜMÜZE KÜRT- TÜRK İLİŞKİLERİ, Issue 31, page 7
  2. Web site: Who Are the Kurds? . 2024-04-16 . Institutkurde.org . en.
  3. Book: Özoğlu, Hakan . Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries . 2004-02-12 . SUNY Press . 978-0-7914-5993-5 . 47–49 . en.
  4. Web site: 2009-11-18 . Burada bizden önce kimler vardı? . 2024-04-14 . Milliyet . tr.
  5. A Modern History of the Kurds - McDowall, David p.28
  6. Book: Klein, Janet . The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone . 2011-05-31 . Stanford University Press . 978-0-8047-7570-0 . 55 . en.
  7. Book: Karpat, H. Kemal . Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System . 1959 . Princeton University Press . 978-0-691-62623-9 . en.
  8. Laçiner . Bal . Bal, Ihsan . 2004 . The Ideological And Historical Roots Of Kurdist Movements In Turkey: Ethnicity Demography, Politics . dead . Nationalism and Ethnic Politics . 10 . 3 . 473–504 . 10.1080/13537110490518282 . 144607707 . https://web.archive.org/web/20071011225529/http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=15 . 11 October 2007 . 19 October 2007.
  9. [Denise Natali]
  10. McDowall, David (1996). A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 131–137. ISBN 1850436533.
  11. Web site: May 13, 2022 . Mighty sovereigns of Ottoman throne: Sultan Abdülhamid II . Daily Sabah.
  12. Web site: "Bavê Kurdan": Abdülhamid uğruna ayaklanan Kürtler .
  13. Book: Eppel . Michael . A People Without a State: The Kurds from the Rise of Islam to the Dawn of Nationalism, page 81 . 13 September 2016 . University of Texas Press . 9781477311073 . en.
  14. Book: McDowall, David . A Modern History of the Kurds . I.B. Tauris . 1996 . 1850436533 . London . 131–137.
  15. Martin van Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan" http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Bruinessen_Religion_in_Kurdistan.pdf
  16. Book: Gingeras, Ryan . Ryan Gingeras . The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire . Random House . 2022 . 978-0-241-44432-0 . Dublin . 204-206.
  17. The Kurds and the Politics of Turkey: Agency, Territory and Religion; Deniz Çifçi; 2019; pp. 58-60
  18. Natali, Denise (2004). "Ottoman Kurds and emergent Kurdish nationalism". Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies. 13 (3): 383–387. doi:10.1080/1066992042000300701. S2CID 220375529.
  19. Web site: 16. Turkey/Kurds (1922–present) . 27 August 2018 . uca.edu.
  20. Web site: 2019-08-13 . Nurullah Alkaç Osmanlı kaynaklarında kadim Kürtler . 2024-04-16 . Independent Türkçe . tr.
  21. Web site: Maarif Vekaleti, adlarının yasaklanması . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20090906180951/http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF8FE9074FF19B00050B809AAFBA588C3B . 6 September 2009 . 23 August 2008.
  22. Book: Baser . Bahar . Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective . 2015 . Ashgate Publishing . 63 . 5 April 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160413095012/https://books.google.com/books?id=8MTVBgAAQBAJ . 13 April 2016 . live.
  23. Web site: Akyol . Mustafa . 21 December 2017 . ‘Kürdistan’ kavramı Türkiye’de niçin yeniden ‘yasak’ oldu? . live . https://web.archive.org/web/20180121132103/https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2017/12/turkey-kurds-how-kurdistan-became-illegal-again.html . 21 January 2018 . 3 April 2020 . Al-Monitor.
  24. News: Kizner . Stephen . 7 December 1998 . Turks See Throwback to Partition in Europe's Focus on Kurds . 24 July 2013 . . With the Sevres treaty dead, most of the world forgot it. Turks, though, did not. Many are convinced that the world is still plotting to dismember Turkey. They see every claim for regional or cultural autonomy, including those put forward by Kurdish nationalists, as means to this end. Turkish historians and sociologists call this belief the Sevres syndrome..
  25. Book: Joseph . J. . Turkey and the European Union internal dynamics and external challenges . 2006 . . 0230598587 . Basingstoke [England] . 100.
  26. Web site: 2021-05-17 . 'Kürt sorununu ilk dile getirenlerden olması, bedelini göze almasıyla önemli bir yer ediniyor İbrahim' . 2024-04-16 . Artı Gerçek . tr.
  27. Book: Esposito, John L. . Islam and politics . 1984 . 59.
  28. Van Bruinessen, M. (1991) "Religion in Kurdistan." Kurdish Times. New York, vol.4, nos 1-2. pp.5-27.
  29. Web site: Irkçı saldırıya karşı Strasbourg’da protesto: Türk faşizmini durdurun! . 2024-04-16 . ANF News . tr.
  30. [Tove Skutnabb-Kangas|Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove]
  31. Web site: March 21, 2023 . Turkey's Kurds eye kingmaker role in election against Erdogan .
  32. Web site: 2021-10-18 . "Anadilde eğitim talebi mazur görülemez" tartışmasına ilahiyatçılar da katıldı: Osmanlı Kürt'ün diliyle uğraşmadı, bu Türkçü kafayla memleket büyüyemez . 2024-04-03 . Independent Türkçe . tr.
  33. Web site: Kurds fear Erdogan win amid sharper nationalist rhetoric .
  34. Ergil, Dogu. "The Kurdish Question in Turkey." Journal of Democracy, vol. 11 no. 3, 2000, p. 122-135. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0054. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk promised to repay Kurds for their loyalty by giving them full political and cultural rights in his planned state he would establish. In 1923, the Turkish National Movement was victorious and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, replacing the Treaty of Sevres and recognising the independence of the Republic of Turkey. Despite the promises made to Kurds, the Turkish state denied the existence of Kurds and began trying to erase their identity.[17] The sudden increase of nationalism among Turks sparked a reactionary rise of nationalism among Kurds.[18] Following the establishment of Turkey and its Turkish nationalist policies, as well as its oppression and denial of Kurds, the Kurdish–Turkish conflict began.[19] The general relations between Turks and Kurds have been negative since the formation of the Republic in 1923. Per article 66 of the Turkish constitution, only ethnic Turks and the Turkish language are recognised.[20] The term Kurdistan was also banned, even though it was never a separatist nor a provocative term at first, and was even used by Turks themself to refer to Kurdish lands, although its usage was and became a taboo as a result of Kemalist reforms.[21] [22] [23] Extreme paranoia also increased in Turkey, where Kurds were often baselessly dragged into many theories, including Sèvres syndrome.[24] The PKK was founded in 1978, during a time period when Anti-Kurdism was very widespread, and any indication of Kurdish identity was punishable by law.[25] Communist and leftist Turks remained tolerant of Kurds.[26] Salafist and Pan-Islamist Turks also remained tolerant of Kurds.[27]

    Kurds refused to include Turkish nationalism in their Islamic teachings, causing many Turks who wanted to pursue an unaltered Islamic education to travel to Kurdistan to begin studies.[28] Islam had always been a unifier between Kurds and Turks, however even that became a subject of division as many Turks ditched mainstream Islamism in favor of the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, an Anti-Kurdish ideology which gave many impressionable Kurdish youth the idea that Islam was also their enemy.[29] Islamists in Turkey, whether Turks or Kurds, were formerly united with the common goal of defeating the Kemalists, however their relations worsened during the tenure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who divided the Islamists on an ethnic basis due to him pushing an Islamist-nationalist rhetoric, with most Islamist Turks being satisfied with him, and most Islamist Kurds opposing him.[30] [31] Some Islamist Turks, such as Alparslan Kuytul, opposed Erdoğan due to his usage of religion to gain voters, his attempts at fusing Turkish nationalism with Islam, and his purposeful exclusion of Kurds in messages about national or religious unity.[32] [33]

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