| Colorcode: |
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| Kirchnerism | |
| Native Name: | Kirchnerismo |
| Founder: | Néstor Kirchner |
| Leader: | Cristina Fernández de Kirchner |
| Ideology: | Economic nationalism[1] [2] [3] [4] |
| Position: | Centre-left to left-wing |
| National: | Front for Victory (2003–2017) Citizen's Unity (2017–2019) Frente de Todos (2019–2023) Union for the Homeland (since 2023) |
| Membership: | Justicialist Party |
| Youth Wing: | The Campora |
| Headquarters: | Buenos Aires |
| Seats1 Title: | Seats in the Chamber of Deputies |
| Seats2 Title: | Seats in the Senate |
Kirchnerism (Spanish; Castilian: Kirchnerismo pronounced as /es/) is an Argentine political movement based on populist ideals through all kinds of violence formed by the supporters of spouses Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who consecutively served as Presidents of Argentina. Although considered a branch of Peronism, it is opposed by some factions of Peronists and generally considered to fall into the category of left-wing populism.[5] [6]
Although originally a section in the Justicialist Party, Kirchnerism later received support from other smaller Argentine political parties (like the Communist Party or the Humanist Party) and from factions of some traditional parties (like the Radical Civic Union and the Socialist Party). In parties which are divided along Kirchnerist/Anti-Kirchnerist lines, the members of the Kirchnerist faction are often distinguished with the letter K (for instance "peronistas/justicialistas K", "radicales K" or "socialistas K") while the anti-Kirchnerist factions, those opposing Kirchnerism, are similarly labelled with the expression "anti-K".
Both Kirchner and Fernández come from the left-wing of Peronism and both began their political careers as members of the Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista). Many of the Kirchners' closest allies belong to the Peronist left. Anti-Kirchnerists often criticize this ideological background with the term setentista ("seventies-ist"), suggesting that Kirchnerism is overly influenced by the populist struggle of the 1970s.
Initially, Kirchnerism has shown itself to be concerned with the defense of human rights, particularly in prosecuting those who committed human rights violations during the Dirty War and were later made immune from prosecution by the governments of Carlos Menem (1989–1999). The willingness of the Kirchner government to revoke these immunities has led many Argentine pressure groups, such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, to take an actively Kirchnerist position.[7] This has led to many controversies and to allegations that the Kirchners were never fully committed to human rights, especially during the period of the last military dictatorship, and that it was only when Kirchner became President and began to make alliances with the left-wing parties in Congress and with the Madres de Plaza de Mayo that he started to campaign about these rights in order to promote his own platform and gain popular favor. It is documented nevertheless that the Kirchners did push for trial against human rights violators during the dictatorship, although late in that period in 1983, when its end was already in sight.[8]
Economically, Kirchnerism has pursued an economic policy of industrialist developmentalism. Tariffs protect local industry and employment.
Internationally, Kirchnerism has strongly supported Mercosur and vice versa, to the point that the President of Mercosur, Carlos Álvarez, is a Kirchnerist.
Kirchnerism, in particular former minister of health Ginés González García, has shown a liberal attitude to birth control and sexuality, including the legalization of same-sex marriage, both of which have provoked the opposition of the Catholic Church and other conservative sectors.[11]
According to Alberto Fernández, the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers during the first five years of Kirchnerism and former President of Argentina, they followed five tenets regarding the economy, which explained the perceived early success of the movement:[12]
According to Fernández, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner moved away from these five tenets after her husband's death, causing an economic crisis that resulted in the first political defeat of Kirchnerism in a presidential election in 2015. In the presidential election of 2019, Kirchnerism returned to power with the election of Alberto Fernández as President and Cristina Kirchner as Vice President.[13] [14] In the 2021 legislative elections on 14 November 2021, the Frente de Todos lost its majority in Congress for the first time in almost 40 years in midterm legislative elections. The election victory of the center-right coalition, Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change), meant a tough final two years in office for President Alberto Fernandez. Losing control of the Senate made it difficult for him to make key appointments, including to the judiciary. It also forced him to negotiate with the opposition every initiative he sends to the legislature.[15] [16]
Unlike his predecessor Eduardo Duhalde, Kirchner was a Peronist that distrusted the Justicialist Party as a support for his government. He proposed instead a "transversalist" policy, seeking the support of progressive politicians regardless of their party. Thus he got support from factions of the Justicialist Party, the Radical Civic Union (which were called "Radicales K") and small centre-left parties.
Kirchner neglected the internal politics of the Justicialist Party and kept instead the Front for Victory party, which was initially an electoral alliance in his home province of Santa Cruz and in the 2003 elections premiered in the federal political scene. Some politicians favored by this policy were Aníbal Ibarra, mayor of Buenos Aires for the Broad Front and supported as Kirchnerist; and Julio Cobos, governor of Mendoza for the UCR and elected as Vice President of Fernández de Kirchner in 2007.
The transversalist project was eventually dismissed. Kirchner took control of the Justicialist Party and some "Radicales K", slowly returned to the "anti-K" faction of their party, most notably Vice President Julio Cobos and Governor of Catamarca province Eduardo Brizuela del Moral, while other very prominent Radical politicians remained in the "K" wing of the Radical Civic Union such as provincial governors Gerardo Zamora of Santiago del Estero, Ricardo Colombi of Corrientes and Miguel Saiz of Río Negro. After the 2011 general elections, several K radicals regretted having been part of that political space, turning once again to the opposition UCR. Such is the case of Miguel Saiz, former governor of Río Negro, who declared: "My commitment to the Concertación ended in December 2011".
In March 2015, dissatisfied with the UCR's alliance with Mauricio Macri's Republican Proposal (PRO), the National Alfonsinist Movement (MNA) led by Leopoldo Moreau joined the Front for Victory. For this reason, Ernesto Sanz, the president of the UCR, announced the expulsion of Moreau from the party.[17] Professor Gustavo Melella was reelected as mayor of the city of Río Grande in 2015, through the FORJA Concertación Party. During the presidency of Alberto Fernández, Ricardo Alfonsin was appointed as the Ambassador to Spain.
| Election year | Candidate | First round | Second round | Result | Note | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % vote |
| % vote | |||||
| 2003 | Néstor Kirchner | 4,312,517 | 22.25 | Null | 0 | 2nd-R Unopposed | within Front for Victory | |
| 2007 | Cristina Kirchner | 8,651,066 | 45.29 | Elected | ||||
| 2011 | 11,865,055 | 54.11 | Elected | |||||
| 2015 | Daniel Scioli | 9,338,490 | 37.08 | 12,317,330 | 48.66 | 2nd-R Defeated | ||
| 2019 | Alberto Fernandez | 12,946,037 | 48.24 | Elected | within Everyone's Front | |||
| 2023 | Sergio Massa | 9,387,184 | 36.38 | 11,598,720 | 44.35 | 2nd-R Defeated | within Union for the Homeland | |
| Election year | Votes | % | Seats won | Total seats | Position | Presidency | Note | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | 5,511,420 | 35.1 | Majority | Eduardo Duhalde (PJ) | including the other PJ factions | |||
| 2005 | 5,071,094 | 29.9 | Minority | Néstor Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2007 | 5,557,087 | Minority | Néstor Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||||
| 2009 | 1,679,084 | 8.8 | Minority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2011 | 10,121,311 | 49.1 | Minority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2013 | 7,487,839 | 33.2 | Majority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2015 | 8,237,074 | Minority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||||
| 2019 | 11,606,411 | 45.3 | Minority | Alberto Fernández (FdT—PJ) | ||||
| 2023 | 8,252,357 | 33.62 | Minority | Sergio Massa (UP—FR) |
| Election year | Votes | % | Seats won | Total seats | Position | Presidency | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | 1,852,456 | 40.7 | Majority | Eduardo Duhalde (PJ) | including the other PJ factions | ||
| 2005 | 3,572,361 | 45.1 | Minority | Néstor Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||
| 2007 | 1,048,187 | Minority | Néstor Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2009 | 756,695 | Minority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | ||||
| 2011 | 5,470,241 | 54.6 | Minority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||
| 2013 | 1,608,866 | 32.1 | Majority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||
| 2015 | 2,336,037 | 32.72 | Majority | Cristina Kirchner (FPV—PJ) | |||
| 2019 | 2,263,221 | 40.16 | Majority | Alberto Fernández (FdT—PJ) | |||
| 2021 | 7,47,,030 | 31.67 | Majority | Alberto Fernández (FdT—PJ) | |||
| 2023 | 4,739,859 | 40.82 | Minority | Sergio Massa (UP—FR) |
Kirchnerism has encountered opposition from various sectors of Argentine society, which tend to criticize its personalism.[18]
In 2012, there was a massive anti-Kirchnerism protest in several cities within Argentina and also in several Argentinian embassies around the world. It became known as 8N.
In 2015, when Foreign Policy was discussing corruption in Latin America it was stated that:[19]
The viceroys of the colonial era set the pattern. They centralised power and bought the loyalty of local interest groups. [...] Caudillos, dictators and elected presidents continued the tradition of personalising power. Venezuela's chavismo and the kirchnerismo of Ms Fernández are among today's manifestations.In an editorial published in October 2015, The Economist expressed the following view about the situation in Argentina:[20]
Argentina needs change. As Ms Fernández slips out of office the economy is starting to crumble. Currency controls and trade restrictions [...] are choking productivity; inflation hovers at around 25%. [...] Argentina cannot seek external financing until it ends its standoff with creditors who rejected a debt-restructuring plan. Unless the new president quickly reverses Ms Fernández's populist policies, a crisis is inevitable"