Is Missile: | yes |
Hwasong-11[1] | |
Origin: | North Korea and Soviet Union |
Type: | SRBM |
Used By: | Korean People's Army Strategic Force |
Manufacturer: | North Korea |
Propellant: | solid |
Service: | 2008–present |
Engine: | Solid-fuel rocket |
Weight: | 2010kg (4,430lb) |
Length: | 6.4m (21feet) |
Diameter: | 0.65m (02.13feet) |
Vehicle Range: | ~NaNkm (-2,147,483,648miles)[2] [3] |
Filling: | single HE, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical |
Filling Weight: | 250or |
Guidance: | Inertial, optical correlation system |
Accuracy: | 100 m[4] |
Launch Platform: | TEL |
Text: | lit. Viper |
Rr: | Doksa |
Mr: | Toksa |
Context: | north |
The KN-02 Toksa (毒蛇), Hwasong-11[5] is a North Korean reverse-engineered locally produced modification of the OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missile.
In 1983, Syria acquired a number of 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab-A) missiles from the Soviet Union, a single-stage, solid-propellant guided missile with a range of 70 km and a CEP of 160 m. In 1996, Syrian missile technicians provided North Korea with technical data on the missiles, then shipped some of the missiles themselves. The first test of a North Korean-produced version occurred in April 2004 and was a failure, but it was then successfully fired on 1 May 2005 into the Sea of Japan; the KN-02 has been tested at least 17 times. Initial production is believed to have begun in 2006, with the missile displayed aboard a launcher during a military parade in April 2007, and entering service in 2008. At least 50 missiles are speculated to be in service.[6] [7] [8]
The KN-02 is a short-range, road-mobile ballistic missile, broadly equivalent to the improved Scarab-B. Although it has a shorter range than other North Korean missiles like the Scud-C, it has superior accuracy of near 100 meters CEP through inertial guidance with an optical correlation system in the terminal phase, making it the most accurate ballistic missile in the inventory; this enables it to be used for precision strikes against priority targets such as airfields, command posts, bridges, storage facilities, and even enemy troops concentrations in a tactical support role on the battlefield. Its warhead weighs 485kg (1,069lb) and likely consists of a high-explosive, submunition, thermonuclear, chemical payload; Russian engineers could equip the OTR-21 with a 100 kiloton nuclear warhead. The missile has a range of NaNkm (-2,147,483,648miles), and it may be capable of traveling 160km (100miles) through reducing payload to 250kg (550lb).[6] [7] [9] [10]
A significant difference between the Russian OTR-21 and North Korean KN-02 is the transporter erector launcher (TEL). While the Russian missile is transported and fired from the 6×6 9P129 that has amphibious capabilities, the KN-02's TEL is a locally fabricated version of the Belarusian MAZ-630308-224 or -243 6×4 or 6×6 commercial heavy utility truck, which has a maximum road speed of 60km/h and is not amphibious. The vehicle has a short firing cycle, able to be ready for launch in 16 minutes, launch the missile in 2 minutes, and be reloaded in 20 minutes by a supporting reloader vehicle of the same design fitted with a crane and holding 2-4 more missiles.[6] [7] [10] [11] [12] [13]
In 2013, South Korean intelligence reports suggested that North Korea was developing an anti-ship ballistic missile version of the KN-02. Its range is estimated to be NaNkm (-2,147,483,648miles), longer than current KN-01 variants, and it would be much more difficult to intercept due to its faster speed.[14]
In March 2014, a South Korean military source claimed that the KN-02's range had been extended to 170km (110miles) through improved engine performance. The source also claimed that North Korea possessed 100 missiles with 30 TELs deployed to fire them.[15] In August 2014, three KN-02s were fired out to a range of 220km (140miles)[16] and estimated to have 100 meter circular error probable accuracy.[17]
Extended range Hwasong-11/KN-02 is referred to as KN-10.[18] [19] [20] [21] It is expected that range of the missile is greater than 230 kilometers.[22]
The U.S. identified the KN-10 system back in 2010.[23]
In January 2024, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby reported that Russia launched North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. According to Joost Oliemans, photographic evidence indicates that Hwasong-11 missiles such as the KN-23 and KN-24 were used in the attacks.[24]