| National Diet of Japan | |
| Transcription Name: | Kokkai |
| Legislature: | 213th Session of the National Diet |
| Coa Pic: | Go-shichi no kiri crest 2.svg |
| House Type: | Bicameral |
| Leader1 Type: | Speaker of the House of Representatives |
| Leader1: | Fukushiro Nukaga |
| Party1: | LDP |
| Election1: | October 20, 2023 |
| Leader2 Type: | President of the House of Councillors |
| Leader2: | Hidehisa Otsuji |
| Party2: | LDP |
| Election2: | August 3, 2022 |
| House1: | House of Councillors |
| Structure1: | Japanese House of Councillors Composition July 2024.svg |
| Political Groups1: | Government (142)
Opposition (92) Unaffiliated (12)
Vacant (2)
|
| House2: | House of Representatives |
| Structure2: | Japanese House of Representatives July 2024.svg |
| Political Groups2: | Government (290)
Opposition (168) Unaffiliated (7)
|
| Voting System1: | Parallel voting
|
| Voting System2: | Parallel voting
|
| Last Election1: | July 10, 2022 (26th) |
| Next Election1: | Before July 25, 2025 (27th) |
| Last Election2: | October 31, 2021 (49th) |
| Next Election2: | Before October 31, 2025 (50th) |
| Session Room: | Diet of Japan Kokkai 2009.jpg |
| Meeting Place: | National Diet Building, Nagatachō 1-7-1, Chiyoda District, Tokyo, Japan 35.6758°N 139.745°W |
| Structure2 Res: | 250px |
| Structure1 Res: | 250px |
The is the national legislature of Japan. It is composed of a lower house, called the House of Representatives (Japanese: 衆議院, Shūgiin), and an upper house, the House of Councillors (Japanese: 参議院, Sangiin). Both houses are directly elected under a parallel voting system. In addition to passing laws, the Diet is formally responsible for nominating the Prime Minister. The Diet was first established as the Imperial Diet in 1890 under the Meiji Constitution, and took its current form in 1947 upon the adoption of the post-war constitution. Both houses meet in the in Nagatachō, Chiyoda, Tokyo.
See main article: List of members of the Diet of Japan.
See also: Elections in Japan.
The houses of the National Diet are both elected under parallel voting systems. This means that the seats to be filled in any given election are divided into two groups, each elected by a different method; the main difference between the houses is in the sizes of the two groups and how they are elected. Voters are also asked to cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a constituency, and one for a party list. Any national of Japan at least 18 years of age may vote in these elections, reduced from age 20 in 2016.[1] [2] Japan's parallel voting system is not to be confused with the Additional Member System used in many other nations. The Constitution of Japan does not specify the number of members of each house of the Diet, the voting system, or the necessary qualifications of those who may vote or be returned in parliamentary elections, thus allowing all of these things to be determined by law. However it does guarantee universal adult suffrage and a secret ballot. It also insists that the electoral law must not discriminate in terms of "race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income".
Generally, the election of Diet members is controlled by statutes passed by the Diet. This is a source of contention concerning re-apportionment of prefectures' seats in response to changes of population distribution. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party had controlled Japan for most of its post-war history, and it gained much of its support from rural areas. During the post-war era, large numbers of people were relocating to the urban centers in the seeking of wealth; though some re-apportionments have been made to the number of each prefecture's assigned seats in the Diet, rural areas generally have more representation than do urban areas.[3] The Supreme Court of Japan began exercising judicial review of apportionment laws following the Kurokawa decision of 1976, invalidating an election in which one district in Hyōgo Prefecture received five times the representation of another district in Osaka Prefecture.[4] In recent elections the malapportionment ratio amounted to 4.8 in the House of Councillors (census 2005: Ōsaka/Tottori;[5] election 2007: Kanagawa/Tottori[6]) and 2.3 in the House of Representatives (election 2009: Chiba 4/Kōchi 3).[7]
Candidates for the lower house must be 25 years old or older and 30 years or older for the upper house. All candidates must be Japanese nationals. Under Article 49 of Japan's Constitution, Diet members are paid about ¥1.3 million a month in salary. Each lawmaker is entitled to employ three secretaries with taxpayer funds, free Shinkansen tickets, and four round-trip airplane tickets a month to enable them to travel back and forth to their home districts.[8]
Article 41 of the Constitution describes the National Diet as "the highest organ of State power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State". This statement is in forceful contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which described the Emperor as the one who exercised legislative power with the consent of the Diet. The Diet's responsibilities include not only the making of laws but also the approval of the annual national budget that the government submits and the ratification of treaties. It can also initiate draft constitutional amendments, which, if approved, must be presented to the people in a referendum. The Diet may conduct "investigations in relation to government" (Article 62).
The Prime Minister must be designated by Diet resolution, establishing the principle of legislative supremacy over executive government agencies (Article 67). The government can also be dissolved by the Diet if the House of Representatives passes a motion of no confidence introduced by fifty members of the House of Representatives. Government officials, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet members, are required to appear before Diet investigative committees and answer inquiries. The Diet also has the power to impeach judges convicted of criminal or irregular conduct.[9]
In most circumstances, in order to become law a bill must be first passed by both houses of the Diet and then promulgated by the Emperor. This role of the Emperor is similar to the Royal Assent in some other nations; however, the Emperor cannot refuse to promulgate a law and therefore his legislative role is merely a formality.[10]
The House of Representatives is the more powerful chamber of the Diet.[11] While the House of Representatives cannot usually overrule the House of Councillors on a bill, the House of Councillors can only delay the adoption of a budget or a treaty that has been approved by the House of Representatives, and the House of Councillors has almost no power at all to prevent the lower house from selecting any Prime Minister it wishes. Furthermore, once appointed it is the confidence of the House of Representatives alone that the Prime Minister must enjoy in order to continue in office. The House of Representatives can overrule the upper house in the following circumstances:[12]
Under the Constitution, at least one session of the Diet must be convened each year. Technically, only the House of Representatives is dissolved before an election. But, while the lower house is in dissolution, the House of Councillors is usually "closed". The Emperor both convokes the Diet and dissolves the House of Representatives but in doing so must act on the advice of the Cabinet. In an emergency the Cabinet can convoke the Diet for an extraordinary session, and an extraordinary session may be requested by one-quarter of the members of either house.[14] At the beginning of each parliamentary session, the Emperor reads a special speech from his throne in the chamber of the House of Councillors.[15]
The presence of one-third of the membership of either house constitutes a quorum[14] and deliberations are in public unless at least two-thirds of those present agree otherwise. Each house elects its own presiding officer who casts the deciding vote in the event of a tie. The Diet has parliamentary immunity. Members of each house have certain protections against arrest while the Diet is in session and arrested members must be released during the term of the session if the House demands. They are immune outside the house for words spoken and votes cast in the House.[16] [17] Each house of the Diet determines its own standing orders and has responsibility for disciplining its own members. A member may be expelled, but only by a two-thirds majority vote. Every member of the Cabinet has the right to appear in either house of the Diet for the purpose of speaking on bills, and each house has the right to compel the appearance of Cabinet members.[18]
The vast majority of bills are submitted to the Diet by the Cabinet.[19] Bills are usually drafted by the relevant ministry, sometimes with the advice of an external committee if the issue is sufficiently important or neutrality is necessary.[20] Such advisory committees may include university professors, trade union representatives, industry representatives, and local governors and mayors, and invariably include retired officials. Such draft bills would be sent to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau of the government, as well as to the ruling party.
See main article: National Diet Building.
Japan's first modern legislature was the established by the Meiji Constitution in force from 1889 to 1947. The Meiji Constitution was adopted on February 11, 1889, and the Imperial Diet first met on November 29, 1890, when the document entered into force.[21] The first Imperial Diet of 1890 was plagued by controversy and political tensions. The Prime Minister of Japan at that time was General Count Yamagata Aritomo, who entered into a confrontation with the legislative body over military funding. During this time, there were many critics of the army who derided the Meiji slogan of "rich country, strong military" as in effect producing a poor country (albeit with a strong military). They advocated for infrastructure projects and lower taxes instead and felt their interests were not being served by high levels of military spending. As a result of these early conflicts, public opinion of politicians was not favorable.[22]
The Imperial Diet consisted of a House of Representatives and a . The House of Representatives was directly elected, if on a limited franchise; universal adult male suffrage was introduced in 1925. The House of Peers, much like the British House of Lords, consisted of high-ranking nobles chosen by the Emperor.[23]
The word diet derives from Latin and was a common name for an assembly in medieval European polities like the Holy Roman Empire. The Meiji Constitution was largely based on the form of constitutional monarchy found in nineteenth century Prussia that placed the king not as a servant of the state but rather the sole holder of power and sovereignty over his kingdom, which the Japanese view of their emperor and his role at the time favoured.[24] The new Diet was modeled partly on the German Reichstag and partly on the British Westminster system. Unlike the post-war constitution, the Meiji constitution granted a real political role to the Emperor, although in practice the Emperor's powers were largely directed by a group of oligarchs called the genrō or elder statesmen.[25]
To become law or bill, a constitutional amendment had to have the assent of both the Diet and the Emperor. This meant that while the Emperor could no longer legislate by decree he still had a veto over the Diet. The Emperor also had complete freedom in choosing the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and so, under the Meiji Constitution, Prime Ministers often were not chosen from and did not enjoy the confidence of the Diet.[23] The Imperial Diet was also limited in its control over the budget. However, the Diet could veto the annual budget, if no budget was approved the budget of the previous year continued in force. This changed with the new constitution after World War II.[26]
The proportional representation system for the House of Councillors, introduced in 1982, was the first major electoral reform under the post-war constitution. Instead of choosing national constituency candidates as individuals, as had previously been the case, voters cast ballots for parties. Individual councillors, listed officially by the parties before the election, are selected on the basis of the parties' proportions of the total national constituency vote.[27] The system was introduced to reduce the excessive money spent by candidates for the national constituencies. Critics charged, however, that this new system benefited the two largest parties, the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (now Social Democratic Party), which in fact had sponsored the reform.[28]
There are three types of sessions of the National Diet:[29]
Any session of the National Diet may be cut short by a dissolution of the House of Representatives (衆議院解散, shūgiin kaisan). In the table, this is listed simply as "(dissolution)"; the House of Councillors or the National Diet as such cannot be dissolved.
| data-sort-type="number" | Diet ! | Type | Opened | Closed | data-sort-type="number" | Length in days (originally scheduled+extension[s]) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | S | 204 (50+154) | ||||
| 2nd | R | 209 (150+59) | ||||
| 3rd | E | 51 (30+21) | ||||
| 4th | R | (dissolution) | 23 (150) | |||
| 5th | S | 110 (70+40) | ||||
| 6th | E | 40 (30+10) | ||||
| 7th | R | 150 | ||||
| 8th | E | 20 | ||||
| 9th | E | 19 (18+1) | ||||
| 10th | R | 178 (150+28) | ||||
| 11th | E | 3 | ||||
| 12th | E | 52 (40+12) | ||||
| 13th | R | 225 (150+85) | ||||
| 14th (ja) | R | (dissolution) | 3 (150) | |||
| – | [HCES] | [1] | ||||
| 15th (ja) | S | (dissolution) | 142 (60+99) | |||
| – | [HCES] | [3] | ||||
| 16th | S | 85 (75+10) | ||||
| 17th | E | 10 (7+3) | ||||
| 18th | E | 9 | ||||
| 19th | R | 188 (150+38) | ||||
| 20th | E | 10 (9+1) | ||||
| 21st | R | (dissolution) | 46 (150) | |||
| 22nd | S | 135 (105+30) | ||||
| 23rd | E | 25 | ||||
| 24th | R | 167 (150+17) | ||||
| 25th | E | 32 (25+7) | ||||
| 26th | R | 151 (150+1) | ||||
| 27th | E | 14 (12+2) | ||||
| 28th | R | (dissolution) | 127 (150) | |||
| 29th | S | 29 (25+4) | ||||
| 30th | E | 70 (40+30) | ||||
| 31st | R | 144 | ||||
| 32nd | E | 12 | ||||
| 33rd | E | 63 (60+13) | ||||
| 34th | R | 200 (150+50) | ||||
| 35th | E | 5 | ||||
| 36th | E | (dissolution) | 8 (10) | |||
| 37th | S | 18 | ||||
| 38th | R | 165 (150+15) | ||||
| 39th | E | 37 | ||||
| 40th | R | 150 | ||||
| 41st | E | 30 | ||||
| 42nd | E | 16 (12+4) | ||||
| 43rd | R | 195 (150+45) | ||||
| 44th | E | (dissolution) | 9 (30) | |||
| 45th | S | 15 | ||||
| 46th | R | 190 (150+40) | ||||
| 47th | E | 40 | ||||
| 48th | R | 163 (150+13) | ||||
| 49th | E | 21 | ||||
| 50th | E | 70 | ||||
| 51st | R | 190 (150+40) | ||||
| 52nd | E | 20 | ||||
| 53rd | E | 21 | ||||
| 54th (ja) | R | (dissolution) | 1 (150) | |||
| 55th | S | 157 (136+21) | ||||
| 56th | E | 23 (15+8) | ||||
| 57th | E | 20 | ||||
| 58th | R | 160 (150+10) | ||||
| 59th | E | 10 | ||||
| 60th | E | 12 | ||||
| 61st | R | 222 (150+72) | ||||
| 62nd | E | (dissolution) | 4 (14) | |||
| 63rd | S | 120 | ||||
| 64th (ja) | E | 25 | ||||
| 65th | R | 150 | ||||
| 66th | E | 11 | ||||
| 67th | E | 73 (70+3) | ||||
| 68th | R | 171 (150+21) | ||||
| 69th | E | 7 | ||||
| 70th | E | (dissolution) | 18 (21) | |||
| 71st (ja) | S | 280 (150+130) | ||||
| 72nd | R | 185 (150+35) | ||||
| 73rd | E | 8 | ||||
| 74th | E | 17 | ||||
| 75th | R | 190 (150+40) | ||||
| 76th | E | 106 (75+31) | ||||
| 77th | R | 150 | ||||
| 78th | E | 50 | ||||
| 79th | E | 5 | ||||
| 80th | R | 162 (150+12) | ||||
| 81st | E | 8 | ||||
| 82nd | E | 58 (40+18) | ||||
| 83rd | E | 4 | ||||
| 84th | R | 180 (150+30) | ||||
| 85th | E | 34 | ||||
| 86th | E | 7 | ||||
| 87th | R | 175 (150+25) | ||||
| 88th | E | (dissolution) | 9 (30) | |||
| 89th | S | 18 | ||||
| 90th | E | 16 | ||||
| 91st | R | (dissolution) | 151 (150+9) | |||
| 92nd | S | 10 | ||||
| 93rd | E | 62 (50+12) | ||||
| 94th | R | 167 (150+17) | ||||
| 95th | E | 66 (55+11) | ||||
| 96th (ja) | R | 244 (150+94) | ||||
| 97th | E | 30 (25+5) | ||||
| 98th | R | 150 | ||||
| 99th | E | 6 | ||||
| 100th | E | (dissolution) | 82 (70+12) | |||
| 101st | S | 227 (150+77) | ||||
| 102nd | R | 207 (150+57) | ||||
| 103rd | E | 69 (62+7) | ||||
| 104th | R | 150 | ||||
| 105th (ja) | E | (dissolution) | 1 | |||
| 106th | S | 4 | ||||
| 107th | E | 4 | ||||
| 108th | R | 150 | ||||
| 109th | E | 76 (65+11) | ||||
| 110th | E | 6 | ||||
| 111th | E | 16 | ||||
| 112th | R | 150 | ||||
| 113th | E | 163 (70+93) | ||||
| 114th | R | 175 (150+25) | ||||
| 115th | E | 6 | ||||
| 116th | E | 80 | ||||
| 117th | R | (dissolution) | 31 (150) | |||
| 118th | S | 120 | ||||
| 119th | E | 30 | ||||
| 120th | R | 150 | ||||
| 121st | E | 61 | ||||
| 122nd | E | 47 (36+11) | ||||
| 123rd | R | 150 | ||||
| 124th | E | 5 | ||||
| 125th | E | 42 (40+2) | ||||
| 126th | R | (dissolution) | 148 (150) | |||
| 127th | S | 24 (10+14) | ||||
| 128th | E | 135 (90+45) | ||||
| 129th | R | 150 | ||||
| 130th | E | 5 | ||||
| 131st | E | 71 (65+6) | ||||
| 132nd | R | 150 | ||||
| 133rd | E | 5 | ||||
| 134th | E | 78 (46+32) | ||||
| 135th | E | 3 | ||||
| 136th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 137th | E | (dissolution) | 1 | |||
| 138th | S | 6 | ||||
| 139th | E | 20 | ||||
| 140th | R | 150 | ||||
| 141st | E | 75 | ||||
| 142nd | R | 158 (150+8) | ||||
| 143rd (ja) | E | 79 (70+9) | ||||
| 144th | E | 18 | ||||
| 145th | R | 207 (150+57) | ||||
| 146th | E | 48 | ||||
| 147th | R | (dissolution) | 135 (150) | |||
| 148th (ja) | S | 3 | ||||
| 149th | E | 13 | ||||
| 150th | E | 72 | ||||
| 151st | R | 150 | ||||
| 152nd | E | 4 | ||||
| 153rd | E | 72 | ||||
| 154th | R | 192 (150+42) | ||||
| 155th | E | 57 | ||||
| 156th | R | 190 (150+40) | ||||
| 157th | E | (dissolution) | 15 (36) | |||
| 158th | S | 9 | ||||
| 159th | R | 150 | ||||
| 160th | E | 8 | ||||
| 161st | E | 53 | ||||
| 162nd | R | (dissolution) | 200 (150+55) | |||
| 163rd (ja) | S | 42 | ||||
| 164th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 165th (ja) | S | 85 (81+4) | ||||
| 166th (ja) | R | 162 (150+12) | ||||
| 167th (ja) | E | 4 | ||||
| 168th (ja) | E | 128 (62+66) | ||||
| 169th (ja) | R | 156 (150+6) | ||||
| 170th (ja) | E | 93 (68+25) | ||||
| 171st (ja) | R | (dissolution) | 198 (150+55) | |||
| 172nd (ja) | S | 4 | ||||
| 173rd (ja) | E | 40 (36+4) | ||||
| 174th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 175th (ja) | E | 8 | ||||
| 176th (ja) | E | 64 | ||||
| 177th (ja) | R | 220 (150+70) | ||||
| 178th (ja) | E | 18 (4+14) | ||||
| 179th (ja) | E | 51 | ||||
| 180th (ja) | R | 229 (150+79) | ||||
| 181st (ja) | E | (dissolution) | 19 (33) | |||
| 182nd (ja) | S | 3 | ||||
| 183rd (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 184th (ja) | E | 6 | ||||
| 185th (ja) | E | 55 (53+2) | ||||
| 186th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 187th (ja) | E | (dissolution) | 54 (63) | |||
| 188th (ja) | S | 3 | ||||
| 189th (ja) | R | 245 (150+95) | ||||
| 190th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 191st (ja) | E | 3 | ||||
| 192nd (ja) | E | 83 (66+17) | ||||
| 193rd (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 194th (ja) | E | (dissolution) | 1 | |||
| 195th (ja) | S | 39 | ||||
| 196th (ja) | R | 182 (150+32) | ||||
| 197th (ja) | E | 48 | ||||
| 198th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 199th (ja) | E | 5 | ||||
| 200th (ja) | E | 67 | ||||
| 201st (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 202nd (ja) | E | 3 | ||||
| 203rd (ja) | E | 41 | ||||
| 204th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 205th (ja) | E | (dissolution) | 11 | |||
| 206th (ja) | S | 3 | ||||
| 207th (ja) | E | 16 | ||||
| 208th (ja) | R | 150 | ||||
| 209th (ja) | E | 3 | ||||
| 210th (ja) | E | 69 | ||||
| 211th (ja) | R | 150 |
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Imperial Diet (1890–1947); upper house: House of Peers | |||||||||||
| 1890 | 1 July 1890 | Yamagata Aritomo | 93.91% | 300 | 450,872 | bgcolor= rowspan="10" style="white-space:nowrap" | Constitutional Liberal | 130 | 43.33% | ||
| (Matsukata Masayoshi) | |||||||||||
| 1892 | 15 February 1892 | Matsukata Masayoshi | 91.59% | (D) December 25, 1891 | 434,594 | 94 | 31.33% | ||||
| (Itō Hirobumi) | |||||||||||
| Mar. 1894 | March 1, 1894 | Itō Hirobumi | 88.76% | (D) December 30, 1893 | 440,113 | bgcolor= | 120 | bgcolor= | 40.00% | ||
| Sep. 1894 | 1 September 1894 | Itō Hirobumi | 84.84% | (D) June 2, 1894 | 460,483 | 107 | 35.66% | ||||
| (Matsukata Masayoshi) | |||||||||||
| (Itō Hirobumi) | |||||||||||
| Mar. 1898 | 15 March 1898 | Itō Hirobumi | 87.50% | (D) December 25, 1897 | 452,637 | 105 | 35.00% | ||||
| bgcolor= | (Ōkuma Shigenobu) | ||||||||||
| Aug. 1898 | 10 August 1898 | bgcolor= | Ōkuma Shigenobu | 79.91% | (D) June 10, 1898 | 502,292 | Kensei Hontō | 124 | 41.33% | ||
| (Yamagata Aritomo) | |||||||||||
| (Itō Hirobumi) | |||||||||||
| (Katsura Tarō) | |||||||||||
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1902 | August 10, 1902 | Katsura Tarō | 88.39% | 376 | (E) August 9, 1902 | 982,868 | Rikken Seiyūkai | 191 | 50.79% | ||
| 1903 | March 1, 1903 | 86.17% | (D) December 28, 1902 | 958,322 | 175 | 46.54% | |||||
| 1904 | 1 March 1904 | Katsura Tarō | 86.06% | 379 | (D) December 11, 1903 | 762,445 | 133 | 35.09% | |||
| (Saionji Kinmochi) | |||||||||||
| 1908 | 15 May 1908 | Saionji Kinmochi | 85.29% | (E) March 27, 1908 | 1,590,045 | 187 | 49.34% | ||||
| (Katsura Tarō) | |||||||||||
| (Saionji Kinmochi) | |||||||||||
| 1912 | 15 May 1912 | Saionji Kinmochi | 89.58% | 381 | (E) May 14, 1912 | 1,506,143 | 209 | 54.85% | |||
| (Katsura Tarō) | |||||||||||
| (Yamamoto Gonnohyōe) | |||||||||||
| bgcolor= | (Ōkuma Shigenobu) | ||||||||||
| 1915 | 25 March 1915 | bgcolor= | Ōkuma Shigenobu | 92.13% | (D) December 25, 1914 | 1,546,411 | Rikken Dōshikai | 153 | 40.15% | ||
| (Terauchi Masatake) | |||||||||||
| 1917 | 20 April 1917 | Terauchi Masatake | 91.92% | (D) January 25, 1917 | 1,422,126 | Rikken Seiyūkai | 165 | 43.30% | |||
| bgcolor= | (Hara Takashi) | ||||||||||
| 1920 | 10 May 1920 | bgcolor= | Hara Takashi | 86.73% | 464 | (D) February 26, 1920 | 3,069,148 | 278 | 59.91% | ||
| bgcolor= | (Takahashi Korekiyo) | ||||||||||
| (Katō Tomosaburō) | |||||||||||
| (Yamamoto Gonnohyōe) | |||||||||||
| (Kiyoura Keigo) | |||||||||||
| 1924 | 10 May 1924 | bgcolor= | Katō Takaaki | 91.18% | (D) January 31, 1924 | 3,288,405 | Kenseikai | 151 | 32.54% | ||
| bgcolor= | (Wakatsuki Reijirō) | ||||||||||
| bgcolor= | (Tanaka Giichi) | ||||||||||
| 1928 | 20 February 1928 | bgcolor= | Tanaka Giichi | 80.36% | 466 | (D) January 21, 1928 | 12,408,678 | Rikken Seiyūkai | 218 | 46.78% | |
| (Hamaguchi Osachi) | |||||||||||
| 1930 | 20 February 1930 | Hamaguchi Osachi | 83.34% | (D) January 21, 1930 | 12,812,895 | Rikken Minseitō | 273 | 58.58% | |||
| (Wakatsuki Reijirō) | |||||||||||
| (Inukai Tsuyoshi) | |||||||||||
| 1932 | 20 February 1932 | Inukai Tsuyoshi | 81.68% | (D) January 21, 1932 | 13,237,841 | Rikken Seiyukai | 301 | 64.59% | |||
| (Saitō Makoto) | |||||||||||
| (Keisuke Okada) | |||||||||||
| 1936 | 20 February 1936 | Kōki Hirota | 78.65% | (D) January 21, 1936 | 14,479,553 | Rikken Minseitō | 205 | 43.99% | |||
| (Senjūrō Hayashi) | |||||||||||
| 1937 | 30 April 1937 | Senjūrō Hayashi | 73.31% | (D) March 31, 1937 | 14,618,298 | 179 | 38.41% | ||||
| (Fumimaro Konoe) | |||||||||||
| (Hiranuma Kiichirō) | |||||||||||
| (Nobuyuki Abe) | |||||||||||
| (Mitsumasa Yonai) | |||||||||||
| (Fumimaro Konoe) | |||||||||||
| (Fumimaro Konoe) | |||||||||||
| (Hideki Tojo) | |||||||||||
| 1942 | 30 April 1942 | Hideki Tojo | 83.16% | (E) April 29, 1942 | 14,594,287 | Imperial Rule Assistance Association | 381 | 81.75% | |||
| (Kuniaki Koiso) | |||||||||||
| (Kantarō Suzuki) | |||||||||||
| (Kantarō Suzuki) | |||||||||||
| (Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni) | |||||||||||
| (Kijūrō Shidehara) | |||||||||||
| 1946 | April 10, 1946 | Shigeru Yoshida | 72.08% | (D) December 18, 1945 | 36,878,420 | Liberal | 141 | 30.25% | |||
| 1947 | 25 April 1947 | Tetsu Katayama | 67.95% | (D) March 31, 1947 | 40,907,493 | Socialist | 143 | 30.68% | |||
| (Hitoshi Ashida) | |||||||||||
| (Shigeru Yoshida) | |||||||||||
| National Diet (1947–present); upper house: House of Councillors | |||||||||||
| 1949 | 23 January 1949 | Shigeru Yoshida | 74.04% | 466 | (D) December 23, 1948 | 42,105,300 | Democratic Liberal | 264 | 56.65% | ||
| (Shigeru Yoshida) | |||||||||||
| 1952 | October 1, 1952 | Shigeru Yoshida | 76.43% | (D) August 28, 1952 | 46,772,584 | Liberal | 240 | 51.50% | |||
| 1953 | 19 April 1953 | Shigeru Yoshida | 74.22% | (D) March 14, 1953 | 47,090,167 | Liberal Yoshida faction | 199 | 42.70% | |||
| (Ichirō Hatoyama) | |||||||||||
| 1955 | 27 February 1955 | Ichirō Hatoyama | 75.84% | 467 | (D) January 24, 1955 | 49,235,375 | Democratic | 185 | 39.61% | ||
| (Ichirō Hatoyama) | |||||||||||
| (Tanzan Ishibashi) | |||||||||||
| (Nobusuke Kishi) | |||||||||||
| 1958 | 22 May 1958 | Nobusuke Kishi | 76.99% | (D) April 25, 1958 | 52,013,529 | Liberal Democratic | 287 | 61.45% | |||
| (Hayato Ikeda) | |||||||||||
| 1960 | November 20, 1960 | Hayato Ikeda | 73.51% | (D) October 24, 1960 | 54,312,993 | 296 | 63.38% | ||||
| 1963 | 21 November 1963 | Hayato Ikeda | 71.14% | (D) October 23, 1963 | 58,281,678 | 283 | 60.59% | ||||
| (Eisaku Satō) | |||||||||||
| 1967 | January 29, 1967 | Eisaku Satō | 73.99% | 486 | (D) December 27, 1966 | 62,992,796 | 277 | 56.99% | |||
| 1969 | 27 December 1969 | Eisaku Satō | 68.51% | (D) December 2, 1969 | 69,260,424 | 288 | 59.25% | ||||
| (Kakuei Tanaka) | |||||||||||
| 1972 | 10 December 1972 | Kakuei Tanaka | 71.76% | 491 | (D) November 13, 1972 | 73,769,636 | 271 | 55.19% | |||
| (Takeo Miki) | |||||||||||
| 1976 | 5 December 1976 | Takeo Fukuda | 73.45% | 511 | (E) December 9, 1976 | 77,926,588 | 249 | 48.72% | |||
| (Masayoshi Ōhira) | |||||||||||
| 1979 | October 7, 1979 | Masayoshi Ōhira | 68.01% | (D) September 7, 1979 | 80,169,924 | 248 | 48.53% | ||||
| 1980 | 22 June 1980 | Zenkō Suzuki | 74.57% | (D) May 19, 1980 | 80,925,034 | 284 | 55.57% | ||||
| (Yasuhiro Nakasone) | |||||||||||
| 1983 | December 18, 1983 | Yasuhiro Nakasone | 67.94% | (D) November 28, 1983 | 84,252,608 | Liberal Democratic (LDP-NLC coalition) | 250 | 48.92% | |||
| 1986 | 2 June 1986 | Yasuhiro Nakasone | 71.40% | 512 | (D) June 2, 1986 | 86,426,845 | Liberal Democratic | 300 | 58.59% | ||
| (Noboru Takeshita) | |||||||||||
| (Sōsuke Uno) | |||||||||||
| (Toshiki Kaifu) | |||||||||||
| 1990 | 18 February 1990 | Toshiki Kaifu | 73.31% | (D) January 24, 1990 | 90,322,908 | 275 | 53.71% | ||||
| (Kiichi Miyazawa) | |||||||||||
| 1993 | 18 July 1993 | Morihiro Hosokawa | 67.26% | 511 | (D) June 18, 1993 | 94,477,816 | Liberal Democratic (JNP-JRP–JSP-Komeito–DSP-NPS-SDF coalition: 1993–1994, JRP–Komeito–JNP-DSP-Liberal Reform League coalition: 1994, LDP-JSP-NPS coalition since 1994) | 223 | 43.63% | ||
| (Tsutomu Hata) | |||||||||||
| (Tomiichi Murayama) | |||||||||||
| (Ryūtarō Hashimoto) | |||||||||||
| 1996 | 20 October 1996 | Ryūtarō Hashimoto | 59.65% | 500 | (D) September 27, 1996 | 97,680,719 | Liberal Democratic (LDP-JSP/SDP-NPS coalition: 1996, LDP-Liberal coalition: 1999, LDP-Komeito-Liberal/NCP coalition: 1999–2000, LDP-Komeito-NCP coalition: 2000) | 239 | 47.80% | ||
| (Keizō Obuchi) | |||||||||||
| (Yoshirō Mori) | |||||||||||
| 2000 | 25 June 2000 | Yoshirō Mori | 62.49% | 480 | (D) June 2, 2000 | 100,492,328 | Liberal Democratic (LDP-Komeito-NCP coalition) | 233 | 48.54% | ||
| (Junichiro Koizumi) | |||||||||||
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | November 9, 2003 | Junichiro Koizumi | 59.86% | 480 | (D) October 10, 2003 | 102,306,684 | Liberal Democratic (LDP-Komeito coalition) | 237 | 49.37% | ||
| 2005 | 11 September 2005 | Junichiro Koizumi | 67.51% | (D) August 8, 2005 | 103,067,966 | 296 | 61.66% | ||||
| (Shinzo Abe) | |||||||||||
| (Yasuo Fukuda) | |||||||||||
| (Tarō Asō) | |||||||||||
| 2009 | 30 August 2009 | Yukio Hatoyama | 69.28% | (D) July 21, 2009 | 104,057,361 | Democratic (DPJ-PNP-SDP coalition: 2009–2010, DPJ-PNP coalition: 2010–2012) | 308 | 64.16% | |||
| (Naoto Kan) | |||||||||||
| (Yoshihiko Noda) | |||||||||||
| 2012 | December 16, 2012 | Shinzo Abe | 59.32% | (D) November 16, 2012 | 103,959,866 | Liberal Democratic (LDP-Komeito coalition) | 294 | 61.25% | |||
| 2014 | December 14, 2014 | 52.66% | 475 | (D) November 21, 2014 | 104,067,104 | 291 | 61.26% | ||||
| 2017 | 22 October 2017 | Shinzo Abe | 53.68% | 465 | (D) September 28, 2017 | 106,091,229 | 284 | 61.08% | |||
| (Yoshihide Suga) | |||||||||||
| (Fumio Kishida) | |||||||||||
| 2021 | October 31, 2021 | Fumio Kishida | 55.93% | (D) October 14, 2021 | 105,622,758 | 261 | 56.12% | ||||
| Election | Date | (during term) | Turnout | Seats | Date of dissolution (D) / expiration of term (E) | Registered voters | Majority party | Seats Share | Monarch | ||