James M. Malcomson Explained

James Malcomson is a British-Irish economist. He is an emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford[1] and emeritus Fellow of All Souls College.[2] He is a specialist in the fields of labour economics and contract theory.

Education

Following graduation with a BA in economics at the University of Cambridge (Gonville and Caius College) in 1967, Malcomson studied for a doctorate in economics at Harvard University, which he completed in 1973[3] with a thesis supervised by the Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief.

Career

Malcomson was a lecturer, then senior lecturer, at the University of York (1972–85), Professor of Economics at the University of Southampton (1985–1999) and then statutory Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College (1999–2013). He was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 2000 and Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2005.[4] He chaired[5] the Office of Health Economics Commission on Competition in the NHS, 2011–2012[6] and served as a member of the Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ Remuneration, 2015–2021.[7]

Research

Malcomson's early research analysed vintage effects in investment, especially the implications for obsolescence, replacement and utilisation of capital equipment and the effects of tax policy on these. He derived rigorous theoretical models of optimal investment and replacement that do not rely on stationarity,[8] showed how optimal policies relate to simple rules, and derived analytic results for the effects of changes in tax policy on investment and replacement.[9] He also devised ways to estimate such models empirically without imposing stationarity, an essential step in predicting the short-run effects of tax policy changes.[10] [11] He additionally explored dynamic inconsistency in government policies,[12] the Laffer Curve,[13] and the impact of trade unions.[14]

Malcomson's empirical research on production convinced him of the need for economists to understand better the labour side of the production process and much of his more recent research has been directed towards that.[15] One of his main concerns has been with different ways of motivating employees when important aspects of performance are not easily specified in an employment contract and their implications: high pay coupled with the threat of dismissal for unsatisfactory performance (efficiency wages),[16] [17] competition for promotion,[18] [19] [20] [21] tournaments[22] and repeated interaction over time,[23] which "showed that the optimal long-term contract can be replicated by a sequence of optimal static contracts when the agent's saving decision can be controlled by the principal."[24] With W. Bentley MacLeod, he characterized the full set of outcomes that can be sustained in such repeated principal-agent contexts, described as "the "classic" relational contract model"[25] and "(t)he most complete analysis of relational contracts under symmetric information".[26] Together they also showed that tournaments and competition for promotion can provide effective methods of motivation provided agent-employees are sufficiently heterogeneous in their abilities, a system that “mimics a remarkable number of the features of actual job ladders in internal labor markets”.[27] Performance-related bonuses are effective even when agent-employees are homogeneous but may result in less efficient outcomes than efficiency wages when prospective employees are plentiful relative to jobs.[28] But when employees differ in abilities, competition for promotion may be open to influence activities and so distort allocation of employees to more senior jobs[29] [30] [31] and efficient outcomes in the future prevent full separation of abilities when differences are sufficiently fine in which "Malcomson provides a general analysis of relational contracts with persistent private information. He shows that full revelation of information is inconsistent with continuation payoffs being on the Pareto frontier, and therefore it generalizes the observation that asymmetric information leads to conflict in relational contracts."[32] This approach has been taken up in the subsequent literature.[33] These results have implications for dual economies and cyclical behavior, in which the "interplay between competition and relational contracts also has implications for output over the business cycle".[34] The implications for labour markets are surveyed in and, more completely, in[35] and those for economic organizations in.

Other research with W. Bentley MacLeod has shown that the types of contracts used in many practical situations have properties that theory suggests are appropriate for protecting investments in general and specific assets.[36] [37] Research with other co-authors has shown how time-serving apprenticeships can mitigate incentive issues in training[38] and the role for not-for-profit providers in provision of public sector services.[39] Malcomson also analysed forms of contract appropriate for the provision of health services,[40] [41] and, most notably, the quality of care and, developments surveyed in.[42]

Selected publications

Personal life

Malcomson is married to the social gerontologist Dr Sally Richards.[43] They live in Oxford.

Notes and References

  1. Web site: James Malcomson . 2023-11-24 . www.economics.ox.ac.uk . en.
  2. Web site: Professor James Malcomson All Souls College . 2023-11-24 . www.asc.ox.ac.uk.
  3. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/
  4. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/
  5. Web site: 2011-02-14 . New OHE Commission on Competition in the NHS – OHE . 2023-11-21 . OHE – Leading intellectual authority on global health economics.
  6. [The Office of Health Economics|Office of Health Economics]
  7. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1005003/DDRB_2021_Web_Accessible_v2.pdf p. iii. Retrieved 24 November 2023.
  8. Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Dynamic Optimization (2nd edition, Dover, 2012), p. 361. https://store.doverpublications.com/048648856x.html
  9. Mark Blaug and Howard Vane (eds.), Who's Who in Economics (4th edition), (Edward Elgar, 2003). https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/who-s-who-in-economics-fourth-edition-9781840649925.html
  10. E. Bjørn, Taxation, Technology, and the User Cost of Capital (Elsevier, 19892), p. 12. https://www.sciencedirect.com/bookseries/contributions-to-economic-analysis/vol/182/suppl/C
  11. Terry Barker, Paul Ekins and Nick Johnstone (eds.), Global Warming and Energy Demand (Routledge, 1994), p. 124. eBook
  12. Keith Blackburn and Michael Christensen, "Monetary policy and policy credibility: theories and evidence", Journal of Economic Literature, 27(1), 1989, p. 12. Print Online
  13. John Kay, "Tax policy: a survey", Economic Journal, 100(399), 1990, p. 35. Print Online
  14. Pierre Cahuc. Stéphane Carcillo and André Zylberberg, Labor Economics (MIT Press, 2014), pp. 755, 780. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262027700/labor-economics/
  15. Mark Blaug and Howard Vane (eds.), Who's Who in Economics (4th edition), (Edward Elgar, 2003). https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/who-s-who-in-economics-fourth-edition-9781840649925.html
  16. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 123. Online https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  17. Lewis A. Kornhauser and W. Bentley MacLeod, "Contracts between legal persons" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 929. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  18. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 122. Online   https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  19. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman, "Careers in organizations: theories and evidence" in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B (Elsevier, 1999), pp. 2401-2402. https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-labor-economics/vol/3/part/PB
  20. Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, "Economic theories of incentives in organizations" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 67. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  21. Michael Waldman, "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 528-529. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  22. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 89. Online   https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  23. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, "The theory of contracts" in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 98. Online   https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/19C16ACE4A35CB03AA5B4C89E69C20FE/9781139052054c03_p71-156_CBO.pdf/theory_of_contracts.pdf
  24. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives (Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 332-333. https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691091846/the-theory-of-incentives
  25. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 267. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  26. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (MIT Press, 2005), p. 462. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262025768/contract-theory/
  27. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 374. https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:152523816
  28. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman, "Careers in organizations: theories and evidence" in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B (Elsevier, 1999), p. 2390. https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-labor-economics/vol/3/part/PB
  29. Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory (MIT Press, 2005), p. 316. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262025768/contract-theory/
  30. Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, "Personnel Economics" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 483, 495. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  31. Michael Waldman, "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 532. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  32. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 331. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  33. David Martimort, Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole, "A theory of contracts with limited enforcement", Review of Economic Studies, 84(2), 2017, p. 820. Print ISSN 0034-6527 Online ISSN 1467-937X https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw024
  34. W. Bentley MacLeod, Advanced Microeconomics (MIT Press, 2022), p. 275. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046879/advanced-microeconomics-for-contract-institutional-and-organizational-economics/
  35. Pierre Cahuc. Stéphane Carcillo and André Zylberberg, Labor Economics (MIT Press, 2014), p. 325. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262027700/labor-economics/
  36. Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston, "Property rights" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 129, 138. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  37. Lewis A. Kornhauser and W. Bentley MacLeod, "Contracts between legal persons" in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 937. https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9781400845354/the-handbook-of-organizational-economics
  38. Jane Humphries, Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 285-288. Online https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511780455
  39. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, The Morality of Markets (ECARES, 2022), p. 36.

    https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-351283.html

  40. Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume, "Gatekeeping in health care", Journal of Health Economics, 26(1), 2007, p. 152. Print ISSN 0167-6296 Online ISSN 1879-1646 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.04.004
  41. Ching-to Albert Ma and Henry Y. Mak, "Incentives in healthcare payment systems" in Andrew Jones (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Health Economics (Oxford University Press, 2020). Print e https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780190902179.001.0001/acref-9780190902179-e-61?rskey=AtYUK0&result=39
  42. Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing the Priceless (MIT Press, 2002), pp. 93-98. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262640589/pricing-the-priceless/
  43. Who's Who 2023 (Bloomsbury, 2022). https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/whos-who-2023-9781472991287/

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "James M. Malcomson".

Except where otherwise indicated, Everything.Explained.Today is © Copyright 2009-2024, A B Cryer, All Rights Reserved. Cookie policy.