Italian front (World War I) explained

Conflict:Italian front
Partof:the European theatre of World War I
Date:23 May 1915 – 6 November 1918
Place:Eastern Alps and Venetian Plain
Result:Italian victory
Combatant1: Italy



United States

Combatant2:
Commander1: Luigi Cadorna
Armando Diaz
Duke of Aosta
Rudolph Lambart
Commander2:

Archduke Eugen
Svetozar Boroević
Otto von Below
Strength1:
1915: up to 58 divisions

1917: 3 divisions

1918: 2 divisions

1918: 5 regiments
Romanian Legion
1918: 3 regiments
United States
1918: 1,200 in one regiment
Strength2:
1915: up to 61 divisions

1917: 5 divisions
Casualties1: 1,832,639:[1]
246,133 killed
946,640 wounded
70,656 missing
569,210 captured
6,700:[2]
1,057 killed
4,971 wounded
670 missing/captured
2,872:
480 killed
(700 died indirectly)
2,302 wounded
Unknown captured
Casualties2: 1,386,327:[3]
155,350 killed
560,863 wounded
175,041 missing
477,024 captured[4]
N/A
Territory:Italy annexes Trento, Bolzano and Trieste and occupies Innsbruck until the armistice

The Italian front (Italian: Fronte italiano; German: Südwestfront) was one of the main theatres of war of World War I. It involved a series of military engagements in Northern Italy between the Central Powers and the Entente powers from 1915 to 1918. Following secret promises made by the Allies in the 1915 Treaty of London, the Kingdom of Italy entered the war on the Allied side, aiming to annex the Austrian Littoral, northern Dalmatia and the territories of present-day Trentino and South Tyrol.

Although Italy had hoped to gain the territories with a surprise offensive, the front soon bogged down into trench warfare, similar to that on the Western Front, but at high altitudes and with extremely cold winters. Fighting along the front displaced much of the local population, and several thousand civilians died from malnutrition and illness in Italian and Austro-Hungarian refugee camps.[5]

Before the Allied victory, the Austro-Hungarian state started to disintegrate on the last week of October.On the 1st of November, the pacifist and pro-Allies Mihály Károlyi's new Hungarian government decided to recall all of the troops, who were conscripted from the territory of Kingdom of Hungary, which was a major blow for the Habsburg's armies.[6]

The Allied victory at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, the ongoing disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the Italian capture of Trento and Trieste ended all military operations on the front by November 1918.

The armistice of Villa Giusti entered into force on 4 November 1918, when Austria-Hungary no longer existed as a unified entity. Italy entered into World War I also with the aim of completing national unity with the annexation of Trentino-Alto Adige and Julian March: for this reason, the Italian intervention in the World War I is also considered the Fourth Italian War of Independence,[7] in a historiographical perspective that identifies in the latter the conclusion of the unification of Italy, whose military actions began during the revolutions of 1848 with the First Italian War of Independence.[8] [9]

History

Pre-war period

However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers, based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well-founded claims of the two Parties.[10]

The Front

Topography

The Italian Front stretched from the Stelvio Pass (at the border triangle between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland) along the Tyrolean, Carinthian, and Littoral borders to the Isonzo. Its total length was around 600 kilometers, of which 450 kilometers ran in high alpine terrain.[14] This information relates to measurements as the crow flies. Taking into account the natural terrain, the many yokes, peaks and ridges with the resulting differences in height, the effective length was several thousand kilometers.[15]

The front touched very different geographical areas: in the first three sections - from the Stelvio Pass to the Julian Alps in the area of Tarvisio, it ran through mountainous territory, where the average ridge heights reached 2,700 to 3,200 meters. The higher mountainous regions have a highly rugged relief with little vegetation; Elevations over 2,500 meters are also covered by glaciers. The barren landscape and lack of sufficient arable land led to little development of these high elevations; settlement was largely limited to the lower-lying zones. From the Julian Alps to the Adriatic Sea, the mountains are constantly losing on height and only rarely reach 1,000 meters as in the area around Gorizia. This area is also sparsely populated and characterized by a harsh climate with cold winters and very hot and dry summers. A craggy karst landscape spreads out around the Isonzo valley, which adjoins the Italian foothills of the Alps in the southwest.[16]

The topographical characteristics of the front area had a concrete impact on the conduct of the war. The rocky ground, for example, made it difficult to dig trenches and in addition, the karst rock in the Isonzo Valley turned out to be an additional danger for the soldiers. If grenades exploded on the porous surface fragments of the exploding rock acted as additional shrapnel.

Mobilization

Archduke Eugen, who was already in command of the Balkan forces, was promoted to Generaloberst on May 22, 1915 and was given supreme command of the new southwest front.[17] Together with his chief of staff Alfred Krauß the 5th Army was reorganized and placed under the command of General d. Inf. Svetozar Boroević who on May 27 had arrived from the Eastern Front. The K. u. k. Landesverteidigungskommando in Tyrol (LVK) was handed to GdK Viktor Dankl to protect the Tyrolean borders. It included the German Alpenkorps which was suitable for operations in the high mountains, the first divisions arrived on May 26; a short time later, the Alpenkorps was already taking part in combat operations against Italian units, although the German Empire was not officially at war with Italy until August 28, 1916.[18] The "Armeegruppe Rohr" stood under the command of Franz Rohr von Denta and was to secure the Carinthian front. The transfer of the 5th Army and additional troops from the east went smoothly; within a few weeks, Archduke Eugen had around 225,000 soldiers under his command. In June the 48. Division (FML Theodor Gabriel) and finally, in July, the four Kaiserjäger regiments and three k.k. Landesschützen regiments from Galicia were added. A major advantage of the Austro-Hungarian defense was its entrenchment on higher ground.

Italy ordered general mobilization on May 22, 1915 and by the end of June four armies had marched into the north-east border area. In the deployment plan of the Italian general staff (Commando Supremo) under the direction of FM Luigi Cadorna, three main points were set:

Although the Italian armed forces were numerically superior, things initially remained surprisingly quiet on the southwestern front. No attempt was made to break through on the Tyrolean front, and there was no major offensive on the Isonzo either. Due to the hesitant implementation of Cadorna's attack plans, the chance to score the decisive blow right at the beginning was lost.[19] FML Cletus Pichler, the chief of staff of the LVK Tirol, wrote: [20]

That the opportunity for a quick breakthrough was not used was partly due to the slow mobilization of the Italian army. Due to the poorly developed transport network, the provision of troops and war material could only be completed in mid-June, i.e. a month later than estimated by the military leadership.[21] The Italian army also suffered from many shortcomings on the structural level. Artillery pieces and munitions were not the only area where shortages were acute. In August 1914 the Italian army had at its disposal only 750,000 rifles of the standard Carcano 1891 model and no hand grenades available at all. This inadequate supply of equipment especially limited the scope and efficiency of training throughout 1914 and 1915. Munitions were also urgently needed: in July 1914 only ca. 700 rounds were available per rifle, despite Cadorna's demand that 2,000 rounds each be found in preparation for war, by May 1915 the army had only succeeded in procuring 900 rounds per rifle.[22] Meanwhile, Emilio De Bono records that "throughout 1915 hand-grenades remained unheard of in the trenches".[23]

Italy's first machine guns were prototypes, as the Perino Model 1908, or Maxim guns acquired in 1913 from the British manufacturer Vickers. In line with the 1911 plan for creating 602 machine gun sections. By August 1914 only 150 of these had been created, meaning there was only one machine gun section per regiment, as opposed to one per battalion, as envisaged in the plans. By May 1915 the Fiat-Revelli Mod. 1914 became the standard machine gun of the Italian army and a total of 309 sections had been created, with 618 guns in total; though this was an improvement it was still only half the planned number, leaving many battalions to do without. In contrast a standard k.u.k regiment had four machine gun sections, MG 07/12 "Schwarzlose", one for each battalion, whilst a standard British regiment had by February 1915 four machine gun sections per battalion.[24]

See also: White War. During the Italo-Turkish War in Libya (1911–1912), the Italian military suffered equipment and munition shortages not yet repaired before Italian entry into the Great War.[25] At the opening of the campaign, Austro-Hungarian troops occupied and fortified high ground of the Julian Alps and Karst Plateau, but the Italians initially outnumbered their opponents three-to-one.

Battles of Isonzo in 1915

See main article: Battles of the Isonzo.

An Italian offensive aimed to cross the Soča (Isonzo) river, take the fortress town of Gorizia, and then enter the Karst Plateau. This offensive opened the first Battles of the Isonzo.

At the beginning of the First Battle of the Isonzo on 23 June 1915, Italian forces outnumbered the Austrians three-to-one but failed to penetrate the strong Austro-Hungarian defensive lines in the highlands of northwestern Gorizia and Gradisca. Because the Austrian forces occupied higher ground, Italians conducted difficult offensives while climbing. The Italian forces therefore failed to drive much beyond the river, and the battle ended on 7 July 1915.

Despite a professional officer corps, severely under-equipped Italian units lacked morale. Also many troops deeply disliked the newly appointed Italian commander, general Luigi Cadorna. Moreover, preexisting equipment and munition shortages slowed progress and frustrated all expectations for a "Napoleonic style" breakout.[25] Like most contemporaneous militaries, the Italian army primarily used horses for transport but struggled and sometimes failed to supply the troops sufficiently in the tough terrain.

Two weeks later on 18 July 1915, the Italians attempted another frontal assault against the Austro-Hungarian trench lines with more artillery in the Second Battle of the Isonzo. In the northern section of the front, the Italians managed to overrun Mount Batognica over Kobarid (Caporetto), which would have an important strategic value in future battles. This bloody offensive concluded in stalemate when both sides ran out of ammunition.

The Italians recuperated, rearmed with 1200 heavy guns, and then on 18 October 1915 launched the Third Battle of the Isonzo, another attack. Forces of Austria-Hungary repulsed this Italian offensive, which concluded on 4 November without resulting gains.

The Italians again launched another offensive on 10 November, the Fourth Battle of the Isonzo. Both sides suffered more casualties, but the Italians conquered important entrenchments, and the battle ended on 2 December for exhaustion of armaments, but occasional skirmishing persisted.

After the winter lull, the Italians launched the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo on 9 March 1916, and captured the strategic Mount Sabatino. But Austria-Hungary repulsed all other attacks, and the battle concluded on 16 March in poor weather for trench warfare.

The Asiago offensive

Following Italy's stalemate, the Austro-Hungarian forces began planning a counteroffensive (Battle of Asiago) in Trentino and directed over the plateau of Altopiano di Asiago, with the aim to break through to the Po River plain and thus cutting off the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Italian Armies in the North East of the country. The offensive began on 15 May 1916 with 15 divisions, and resulted in initial gains, but then the Italians counterattacked and pushed the Austro-Hungarians back to the Tyrol.

Later battles for the Isonzo

Later in 1916, four more battles along the Isonzo river erupted. The Sixth Battle of the Isonzo, launched by the Italians in August, resulted in a success greater than the previous attacks. The offensive gained nothing of strategic value but did take Gorizia, which boosted Italian spirits. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth battles of the Isonzo (14 September – 4 November) managed to accomplish little except to wear down the already exhausted armies of both nations.

The frequency of offensives for which the Italian soldiers partook between May 1915 and August 1917, one every three months, was higher than demanded by the armies on the Western Front. Italian discipline was also harsher, with punishments for infractions of duty of a severity not known in the German, French, and British armies.

Shellfire in the rocky terrain caused 70% more casualties per rounds expended than on the soft ground in Belgium and France. By the autumn of 1917 the Italian army had suffered most of the deaths it was to incur during the war, yet the end of the war seemed to still be an eternity away. This was not the same line of thought for the Austro-Hungarians. On 25 August, the Emperor Charles wrote to the Kaiser the following: "The experience we have acquired in the eleventh battle has led me to believe that we should fare far worse in the twelfth. My commanders and brave troops have decided that such an unfortunate situation might be anticipated by an offensive. We have not the necessary means as regards troops."

Tunnel warfare in the mountains

See also: Strada delle 52 Gallerie and Mines on the Italian front (World War I).

From 1915, the high peaks of the Dolomites range were an area of fierce mountain warfare. In order to protect their soldiers from enemy fire and the hostile alpine environment, both Austro-Hungarian and Italian military engineers constructed fighting tunnels which offered a degree of cover and allowed better logistics support. Working at high altitudes in the hard carbonate rock of the Dolomites, often in exposed areas near mountain peaks and even in glacial ice, required extreme skill of both Austro-Hungarian and Italian miners.

Beginning on the 13th, later referred to as White Friday, December 1916 would see 10,000 soldiers on both sides killed by avalanches in the Dolomites.[26] Numerous avalanches were caused by the Italians and Austro-Hungarians purposefully firing artillery shells on the mountainside, while others were naturally caused.

In addition to building underground shelters and covered supply routes for their soldiers like the Italian Strada delle 52 Gallerie, both sides also attempted to break the stalemate of trench warfare by tunneling under no man's land and placing explosive charges beneath the enemy's positions. Between 1 January 1916 and 13 March 1918, Austro-Hungarian and Italian units fired a total of 34 mines in this theatre of the war. Focal points of the underground fighting were Pasubio with 10 mines, Lagazuoi with 5, Col di Lana/Monte Sief also with 5, and Marmolada with 4 mines. The explosive charges ranged from 110to(-) of blasting gelatin. In April 1916, the Italians detonated explosives under the peaks of Col Di Lana, killing numerous Austro-Hungarians.

1917: Germany arrives on the front

The Italians directed a two-pronged attack against the Austrian lines north and east of Gorizia. The Austrians checked the advance east, but Italian forces under Luigi Capello managed to break the Austrian lines and capture the Banjšice Plateau. Characteristic of nearly every other theater of the war, the Italians found themselves on the verge of victory but could not secure it because their supply lines could not keep up with the front-line troops and they were forced to withdraw. However, the Italians despite suffering heavy casualties had almost exhausted and defeated the Austro-Hungarian army on the front, forcing them to call in German help for the much anticipated Caporetto Offensive.

The Austro-Hungarians received desperately needed reinforcements after the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo from German Army soldiers rushed in after the Russian offensive ordered by Kerensky of July 1917 failed. Also arrived German troops from Romanian front after the Battle of Mărășești. The Germans introduced infiltration tactics to the Austro-Hungarian front and helped work on a new offensive. Meanwhile, mutinies and plummeting morale crippled the Italian Army from within. The soldiers lived in poor conditions and engaged in attack after attack that often yielded minimal or no military gain.

On 24 October 1917 the Austro-Hungarians and Germans launched the Battle of Caporetto (Italian name for Kobarid or Karfreit in German). Chlorine-arsenic agent and diphosgene gas shells were fired as part of a huge artillery barrage, followed by infantry using infiltration tactics, bypassing enemy strong points and attacking on the Italian rear. At the end of the first day, the Italians had retreated 12miles to the Tagliamento River.

When the Austro-Hungarian offensive routed the Italians, the new Italian chief of staff, Armando Diaz ordered to stop their retreat and defend the fortified defenses around the Monte Grappa summit between the Roncone and the Tomatico mountains; although numerically inferior (51,000 against 120,000) the Italian Army managed to halt the Austro-Hungarian and German armies in the First Battle of Monte Grappa.

1918: The war ends

Second Battle of the Piave River (June 1918)

See main article: Second Battle of the Piave River.

Advancing deep and fast, the Austro-Hungarians outran their supply lines, which forced them to stop and regroup. The Italians, pushed back to defensive lines near Venice on the Piave River, had suffered 600,000 casualties to this point in the war. Because of these losses, the Italian Government called to arms the so-called 99 Boys (Ragazzi del '99); the new class of conscripts born in 1899 who were turning 18 in 1917. In November 1917, British and French troops started to bolster the front line, from the 5 and 6 divisions respectively provided.[27] [28] Far more decisive to the war effort than their troops was the Allies economic assistance by providing strategic materials (steel, coal and crops – provided by the British but imported from Argentina – etc.), which Italy always lacked sorely. In the spring of 1918, Germany pulled out its troops for use in its upcoming Spring Offensive on the Western Front. As a result of the Spring Offensive, Britain and France also pulled half of their divisions back to the Western Front.

The Austro-Hungarians now began debating how to finish the war in Italy. The Austro-Hungarian generals disagreed on how to administer the final offensive. Archduke Joseph August of Austria decided for a two-pronged offensive, where it would prove impossible for the two forces to communicate in the mountains.

The Second Battle of the Piave River began with a diversionary attack near the Tonale Pass named Lawine, which the Italians repulsed after two days of fighting.[29] Austrian deserters betrayed the objectives of the upcoming offensive, which allowed the Italians to move two armies directly in the path of the Austrian prongs. The other prong, led by general Svetozar Boroević von Bojna initially experienced success until aircraft bombed their supply lines and Italian reinforcements arrived.

The decisive Battle of Vittorio Veneto (October–November 1918)

See main article: Battle of Vittorio Veneto.

To the disappointment of Italy's allies, no counter-offensive followed the Battle of Piave. The Italian Army had suffered huge losses in the battle, and considered an offensive dangerous. General Armando Diaz waited for more reinforcements to arrive from the Western Front. By the end of October 1918, Austro-Hungary was in a dire situation. Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia proclaimed their independence and parts of their troops started deserting, disobeying orders and retreating. Many Czechoslovak troops, in fact, started working for the Allied Cause, and in September 1918, five Czechoslovak Regiments were formed in the Italian Army.

By October 1918, Italy finally had enough soldiers to mount an offensive. The attack targeted Vittorio Veneto, across the Piave. The Italian Army broke through a gap near Sacile and poured in reinforcements that crushed the Austro-Hungarian defensive line. On 31 October, the Italian Army launched a full scale attack and the whole front began to collapse. On 3 November, 300,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers surrendered, at the same day the Italians entered Trento and Trieste, greeted by the population.

On 3 November, the military leaders of the already disintegrated Austria-Hungary sent a flag of truce to the Italian commander to ask again for an armistice and terms of peace. The terms were arranged by telegraph with the Allied authorities in Paris, communicated to the Austro-Hungarian commander, and were accepted. The Armistice with Austria was signed in the Villa Giusti, near Padua, on 3 November, and took effect at three o'clock in the afternoon of 4 November. Austria and Hungary signed separate armistices following the overthrow of the Habsburg monarchy and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Casualties

Italian military deaths numbered 834 senior officers and generals, 16,872 junior officers, 16,302 non-commissioned officers, and 497,103 enlisted men, for a total of over 531,000 dead. Of these, 257,418 men came from Northern Italy, 117,480 from Central Italy, and 156,251 from Southern Italy.[30] While the KIA numbers of Italian soldiers on the Italian front in 1915 were 66,090 killed, in 1916 this figure was 118,880 killed, in 1917 it was 152,790 killed, and in 1918 it stood at 40,250 killed soldiers.[31]

Austro-Hungarian KIAs (this category does not include soldiers who perished in the rear or as POWs) amounted to 4,538 officers and 150,812 soldiers, for a total of 155,350 dead. The losses were increasing over time; there were 31,135 killed in 1915, 38,519 in 1916, 42,309 in 1917 and 43,387 in 1918.[32] While in 1915 killed-in-action fatalities on the Italian front constituted 18% of all Austro-Hungarian KIAs, in 1916 this figure was 41%, in 1917 it was 64%, and in 1918 it stood at 84%.[33]

Occupation of Dalmatia, Istria, Trentino and Tyrol

Italian soldiers entered Trento while Bersaglieri landed from the sea in Trieste. The following day the Istrian cities of Rovigno and Parenzo, the Dalmatian islands of Lissa, Lagosta and Lissa, and the cities of Zara and Fiume were occupied: the latter was not included in the territories originally promised secretly by the Allies to Italy in case of victory, but the Italians decided to intervene in reply to a local National Council, formed after the flight of the Hungarians, and which had announced the union to the Kingdom of Italy. The Regia Marina occupied Pola, Sebenico and Zara,[34] which became the capital of the Governorate of Dalmatia.The Governorate of Dalmatia had the provisional aim of ferrying the territory towards full integration into the Kingdom of Italy, progressively importing national legislation in place of the previous one. The Governorate of Dalmatia was evacuated following the Italo-Yugoslav agreements which resulted in the Treaty of Rapallo (1920). Italy occupied also Innsbruck and all Tyrol by the III Corps of the First Army with 20–22,000 soldiers.[35]

Aftermath

As the war came to an end, Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando met with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of France Georges Clemenceau and United States President Woodrow Wilson in Versailles to discuss how the borders of Europe should be redefined to help avoid a future European war. The talks provided little territorial gain to Italy as Wilson promised freedom to all European nationalities to form their nation-states. As a result, the Treaty of Versailles did not assign Dalmatia and Albania to Italy as had been promised. Furthermore, the British and French decided to divide the German overseas colonies into their mandates, with Italy receiving none. Italy also gained no territory from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Despite this, Orlando agreed to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which caused uproar against his government. The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) allowed the annexation of Trentino Alto-Adige, Julian March, Istria, Kvarner as well as the Dalmatian city of Zara.

Furious over the peace settlement, the Italian nationalist poet Gabriele D'Annunzio led disaffected war veterans and nationalists to form the Free State of Fiume in September 1919. His popularity among nationalists led him to be called Il Duce ("The Leader"), and he used black-shirted paramilitary in his assault on Fiume. The leadership title of Duce and the blackshirt paramilitary uniform would later be adopted by the fascist movement of Benito Mussolini. The demand for the Italian annexation of Fiume spread to all sides of the political spectrum.[36]

The subsequent Treaty of Rome (1924) led to the annexation of the city of Fiume to Italy. Italy's lack of territorial gain led to the outcome being denounced as a mutilated victory. The rhetoric of mutilated victory was adopted by Mussolini and led to the rise of Italian fascism, becoming a key point in the propaganda of Fascist Italy. Historians regard mutilated victory as a "political myth", used by fascists to fuel Italian imperialism and obscure the successes of liberal Italy in the aftermath of World War I.[37] Italy also gained a permanent seat in the League of Nations's executive council.

Italian Army Order of Battle as of 24 May 1915

First Army

Lieutenant General Roberto Brusati

III Corps

Lieutenant General Vittorio Camerana

V Corps

source:Lieutenant General Florenzio Aliprindi

Army Troops

Second Army

Lieutenant General Pietro Frugoni

II Corps

Lieutenant General Enzio Reisoli

IV Corps

source:Lieutenant General Mario Nicolis de Robilant

XII Corps

source:Lieutenant General Luigi Segato

Army Troops

Third Army

source:His Royal Highness, Prince Emanuele Filiberto, Duke of Aosta

VI Corps

source:Lieutenant General Carlo Ruelle

VII Corps

source:Lieutenant General Vincenzo Garioni

XI Corps

Main Source:Lieutenant General Giorgio Cigliana

Army Troops

Fourth Army

source:Lieutenant General Luigi Nava

I Corps

Lieutenant General Ottavio Ragni

IX Corps

Lieutenant General Pietro Marini

Army Troops

Carnia Zone

source:Lieutenant General Clemente Lequio

High Command Troops

source:[38]

VIII Corps

source:Lieutenant General Ottavio Briccola

X Corps

source:Lieutenant General Domenico Grandi

XIII Corps

source:Lieutenant General Gaetano Zoppi

XIV Corps

source:Lieutenant General Paolo Morrone

3rd Cavalry Division

Lieutenant General Carlo Guicciardi di Cervarolo

4th Cavalry Division

source:Lieutenant General Alessandro Malingri di Bagnolo

Misc.

See also

Sources

Footnotes

Notes and References

  1. Web site: War Losses (Italy) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) .
  2. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920, The War Office, p. 744.
  3. Encyclopedia: War Losses (Austria-Hungary) . International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) .
  4. Tortato, Alessandro: La Prigionia di Guerra in Italia, 1914–1919, Milan 2004, pp. 49–50. Does not include 18,049 who died. Includes 89,760 recruited into various units and sent back to fight the AH army, and 12,238 who were freed.
  5. Petra Svoljšak (1991). Slovene refugees in Italy during the First World War (Slovenski begunci v Italiji med prvo svetovno vojno), Ljubljana. Diego Leoni – Camillo Zadra (1995), La città di legno: profughi trentini in Austria 1915–1918, Trento-Rovereto 1995.
  6. Book: Robert Gerwarth. November 1918 The German Revolution. Oxford University Press. 2020. 65. 9780192606334.
  7. Web site: Il 1861 e le quattro Guerre per l'Indipendenza (1848-1918). 6 March 2015. it. 12 March 2021. 19 March 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220319075828/http://www.piacenzaprimogenita150.it/index.php?it%2F176%2Fil-1861-e-le-quattro-guerre-per-lindipendenza-1848-1918. dead.
  8. Web site: La Grande Guerra nei manifesti italiani dell'epoca. it. 12 March 2021. 23 September 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20150923183754/http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/MiBAC/sito-MiBAC/Contenuti/MibacUnif/Eventi/visualizza_asset.html_1239896580.html. dead.
  9. Book: Il Manuale di Storia in Italia, di Piergiovanni Genovesi. 9788856818680. it. 12 March 2021. Genovesi. Piergiovanni. 11 June 2009. FrancoAngeli .
  10. http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Amended_Version_of_The_Triple_Alliance Amended Version of the Triple Alliance
  11. Alexander Jordan: Krieg um die Alpen: Der Erste Weltkrieg im Alpenraum und der bayerische Grenzschutz in Tirol. Berlin 2008, p. 60.
  12. Hugo Hantsch: Leopold Graf Berchtold. Grand seigneur and statesman. Styria, Graz/Vienna/Cologne 1963, Volume 1: p. 567.
  13. Hugo Hantsch: Leopold Graf Berchtold. Grand seigneur and statesman. Styria, Graz/Vienna/Cologne 1963, volume 2: pp. 705-717.
  14. Helmut Peter, Das Wesen des Hochgebirgskrieges 1915–1917/1918. phil. Dipl., Wien 1997 (masch.), p. 6.
  15. Jordan, Krieg, p. 88; Schaumann/Schubert, Süd-West-Front, S. 21.
  16. Jordan, Krieg, p. 89
  17. Rauchensteiner, Doppeladler; S. 244, Etschmann, Südfront, p. 27.
  18. Etschmann, Südfront, p. 27, p. 29 f.
  19. Jordan, Krieg, p. 220–223.
  20. Cletus Pichler, Der Krieg in Tirol 1915/1916, Innsbruck 1924, p. 33 f.
  21. Klavora, Karstfront, p. 21; Hans Jürgen Pantenius, Der Angriffsgedanke gegen Italien bei Conrad von Hötzendorf. Ein Beitrag zur Koalitionskriegsführung im Ersten Weltkrieg, Bd. 1, Wien 1984, 613 ff.
  22. Wilcox, Vanda, Morale and the Italian Army during the First World War, Cambridge University Press, 2016 p. 95
  23. Emilio de Bono, La guerra: Come e dove l'ho vista e combattuta io (Milan: A.Mondadori, 1935), p. 35.
  24. Wilcox, Vanda, Morale and the Italian Army during the First World War, Cambridge University Press, 2016 p. 95
  25. Book: Keegan, John. The First World War. 1999. Knopf, N.Y.. 0-375-40052-4. 226, 227. registration.
  26. Book: Thompson, Mark. Mark Thompson (historian). The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front, 1915–1919. Faber & Faber. London. 2008. 978-0-571-22333-6.
  27. Book: Williamson, Howard J.. The award of the Military Medal for the campaign in Italy 1917-1918. privately published by Anne Williamson. 2020. 978-1-8739960-5-8. The book includes: – A detailed overview of the Italian Campaign and its battles. – Notes on the [five] Divisions engaged in Italy..
  28. Web site: Liste précise régiments [parmi 6 divisions] en Italie ]. 10 April 2006. Forum pages14-18. fr. 14 August 2020.
  29. Web site: From the website of the museum of the war on Adamello. museoguerrabianca.it. 29 April 2018. dead. https://web.archive.org/web/20110722042646/http://www.museoguerrabianca.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=41. 22 July 2011.
  30. Ministry of War and later Ministry of Defence: Albo d’Oro [Roll of Honour], 28 vols., Rome 1926–1964.
  31. Pierluigi Scolè, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_losses_Italy, [in:] International Encyclopedia of the First World War [accessed May 31, 2021]
  32. Anatol Schmied-Kowarzik, War Losses (Austria-Hungary), [in:] International Encyclopedia of the First World War [accessed May 31, 2021]
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