Iron triangle (US politics) explained

In United States politics, the "iron triangle" comprises the policy-making relationship among the congressional committees, the bureaucracy, and interest groups,[1] as described in 1981 by Gordon Adams.[2] [3] Earlier mentions of this 'iron triangle' concept are in a 1956 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report as, "Iron triangle: Clout, background, and outlook" and "Chinks in the Iron Triangle?"[4]

Central assumption

Central to the concept of an iron triangle is the assumption that bureaucratic agencies, as political entities, seek to create and consolidate their own power base.[5]

In this view an agency's (such as State-owned enterprises of the United States, Independent agencies of the United States government or Regulatory agency) power is determined by its constituency, not by its consumers.[6] (For these purposes, "constituents" are politically active members sharing a common interest or goal; consumers are the expected recipients of goods or services provided by a governmental bureaucracy and often are identified in an agency's written goals or mission statement.)[7] [8]

Apparent bureaucratic dysfunction may be attributable to the alliances formed between the agency and its constituency.[9] The official goals of an agency may appear to be thwarted or ignored altogether, at the expense of the citizenry it is designed to serve.[10]

Cultivation of constituency

The necessity for a bureaucratic institution to establish a strong support base often results in the institution fostering ties with a specific group within its policy jurisdiction. This is accomplished by identifying potential allies that could significantly enhance its power in the political sphere, utilizing their civic intelligence to leverage collective social capital.[11]

Notably, within the more junior tiers of the bureaucracy, the intended recipients of an agency's services may not possess significant influence, resulting in their perception as ineffective supporters. Large portions of the general public, whose interests are widespread, may lack political engagement, demonstrate inconsistent voting behaviors, suffer from disorganization or inertia, and frequently lack financial strength or resources.[12]

In contrast, private entities or advocacy groups, including 501(c) and 527 organizations, often wield substantial power. These groups typically have robust organization, considerable resources, high mobilization capacity, and are highly active in political endeavors, evidenced by their voting patterns, campaign contributions, lobbying activities, and even initiating legislation.[13]

Therefore, an agency might find it advantageous to shift its attention away from its designated service recipients towards a strategically chosen group of supporters. This enables the agency to pursue its objective of increasing its political clout.

Dynamics

In the United States, power is exercised in the Congress, and, particularly, in congressional committees and subcommittees. By aligning itself with selected constituencies, an agency may be able to affect policy outcomes directly in these committees and subcommittees.[14] This is where an iron triangle may manifest itself.

The image above displays the concept.

The result is a three-way, stable alliance that sometimes is called a "sub-government" because of its durability, impregnability, and power to determine policy.[18] An iron triangle relationship can result in regulatory capture, the passing of very narrow, pork-barrel policies that benefit a small segment of the population. The interests of the agency's constituency (the interest groups) are met, while the needs of consumers (which may be the general public) are passed over.[19]

That public administration may result in benefiting a small segment of the public in this way, may be viewed as problematic for the popular concept of democracy if the general welfare of all citizens is sacrificed for very specific interests. This is especially so if the passed legislation neglects or reverses the original purpose for which the agency was established. The Regulatory Capture Prevention Act of 2011 - Establishes the Office of Regulatory Integrity in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), requires investigation when (1) agency action or inaction that fails to advance the mission of the agency or is otherwise inimical to the public interest; (2) regulation, licensing, adjudication, grants, or other agency action that favors a limited number of economic interests or is otherwise inimical to the public interest; (3) enforcement priorities that are not reasonably calculated to accomplish regulatory goals; and (4) a loss of confidence in the integrity of the regulatory process.[20]

Some maintain to the contrary, that such arrangements are natural outgrowths of, and not discordant with, the democratic process, since they frequently involve a majority block of voters implementing their will—through their elected representatives in government.[21]

On January 27, 2011, FBI Director Robert Mueller used "iron triangles" to refer to "organized criminals, corrupt government officials, and business leaders" which he said "pose a significant national security threat".[22]

See also

Bibliography

Notes and References

  1. Hayden. F.. Policymaking Network of the Iron-Triangle Subgovernment for Licensing Hazardous Waste Facilities. Journal of Economic Issues. June 2002. 36. 2. 479. 10.1080/00213624.2002.11506492 . 154590723 . 1 November 2013.
  2. Adams, Gordon, The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting, Council on Economic Priorities, New York, 1981. .
  3. Connor O'Brian, David Brown, Meet Trump's acting Pentagon chief, Politico, December 23, 2018 - which notes, "Gordon Adams, a former Democratic White House budget official specializing in defense,..."
  4. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report . 1956 . 30, 1627–1634.
  5. Power and Politics in Organizational Life . Harvard Business Review . May 1970 . Zaleznik . Abraham .
  6. Multiple-State Constituencies in the IMF: An Agency Approach . Martin . Lisa L. . Woods. Ngaire . October 2005 . IMF Sixth Annual Research Conference .
  7. Web site: The American Tradition of Consumer Politics | the American Historian .
  8. Book: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . Government Performance and Results Act Planning Document 1997-2002.
  9. Web site: Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate .
  10. Web site: The Decay of American Political Institutions . 8 December 2013 .
  11. http://faculty.washington.edu/matsueda/courses/590/Readings/Evans%2520Synergy%25201996.pdf 590 Course readings
  12. Web site: Political Typology Archives .
  13. 10.1057/iga.2012.9 . Interest group influence on US policy change: An assessment based on policy history . 2012 . Grossmann . Matt . Interest Groups & Advocacy . 1 . 2 . 171–192 . 144801902 . free .
  14. Web site: Super PACs & Coordination | Brennan Center for Justice .
  15. Web site: NIC Releases Global Trends - Paradox of Progress .
  16. Book: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/ . The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Political Representation . 2018 . Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University .
  17. Baldwin . David A. . 1971 . Money and Power . The Journal of Politics . en . 33 . 3 . 578–614 . 10.2307/2128274 . 0022-3816.
  18. Subgovernments as Determinants of Political Viability . 2151026 . McCool . Daniel . Political Science Quarterly . 1990 . 105 . 2 . 269–293 . 10.2307/2151026 .
  19. Web site: - Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture .
  20. Web site: S.1338 - 112th Congress (2011-2012): Regulatory Capture Prevention Act of 2011 . 20 July 2011 .
  21. Web site: Texas Politics - Iron Triangles: Government's Secret Playbook? .
  22. Web site: The Evolving Organized Crime Threat. 2021-11-07. FBI. en-us.