| Status: | Frozen negotiations |
| Applied: | 14 April 1987 |
| Application Approved: | 16 December 2004 |
| Negotiations Start: | 3 October 2005 |
| Negotiations Finish: | TBD |
| Nato: | 18 February 1952 |
| Nation: | Turkey |
| National Denonym: | Turkish |
| Map: | European Union Turkey Locator (with internal borders).svg |
| Progress: | Negotiating / Stalled |
| National Population: | 83,154,997[1] |
| National Area Total: | 783,562 |
| National Gdp: | $2.393 trillion |
| National Gdp Pc: | $32,278 |
| National Hdi: | 0.82 |
| National Gini: | 41.9 |
| New Eu Population: | 527,863,413 (+18.70%) |
| New Eu Area: | 5,164,938 (+17.88%) |
| New Eu Gdp: | 20,253 (+13.90%) |
| New Eu Gdp Pc: | 38,367 (−3.74%) |
| New Languages: | 25 (+1) (Turkish) |
| Website: | Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs |
Turkey is negotiating its accession to the European Union (EU) as a member state, following its application to become a full member of the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU, on 14 April 1987.[2]
After the ten founding members in 1949, Turkey became one of the first new members (the 13th member) of the Council of Europe in 1950.[3] [4] The country became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 and was an associate member of the Western European Union from 1992 to its end in 2011. Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 and was officially recognised as a candidate for full membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit of the European Council.
Negotiations for full membership were started on 3 October 2005.[5] Progress was slow: out of the 35 chapters necessary to complete the accession process, only 16 had been opened and one had been closed by May 2016.[6] The early 2016 refugee deal between Turkey and the European Union was intended to accelerate negotiations after previous stagnation and allow visa-free travel through Europe for Turks.[7]
Since 2016, accession negotiations have stalled.[8] The EU has accused and criticized Turkey for human rights violations and deficits in rule of law. In 2017, EU officials said that the strong presidency created by the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum would violate the Copenhagen criteria of eligibility for an EU membership.[9]
On 20 February 2019, a European parliament committee voted to suspend the accession talks, sparking criticism from the government of Turkey. Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.[10] [11] [12]
On 30 January 2023, the Table of Six (then-main opposition alliance) in Turkey released a memorandum of understanding for common policies. It re-affirmed the opposition's intent to continue the EU accession talks if they were to be elected in that year's elections.[13] [14] It is one of nine current EU candidate countries, together with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine.
See main article: European Union–Turkey relations.
After the Ottoman Empire's collapse following World War I, Turkish revolutionaries led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged victorious in the Turkish War of Independence, establishing the modern Turkish Republic as it exists today. Atatürk, President of Turkey, implemented a series of reforms, including secularisation and industrialisation, intended to "Europeanise" or Westernise the country.[15] During World War II, Turkey remained neutral until February 1945, when it joined the Allies. The country took part in the Marshall Plan of 1947, became a member of the Council of Europe in 1950,[3] [4] and a member of NATO in 1952.[16] During the Cold War, Turkey allied itself with the United States and Western Europe. The Turkish position vis-à-vis Europe has been characterized as "Europe has been an object of desire as well as a source of frustration for Turkish national identity in a long and strained history".[17]
| 13 December 1997 | Luxembourg Council declares Turkey eligible to become an EU member. | |
| 11 December 1999 | Helsinki Summit European Council declares Turkey a candidate country. | |
| 24 March 2001 | Council adopts Accession Partnership for Turkey. | |
| 19 May 2003 | Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. | |
| 16 December 2004 | European Council declares that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the criteria for opening accession negotiations beginning in October 2005. | |
| 3 October 2005 | Council adopts negotiating framework and negotiations are formally opened. Screening process begins. | |
| 1 June 2006 | Negotiations are opened and closed on Chapter 25 – Science and Research. | |
| 11 December 2006 | Because Turkey refused to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, Council decides that eight chapters will not be opened. See main article: Cyprus dispute. | |
| 19 February 2008 | Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. | |
| 30 June 2010 | Negotiations are opened on Chapter 12 – Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy. | |
| 17 May 2012 | Positive Agenda intended to bring fresh dynamics into the EU-Turkey relations was launched. | |
| 5 November 2013 | Negotiations are opened on Chapter 22 – Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments. | |
| 16 December 2013 | Visa liberalisation dialogue launched and EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement signed. | |
| 29 November 2015 | First EU-Turkey Summit held and Joint EU-Turkey Action Plan activated. The EU welcomes Turkey's commitment to accelerate the fulfilment of the Visa Roadmap benchmarks in return for halting the flow of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Greece.[19] | |
| 14 December 2015 | Negotiations are opened on Chapter 17 – Economic and Monetary Policy. | |
| 30 June 2016 | Negotiations are opened on Chapter 33 – Financial and Budgetary Provisions. | |
| 24 November 2016 | MEPs vote overwhelmingly to suspend negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns. | |
| 6 July 2017 | EU parliament called for the suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey. | |
| 20 February 2019 | EU parliament committee votes to suspend accession talks with Turkey. | |
| 13 March 2019 | The European Parliament unanimously accepted the call for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey. |
Turkey first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1959, and on 12 September 1963 signed the "Agreement Creating An Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community", also known as the Ankara Agreement. This agreement came into effect the following year on 12 December 1964. The Ankara Agreement sought to integrate Turkey into a customs union with the EEC whilst acknowledging the final goal of membership.[15] In November 1970, a further protocol called the "Additional Protocol" established a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods traded between Turkey and the EEC.[15]
On 14 April 1987, Turkey submitted its application for formal membership into the European Economic Community. The European Commission responded in December 1989 by confirming Ankara's eventual membership but also by deferring the matter to more favourable times, citing Turkey's economic and political situation, as well its poor relations with Greece and the conflict with Cyprus as creating an unfavourable environment with which to begin negotiations.[20] This position was confirmed again in the Luxembourg European Council of 1997 in which accession talks were started with central and eastern European states and Cyprus, but not Turkey. During the 1990s, Turkey proceeded with closer integration with the European Union by agreeing to a customs union in 1995. In 1999, following the Greek-Turkish earthquake diplomacy, Greece lifted its opposition to Turkey's accession to the European Union. Moreover, the Helsinki Summit European Council of 1999 proved a milestone as the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate on equal footing with other potential candidates.
The next significant step in EU–Turkey relations came with the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council.[21] According to it, "the EU would open negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria."[21] French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed joint support for the December 2004 European Commission summit meeting agenda for Turkey joining the European Union.[22]
The European Commission recommended that the negotiations should begin in 2005, but also added various precautionary measures. The EU leaders agreed on 16 December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October 2005.[23] While Austria and Germany initially wanted to leave open the possibility that negotiations with Turkey would lead to a privileged partnership, less than full membership, accession negotiations were ultimately launched with the "shared objective" of membership.[24]
Turkey's accession talks have since been stalled by a number of domestic and external problems. Both Austria and France have said they would hold a referendum on Turkey's accession. In the case of France, a change in its Constitution was made to impose such a referendum, but later another constitutional change has enabled the parliament (if a large majority of its members agrees) to prevent such a referendum.[25] The issue of Cyprus continues to be a major obstacle to negotiations.[26] European officials have commented on the slowdown in Turkish reforms which, combined with the Cyprus problem, led the EU's Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn in March 2007 to warn of an impending 'train crash' in the negotiations.[27] Due to these setbacks, negotiations again came to a halt in December 2006, with the EU freezing talks in 8 of the 35 key areas under negotiation.[28]
In 2007, Turkey stated that they were aiming to comply with EU law by 2013,[29] but Brussels refused to back that as a deadline for membership.[30] In 2006 President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso said that the accession process will take at least until 2021.[31] In a visit to Germany on 31 October 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made clear that Turkey was expecting membership in the Union to be realised by 2023, the 100th Anniversary of the Turkish Republic, implying that they could end membership negotiations if the talks had not yielded a positive result by then.[32] Turkish President Abdullah Gül said that upon completing the accession process Turkey will hold a referendum for Turkish membership in the European Union.[33]
In December 2009, EU member the Republic of Cyprus blocked 6 chapters of Turkish accession negotiations, including those on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Energy and Education and Culture, arguing that Turkey needs to first normalise relations with Cyprus.[34] [35] As a result, no chapters have been opened since June 2010.[36] [37] [38] Hence, there is no chapter Turkey could open other than the difficult and economically detrimental chapters Competition Policy, Social Policy and Employment, and Public Procurement that most candidate countries open at the end of accession as all other chapters were blocked. In February 2013, Turkish Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Burak Erdenir, claimed that the EU had yet to communicate to Turkey the benchmark criteria for opening chapters 23 and 24, Judiciary & Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom & Security, which was to be done after screening of the chapters was completed in 2006, thus making it impossible to comply with them. He also suggested this was a deliberate attempt to slow their accession process.[39]
After over two years of no chapter openings, the European Commission set up a "Positive Agenda" designed to focus on common EU-Turkey interests. EU Commissioner for expansion Stefan Füle describes that the goal was "to keep the accession process alive and put it properly back on track after a period of stagnation which has been a source of frustration for both sides."[40] The EU Commission mentioned a broad range of areas as the main elements of the Agenda such as "intensified dialogue and cooperation on political reforms", "visa", "mobility and migration", "energy", "fight against terrorism", "further participation of Turkey in Community programmes", "town twinning", "trade and the Customs Union" and "supporting efforts to align with the acquis, including on chapters where accession negotiations cannot be opened for the time being". The proposal was considered favorably on the condition that it serves as an instrument in support of and complementary to the negotiation process with the EU.
In the framework of "Positive Agenda", Working Groups were established on 8 chapters ("3-Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services", "6-Company Law", "10-Information Society and Media", "18-Statistics", "23-Judiciary and Fundamental Rights", "24-Justice, Freedom and Security", "28-Consumer and Health Protection", and "32-Financial Control"). The "Positive Agenda" kick-off meeting was held on 17 May 2012 in Ankara with the participation of Stefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. As a result of the Working Groups meetings held so far, a total of four closing benchmarks were confirmed to have been met by Turkey in three chapters (Company Law, Consumer and Health Protection as well as Financial Control chapters).[41]
On 20 June 2013, in the wake of Ankara's crackdown on mass demonstrations in Taksim Square, Germany blocked the start to new EU accession talks with Turkey.[42] According to the Financial Times, one Turkish official said that such a move could potentially break off political relations with the bloc.
A Eurobarometer poll which included EU countries and candidate countries as well, showed that 43% of Turks viewed the EU positively, as compared with 60% six months previously. In the same poll, 29% of Turks polled expressed support for an EU Constitution, the lowest level of support among EU countries and candidates polled.[43] Germany said that its reservation stems from a technical issue, but then-Chancellor Angela Merkel, an opponent of Turkish entry into the EU, described herself as "shocked" after Ankara's use of overwhelming police force against mostly peaceful demonstrators. France stated that they would not waive their veto over unfreezing four accession chapters with Turkey until after the elections for the European Parliament in June 2014.[44]
Following President Erdoğan's crackdown on supporters of the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, EU relations became damaged. Erdoğan has indicated his approval of reinstating the death penalty to punish those involved in the coup, with the EU suggesting that this would end its EU ambitions. On 26 July 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that Turkey's EU membership process would come to an end if the death penalty was returned in Turkey.[45] Erdoğan stated in November 2016 that he was considering putting Turkey's continued negotiations with the EU on membership to a referendum in 2017.[46] In November 2016, the European Parliament voted in favour of a non-binding resolution to request that the European Commission temporarily suspend membership negotiations due to the "disproportionate repressive measures" of the government to the coup.[47] On 13 December, the European Council (comprising the heads of state or government of the member states) resolved that it would open no new areas in Turkey's membership talks in the "prevailing circumstances";[48] Turkey's path toward autocratic rule makes progress on EU accession impossible.[49] In 2016, EU member Austria opposed Turkey's EU membership.[50]
In April 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted to reopen its monitoring procedure against Turkey. This vote is widely understood to deal a major blow to Turkey's perspective of eventual EU membership, as exiting that process was made a precondition of EU accession negotiations back in 2004.[51] In June 2017, members of the European Parliament expressed that the strong presidency created by the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum violate the Copenhagen criteria of eligibility for an EU membership.[9] On 6 July 2017, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey.[52]
The European Commission's long-term budget proposal for the 2021–2027 period released in May 2018 included pre-accession funding for a Western Balkan Strategy for further enlargement, but omitted Turkey.[53]
In March 2018, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz opposed Turkey's EU accession talks and urged it to halt membership talks.[54] On 26 June 2018, the EU's General Affairs Council stated that "the Council notes that Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen." The Council added that it is "especially concerned about the continuing and deeply worrying backsliding on the rule of law and on fundamental rights including the freedom of expression."[55] [56] [57]
On 20 February 2019, a European parliament committee voted to suspend the accession talks, sparking criticism from the government of Turkey.[58] [59] [60] On 13 March 2019, the European Parliament unanimously voted for a halt to the full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey.[61] In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan brought up Turkey's EU membership application during a NATO summit in Vilnius, linking it to Sweden's accession to NATO.[62] [63] According to Dagens Nyheter's data, in September 2023, 60% of Swedes said that Sweden opposes Turkey's EU membership and will not support the membership process, while 7% said that Sweden does not oppose Turkey's EU membership and will support the membership process.[64]
| 1. Free Movement of Goods | 16 January 2006 | 24 February 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006[65] | – | – | – | |
| 2. Freedom of Movement For Workers | 19 July 2006 | 11 September 2006 | – | – | 8 December 2009[66] | – | – | – | |
| 3. Right of Establishment & Freedom To Provide Services | 21 November 2005 | 20 December 2005 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 4. Free Movement of Capital | 25 November 2005 | 22 December 2005 | – | 19 December 2008 | – | – | – | – | |
| 5. Public Procurement | 7 November 2005 | 28 November 2005 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 6. Company Law | 21 June 2006 | 20 July 2006 | – | 17 June 2008 | – | – | – | – | |
| 7. Intellectual Property Law | 6 February 2006 | 3 March 2006 | – | 17 June 2008 | – | – | – | – | |
| 8. Competition Policy | 8 November 2005 | 2 December 2005 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 9. Financial Services | 29 March 2006 | 3 May 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 10. Information Society & Media | 12 June 2006 | 14 July 2006 | – | 19 December 2008 | – | – | – | – | |
| 11. Agriculture & Rural Development | 5 December 2005 | 26 January 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 12. Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy | 9 March 2006 | 28 April 2006 | – | 30 June 2010 | – | – | – | – | |
| 13. Fisheries | 24 February 2006 | 31 March 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 14. Transport Policy | 26 June 2006 | 28 September 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 15. Energy | 15 May 2006 | 16 June 2006 | – | – | 8 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 16. Taxation | 6 June 2006 | 12 July 2006 | – | 30 June 2009 | – | – | – | – | |
| 17. Economic & Monetary Policy | 16 February 2006 | 23 March 2006 | – | 14 December 2015 | 25 June 2007[67] [68] | 14 December 2015[69] | – | – | |
| 18. Statistics | 19 June 2006 | 18 July 2006 | – | 25 June 2007 | – | – | – | – | |
| 19. Social Policy & Employment | 8 February 2006 | 22 March 2006 | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy | 27 March 2006 | 5 May 2006 | – | 29 March 2007 | – | – | – | – | |
| 21. Trans-European Networks | 30 June 2006 | 29 September 2006 | – | 19 December 2007 | – | – | – | – | |
| 22. Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments | 11 September 2006 | 10 October 2006 | – | 5 November 2013[70] [71] [72] | 25 June 2007 | 12 February 2013 | – | – | |
| 23. Judiciary & Fundamental Rights | 7 September 2006 | 13 October 2006 | – | – | 8 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 24. Justice, Freedom & Security | 23 January 2006 | 15 February 2006 | – | – | 8 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 25. Science & Research | 20 October 2005 | 14 November 2005 | – | 12 June 2006 | – | – | – | 12 June 2006 | |
| 26. Education & Culture | 26 October 2005 | 16 November 2005 | – | – | 8 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 27. Environment & Climate Change | 3 April 2006 | 2 June 2006 | – | – | 21 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 28. Consumer & Health Protection | 8 June 2006 | 11 July 2006 | – | – | 19 December 2007 | – | – | – | |
| 29. Customs Union | 31 January 2006 | 14 March 2006 | – | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | |
| 30. External Relations | 10 July 2006 | 13 September 2006 | – | 11 December 2006 | – | – | – | – | |
| 31. Foreign, Security & Defence Policy | 14 September 2006 | 6 October 2006 | – | – | 8 December 2009 | – | – | – | |
| 32. Financial Control | 18 May 2006 | 30 June 2006 | – | 26 July 2007 | – | – | – | – | |
| 33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions | 6 September 2006 | 4 October 2006 | – | 30 June 2016[73] | 25 June 2007 | 18 March 2016 | – | – | |
| 34. Institutions | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| 35. Other Issues | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |
| Progress | 33 of 33 | 33 of 33 | 0 of 13 | 16 of 33 | 17 of 33 | 3 of 17 | 1 of 33 | 1 of 13 | |
‡ Prior to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, there were thirty-one chapters of the acquis communautaire. | |||
| Acquis chapter | 2003[74] | 2004[75] | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Free Movement of Goods | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 2. Freedom Movement of Persons | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | |
| 3. Freedom to Provide Services | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 4. Free Movement of Capital | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 5. Company Law | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 6. Competition Policy | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 7. Agriculture | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 8. Fisheries | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 9. Transport Policy | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 10. Taxation | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 11. Economic and Monetary Union | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 12. Statistics | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 13. Social Policy and Employment | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 14. Energy | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 15. Industrial Policy | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | |
| 16. Small and Medium-sized Companies | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | |
| 17. Science and Research | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 18. Education and Training | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | |
| 19. Telecommunication and Information Technologies | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | |
| 20. Culture and Audio-visual Policy | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 21. Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 22. Environment | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | |
| 23. Consumer and Health Protection | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | |
| 24. Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 25. Customs Union | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | |
| 26. External Relations | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | |
| 27. Common Foreign and Security Policy | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | |
| 28. Financial Control | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | |
| 29. Financial and Budgetary Provisions | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 30. Institutions | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 31. Others | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
‡ Prior to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union there were thirty-one chapters of the acquis communautaire. | |||
‡ After the 2004 enlargement of the European Union four more chapters were added and/or restructured, bringing the total number of acquis communautaire chapters to 35. | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Clusters | Acquis chapter | 2005[76] | 2006[77] | 2007[78] | 2008[79] | 2009[80] | 2010[81] | 2011[82] | 2012[83] | 2013[84] | 2014[85] | 2015[86] | 2016[87] | 2018[88] | 2019[89] | 2020[90] | 2021[91] | 2022[92] | 2023[93] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cluster 1: Fundamentals | 23. Judiciary and Fundamental Rights | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | |
| 24. Justice, Freedom, and Security | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 5. Public Procurement | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 18. Statistics | Considerable efforts needed | Some level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Advanced | Advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 32. Financial Control | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Good level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | ||
| Cluster 2: Internal Market | 1. Free Movement of Goods | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | |
| 2. Freedom of Movement for Workers | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | ||
| 3. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | ||
| 4. Free Movement of Capital | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 6. Company Law | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | ||
| 7. Intellectual Property Law | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Early stage | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | ||
| 8. Competition Policy | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| 9. Financial Services | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Good level of preparation | Advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | ||
| 28. Consumer and Health Protection | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | ||
| Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth | 10. Information Society and Media | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | |
| 16. Taxation | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 17. Economic and Monetary Policy | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Advanced | Advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| 19. Social Policy and Employment | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| 20. Enterprise and Industrial Policy | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 25. Science and Research | Further efforts needed | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | ||
| 26. Education and Culture | Further efforts needed | Well advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Well advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 29. Customs Union | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Advanced | Advanced | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | ||
| Cluster 4: Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity | 14. Transport Policy | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | |
| 15. Energy | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 21. Trans-European Networks | Early stage | Early stage | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Advanced | Further efforts needed | Advanced | Moderately advanced | Advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | Well advanced | ||
| 27. Environment and Climate Change | Early stage | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| Cluster 5: Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion | 11. Agriculture and Rural Development | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Early stage | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | |
| 12. Food Safety, Veterinary, and Phytosanitary Policy | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Moderately advanced | Early stage | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| 13. Fisheries | Early stage | Early stage | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Further efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 22. Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments | Considerable efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Considerable efforts needed | Considerable efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | ||
| 33. Financial and Budgetary Provisions | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Early stage | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| Cluster 6: External Relations | 30. External Relations | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Advanced | Good level of preparation | Good level of preparation | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | |
| 31. Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Moderately advanced | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | Some level of preparation | ||
| Others | 34. Institutions | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | |
| 35. Other Issues | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | Further efforts needed | ||
‡ After the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, four more chapters were added and/or restructured, bringing the total number of acquis communautaire chapters to 35. | ||||||||||||||||||||
See main article: article. The European Commission's long-term budget proposal for the 2021-2027 period released in May 2018 included pre-accession funding for a Western Balkan Strategy for further enlargement, but omitted Turkey.[94]
The problem of Turkey's membership of the EU is compounded by conflicting views as to what the EU should ultimately become.[95] This has played a significant role in the debate, due in part to the European debt crisis and the fact that as a result of this the eurozone and the EU overall is more federalised on both fiscal, legal and political levels than it was at the time of Turkey's application or at the time that Turkey was accepted as a candidate.[96] Generally those members of the EU who support a rights-based free trade bloc do not oppose Turkey as adamantly as those who support a broader political union. The latter, in particular, were concerned that unification would be frustrated and the European project threatened by Turkey's inclusion.[97]
Proponents of Turkey's membership argue that Turkey's geographical location will contribute to peace. According to the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, "the accession of Turkey would give the EU a decisive role for stability in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which is clearly in the strategic interest of Europe".[98] Poland is a key supporter for Turkey's bid to join the EU,[99] [100] while the United Kingdom has expressed support previously, but not since leaving the EU.[101]
Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 83 million inhabitants would bestow the largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament.[27] Turkey now has a larger population than Germany. However, a single country can only hold a maximum of 96 seats in the European Parliament.
Turkey's membership would also affect future enlargement plans, especially the number of nations seeking EU membership,[27] grounds on which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has opposed Turkey's admission. Giscard has suggested that it would lead to demands for accession by Morocco. Morocco's application is already rejected for "not being a European country"; Turkey, unlike Morocco, has 3% of its territory in Europe. The vast majority of its population lives in the Asian side of the country. On the other hand, the country's largest city, Istanbul, lies mostly in Europe. On the other hand, Cyprus, which is geographically located in Asia, joined the European Union in 2004. French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated in January 2007 that "enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political union, and that I do not accept ... I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside the European Union."[102]
EU member states must unanimously agree on Turkey's membership for the Turkish accession to be successful. A number of nations may oppose it; notably Austria; Germany (former chancellor Angela Merkel has long rejected Turkey's accession bid, and has proposed a "privileged partnership" instead);[103] and France (where some are anxious at the prospect of a new wave of Muslim immigrants, given the country's already large Muslim community).[104]
Negotiations to remove the French constitutional requirement for a compulsory referendum on all EU accessions after Croatia resulted in a new proposal to require a compulsory referendum on the accession of any country with a population of more than 5% of the EU's total population; this clause would mainly apply to Turkey and Ukraine.[105]
The current situation according to the French constitution is as follows: if of the delegates (from the Senate and the Parliament) agree to the accession of Turkey, there will be no referendum.
Upon accession to the EU, Turkey expects to receive economic development aid.[106] There is also an expectation that there will be an increase in European foreign investment in the Turkish economy, further driving economic growth.[106] During potential economic crisis events, Turkey could benefit from EU assistance.[107]
Free movement of people across the EU will give many Turkish people the opportunity to migrate to other parts of Europe in search of work, or a higher standard of living. The option of migration out of Turkey will inevitably ease tensions in the east of the country, as the prospect of a better standard of living will tend to cool separatist tendencies. However, there have been problems concerning irregular transit migration through Turkey to the EU.[108]
Some secularists in Turkey envisage that the accession of Turkey will contribute to the spread of secular western values in Turkey. Conversely, some non-secularists in Turkey envisage that accession will contribute to the further growth and acceptance of Islam in Europe.[109] The EU accession bid has stimulated Turkey's political and legal reforms and intensified the democratisation process.[110]
Given Turkey's large and growing population, Turkey will have a correspondingly large representation in the European Parliament (2nd and equal with Germany, with 96 seats in EU parliament). This will give Turkey a strong direct influence over EU policies.[111]
See main article: Economy of Turkey.
See also: European Union–Turkey Customs Union.
Turkey has the world's 11th largest GDP-PPP[112] and 20th largest Nominal GDP.[112] The country is a founding member of the OECD and the G-20 major economies.
Turkey has taken advantage of a customs union with the European Union, signed in 1995, to increase its industrial production destined for exports, while at the same time benefiting from EU-origin foreign investment into the country.[113] In 2008, Turkey's exports reached US$141.8 billion[114] (main export partners: Germany 11.2%, UK 8%, Italy 6.95%, France 5.6%, Spain 4.3%, US 3.88%; total EU exports 56.5%.) However, larger imports amounting to about US$204.8 billion[114] threaten the balance of trade (main import partners: Russia 13.8%, Germany 10.3%, China 7.8%, Italy 6%, USA 4.8%, France 4.6%, Iran 3.9%, UK 3.2%; total EU imports 40.4%; total Asia imports 27%).[115] [116]
The opening of talks regarding the Economic and Monetary Policy acquis chapter of Turkey's accession bid was expected to begin in June 2007, but were stalled by France.[117] Turkey became the European Union's fifth-largest trade partner in 2015 according to data released by Eurostat.[118]
Turkey is set to receive EUR 9.2bn from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.
, the population of Turkey stood at 71.5 million with a yearly growth rate of 1.5%.[119] [120] The Turkish population is relatively young, with 25.5% falling within the 0–15 age bracket.[121] As of February 2023, the population of Turkey is approximately at 87 million people.[122]
Turkey's large population could alter the balance of power in the representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 83 million inhabitants would bestow it a large number of MEPs in the European Parliament. This is because the European Parliament distributes seats to member states according to their population.[123] Therefore, if Turkey is admitted, it could influence the EU legislation and administration in line with its own policies.[124]
If Turkey were to join the European Union, Istanbul would become the most populous metropolis in the EU (as of 2004).[125]
See main article: Foreign relations of Turkey.
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Cyprus as Turkey does not recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus,Cyprus was divided when, on 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied a third of the island in response to an Athens-engineered coup aimed at annexing Cyprus to Greece.[126] [127] Since then, Turkey has refused to acknowledge the Republic of Cyprus (an EU member since 2004) as the sole authority on the island, and recognizes the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since its establishment in 1983. The Turkish invasion in 1974 and the resulting movement of refugees along both sides of the Green Line, and the establishment of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, form the core issues which surround the ongoing Cyprus dispute.
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots backed the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus aimed at the reunification of the island, but the plan was subsequently rejected by Greek Cypriots on the grounds that it did not meet their needs. According to Greek Cypriots, the latest proposal included maintained residence rights for the many Anatolian Turks who moved to Cyprus after the invasion (and their descendants who were born on the island after 1974), while the Greek Cypriots who lost their property after the Turkish invasion would be granted only a restricted right of return to the north following the island's proposed reunification. Although the outcome received much criticism in the EU as well, the Republic of Cyprus was admitted into the EU a week after the referendum.
The Turkish government has refused to officially recognise the Republic of Cyprus until the removal of the political and economic blockade on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus has led to complications within the Customs Union. Under the customs agreements which Turkey had already signed as a precondition to start EU membership negotiations in 2005, it is obliged to open its ports to Cypriot planes and vessels, but Turkey has not complied so far; refusing to do so until the EU eases the international isolation of Northern Cyprus.[128] In February 2013, Turkish EU Minister Egemen Bağış told the Republic of Cyprus, "if you truly want salvation, truly want peace, then remove your blockade of Ercan Airport to EU member countries and Turkey will open its ports to you."[129]
Turkey's refusal to implement a trade pact between Turkey and the EU that requires the Turkish government to allow Greek Cypriot vessels to use its air and seaports has prompted the EU to freeze eight chapters in Turkey's accession talks.
In November 2009, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek declared that, should Turkey be forced to choose between supporting either EU membership or Turkish Cypriots, "[then] Turkey's choice will forever be to stand next to the Turkish Cypriots. Everybody should understand this."[130]
The issue of Turkish membership has been contentious in Greece. An opinion poll from 2005 suggested that only 25% of Greeks believe Turkey has a place in the European Union.[131] The former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis stated that Turkish membership of the EU could only be predicated upon, "full compliance, full accession" in December 2006.[132] In 2005 the European Commission referred to relations between Turkey and Greece as "continuing to develop positively"[133] while also citing a key barrier to progress being Turkey's ongoing claim of casus belli over a dispute about territorial waters boundaries.[133] In September 2017, Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, mentioned that halting accession talks with Turkey would be a strategic mistake by the European Union, amid a war of words raging between Germany and Turkey.[134] Also, former Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, has urged European Union leaders to keep the doors open to Turkey and to continue dialogue with the Turkish government, in an apparent reference to the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel's calls for the suspension of accession talks with Turkey.[135]
Turkey has a secular constitution, civil and judicial system with no official religion, although the country's most prominent imam (currently Ali Erbaş) is a civil servant and head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, or Diyanet.[136] 82% of the Turkish population is Muslim[137] [138] of whom over 70% belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. A minority is affiliated with syncretic Alevi branch.[139] A separate study published in 2019 found 89.5% of Turks identify as Muslim.[140] Turkey would be the first and only Muslim-majority country to join or belong to the European Union. Current EU states typically contain large Muslim minorities. By contrast, Christians are believed to compose only 0.2% of Turkey's population.[141] [142]
Official population census polls in Turkey do not include information regarding a person's religious belief or ethnic background due to the regulations set by the Turkish constitution, which defines all citizens of the Republic of Turkey as Turkish in terms of nationality, regardless of faith or race.[143]
There is a tradition of secularism in Turkey. The state has no official religion nor promotes any, and actively monitors .[144] The constitution recognises the freedom of religion for individuals, whereas religious communities are placed under the protection of the state; but the constitution explicitly states that they cannot become involved in the political process (by forming a religious party, for instance) or establish faith-based schools. No party can claim that it represents a form of religious belief; nevertheless, religious sensibilities are generally represented through conservative parties. Turkey used to prohibit by law the wearing of religious headcover and theo-political symbolic garments for both sexes in government buildings, schools, and universities;[145] the law was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights as legitimate in the Leyla Şahin v. Turkey case on 10 November 2005.[146] However, in 2010, the prohibition of wearing headscarves in universities was lifted.
Cultural differences between Muslim-majority Turkey and predominantly Christian Europe play an important part in the entire debate on Turkish accession to the European Union.
In 2004, the French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier stated that Turkey must recognise the systematic massacres of Armenians in 1915 as a genocide.[147] However, he insisted that although France did not set a precondition for European Union entry regarding the matter, he stated that France would raise the issue during negotiations. The President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, stated that it must be a precondition for Turkey to recognise the systematic massacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide.[148]
The government of Turkey rejects such a precondition for EU membership and does not accept it as a part of the EU membership criteria.
In 2006, the European Parliament voted against a proposal to formally add the issue as a membership criterion for Turkey.[149] A similar proposal by Greek and Greek Cypriot MEPs was also rejected by the European Parliament in 2011.[150]
See main article: LGBT rights in Turkey.
Although homosexuality is not a crime in Turkey, in contravention of European Union directives on human rights; Turkey temporarily banned LGBT pride parades in 2015 and 2016.[151] [152] [153] Reasons given for the ban were "security concerns", and "religious sensitivities of the public" caused by holding the parade during the month of Ramadan.
See main article: Censorship in Turkey, Human rights in Turkey and Article 301.
Article 301 states that "a person who publicly insults the Turkish nation, the State of the Republic of Turkey, or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years" and also that "expressions of thought intended to criticise shall not constitute a crime."
The EU was especially critical of this law during the September 2005 trial of novelist Orhan Pamuk over comments that recognised the deaths of thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians. Enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn and members of the European Parliament called the case "regrettable", "most unfortunate", and "unacceptable".[154] After the case was dropped three months later, Turkey's Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül indicated that Turkey may abandon or modify Article 301, stating that "there may be need for a new law".[155] In September 2006, the European Parliament called for the abolition of laws, such as Article 301, "which threaten European free speech norms".[156] On 30 April 2008, the law was reformed.[157] According to the reform, it is now a crime to explicitly insult the "Turkish nation" rather than "Turkishness"; opening court cases based on Article 301 require the approval of the Justice Minister; and the maximum punishment has been reduced to two years in jail.[157]
Kemal Kerinçsiz, a patriotic lawyer, and other members of Büyük Hukukçular Birliği (Great Jurists Union) headed by Kerinçsiz, have been "behind nearly all of [Article 301] trials."[158] In January 2008, Kerinçsiz was arrested for participating in an ultra-nationalist underground organisation, Ergenekon, allegedly behind the attacks on the Turkish Council of State and Cumhuriyet newspaper,[159] the assassination of several Christian missionaries and Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink,[160] as well as allegedly plotting the assassination of Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk.[161] [162] The Ergenekon trials were later attributed to a plot organized by a "foreign-based Gulenist terror organization" and all charges were dropped after the attempted military coup by Gulenists on 15 July 2016.
Turkey gave women the right to vote in 1930 for municipal elections. In 1934 this right was expanded for the national elections, while women were also given the right to become elected as MPs in the Turkish Parliament, or for being appointed as Ministers, Prime Minister, Speaker of the Parliament and President of the Republic. In 1993 Tansu Çiller became the first female Prime Minister of Turkey.
In its second report on women's role in social, economic, and political life in Turkey, the European Parliament emphasised that respecting human rights, including women's rights, is an essential condition for Turkey's membership in the EU. According to the report, Turkey's legal framework on women's rights "has in general been satisfactory, but its substantive implementation remains flawed."[163]
Turkey is one of two states (along with Azerbaijan) among the 47 members of the Council of Europe which refuse to recognise the status of conscientious objectors or give them an alternative to military service, other than a reduction of service by paying a tax.[164]
Public opinion in EU countries generally opposes Turkish membership, though with varying degrees of intensity. The Eurobarometer September–October 2006 survey[165] shows that 59% of EU-27 citizens were against Turkey joining the EU, while only about 28% were in favour. Nearly all citizens (about 9 in 10) expressed concerns about human rights as the leading cause. In the earlier March–May 2006 Eurobarometer, citizens from the new member states were more in favour of Turkey joining (44% in favour) than the old EU-15 (38% in favour). At the time of the survey, the country whose population most strongly opposed Turkish membership was Austria (con: 81%), while Romania was most in favour of the accession (pro: 66%). On a wider political scope, the highest support came from the Turkish Cypriot Community (pro: 67%) (which is not recognised as a sovereign state and is de facto not EU territory and out of the European institutions). These communities were even more in favour of the accession than the Turkish populace itself (pro: 54%).[166] Opposition in Denmark to Turkish membership was polled at 60% in October 2007, despite the Danish government's support for Turkey's EU bid.[167]
There is a trend in declining support since 2000 that has continued due to the 2013 Gezi protests and the Purges in Turkey (2016–present). In the past support for Turkish accession came especially from left-wing parties, but more recently both sides of the political spectrum in Europe have been highly critical of Turkey's human rights record. Opposition to Turkish accession is higher in countries such as Bulgaria and Germany which have a high population of Turkish diaspora or Muslims in Europe.[168] [169] YouGov polls from 2016[170] and 2019 have found respondents from France, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden to have the largest net opposition to Turkey's EU bid out of several other choices, including Israel and Russia.[171]
The opening of membership talks with the EU in December 2004 was celebrated by Turkey with much fanfare,[172] but the Turkish populace has become increasingly sceptical as negotiations were delayed based on what it views as lukewarm support for its accession to the EU and perceived double standards in its negotiations particularly with regard to the French and Austrian referendums. A mid-2006 Eurobarometer survey revealed that 43% of Turkish citizens view the EU positively; just 35% trust the EU, 45% support enlargement and just 29% support an EU constitution.[173]
Moreover, Turks were divided on whether to join at all. A 2007 poll put Turkish support for accession to the EU at 41.9% (up from 32% in 2006), with 27.7% opposed and 24.0% indifferent.[174] A 2009 poll showed that support for accession had risen to 48%, even as negative views of the EU had risen from 28% to 32%.[175] A 2013 poll showed Turkish support for the EU bid at one third of the population, and opposition to double that share.[176]
According to the Transatlantic Trends survey for 2013, 60% of Turks have an unfavourable view of the European Union[177] and most Turks believe that working with Asia is more important to their national interests than working with Europe.[178] Around 44% of Turks believe EU membership could be good for the economy in contrast with 61% for EU citizens.[179] During an interview with Euractiv, EU Minister Egemen Bağış stated that: "This is what Europe needs to do; they need to say that when Turkey fulfills all requirements, Turkey will become a member of the EU on date X. Then, we will regain the Turkish public opinion support in one day."[180]
Primary reasons for Turkey's persistent requests to join the EU are, among others, the many Turks in Europe and the importance of trade between the two. Turkey is, however, also increasingly disappointed with the widespread opposition to its accession among EU member states. In September 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan was asked by CNN if Turkey still wants to join the EU. His response: "There are 5 million Turks in Europe and 3 million Turks in Germany alone. We are a natural member of the European Union. Germany invited Turkish workers 50 years ago, however, 50 years have passed and we have waited at the European Union's doorstep. No other country has experienced such a thing. We will be patient until a point. However, when we cross that point, we will bring light to the situation and decide accordingly."[183] During a trip to Yalta, Erdoğan expressed his stern disappointment regarding the EU accession process: "We are still an EU negotiating candidate. At such a position, I wish EU accession. Otherwise, such a scenario would affect a large region including Ukraine and Turkey."[184]
Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy opposed the entrance of Turkey in the European Union, arguing the country was too big, too poor, and too culturally different to join the EU. Former President Francois Hollande, however, reaffirmed support for Turkey in 2012, intending to smooth the way for French companies seeking contracts in Turkey. Franco-Turkish relations remained tense after Turkey imposed a law in 2009 that criminalised recognition of the killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as a genocide; a move France's Constitutional Court reversed, in turn, causing French firms' share of foreign investment in Turkey to shrink from 6% in 2009 to 3% in 2012. Leaders of French infrastructure companies were especially eager to enter the Turkish markets for nuclear security and rail infrastructure, expected to respectively be worth $40 and $50 billion by 2020.[191] [192]/ In November 2002, then-French President and then-President of the European Convention Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, "Turkey is an important country close to Europe, but it is not a European country. It is not a European country because its capital is not in Europe and 95% of its population lives outside Europe." he said. Estaing continued as follows: "The Union should now focus on internal financial problems and the construction of European harmony instead of expansion. Those who most support Turkey joining the Union are actually opponents of the European Union. In fact, the majority of European Council members are against Turkey joining, but the Turks were never told this. Turkey joining the European Union would mean the end of the European Union."[194]
On 5 November 2008, the Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini declared that "the Italian government will support the inclusion of Turkey in the European Union with all its strength."[199] He indicated that "the Italian Parliament will give a 'clear word' when necessary with the 'enormous majority' of the Berlusconi government, but also with 'the opposition' which it knows it can count on."[199] "Turkey's inclusion will not be a problem, but it will be part of the solution for strengthening Europe in relations with other countries, such as the Caucasus region" he added.[199] On 13 November 2008, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi urged the EU to "accelerate Turkey's membership bid" and pledged to "help Ankara gain accession."[200] Berlusconi pledged to "try and win over those EU members resistant to Turkey's application."[200] "Regarding the opposition shown by certain countries – some of which are important countries – I am confident we will be able to convince them of the strategic importance of Turkey, within the European framework, as a country bordering the Middle East," Berlusconi declared.[200]
/ On 29 May 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy cancelled a visit to Sweden scheduled for 2 June 2009, to avoid a clash on the question of Turkey's EU membership just a few days before the European elections and a month before Stockholm took over the EU's rotating presidency.[201] The French President, who is an outspoken opponent of Turkey's entry to the European Union, did not want to highlight the strong divergence of views on this topic with Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, the French newspaper Le Monde reported on 28 May 2009.[201] Sweden favours further EU enlargement, including to Turkey.[201] Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the French newspaper Le Figaro that "the EU has 'a strategic interest' in Turkey's EU integration and warned against 'closing the door' to Ankara."[201] "If we judge Cyprus to be in Europe, although it is an island along Syria's shores, it is hard not to consider that Turkey is in Europe," Bildt said, referring to Sarkozy's repeated statements that Turkey is not a European country and does not belong to Europe.[201] In the Le Figaro interview, Bildt said: "My vision of Europe is not as defensive as I observe it with other people."[201] The French president's trip to Sweden was cancelled the day after the interview was published.[201] "Nicolas Sarkozy cancelled his visit because of the Carl Bildt interview," one French minister told Le Monde.[201] "The president wanted to avoid a clash on Turkey and did not want that his visit to Sweden interferes with the elections [five days later]."[201] In March 2013, King Carl XVI of Sweden said that "The EU will become stronger with Turkey"[202]
On 5 April 2009, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero stated that "Spain firmly supports Turkey's candidature to enter the EU, provided it meets the necessary requisites."[203] Zapatero told Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that "Spain's position is 'firm, clear and solid' in favour of Turkey's candidature to enter the European Union."[203] "We must 'open the door' for Turkey to enter 'the EU peace and cooperation project', provided it meets the necessary requisites for integration," Zapatero added;[203] before remarking that "Turkey's entrance is good both for Turkey and for the EU."[203]
In March 2011, then-Finnish President Tarja Halonen pledged her country's full support for Turkey's European Union membership process.[209] On 7 June 2013, Turkey's Undersecretary of the Ministry of EU Affairs Haluk Ilıcak said "The process means more than the accession. Once the necessary levels are achieved, Turkey is big enough to continue its development without the accession. Our aim is to achieve a smooth accession process."[212]
In 2013, Czech Republic Prime Minister Petr Nečas said: "We continue to believe that Turkey should be given the chance to become a full-fledged member of the European Union after it meets all accession criteria". He described Turkey as an important partner to the EU and praised the constructive role it plays in the Middle East region.[213] In March 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that democracy and freedom were "phrases" which had "absolutely no value" in Turkey, after calling for journalists, lawyers and politicians to be prosecuted as terrorists.[214]
In August 2016, then-Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern called for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey.[216] In March 2017, in a speech given to supporters in the western Turkish city of Sakarya, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said "my dear brothers, a battle has started between the cross and the half moon" (referring to Christianity and Islam respectively) after insulting European government politicians as "Nazis" in the weeks before.[217] The same month, he threatened that Europeans would "not be able to walk safely on the streets" if they kept up banning Turkish ministers from addressing rallies in Europe.[218] European politicians rejected Erdoğan's comments.[219] In September 2017, then-Finnish foreign minister Timo Soini, announced that they were in favor of not stopping Turkey's membership negotiations with the European Union.[221] In December 2017, then-Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced that they were in favor of stopping Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union.[222] On 17 July 2018, then-Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, in an interview with the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, called for ending full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey and developing relations instead of full membership negotiations. Kurz said: "I have been speaking out for years about developing an honest relationship with Turkey." Kurz continued as follows: "EU membership negotiations with Turkey should be stopped immediately. Turkey has continuously moved away from Europe and its values over the last few years. We should also focus on exploring other forms of cooperation between our neighbors the EU and Turkey."[223] In September 2023, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer, in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt, called for the termination of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey and the development of a new concept within the relations between the EU and Turkey.[224] In September 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that the European Union was well into a rupture in its relations with Turkey and that they could part ways, if necessary, during Turkey's European Union membership process.[225]
