Litigants: | In re Winship |
Arguedate: | January 20 |
Argueyear: | 1970 |
Decidedate: | March 31 |
Decideyear: | 1970 |
Fullname: | In the Matter of Samuel Winship, Appellant |
Usvol: | 397 |
Uspage: | 358 |
Parallelcitations: | 90 S. Ct. 1068; 25 L. Ed. 2d 368; 51 O.O.2d 323; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 56 |
Prior: | 91 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 247 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1969). |
Holding: | The Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that every element of a criminal offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard used heretofore in juvenile court. |
Majority: | Brennan |
Joinmajority: | Douglas, Harlan, White, Marshall |
Concurrence: | Harlan |
Dissent: | Burger |
Joindissent: | Stewart |
Dissent2: | Black |
Lawsapplied: | U.S. Const. amend. XIV |
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court decision that held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged."[1] It established this burden in all cases in all states (constitutional case).[1]
In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court held that when a juvenile is charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, not preponderance of the evidence.[2] The case has come to stand for a broader proposition, however: in a criminal prosecution, every essential element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).[3] This case marked a rejection of the preponderance of evidence standard in any criminal cases and expanded the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.[4]