Schutzenpanzer Lang HS.30 | |
Type: | Infantry fighting vehicle |
Is Vehicle: | yes |
Service: | 1960–1980s |
Designer: | Hispano-Suiza |
Design Date: | 1956–1958 |
Manufacturer: | Hispano-Suiza Hanomag Henschel |
Unit Cost: | DM 238,000 |
Production Date: | 1958–1962 |
Number: | 2,176 |
Crew: | 3 |
Passengers: | 5 |
Length: | 5.56m (18.24feet) |
Width: | 2.54m (08.33feet) |
Height: | 1.85m (06.07feet) |
Weight: | 14.6 tonnes |
Armour: | 30 mm at 45° |
Primary Armament: | 20 mm HS 820 autocannon 2,000 rounds |
Secondary Armament: | 7.62 mm MG3 machine gun |
Engine: | Rolls-Royce B81 Mk 80F 8-cylinder petrol |
Engine Power: | 220 hp (164 kW) |
Suspension: | Torsion bar, three bogie, five road wheels |
Speed: | 58km/h |
Pw Ratio: | 15.3 hp/tonne |
Vehicle Range: | 270km (170miles) |
The Schützenpanzer Lang HS.30, officially designated as Schützenpanzer, lang, Typ 12-3 or SPz lg 12-3 for short,[1] (German for "Infantry tank, long, Type 12-3"), was a West German infantry fighting vehicle developed between 1956 and 1958.[2] It was designed by the Swiss company Hispano-Suiza and powered by a Rolls-Royce engine. Despite initial mechanical issues, only 2,176 units were produced out of the 10,680 originally planned. The vehicle was equipped with a 20 mm autocannon, which was a typical armament for infantry fighting vehicles of that era.
The HS.30's design was plagued by numerous flaws and drawbacks, which eventually led to a significant political scandal in West Germany during the 1960s. Of the 2,176 SPz HS.30 and its variants built by 1962, the German government paid 517 million DM, translating to approximately 238,000 DM per vehicle. The HS.30 first entered service with the Panzergrenadier battalions in 1960, but was gradually replaced by the more advanced Marder infantry fighting vehicle starting in 1971.
Rejecting the American doctrine that an armored personnel carrier (APC) should serve as a "battlefield taxi" and not as an assault vehicle, the Germans developed the HS.30 to fight alongside tanks and enable their mechanized infantry to engage the enemy from within the vehicle. This approach was influenced by Germany's World War II experience with Panzergrenadiere (armored infantry). German doctrine considered the SPz 12-3 as an integral part of the squad's equipment, with the squad trained to fight with the vehicle in both offensive and defensive operations. Unlike the American M113, the HS.30 could not float, but since German doctrine envisioned the HS.30 operating in conjunction with main battle tanks that also lacked amphibious capabilities, this was not seen as a significant disadvantage.[3]
The HS.30 was equipped with a small turret housing a Hispano-Suiza HS.820 20-mm autocannon and a 15×15 periscopic sight. According to German doctrine, the role of the 20-mm autocannon was to engage helicopters, anti-tank weapons, and light armored vehicles, thereby allowing tanks to focus their firepower on other tanks. Despite having a turret, the HS.30 was still two feet (0.6 m) lower in height than the M113, making it a smaller target. The vehicle carried an onboard supply of 2,000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition.[4] The frontal armor provided protection against 20-mm projectiles, which was superior to that of comparable vehicles from other nations. However, this additional armor made the HS.30 four tons heavier than the M113, even though it could only carry half as many troops. To allow squad members to fire their personal weapons while mounted, roof hatches had to be opened, exposing the soldiers. The Germans considered this a significant disadvantage, especially given the expectation that the Soviet Army would use chemical agents in any conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Despite the German army's emphasis on developing a true infantry fighting vehicle rather than just an APC, the Panzergrenadier brigades included an infantry battalion initially transported by trucks and later by M113 APCs. This composition likely reflected cost considerations as well as doctrine, which called for one-third of the Panzergrenadiere to be a motorized force.[5]
+Comparison of the SPz HS.30 and similar vehicles[6] | |||||
Vehicle | Main weapon | Frontal armor | Height | Infantry carried | Introduction year |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SPz 12-3 Lang (Germany) | 20 mm HS-820 | 30 mm at 45° | 1.85 m | 5 | 1960 |
SPz 11-2 Kurz (Germany) | 20 mm HS-820 | 15 mm at 62° | 1.97 m | 3 | 1959 |
AMX-VCI (France) | 12.7 mm M2 Browning machine gun (later 20mm autocannon) | 15 mm at 45° | 2.1 m | 10 | 1957 |
M113 (USA) | 12.7 mm M2 HMG | 38 mm aluminium at 45° | 2.5 m | 11 | 1960 |
BTR-50P (USSR) | 7.62 mm SGMB machine gun (some with 14.5 mm heavy machine gun) | 11 mm steel at 60° | 1.97 m | 20 | 1954 |
FV432 (UK) | 7.62 mm FN MAG | 12.7 mm steel | 2.28 m | 10 | 1962 |
Pansarbandvagn 301 (Sweden) | 20 mm akan m/45B (Bofors 20 mm automatic gun L/70)[7] | 8 – 50 mm steel | 2.64 m to top of gunmount | 8 | 1961 |
Saurer 4K 4FA-G2 (Austria) | 12.7 mm M2 HMG (or) 20 mm Oerlikon Model 204 | 12 – 20 mm steel | 2.1 m | 6 | 1961 |
The acquisition of equipment for the newly formed Bundeswehr in its early years was driven by military, economic, and political factors. Military requirements pointed towards a vehicle similar to the French AMX-13 VTP, but its unit cost was too high. The US M59 armored personnel carrier was considered too heavy and too tall for the envisioned doctrine. Additionally, the lack of interest from West German industries in building weapons posed a challenge—Germany was still forbidden to export arms due to post-World War II restrictions. This meant that investment in developing an armored fighting vehicle (AFV) would not generate future revenue from exports. Politically, it seemed reasonable to turn to West Germany's allies to order AFVs and support their struggling economies. Consequently, the Schützenpanzer SPz 11-2 Kurz (developed from the Hotchkiss SP1A) was ordered from France. After a deal to acquire the Centurion from the United Kingdom became obsolete when the US provided M41 Walker Bulldog and M47 Patton tanks as military aid, forming a consortium to build the new AFV partially in Britain, as offered by Hispano-Suiza in 1955, seemed appealing.[8]
The Hispano-Suiza offer met all the requirements laid out by the German Federal Ministry of Defence. With an estimated cost of only 170,000 DM per unit, it was 30% cheaper than the AMX VTP. The urgency created by the commitment to NATO to form and equip 12 West German divisions by 1960 led the Ministry of Defence to opt for the Hispano-Suiza model, placing orders for 10,680 AFVs.[8] Dieter H. Kollmar, in his analysis of the acquisition process, suggests that Hispano-Suiza may have learned about the requirements in advance and tailored their offer accordingly. Hispano-Suiza itself did not have the facilities to build an AFV. Instead, it acquired patents for a 20-mm autocannon and used its network of business contacts across Europe to finalize the AFV plans. Lobbyists, often former Wehrmacht officers, aggressively promoted Hispano-Suiza's offer to decision-makers in the Ministry of Defence, many of whom shared the same background.[8]
When the Ministry of Defence, under its new secretary Franz Josef Strauss, learned from the 1958 evaluation on the proving grounds about multiple shortcomings of the HS.30,[9] it grew increasingly impatient with Hispano-Suiza and cut the initial order of 10,680 units down to 2,800, with 1,089 to be built by Leyland Motors in the United Kingdom, and the remainder by Henschel and Hanomag in Germany.[8] A settlement with Hispano-Suiza was reached in 1960, with the German government paying 40 million DM to compensate for investments and lost revenue.
Later, a series of disclosures by the press, several hearings, and an investigation unfolded around the acquisition of the HS.30. Witnesses, such as the former German ambassador to Switzerland, Friedrich Holzapfel,[10] were heard, and stories emerged about potential payments made to individuals and political parties, based on claims by then-lobbyist and former Weimar Republic secretary Gottfried Treviranus[9] and businessman Werner Plappert.[11] According to Dieter H. Kollmar, the progress of the official investigation was hindered by witnesses seeking recognition and by charlatans. Accusations made in this context against Franz Josef Strauss were later proven false. Kollmar attributed the problems with the HS.30 to the fraudulent practices of Hispano-Suiza and insufficient oversight in the Federal Ministry of Defence’s procurement processes.[8]
After a series of substantial upgrades, the HS.30 was reported by the official investigation committee in the 1960s to meet the army's requirements "conditionally" ("bedingt"). By 1965, approximately 65 percent of the vehicles were operational, and by 1968, this number had increased to 85 percent. However, the issues with the early models were so severe that the Ministry of Defence had to provide its own technical personnel to bring the AFVs to operational status.[12] The evaluation report included expert testimony and listed several technical problems with the HS.30:
Other problems stemmed from the design itself:
The HS.30 AFV was introduced into the Bundeswehr in late 1959 but experienced significant teething problems.[17] Initially, the AFV was used to equip only individual battalions, which co-existed in the 1960s with two other types of Grenadier formations that were equipped with trucks or APCs.[18]
Starting in 1974, the Marder IFV replaced the HS.30 in German armored infantry units. Peru received around 20 SPz HS.30s during the 1970s. Eventually, some HS.30s were repurposed as armored targets on gunnery ranges.[19]
The Bundeswehr Museum of German Defense Technology in Koblenz has one of these "HS 30 Mörser" vehicles in its collection.