Gromyko Commission Explained

The Gromyko Commission, officially titled the State Commission for Consideration of Issues Raised in Applications of Citizens of the USSR from Among the Crimean Tatars was the first state commission on the subject of addressing what the dubbed "the Tatar problem". Formed in July 1987 and led by Andrey Gromyko, it issued a conclusion in June 1988 rejecting all major demands of Crimean Tatar civil rights activists ranging from right of return to restoration of the Crimean ASSR.

Background

See also: Deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Ukaz 493 and Tashkent Ten. In May 1944 the Crimean Tatar people was deported from Crimea on blanket accusations of mass collaboration with Nazi Germany. Most were sent to the Uzbek SSR and scattered around various oblasts within the Uzbek SSR, but some were sent to other areas such as the Mari ASSR. Those who did not collaborate with the Nazis were not spared deportation. Even the families of Heroes of the Soviet Union where the head of the household was Crimean Tatar were subject to deportation.[1] Crimean Tatars who were members of the Communist Party and in leadership positions in the Crimean ASSR government, as well Crimean Tatars serving in the Red Army[2] and even Tajfa Crimean Tatar Holocaust survivors were subject to exile.[3] As special settlers in diaspora they had few civil rights and were forbidden from leaving a small radius of the village or city they were assigned to, punishable by 20 years in prison.[4]

The Crimean ASSR was dissolved on 30 June 1945, and a campaign of mass detatarization of Crimea followed: Crimean Tatar books were burned,[5] villages with Crimean Tatar names were renamed, and Crimean Tatar cemeteries were not only destroyed but the gravestones used as building materials.[6] Crimea was quickly resettled by waves of ethnic Russian and Ukrainian immigrants, many of whom were given houses and property of deported Crimean Tatars.[7]

In 1956 other nations deported with accusations of mass treason were permitted to return and their titular republics were officially restored - such as the Chechens and Ingush, Kalmyks, Balkars, and Karachays.[8] [9] The deported Caucasian peoples heavily resisted their exile,[10] [11] many participating in a prolonged guerrilla war against the NKVD in the mountains of the Caucasus.[12] Abreks, like Akhmed Khuchbarov and Laysat Baisarova became folk heroes of those deported peoples.[13] In contrast, Crimean Tatars put up considerably less resistance to exile,[14] but still had a strong desire to return. The decree rehabilitating the aforementioned deported peoples of the Caucasus in 1956 did not restore the Crimean ASSR, and said that Crimean Tatars who wanted a national autonomy could "reunite" with the Volga Tatars of the Tatar ASSR.

For twenty years, the government maintained that their national issue had been "solved" by the decree in 1967 which proclaimed that "people of Tatar nationality formerly living in Crimea" [sic] were "rehabilitated". The degree, published selectively in newspapers where Crimean Tatars lived for them to see,[15] showed that the state no longer recognized Crimean Tatars as a distinct ethnic group, through the use of the euphemism "people of Tatar nationality formerly living in Crimea".[16] [17] [18] The decree did not answer any of the requests of Crimean Tatar rights activists at the time, specifically official rehabilitation by the state restoration of the Crimean ASSR with a Crimean Tatar national district, the right to return to Crimea.[19] As more and more tried to return to Crimea, the government made it even harder for Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea by issuing decrees in the 1970s tightening the passport regime in Crimea.[20]

Because they were not a recognized ethnic group and lumped into the Tatars in censuses despite being a completely separate ethnic group of a different origin, it was very hard to determine what the Crimean Tatar population was in the Soviet Union during the struggle for the right of return.[21] When pressed on the issue by foreign journalists, the government insisted that Crimean Tatars had equal rights and but that most simply did not want to return to Crimea[22] and had "taken root" in places of exile. However, when Crimean Tatars tried to move to Crimea, they were almost always denied the required propiska (residence permit) and subject to re-deportation,[23] while slavic migrants to Crimea faced no such barriers to getting permission to live in Crimea and were frequently encouraged to move there. While Crimean Tatars were told that Crimea was already overpopulated as an excuse for not letting them return, even though newspapers frequently advertised the need for more workers in Crimea.[24]

In the Uzbek SSR, where most Crimean Tatars lived, those who expressed desire to move to Crimea were told that they could not move to Crimea and should know better than to ask for the right of return,[25] and Crimean Tatars who tried to return to Crimea were almost always forced to leave.[26] Nevertheless, most Crimean Tatars still wanted to return to Crimea.[27]

Initial Red Square protest and delegations

During the early days of the Crimean Tatar national movement, Crimean Tatars sent large delegations of highly respected Crimean Tatar activists and party members to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders and ask for right of return and restoration of the Crimean ASSR and present them with petitions.[28] However, as time passed and the delegations accomplished little[29] besides being participants being berated for their participation, such delegations and visits to Moscow became smaller and less frequent. However, due to perestroika, Crimean Tatar activists developed a renewed interest in visiting Moscow en masse.[30] In addition, they hoped that under reduced censorship the media would be willing to listen to and include their opinions in media coverage of the national issue instead of maintaining the line that the issue was settled. On 20 June 1987 the first Crimean Tatar delegates arrived in Moscow, where they visited the offices of various newspapers, magazines, and TV stations as well as the writers union and talked about their exile and requested that their letters and petitions be published, but they were typically turned down.[31] Later on 26 June several Crimean Tatars met with Pyotr Demichev, who only agreed to tell Gorbachev about their comments. Later on in early July several dozen Crimean Tatars began picketing in Red Square holding signs calling for right of return. The size of the protests grew quickly: the picket in front of the building of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 23 July drew around 100 protesters, but the number increased to around 500 just two days later.[32]

Formation of commission

On 9 July 1987 the government agreed to form a commission decide the fate of the Crimean Tatar people.[33] The day before, a small delegation of Crimean Tatars met with People's Writer of the USSR Yevgeny Yevtushenko, who then encouraged Soviet leaders to give them a meeting or at least listen to them.[34] Originally they were given a meeting with Pyotr Demichev, not Gorbachev; Demichev was not sympathetic to their petitioning but did forward their message to Gorbachev.

The issue made it to discussion in the politburo, and Gorbachev, who was reluctant to make any solid decisions on the issue, decided to outsource the issue to a commission. Subsequently, Gromyko, who rarely handled domestic issues, was selected by Gorbachev to head the commission despite his extreme reluctance to meet with Crimean Tatars and his hostile attitude towards the ethnic group. In a conversation with Gorbachev, he expressed desire to ignore the Crimean Tatars entirely and keep them in places of exile as was policy for the past decades. Nevertheless, Gromyko was appointed head of the commission, and he reluctantly discussed the issue with other Soviet politicians.

The leadership of the commission consisted of various senior Soviet politicians who had strong feelings on the issue, specifically Viktor Chebrikov, Vitaly Vorotnikov, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Inomjon Usmonxoʻjayev, Pyotr Demichev, Alexander Yakovlev, Anatoly Lukyanov, Georgy Razumovsky, but no Crimean Tatars.[35]

Period of operation

After asking for meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev, 21 Crimean Tatar representatives eventually met in the Kremlin with Gromyko on 27 July 1987 in a very unproductive meeting for 2 hours and 27 minutes where he demanded Crimean Tatars be more calm but was extremely condescending[36] insulted them as an "invented" ethnic group and showed his hatred for Crimean Tatars,[37] [38] [39] living up to his nickname "Mr. No."[40]

Compounded by the publication of the libelous announcement from TASS in central newspapers the next day about the formation of the commission, many Crimean Tatar activists and even communist elders were very disappointed as it became obvious that the commission was unwilling to seriously consider their demands. Later another statement from Gromyko warning that any attempt to put pressure on state organs would not work out in their favor was republished by TASS.

Meanwhile, authorities in Crimea remained hostile to the idea of allowing Crimean Tatar right of return, and further tightened the passport regime in Crimea as additional Crimean Tatars attempted to arrive and register in the peninsula.[41] A decree signed by Nikolai Ryzhkov created special restrictions on registering new residents in Crimea as well as Krasnodar.[42] The government characterized the Crimean Tatar desire to return and restoration of the Crimean ASSR as an extreme position and claimed such positions were not specific.[43]

Central Initiative Group actions

Despite Gromyko's warning that increased protests and other forms of public discontent would not be taken well, members of the Central Initiative Group (OKND) led by Mustafa Dzhemilev continued to remain in Moscow, holding rallies in Izmailovsky Park. Prominent representatives from the Dzhemilev faction including Sabriye Seutova, Safinar Dzhemileva, Reshat Dzhemilev, and Fuat Ablyamitov. While the original advocates of the Crimean Tatar national movement who were condemned by mainstream Soviet dissidents as Marxists,[44] many members of the more radical Central Initiative Group listed above, among others, openly solicited support from the West,[45] which concerned the more moderate NDKT. The Central Initiative group disproportionately of the younger generation born in exile and had never been part of the national movement before, and grew in power as Soviet authorities failed to meaningfully address Crimean Tatar rights.[46] [47] [48]

Results

Despite being sent various proposals for plans to restore the Crimean ASSR and return Crimean Tatars to Crimea, in addition to polling information of Crimean Tatars showing that a solid majority supported returning to Crimea, the requests of the Crimean Tatar community were rejected. The conclusion statement issued by Gromyko in June 1988 stated there was "no basis" restore the Crimean ASSR because of the current demographics of Crimea,[49] and suggested only a small percent of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea to work in Crimea under an organized recruitment scheme,[50] but maintained that there would be no mass return of Crimean Tatars, and instead offered additional small-scale measures to address the cultural needs of Crimean Tatars places of exile.

It also did not agree to restore the official recognition of Crimean Tatars as a distinct ethnic group.[51]

Reception and aftermath

Responses to the conclusions of the commission were overwhelmingly negative; even people the most loyal communist Crimean Tatars were disappointed by the conclusions of the commission and criticized the lack of good faith on part of the commission. For example Rollan Kadyev, by then having evolved politically to the point of opposing the rally in Red Square out of fear it would provoke authorities and frequently telling other Crimean Tatars to not respond to provocations from the government and maintain patriotism,[52] expressed dismay at the idea that only a few more Crimean Tatars could be allowed to move to Crimea, which he dubbed "lottery for the homeland." He also criticized Gromyko's conclusions that the Crimean ASSR could not be restored because of demographic reasons, noting that the Kazakh SSR was formed when Kazakhs were only 13% of the population of the region.[53]

Barely a year after the conclusion of the commission rejecting return and restoration of the Crimean ASSR, a second commission was composed to re-evaluated the issue, but headed by Yanaev instead of Gromyko and inclusive of Crimean Tatars on the board. Only in 1989 were the restrictions on the use of the term Crimean Tatar officially lifted.[54]

References

Works cited

Notes and References

  1. Web site: Ablyazov. Emir. 13 March 2015. Герой добился права жить и умереть на Родине. live. https://web.archive.org/web/20191009202548/http://goloskrimanew.ru/geroy-dobilsya-prava-zhit-i-umeret-na-rodine.html . 2019-10-09 . 2019-10-09. goloskrimanew.ru.
  2. Book: Sandole . Dennis J. D. . Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution . Byrne . Sean . Sandole-Staroste . Ingrid . Senehi . Jessica . 2008-07-31 . Routledge . 978-1-134-07963-6 . en.
  3. Book: Kucherenko, Olga . Soviet Street Children and the Second World War: Welfare and Social Control under Stalin . 2016-07-14 . Bloomsbury Publishing . 978-1-4742-1343-1 . en.
  4. Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР № 123/12 от 26 ноября 1948 года «Об уголовной ответственности за побеги из мест обязательного и постоянного поселения лиц, выселенных в отдаленные районы Советского Союза в период Отечественной войны». (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR No. 123/12 of November 26, 1948 “On criminal liability for escapes from places of compulsory and permanent settlement of persons evicted to remote areas of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War.”)
  5. "Crimean Tatar libraries were closed and plundered, valuable books were burned, and numerous historical-cultural monuments in Crimea were destroyed, while others survived precariously"
  6. Web site: В аннексированном Крыму нашли дома, построенные из мусульманских надгробий - РИСУ . 2023-12-04 . Религиозно-информационная служба Украины . ru.
  7. Book: Walker, Shaun . The Long Hangover: Putin's New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past . 2018 . Oxford University Press . 978-0-19-065924-0 . en.
  8. Book: Political History of Russia . 1994 . Nova Science Publishers . 4 . 29 . en . In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev condemned the deportations as a violation of Leninist principles. In his "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, he stated that the Ukrainians avoided such a fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." That year, the Soviet government issued decrees on the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic, the formation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast’, and the reorganization of the Cherkess Autonomous Oblast’ into the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast’..
  9. https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%9A%D0%9F%D0%A1%D0%A1_%D0%BE%D1%82_24_%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%8F%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8F_1956_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0 Постановление Центрального Комитета КПСС от 24 ноября 1956 года «О восстановлении национальной автономии калмыцкого, карачаевского, балкарского, чеченского и ингушского народов»
  10. "К несчастью для крымских татар, они не были в 1956 году так хорошо организованы, так сплочены, как чеченцы и ингуши. Если бы они начали массовое самовольное возвращение в Крым, то, вероятно, добились бы своего. В ноябре 1956 года, в связи с событиями в Венгрии и других странах Восточной Европы, советское руководство очень опасалось осложнений в собственной стране и вынуждено было бы пойти крымским татарам на уступки. Но этого не произошло, и крымские татары надолго утратили свой исторический шанс." ("Unfortunately for the Crimean Tatars, in 1956 they were not as well organized, as united, as the Chechens and Ingush. If they had begun a mass unauthorized return to Crimea, they would probably have achieved their goal. In November 1956, due to "With the events in Hungary and other countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership was very afraid of complications in its own country and would have been forced to make concessions to the Crimean Tatars. But this did not happen, and the Crimean Tatars lost their historical chance for a long time.")
  11. Book: Hansen . Randall . Authenticity and Victimhood after the Second World War: Narratives from Europe and East Asia . Saupe . Achim . Wirsching . Andreas . Yang . Daqing . 2021 . University of Toronto Press . 978-1-4875-2823-2 . en . the Chechens were the most "defiant" or "resistant" or all deported groups..
  12. Book: History of political repression and resistance to unfreedom in the USSR.. 2002. Mosgorarchiv. Moscow.
  13. Book: Yandieva, M.. 2004. Ингушское сопротивление: Ахмед Хучбаров в контексте времени. Ingush resistance: Akhmed Khuchbarov in the context of time. ru. Nazran
    Moskva
    .
  14. "The Crimean Tatars filled the construction, mining, and factory jobs in Uzbekistan’s industrial towns shunned by the Uzbeks. Between May 20, 1944, and July 1, 1948, the proportion of Crimean Tatars working in such occupations in Uzbekistan increased from 15 to 70 percent. The NKVD noted that they had a “positive attitude” toward labor and that many of them overfulfilled their assigned work quotas by substantial margins, thus qualifying them as Stakhanovites. In 1945, the NKVD noted that 50 to 60 percent of Crimean Tatar workers at the Fergana Textile Combine, construction sites in Fergana, Ozakerit mines in Fergana, and silk factories in Margilan had exceeded their assigned quotas by 200 to 300 percent. The same report also commended the work ethic of Crimean Tatar workers in the Samarkand and Namagan oblasts. The Crimean Tatars became prized workers in the undesirable and thus difficult-to-fill jobs in Uzbekistan’s underdeveloped industrial economy."
  15. "Finally, and perhaps most ominously, the decree was not published widely and loudly as originally promised by Andropov; it was published selectively, in those regions of the USSR where the Tatars had "taken root." For the vast majority of Soviet citizens, nothing had changed, and the views about the Tatars with which they had been indoctrinated for twenty-three years remained unrevised. In the years that followed, this fact caused the Tatars untold harm, for they were unable to persuade many non-Tatar Soviet citizens of the justness of their cause. "
  16. "With the stroke of a pen the Crimean Tatars' dream of returning to their homeland had been once again crushed and instead they were said to have spontaneously 'taken root' (ukorenilis') in Uzbekistan. In addition, the very existence of the Crimean Tatar nationality had been refuted by the wording of the decree which referred not to the 'Crime-an Tatars' but to the 'Tatars who had formerly been living in the Crimea.'
    From this time forward the Crimean Tatars of Central Asia were, for all official purposes,(i.e. passports, censuses etc.), considered to be a sub-section of the Volga Tatars. The real meaning of this decree was clear for all to see for, as Alan Fisher pointed out, "a people without a nationality has no homeland to which to return." After twenty years of mass-based nationalization during the korenizatsiia period, which saw the construction of the Crimean Tatars as the 'primordial, rooted people' in the Crimean Peninsula, the Soviet government had apparently reversed itself and hit upon the idea of 'de-rooting' this nation and simply transplanting it in Central Asia by administrative caveat. "
  17. "Практически полстолетия крымские татары были лишены права этнической самоидентифи- кации — этноним «крымские татары» был изъят из переписей населения, научного и правового использования, культурного обихола." (For almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were deprived of the right of ethnic self-identification - the ethnonym “Crimean Tatars” was removed from population censuses, scientific and legal use, and cultural life.)
  18. "Second, the decree of 1967 did not speak of Crimean Tatars at all, but rather of "Tatars resident in the Crimea," or "citizens of Tatar nationality who lived in the Crimea." This implicitly denied the existence of their nationality itself. Thus, there could be no need to return to the Crimea—a people without a nationality has no homeland to which to return. In addition, the decree described the Tatars as having taken root in the areas to which they had been deported, implying that they did not want to return. Although the decree mentioned their national language, this reference clearly meant the language spoken and read by Tatars in general, not by those of the Crimea in particular."
  19. "Prior to 1967, when making their demands for redress of grievances, the Crimean Tatar leadership had concentrated on three areas: (1) complete rehabilitation of their nationality, to be officially announced by government authorities; (2) restoration of property illegally seized at the time of the deportation; and (3) the right to return to their homeland in the Crimea, with the re-creation of the Crimean ASSR. In their euphoria just after the issuance of the decree in September, the Tatars temporarily forgot these demands. But not for long. It did not take a high degree of sophistication to realize that the wording of the "rehabilitation" left two of their demands completely unanswered and only partially dealt with the third."
  20. "On 22 February 1974, and 1978, the regime issued further decrees named “additional measures for strengthening the passport regime in Crimea” to make the registration and resettlement of Crimean Tatars in Crimea almost impossible and to enable re-deportation of those who attempted to return by the police."
  21. Book: Rorlich, Azade-Ayse . The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience . 2017-09-01 . Hoover Press . 978-0-8179-8393-2 . en.
  22. " In answering foreign journalists on the question of the position of Crimean Tatars in the USSR, Paletskis stated that Crimean Tatars had every right an opportunity to live in the Crimea, but that the number of Crimean Tatars who wanted to return to Crimea was quite insignificant and that, therefore, Crimean ASSR would not be established"
  23. "But only a few families were able to hold their ground. The vast majority was re-deported outside the Crimean peninsula."
  24. "Ultimately, the regime relied on the excuse that even if the deportation was a mistake it was too late to redress it. Crimea was already populated by Russians and Ukrainians, argued the regime, and any further large movement of people into the Crimea would only disrupt the normal living of the local population. The claim that the Crimea was over-populated contradicted the fact that continuous invitations of the labor force in Crimea were published in Soviet newspapers"
  25. "You know well that the Crimea was settled long ago and it's not for you to see it"
  26. "Another Crimean Tatar document, issued in 1967, told of a large family, including children and a seventy-eight-year-old grandmother that was kicked out of its house in the Crimea. The document quoted a Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of the Crimean Region as saying to family members: "There will never be a place for you in the Crimea." The following year, in 1968, a Letter by Crimean Tatars to the Soviet authorities mentioned instructions given to Crimean officials, ordering them to prevent the return of Crimean Tatars to "their native soil.""
  27. "The majority of Crimean Tatars has also evidenced a strong desire to return"
  28. "Between 1962 and 1966, the Crimean Tatars expanded their efforts in two directions. First, in each Tatar settlement they organized committees whose aim was to instruct the Tatars about the truth of their past, the facts of life under the German occupation, and the injustices of their deportation and subsequent existence. Crimean Tatar delegations from these committees were sent to Moscow (this was perfectly legal both according to Soviet law and under the special provisions of the decision of 1956), to deliver petitions signed by members of the Tatar communities and present their case to Soviet authorities"
  29. "The national movement of the Crimean Tatars accomplished little: political rehabilitation on September 5, 1967, minor cultural-linguistic concessions like the publication of a few Crimean Tatarian books and the establishment of a Crimean Tatarian department within Uzbekistan's Writers' Union. They fell short of their actual goals. The Soviets did not reinstitute the Crimean ASSR and have permitted up to the mid-1980s only about 5,000 Crimean Tatars to return to the Crimean peninsula since 1968."
  30. "The Crimean Tatar movement reemerged under perestroika after 1985"
  31. Book: Yaremchuk, Olesya . Our Others . 2020-11-16 . BoD – Books on Demand . 978-3-8382-1475-7 . 147–148 . en.
  32. Web site: Bekirova. Gulnara. 9 July 2015. Московские акции крымских татар летом 1987-го. 2021-11-28. Крым.Реалии. ru.
  33. Book: Кримські татари: шлях до повернення : кримськотатарський національний рух, друга половина 1940-х-початок 1990-х років очима радянських спецслужб : збірник документів та матеріалів . 2004 . Ін-т історії України . 978-966-02-3287-7 . 120 . uk . 9 июля 1987 года была создана Государственная комиссия во главе с А.А.Громыко с целью изучения крымскотатарского национального вопроса.
  34. News: Gubernsky . Bogdan . 9 July 2015 . Московские акции крымских татар летом 1987-го . krymr.com . На следующий день, 8 июля, группа крымскотатарских делегатов встретилась с секретарем правления Союза писателей СССР, лауреатом Государственной премии СССР поэтом Евгением Евтушенко. Он выразил солидарность с борьбой крымских татар и написал обращение в Президиум Верховного Совета СССР. Вручая копию этого обращения делегатам крымских татар, Евтушенко оказал: «Мое обращение можете сдавать во все инстанции. Буду рад, если оно поможет решению национального вопроса крымских татар». (The next day, July 8, a group of Crimean Tatar delegates met with the secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of the USSR, laureate of the USSR State Prize, poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko. He expressed solidarity with the struggle of the Crimean Tatars and wrote an appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Handing a copy of this appeal to the Crimean Tatar delegates, Yevtushenko said: “You can submit my appeal to all authorities. I would be glad if it helps resolve the national issue of the Crimean Tatars"). ru.
  35. Book: Gorbachev, Mikhail. My Country and the World. Columbia University Press. 2019. 109. A commission is created consisting of Gromyko, Shcherbitsky, Vorotnikov, Us-mankhodzhaev, Demichev, Chebrikov, Lukyanov, Razumovsky, and Yakovlev..
  36. Book: Fouse, Gary C. . The Languages of the Former Soviet Republics: Their History and Development . 2000 . University Press of America . 978-0-7618-1607-2 . 240 . en . The Tatars were put off by what they considered Gromyko's condescending attitude..
  37. Leskova. Tatyana. Мы можем жить только на своей земле - история возвращения крымских татар на Родину. ru. Восточный экспресс. 19. May 2001. как нам сказал Громыко на приеме, крымские татары - народ "изобрытательный"! (as Gromyko told us at the reception, the Crimean Tatars are "invented" people!).
  38. Book: Dash, Padma Lochan. Russian Dilemma, the Ethnic Aftermath . 1994 . Arya Prakashan . 978-81-7412-009-0 . en . Gromyko proved himself once more as a Mr. No.
  39. Book: Soviet Muslims Brief . 1987 . Islamic Foundation . 4–5 . en.
  40. Book: Dash, Padma Lochan . Russian Dilemma, the Ethnic Aftermath . 1994 . Arya Prakashan . 978-81-7412-009-0 . 115 . en . Gromyko proved himself once more as Mr. No.
  41. Постановление Совета Министров СССР от 24 декабря 1987 года № 1476 «Об ограничении прописки граждан в некоторых населенных пунктах Крымской области и Краснодарского края»
  42. "Мощным подспорьем Комиссии А.А.Громыко явилось подписанное Н.И.Рыжковым Постановление Совета Министров СССР от 24 декабря 1987 г. "Об ограничений прописки граждан некоторых населенных пунктах Крымской области и Краснодарского края", затрудняющее возвращение крымских татар на родину." (A powerful support for the A.A. Gromyko Commission was the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated December 24, 1987, signed by N.I. Ryzhkov, “On restrictions on the registration of citizens in some settlements of the Crimean region and the Krasnodar Territory,” which complicates the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland.)
  43. Book: Советская етнография . 1989 . Nauka . 19 . ru . Среди самих крымских татар существуют крайние позиции : от требования возвращения автономии Крыму до неверия в возможность положительного решения вопроса . Лозунги а или «немедленного возвращения всех крымских татар в Крым» скорее ю не содержат никаких конкретных предложений. Кратковременная эйфория летом 1987 г., когда для решения вопроса была создана правительственная Комиссия под председательством А. А. Громыко, быстро окончилась. (Among the Crimean Tatars themselves, there are extreme positions: from the demand for the return of autonomy to Crimea to disbelief in the possibility of a positive resolution of the issue. The slogans “a” or “immediate return of all Crimean Tatars to Crimea” most likely do not contain any specific proposals. The short-term euphoria in the summer of 1987, when a government commission chaired by A. A. Gromyko was created to resolve the issue, quickly ended.).
  44. Book: Intercontinental Press Combined with Inprecor . 1976 . Intercontinental Press . 14 . 443 . en . Yuri Osmanov, one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement, is a convinced Marxist..
  45. Book: Arbatov, Aleksey . Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives . 1997 . MIT Press . 978-0-262-51093-6 . 95 . en . Some Crimean Tatars had appealed to the US Embassy for Assistance.
  46. Book: Краткая хроника деятельности Меджлиса крымскотатарского народа: июль 1991 г. - июнь 1996 г . 1996 . Тим плус . ru.
  47. "но ОКНД постепенно перехватывала инициа-тиву у НДКТ и это со всей очевидностью стало ясно при подготовке и в ходе состоявшегося курултая съезда крымских татар . - Планы по его проведению разрабатыва- лись еще с сентября 1990 г."
  48. Book: Вибрати не можна тільки батьківщину : Збірник статей і досліджень з історії кримськотатарського народу та його боротьби за повернення на історичну Батьківщину. Центр інформаціï та документаціï кримських татар. 2003. 978-966-8136-12-2. Kiyv. uk.
  49. "Eleven months after the establishment of the state commission, its conclusions were published, according to which an organized resettlement of the entire people to their homeland would not be possible in view of the postwar demographic changes in the Crimea; for this reason, the Crimean ASSR would not be reestablished, but measures would be taken "for the complete satisfaction of the social and cultural requirements" of the Crimean Tatars in the places where they currently reside. In the course of these eleven months, new anticonstitutional decrees were passed directed at keeping the Crimean Tatars outside the boundaries of their Homeland, including the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1476 of December 24, 1987, "On measures for the further stabilization of the situation among the Crimean Tatars," which stands to this day."
  50. Book: The American University Journal of International Law and Policy . 1989 . The College . en . The Gromyko commission issued a statement in June rejecting Tatar demands for the reestablishment of a Crimean autonomous region as unfounded and approving only limited opportunities for return to the Crimea.
  51. "Gromyko Commission did not extend the master frame to include the key Crimean Tatar demands. It also "failed to provide unequivocal condemnation of the 1944 deportation and made no mention of restoring the designation Crimean Tatar""
  52. Book: Kadyev, Rollan . "Наши болезни"– критические заметки по нашему национальному вопросу . 15 February 1988 . Сектор архивных и рукописных материалов КРУ "Крымскотатарская библиотека им. И. Гаспринского” . “Our illnesses” – critical notes on our national issue . III. Национальный вопрос; патриотизм и интернационализм. . На одном из сентябрьских собраний 1987г. после бурных обсуждений происходивших летом событий на Красной площади с участием крымских татар я обратился с вопросом к молодым участникам собрания о понимании ими патриотизма и каково было бы их поведение в экстремальных ситуациях, например, войны с учётом тех незаконных обид и унижений, которые пришлось вынести народу за все годы изгнания с родной земли, да и волны волюнтаризма, окатившей всю страну после Сообщения ТАСС от 24 июля. Отношение своё к данному Сообщению ТАСС и к демонстрациям соотечественников на Красной площади крымские татары Самаркандской области единодушно выразили в своей резолюции от 26 июля, но на этом собрании было 4-5 молодых людей, которые, как я знал, тяготели своими настроениями к янгиюльским экстремистам, хотя ещё и не осмеливались отрыто противостоять большинству присутствующих..
  53. Book: Kadyev, Rollan . "Наши болезни"– критические заметки по нашему национальному вопросу . 15 June 1988 . Сектор архивных и рукописных материалов КРУ "Крымскотатарская библиотека им. И. Гаспринского”. . “Our illnesses” – critical notes on our national issue . что к моменту образования Казахской ССР казахи составляли почти 13% от населения республики. (that by the time of the formation of the Kazakh SSR, Kazakhs made up almost 13% of the republic’s population.) . Rollan Kadyev.
  54. "In 1989, the secret ban on the ethnonym “Crimean Tatar” was lifted"

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