Glenanne gang explained

Glenanne gang
War:the Troubles, RUC
Active:1972–1980
Ideology:Ulster loyalism
Irish unionism
Leaders:John Weir
Billy McCaughey
Billy Hanna
Robin Jackson
Harris Boyle
Headquarters:Glenanne, County Armagh, Northern Ireland
Area:Mainly County Armagh and east County Tyrone
Size:40 Known members
Partof:Ulster Volunteer Force
Opponents:Irish nationalists
Official Name:Glenanne Farm
Static Image Caption:Location of Glenanne farm in Northern Ireland
Map Type:Northern Ireland
Coordinates:54.2532°N -6.5171°W
Country:Northern Ireland
Post Town:ARMAGH
Postcode Area:BT
Postcode District:BT60
Hide Services:yes

The Glenanne gang or Glenanne group was a secret informal alliance of Ulster loyalists who carried out shooting and bombing attacks against Catholics and Irish nationalists in the 1970s, during the Troubles.[1] Most of its attacks took place in the "murder triangle" area of counties Armagh and Tyrone in Northern Ireland.[2] It also launched some attacks elsewhere in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. The gang consisted of soldiers from the British Army's Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), police officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and members of the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).[3] [4] Twenty-five UDR soldiers and RUC police officers were named as purported members of the gang.[5] Details about the group have come from many sources, including the affidavit of former member and RUC officer John Weir; statements by other former members; police, army and court documents; and ballistics evidence linking the same weapons to various attacks. Since 2003, the group's activities have also been investigated by the 2006 Cassel Report, and three reports commissioned by Irish Supreme Court Justice Henry Barron, known as the Barron Reports.[6] A book focusing on the group's activities, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland, by Anne Cadwallader, was published in 2013.[7] It drew on all the aforementioned sources, as well as Historical Enquiries Team investigations. The book was the basis for the 2019 documentary film Unquiet Graves, directed by Sean Murray.

According to Lethal Allies, permutations of the group killed about 120 people – almost all of whom were Catholic civilians with no links to Irish republican paramilitaries.[5] The Cassel Report investigated 76 killings attributed to the group and found evidence that UDR soldiers and RUC police officers were involved in 74 of those.[8] John Weir said his superiors knew he was working with loyalist militants but allowed it to continue.[9] The Cassel Report also said that some senior officers knew of the crimes but did nothing to prevent, investigate or punish.[8] It has been alleged that some key members were double agents working for British military intelligence and RUC Special Branch.[4] [10]

Attacks attributed to the group include the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (1974), the Miami Showband killings (1975), the Reavey and O'Dowd killings (1976) and the Hillcrest Bar bombing (1976).[4] Many of the victims were killed at their homes or in indiscriminate attacks on Catholic-owned pubs with guns and/or bombs. Some were shot after being stopped at fake British Army checkpoints, and a number of the attacks were co-ordinated.[11] When it wished to "claim" its attacks, the group usually used the name "Protestant Action Force". The name "Glenanne gang" has been used since 2003 and is derived from the farm at 59 Lough Road, Glenanne (three miles south of Markethill, County Armagh) that was used as the gang's main 'base of operations'.[12] [13] It also made use of a farm near Dungannon.[14]

Political situation in Northern Ireland

See main article: The Troubles. By the mid-1970s the violent ethno-political conflict known as the Troubles had radically transformed the daily lives of people in Northern Ireland; after five years of turbulent civil unrest, the bombings and shootings showed no signs of abating. The armed campaign waged by members of the loyalist paramilitary groups Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) increased greatly in response to the Provisional IRA carrying out attacks in England and increasing its attacks on the British security forces within Northern Ireland. Suspected Catholic civilians had become the primary targets of loyalist gangs forces. Active members of the RUC Special Patrol Group (SPG) believed that the situation was rapidly deteriorating and that the IRA were actually 'winning the war'. As early as the end of 1973, it was suggested that drastic measures had to be taken to defeat the organisation.[15] The SPG was a specialised police unit tasked with providing back-up to the regular RUC and to police sensitive areas.

On 10 February 1975, the Provisional IRA and British government entered into a truce and restarted negotiations. The IRA agreed to halt attacks on the British security forces, and the security forces mostly ended its raids and searches.[16] However, there were dissenters on both sides. Fully opposed to the agreement, the UVF and UDA/UFF wanted no part of the truce, while British military commanders resented being told to stop their operations against the IRA just when—they claimed—they had the Provisionals on the run.[16] There was a rise in sectarian killings during the truce, which 'officially' lasted until February 1976. Ulster loyalist paramilitaries, fearing they were about to be forsaken by the British government and forced into a united Ireland,[17] increased their attacks on Roman Catholic civilians and nationalists. Increased Loyalist attacks were partially due to their discovery that MI6 agent Michael Oatley had engaged in negotiations with a member of the IRA Army Council during which "structures of disengagement" from Ireland were discussed. While these 1:1 talks could potentially have meant a possible withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland, it is not known how far they ever progressed.[18] Loyalists killed 120 Catholics in 1975, the vast majority civilians.[19] They hoped to force the IRA to retaliate in kind and thus hasten an end to the truce, but were unsuccessful.[19]

Formation of the Glenanne gang

It was during this exceptionally violent period that a group of loyalist extremists formed a loose alliance that in 2003 was belatedly given the name "Glenanne gang".[6] The gang, which contained over 40 known members, included soldiers of the British Army's Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), active police officers within the RUC and its Special Branch, covert agents from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more commonly known as MI6 (i.e. Military Intelligence, Section 6), and extremists from both the nominally illegal Mid-Ulster Brigade as well as the state sanctioned Ulster Defence Association (UDA).[3] [4] [20] [21]

This group began to carry out shooting and bombing attacks directed against Catholics and nationalists to retaliate for the IRA's intensified campaign. Most of these attacks took place in the area of County Armagh and Mid-Ulster referred to as the "murder triangle" by journalist Joe Tiernan.[2] It also launched attacks elsewhere in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.[22] The name "Glenanne gang" is derived from the farm at Glenanne (near Markethill, County Armagh) that was used as the gang's arms dump and bomb-making site.[12]

Alleged members

The following people, among others, have been implicated by Justice Barron and Professor Douglass Cassel in their respective reports as having been members of the Glenanne gang:

Key figures

Other members

The gang has also been linked to military intelligence liaison officer Captain Robert Nairac who worked for 14th Intelligence Company (The Det).[4] On The Hidden Hand programme made by Yorkshire Television in 1993, it was claimed that Robin Jackson was controlled by Nairac and 14th Intelligence.[66] In May 1977, Nairac was kidnapped by the IRA in Dromintee and taken across the border into the Republic where he was interrogated for more than an hour and pistol-whipped in Ravensdale Woods, County Louth. Nairac was then shot dead by Liam Townson.[67] Pte Ian Leonard Price, 2nd battalion, The Queens Reg Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, lifted the proscription against the UVF on 4 April 1974,[68] but it was made illegal once again on 3 October 1975; therefore, during the period between April 1974 and October 1975, membership of the UVF was not a crime. The largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was also not proscribed at the time.[69]

Attacks attributed to the Glenanne gang

In 2004, the Pat Finucane Centre asked Professor Douglas Cassel (formerly of Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago) to convene an international inquiry to investigate collusion by members of the British security forces in sectarian killings in Northern Ireland committed during the mid-1970s. The gang's involvement in the killings was to be investigated in particular.[70]

The panel interviewed victims and their relatives, as well as four members of the security forces. The four members of the security forces were: RUC SPG officers John Weir and Billy McCaughey; psychological warfare operative Colin Wallace and MI6 operative Captain Fred Holroyd. They all implicated the Glenanne gang in the attacks. In seven out of eight cases, ballistic tests corroborated Weir's claims linking the killings to weapons carried by the security forces. The interviews revealed many similarities in the way the attacks were carried out, while various documents (including the Barron Report) established a chain of ballistic history linking weapons and killings to the gang. Justice Barron commented in reference to the gang

This joining of RUC and UDR members with members of Loyalist paramilitary organisations is emphasised by the use of the same or connected guns by intermingled groups of these organisations.[71]

The Glenanne gang has been linked to the following attacks and/or incidents:[4] [72]

1972 and 1973

1974

1975

1976

1977 onward

Attack Date.455 Webley revolver (1) 9 mm Luger pistol Serial No. U 4 (1) 9mm Luger pistol (2) .38 ACP pistol .455 Webley revolver (2) 9 mm Sterling SMG (1) 9 mm Sterling SMG (2) 9 mm SMG (3) 9mm SMG (4) Star pistol 9 mm Emra SMG .45 ACP Colt pistol
Patrick Turley 10 March 1973 X
Loughgall shooting 24 March 1973 X
Argory shooting 13 June 1973 X
McAliskey family 4 August 1973
Mullan family 5 August 1973 X
Boyle's Bar 17 January 1974 X
Devlin family 7 May 1974 X X
T.J. Chambers 3 September 1974 X X
Shooting incident 3 September 1974X
Falls Bar 20 November 1974 X
Newtownhamilton shooting 8 December 1974 X X
John Francis Green 10 January 1975 X X X
Trainor family 1 April 1975 X
Owen Boyle 11 April 1975 X
Glenside Bar 7 May 1975 X
Miami Showband 31 July 1975 X X X
Altnamacken shooting 2 August 1975 X
McCartney/Farmer 24 August 1975 X X X
Denis Mullen 1 September 1975 X
McKearney family 23 October 1975 X X X
Donnelly's Bar 19 December 1975X
O'Dowd family 4 January 1976 X
Reavey family 4 January 1976 X X X X
Eagle Bar 15 May 1976 X
Rock Bar 5 June 1976 X X
Patrick McNeice 25 July 1976 X
William Strathearn 19 April 1977 X
Ahoghill shooting 23 June 1977 X
Brendan McLaughlin 29 February 1980 X

The Glenanne farm and the Dublin and Monaghan bombings

According to the Barron Report, Billy Hanna had asked James Mitchell for permission to use his farm as a UVF arms dump and bomb-making site.[117] Information that loyalist paramilitaries were regularly meeting at the farm appeared on British Intelligence Corps documents from late 1972.[118] According to submissions received by Mr Justice Barron, the Glenanne farm was used to build and store the bombs that exploded in Dublin and Monaghan. The report states they were placed onto Robin Jackson's poultry lorry, driven across the border to a carpark, then activated by Hanna and transferred to three allocated cars. These cars exploded almost simultaneously in Dublin's city centre at about 5.30pm during evening rush hour, killing 26 civilians. Ninety minutes later a fourth car bomb exploded in Monaghan, killing another seven civilians.

Mitchell and his female housekeeper, Lily Shields both denied knowledge that the farm was used for illicit paramilitary activity. They also denied partaking in any UVF attacks. In his affidavit, John Weir affirms that the farmhouse was used as a base for UVF operations that included the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.[119] Weir also stated that on one occasion an RUC constable gave him two weapons to store at the Glenanne farm:

He then offered me the two sub-machine guns because he knew about my connection to Loyalist paramilitaries. I accepted them and took them to Mitchell's farmhouse.[120]

In his affidavit, Weir recounted when in March 1976 he had gone to the farm where between eight and ten men dressed in camouflage had been parading in the farmyard. Inside he had discussed with Mitchell and others the details of a planned bombing and shooting attack against a nationalist pub, Tully's in Belleeks. Mitchell had shown him the floor plans of the pub's interior which he had drawn up highlighting the lack of escape routes for the pub's patrons. The plan was temporarily called off when it was discovered that the British Army's Parachute Regiment was on patrol that evening in the area. Weir returned to Belfast the next day and the attack went ahead that evening, 8 March. There were no casualties, however, as Mitchell's floor plans had been inaccurate, and the customers had fled into the pub's living quarters for safety once the shooting had commenced outside, and the bomb only caused structural damage to the building.[41]

Mr. Justice Barron concluded in his report:

It is likely that the farm of James Mitchell at Glenanne played a significant part in the preparation for the attacks [Dublin and Monaghan bombings]. It is also likely that members of the UDR and RUC either participated in, or were aware of those preparations.[121]

In May 2024 Iain Livingstone, head of Operation Denton, said that there was no doubt of collusion between the Glenanne gang and British authorities in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.[122]

Miami Showband massacre

See main article: Miami Showband killings.

On 31 July 1975, four days after Hanna's shooting and Jackson's assumption of leadership of the Mid-Ulster brigade,[123] the Miami Showband's minibus was flagged-down outside Newry by armed UVF men wearing British Army uniforms at a bogus military checkpoint. Two UVF men (Harris Boyle and Wesley Somerville) loaded a time delay bomb on the minibus but it exploded prematurely and killed them.[124] The remaining UVF gunmen then opened fire on the bandmembers, killing three (Brian McCoy, Anthony Geraghty and Fran O'Toole) and wounding two (Stephen Travers and Des McAlea).[125] Two of the three men convicted of the killings and sentenced to life imprisonment were serving members of the UDR, and the third was a former member.[125] [126] The Luger pistol used in the attack was found to have been the same one used to kill Provisional IRA member John Francis Green in January 1975 and was also used in the O'Dowd killings of January 1976.[87] [125] The following May, the security forces found Jackson's fingerprints on a home-made silencer attached to a Luger. Although charged, Jackson avoided conviction. A Sterling 9mm submachine gun was also used in the Miami Showband killings.[127] The 2003 Barron Report suggests that the guns were taken from the stockpile of weapons at the Glenanne farm.[128] The Luger pistol used in the Green, Miami Showband, and O'Dowd attacks was later destroyed by the RUC on 28 August 1978.[129]

Liaison officer Captain Robert Nairac has been linked to the Miami Showband killings and the killing of John Francis Green.[130] Miami Showband survivors Stephen Travers and Des McAlea both testified in court that a man with a "crisp, clipped English accent, and wearing a different uniform and beret" had been at the scene of the explosion and subsequent shootings.[130] Martin Dillon in The Dirty War, however, adamantly states that Nairac was not involved in either attack.[131] The Cassel Report concluded that there was "credible evidence that the principal perpetrator [of the Miami Showband attack] was a man who was not prosecuted – alleged RUC Special Branch agent Robin Jackson".[132] Although Jackson had been questioned by the RUC following the Showband attack, he was released without having been charged.[133]

Reavey and O'Dowd killings and the Kingsmill massacre

See main article: Reavey and O'Dowd killings and Kingsmill massacre. The co-ordinated sectarian shootings of the Reavey and O'Dowd families, allegedly perpetrated by the Glenanne gang and organised by Robin Jackson, was followed the next day by the Kingsmill massacre. On 5 January 1976, gunmen from the Provisional IRA stopped a minibus carrying eleven Protestant men home from their workplace in Glenanne.[134] The gunmen lined them up alongside it and shot them, killing ten. The "South Armagh Republican Action Force" claimed responsibility, saying that the shooting was retaliation for a string of attacks on Catholic civilians in the area by loyalists, particularly the Reavey and O'Dowd killings. A 2011 Historical Enquiries Team (HET) report however found that Kingsmill had been planned in advance of these killings.[135]

In 2001, an unidentified former Glenanne gang member (a former RUC officer sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the gang's killings) revealed that the gang had planned to kill thirty Catholic schoolchildren as revenge for Kingsmill.[136] It planned to attack St Lawrence O'Toole Primary School in the South Armagh village of Belleeks.[136] [137] The attack was allegedly called off because the UVF leadership ruled it would be "morally unacceptable" and would lead to a harsh IRA response and likely civil war.[136] Allegedly, the leadership also suspected that the member who suggested the attack was working with British Military Intelligence,[136] and that Military Intelligence were seeking to provoke a civil war.[137] Former Glenanne gang member Billy McCaughey admitted the plot in a 2004 documentary.[137] [138]

Convictions

The Cassel Report states that convictions were obtained in only nine of the 25 cases it investigated and that several of those convictions are suspect as erroneous and incomplete. A month before Nairac's killing, a Catholic chemist, William Strathearn, was gunned down at his home in Ahoghill, County Antrim. SPG officers Weir and McCaughey were charged and convicted for the killing. Weir named Jackson as having been the gunman but Jackson was never interrogated for "reasons of operational strategy". The Special Patrol Group was disbanded in 1980 by the RUC after the convictions of Weir and McCaughey for the Strathearn killing.[139]

In December 1978 the authorities raided the Glenanne farm and found weapons and ammunition. This made it necessary for the gang to seek an alternative base of operations and arms dump.[140] James Mitchell was charged and convicted of storing weapons on his land.[112] Northern Ireland's Lord Chief Justice Robert Lowry presided over his trial on 30 June 1980.[141] The farm had been under RUC observation for several months before the raid.[142]

On 16 October 1979, Robin Jackson was arrested when he was found with a number of weapons and hoods. In January 1981 he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for possession of guns and ammunition, but was then released in May 1983.[36] John Weir stated that the Glenanne gang usually did not use the name "UVF" whenever it claimed its attacks; instead it typically employed the cover names of Red Hand Commando, Red Hand Brigade or Protestant Action Force.[48]

Later developments

The circumstances of a number of the murders attributed to the Glenanne gang were re-investigated by the PSNI Historical Enquiries Team, established in 2005 to investigate unsolved murders committed between 1968 and 1998, with a particular brief to investigate any evidence of state involvement in such killings. In addition to reports on individual murders, assurances were given that the HET would also produce an overarching report into the pattern of activities of the gang as a whole. By May 2010 about 80% of this report had been completed.

However, in early 2014 it became clear that the HET was no longer proceeding with the broader review, and later that year due to budget cuts the HET was wound up altogether, with its remaining activities absorbed back into the PSNI with a much narrowed remit.

In February 2015 relatives of victims of the gang won an application for a judicial review of this decision at the High Court in Belfast.[143] This review found, in July 2017,[144] [145] that the decision by PSNI Chief Constable Matt Baggott had effectively prevented an "overarching thematic report" into the activities of the Glenanne gang had breached the victims' families' rights as defined in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court had been told that there was evidence of collusion by elements of the British state in at least three of the cases and Mr. Justice Treacy said that there was a "credible expectation of collusion" in the remaining cases. Therefore, he concluded, the decision of the Chief Constable to end the broader review into the activities of the Glenanne gang and the alleged collusion of elements of the British state in those murders had resulted in a "real risk that this will fuel in the minds of the families the fear that the state has resiled from its public commitments because it is not genuinely committed to addressing the unresolved concerns that the families have of state involvement". Mr Justice Treacy gave the parties until the start of September 2017 to try to reach an agreement on the appropriate form of relief. In November 2017 Mr Justice Treacy gave further judgement, confirming that he would be issuing an order of mandamus that would require compliance by the Chief Constable and the PSNI.[146] [147]

An appeal by the Chief Constable against the decision was heard in April 2018,[148] [149] amid claims that an outsourced investigation would cost £60 million.[150]

In 2018, the documentary film Unquiet Graves was released, with testimony from several people involved. It came to wider public attention after being shown on RTÉ One (Republic of Ireland state television) in 2020.[151] [152] [153]

In July 2019 the Court of Appeal ruled that a full, independent inquiry into allegations of collusion between security services and the Glenanne gang should be held.[154]

In February 2020 the terms of reference for a review into the activities of the gang were agreed.[155] Former Bedfordshire Police chief Jon Boutcher is heading the review.[155] Boutcher had previously headed an inquiry into allegations that multiple murders had been committed by the British agent known as Stakeknife.[156] [157]

See also

Bibliography

Notes and References

  1. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/docs/cassel061106.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)
  2. Tiernan, Joe (2000). The Dublin Bombings and the Murder Triangle. Ireland: Mercier Press.
  3. The Cassel Report (2006), pp. 8, 14, 21, 25, 51, 56, 58–65.
  4. http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/sarmagh.html Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid Ulster Area in the mid-1970s
  5. http://patfinucanecentre.org/collusion/PFC%20Conclusions%20-%20Lethal%20Allies%20%28Oct%2023%29.pdf Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland - Conclusions
  6. http://www.dublinmonaghanbombings.org/index2.html The First Barron Report (2003)
  7. http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/a-shameful-part-of-our-country-s-troubled-history-1.1578119 Lethal Allies review
  8. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 4
  9. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 63
  10. The First Barron Report (2003). pp. 136, 172
  11. The Cassel Report (2006), p.12
  12. The First Barron Report (2003). pp. 144-45.
  13. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-24962960 "Victims' families sue over UVF Glenanne gang collusion claims"
  14. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-24645945 "Book claims 'indisputable evidence of security forces collusion'"
  15. Liam Clarke. "RUC men's secret war with the IRA", The Sunday Times (7 March 1999).
  16. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/kelley88.htm Extracts from The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA by Kevin J. Kelley
  17. Taylor, Peter (1999). Loyalists. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p. 142
  18. Taylor, pp. 142–43
  19. Taylor, Peter. Brits: The War Against the IRA. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2001. p. 182
  20. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.pdf
  21. https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no-248-n-ireland-de-silva-report.pdf
  22. http://www.seeingred.com/Copy/2.1_CODE_weiraff.html Seeing Red. John Weir affidavit, 3 February 1999
  23. "RUC man's secret war with the IRA" by Liam Clarke, Sunday Times, 7 March 1999.
  24. The Barron Report (2003), p. 143
  25. http://www.seeingred.com/Copy/2.1_CODE_weiraff.html John Weir affidavit
  26. Web site: Rogue cop's rage. Sundayworld.com. 1976-06-05. 2016-05-29. https://web.archive.org/web/20150924112259/http://www.sundayworld.com/news/northern-ireland/rogue-cops-rage. 24 September 2015. dead.
  27. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 115
  28. Potter, p. 90
  29. The Barron Report (2003), p. 174
  30. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/alpha/H.html Hanna profile
  31. Book: Larkin, Paul. A Very British Jihad: collusion, conspiracy, and cover-up in Northern Ireland. Beyond the Pale Publications. 2004. Belfast. 182. 1-900960-25-7.
  32. https://www.questia.com/read/1G1-88079079 "UVF Rules Out Jackal Link to Murder"
  33. Seeing Red, John Weir affidavit, 3 February 1999; retrieved 15 December 2010
  34. John Weir: "I'm Lucky to Be Above the Ground". Article from Politico.ie by Frank Connolly, 16 November 2006; retrieved 13 February 2011.
  35. The Barron Report (2003), pp. 85, 119
  36. The Barron Report (2003), p. 261
  37. The Barron Report (2003), p. 260
  38. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 114
  39. The Barron Report (2003), p. 258
  40. The Barron Report (2003), p. 136
  41. "Seeing Red", John Weir affidavit, 3 February 1999.
  42. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 111
  43. The Barron Report (2003), p. 235
  44. The Barron Report (2003), p. 157
  45. http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/GFJ2013121200011?opendocument Tetsimony by Eugene Reavey
  46. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/kaystavern0706.pdf Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk
  47. Seeing Red, John Weir affidavit, 3 February 1999.
  48. The Barron Report (2003), p. 145
  49. The Barron Report (2003), p. 154
  50. Web site: Irish News: NEWS: Farmer linked to collusion defended. 2016-05-29.
  51. Taylor, Peter (1999). Loyalists. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 148
  52. Ireland's OWN: History: The 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings: the truth sold out for vested interests and dirty tricks, by Jack Harper. http://www.irelandsown.net/monaghanbomb.html; retrieved 24 December 2010
  53. "How Loyalists got the bombs to Dublin", by Donal O'Maolfabhail, The Post.ie, 19 January 2003; retrieved 15 January 2011
  54. The Barron Report (2003), p. 146
  55. The Barron Report (2003), p. 124
  56. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/kaystavern0706.pdf Kay's Tavern bombing
  57. http://www.seeingred.com/Copy/2.1_CODE_weiraff.html Seeing Red
  58. The Cassel Report (2006), p.110
  59. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 112
  60. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 73
  61. https://books.google.com/books?id=3UF1l4dBRWMC&dq=Peter+and+Jane+McKearney+mistakenly+thought+to+be+related+to+Margaret+McKearney&pg=PA461 Excerpt from The IRA by Tim Pat Coogan, page 461, relating to McKearney mistaken identity
  62. The Cassel Report (2006), pp. 111–112
  63. Cassel Report (2006), p. 54
  64. McKittrick, David (1999). Lost Lives. UK: Mainstream. p. 619.Google Books; retrieved 12 April 2011
  65. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 113
  66. The Hidden Hand. Yorkshire Television. 1993
  67. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3972512.ece "Man held over death of Robert Nairac whose bravery was admitted by IRA"
  68. Taylor, p. 124
  69. http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk./othelem/organ/uorgan.htm CAIN: Abstracts on Organisations
  70. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 7
  71. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 64
  72. http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/introsar.html ROLMA – The Recovery of Living Memory Archive
  73. Cassel Report (2006), p. 43
  74. McKittrick, p. 227
  75. McKittrick, pp. 381-82
  76. McKittrick, p. 400
  77. McKittrick, p. 397
  78. McKittrick, p. 416
  79. Cassel Report (2006), p. 44
  80. McKittrick, p. 444
  81. http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/collusion/PFC%20Main%20Findings%20Oct%2023%202013.pdf Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland - Main findings
  82. McKittrick, p. 487
  83. Cassel Report (2006), p. 45
  84. McKittrick, p. 506
  85. McKittrick, p. 595
  86. McKittrick, pp. 506, 595
  87. The Barron Report (2003). p. 206
  88. McKittrick, p. 517
  89. McKittrick, p. 528
  90. [Martin O'Hagan|O'Hagan, Martin]
  91. McKittrick, p. 529
  92. McKittrick, p. 536
  93. Cassel Report (2006), p. 46
  94. Cassel Report (2006), p. 47
  95. McKittrick, p. 535
  96. McKittrick, p. 537
  97. McKittrick, p. 227
  98. Cassel Report (2006), p. 48
  99. McKittrick, p. 565
  100. Cassel Report (2006), p. 49
  101. McKittrick, p.573
  102. http://www.irishnews.com/news/2015/09/18/news/family-demand-justice-for-woman-killed-40-years-ago-265249/ "Family demand justice for woman killed 40 years ago"
  103. McKittrick, p.579
  104. McKittrick, p.588-589
  105. Cassel Report (2006), p. 50
  106. Cassel Report (2006), p.51
  107. McKittrick, p.606
  108. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/kaystavern291106.pdf Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Kay’s Tavern, Dundalk
  109. Cassel Report (2006), p. 53
  110. Cassel Report (2006), pp. 53–54
  111. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/23/ruc-cover-up-inquiry-documents-book ""RUC commanders covered up killings by rogue officers, inquiry files allege"
  112. Cassel Report (2006), p. 69
  113. Cassel Report (2006), p. 55
  114. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch78.htm Chronology of the Conflict: 1978
  115. Beeson, Trevor (2002). Priests and Prelates: The Daily Telegraph Clerical Obituaries. London: Continuum Books. p. 93. Google Books; ; retrieved 9 January 2011.
  116. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1980.html Sutton Index of Deaths: 1980
  117. The Barron Report (2003), p. 149
  118. The Barron Report (2003), p. 176
  119. Seeing Red, John Weir affidavit3 February 1999 Web site: SeeingRed [John Weir's Affadavit] . 2011-04-21 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20090619170035/http://www.seeingred.com/Copy/2.1_CODE_weiraff.html . 19 June 2009. . Retrieved 14 December 2010
  120. The Barron Report (2003). p. 147
  121. Web site: Dublin and Monaghan Bombings . Troops Out Movement . 2016-05-29 . 28 November 2010 . https://web.archive.org/web/20101128202609/http://troopsoutmovement.com/dublinandmonaghanbombings.htm . dead .
  122. News: Dublin-Monaghan bomb gang investigator says 'there was collusion' . Kearney . Vincent . 2024-05-17 . 2024-05-17 . RTÉ News.
  123. UVF Rules Out Jackal Link to Murder article https://www.questia.com/read/1G1-88079079 . Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  124. Taylor, Peter (1999). Loyalists. pp. 147–48
  125. "The mystery of the Miami murders" by Tom McGurk. The Sunday Business Post. 31 July 2005. http://www.thePost.ie/archives/2005/0731/the-mystery-of-the-miami-murders-6772.html . Retrieved 15-12-10
  126. The Cassel Report 2006, pp. 48, 52, 67, 110
  127. The Cassel Report (2006). pp.110–11
  128. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 65
  129. The Barron Report (2003): The murder of John Francis Green, p. 7
  130. Enigmatic SAS man linked to massacre. Article in The News Letter. 1 August 2005
  131. Dillon, Martin (1991). The Dirty War. London: Arrow Books. p. 221
  132. The Cassel Report (2006), p. 68
  133. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/kaystavern0706.pdf Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Kay's Tavern, Dundalk
  134. http://www.belfastelegraph.co.uk/imported/blood-in-the-rain-13744607.html "Blood in the Rain". Belfast Telegraph. 5 January 2006
  135. Web site: Newsletter – Kingsmills was "sectarian savagery" . Newsletter . 17 June 2011 . 17 June 2011.
  136. Web site: UVF gang planned to kill 30 children. The Irish News. 9 July 2007. 17 August 2010. 14 July 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20110714213229/http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2007/jul9_UVF_planned_kill_30_children.php. dead.
  137. Web site: Statement from the families of those murdered at Donnelly's Bar, Silverbridge, outside Kay's Tavern, Dundalk and in the Reavey and O'Dowd homes. Pat Finucane Centre. 9 July 2007.
  138. Spotlight

    Dangerous Liaisons. BBC Northern Ireland. 25 May 2004.

  139. http://irishconflict.webs.com/britishmilitary.htm British Military – The Troubles in Northern Ireland
  140. Cassel Report (2006), p. 61
  141. http://www.dublinmonaghanbombings.org/oralsubdm18feb04page2.html Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, and Women's Rights Sub-committee on the Barron Report 18 February 2004
  142. http://www.seeingred.com/Copy/2.1_CODE_weiraff.html Seeing Red John Weir affidavit, 3 February 1999
  143. News: Glenanne gang case: Judicial review granted over investigation into UVF killings . BBC News . 2016-05-29.
  144. Web site: Summary decision of Belfast high court July 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170730230851/https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/SummaryJudgments/Documents/Summary%20of%20judgment%20-%20Court%20finds%20Chief%20Constable%20breached%20article%202%20by%20failing%20to%20produce%20HET%20Report%20into%20activities%20of%20Gl/Summary%20of%20judgment%20-%20In%20re%20Edward%20Barnard.pdf. 30 July 2017. courtsni.gov.uk. 30 July 2017. 30 July 2017.
  145. https://judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Barnard%27s%20%28Edward%29%20Application%20for%20Judicial%20Review%20of%20the%20Decision%20by%20Chief%20constable%20of%20the%20Police%20Service%20of%20Northern%20Ireland.pdf Barnard's (Edward) Application for Judicial Review of the Decision by Chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland
  146. Alan Erwin, Glenanne Gang: Witnesses and victim's relatives are dying without closure on suspected state collusion, High Court hears, Belfast Telegraph, 7 November 2017
  147. https://judiciaryni.uk/sites/judiciary/files/decisions/Barnard%27s%20%28Edward%29%20Application.pdf Barnard's (Edward) Application
  148. Alan Erwin, Police officers and soldiers connected to loyalist killings, court told, Belfast Telegraph, 11 April 2018
  149. Alan Erwin, Judges to consider Glenanne Gang verdict, Belfast Telegraph, 13 April 2018
  150. Brett Campbell, Outside probe of Glenanne Gang would cost £60m: PSNI chief, Belfast Telegraph, 16 December 2017
  151. Web site: Producers of film on Loyalist murder gang slam Flanagan over criticism. Michael. Staines. Newstalk.
  152. Web site: The Explainer Interview: The story of Unquiet Graves with filmmaker Seán Murray. Sinead. O'Carroll. TheJournal.ie. 25 September 2020 .
  153. Web site: Viewers Were Blown Away And Furious Watching 'Unquiet Graves' Last Night. Balls. Team. Balls.ie. 17 September 2020 .
  154. News: Glenanne gang: Court of Appeal rules investigation must be held. BBC News. 5 July 2019. 15 February 2020.
  155. News: Glenanne gang: Families have 'legal and moral right to truth'. BBC News. 15 February 2020. 15 February 2020.
  156. News: What is the Stakeknife scandal, and what happens next? . 31 October 2020 . The Guardian. 2 October 2019.
  157. News: Madden . Andrew . Kenova boss Jon Boutcher to head up collusion probe into 'Glenanne Gang' killings . 31 October 2020 . Belfast Telegraph. 30 November 2019.

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Glenanne gang".

Except where otherwise indicated, Everything.Explained.Today is © Copyright 2009-2024, A B Cryer, All Rights Reserved. Cookie policy.