Foreign involvement in the Myanmar civil war (2021–present) explained

Many countries and international organizations have influenced the Myanmar civil war (2021–present) to various extents. Myanmar's neighboring countries have largely had the most influence. Myanmar is bordered by India, Bangladesh, Thailand, China, and Laos.

List by country and region

United Nations

In June 2021, the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution asking member states to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.[1] Two hundred international organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have continued to press the UN and its member states to adopt a global arms embargo.[2] [3]

ASEAN and East Timor

ASEAN has blocked Myanmar from participating in regional summits since the 2021 coup.[4] For instance, during the 2022 ASEAN summit, Myanmar's chair remained empty.[5] This condition persisted until New Zealand invited the junta to two ASEAN summits hosted in Wellington in April 2024.[6] ASEAN member-states have not taken a consistent, coordinated approach with respect to the ongoing civil war, due to internal divisions. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are strongly opposed to the military junta.[7] [8] Sasa, a cabinet minister with NUG, stated the group had failed to act even after the SAC "blatantly disregarded ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus", which stipulates an end to the violence, undermining the bloc's standing.[9]

Prime minister Hun Sen of Cambodia was the first head of government to visit Myanmar since the coup in January 2022, in his capacity as ASEAN Chair. Sen said not long before the visit that he believed junta representatives should be allowed to attend ASEAN meetings.[10]

Thailand was a key ally of the junta; former Prime Minister of Thailand Prayut Chan-o-cha used back-channel contacts in mid-2021 to shape Thailand's diplomatic options, especially as these related to ASEAN.[11] [12] On 30 June 2022, when the Myanmar Air Force allegedly violated Thai airspace, Thailand scrambled a defence attache. Later, Prayuth said that the incident was "not a big deal".[13] After the 2023 Thai general election, the new Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin has shown support for the military's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement urging all parties in Myanmar to stay on the path for peace and stability.[14] In April 2024, Thavisin remarked in an interview with Reuters that the Tatmadaw's power was weakening, and expressed support for stability in Myanmar, which borders Thailand.[15]

Singapore initially emphasised the importance of separating business from politics, but subsequently became wary of doing business with Myanmar.[16] Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong described the use of lethal force in the suppression of anti-junta protestors as "just not acceptable" and "disastrous".[17] In 2022, Lee continued supporting the exclusion of the military regime from ASEAN meetings until the regime cooperates on ASEAN's peace plans.[18] Currently, Singapore does not recognise the military junta.[19] Before the war, Singapore has been a major equipment supplier for the junta's weapons factories but had banned the trade of weapons after the coup. After a report by Thomas Andrews, the United Nations' special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, revealed that several Singapore-based firms had served as intermediary companies for the junta, collectively shipping 254 million US dollars' worth of arms to the junta between 2021 and 2023, the Singapore government began conducting an investigation and crackdown on companies alleged to be conducting arms-related trade with the junta.[20] [21] [22] [23]

As of December 2023, East Timor remains the only government to have openly expressed sympathies to the anti-regime forces in Myanmar.[24] In August 2023, the State Administration Council expelled the East Timorese ambassador in retaliation for the East Timorese government meeting with the NUG.[25]

Bangladesh

See also: Spillover of the Myanmar civil war (2021–present).

Bangladesh recognizes the military junta, but does not support its actions, in part because the Rohingya genocide has led to around 1 million Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh. In the first week of September 2020, Bangladeshi forces reported that the Tatmadaw started amassing troops and doing unusual buildups in three different locations on the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. As a consequence, Bangladesh's foreign minister summoned Myanmar's ambassador, calling for him to desist from such activities and to work for mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.[26] As a result, Bangladesh revealed that is ready to face any situation, deploying the 34 Border Guard Bangladesh battalion on the border with Myanmar. This battalion asked their counterparts to arrange a flag meeting but they received no response.[27]

In August 2022, Bangladesh strongly protested territorial violations when two Myanmar Army mortar shells hit a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh and when a junta helicopter entered Bangladeshi airspace and fired a shell.[28] Aung Kyaw Moe, the ambassador of Myanmar to Bangladesh, was summoned by the Bangladesh ministry of foreign affairs four times in 2022 due to multiple violations of Bangladesh's airspace in the Naikhongchhari border area by the Myanmar Army.[29]

On 3 February 2024, intensifying clashes between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw in Rakhine state lead to mortar shells and bullets landing in Bangladesh, injuring civilians and prompting local villagers to flee. Bangladeshi authorities closed schools and madrasas in border villages. As tensions increased, Bangladesh strengthened the Bangladesh Police and Bangladesh Coast Guard to be stationed to resist any intrusion through the borders.[30] Three hundred and twenty-seven Myanmar Border Guard Police personnel sought refuge in Bangladesh, where they were disarmed and sheltered by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).[31] Two days later, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina instructed the Bangladesh Armed Forces and BGB to have patience regarding the situation in Myanmar.[32] On 7 February BGB Director Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui recommended suspending the naval route to St. Martin's Island in Bangladesh due to the increasing border tensions,[33] accordingly, sea travel to St. Martin's Island is indefinitely closed down by the district administration of Cox's Bazar from 10 February.[34] On 8 February 2024, the Tatmadaw agreed to send a ship to take back the stranded BGP personnel in Bangladesh.[35] [36]

China

Since the coup d'état, China and Russia have supported the military junta and have been its main arms suppliers. China is Myanmar's largest trading partner.[37] [38] China has also been accused of tacitly supporting the junta. China and Russia have blocked any substantive action against Myanmar's military at the United Nations Security Council, while the country's security forces have reportedly used Chinese and Russian-supplied weapons to perpetrate human rights violations.

Chinese support for the junta has led to a rise in popular anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar.[39]

In December 2022, China's special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, engaged with the military junta in Naypyidaw. After his visit, the Burmese military pulled 30 battalions from the Northeastern Command, and redeployed them to launch major offensives against pro-democracy forces in other areas.[40] However, concerns later grew over allegations of China no longer 'restraining' the influence of the insurgents, which some viewed as a response to the Burmese military's inaction over Chinese citizens being forced to work in scam centres in northern Shan state.[41]

China is particularly sensitive to Western support for EAOs along the Burmese–Chinese border, and has moved to simultaneously support the military junta and powerful EAOs like the United Wa State Army, which has supported pro-democracy forces.[42] In response to the BURMA Act passed by the United States in 2022, the Government of China increased diplomatic efforts to engage EAOs and the military junta, to protect Chinese business and geopolitical interests,[43] though the country claimed that it does not intend to normalise relations with the military junta.[44] Annual cross-border trade between China and Myanmar before the coup was estimated to over 5 billion (in U.S. dollars) annually.[45]

The fact that the Three Brotherhood Alliance's Operation 1027 in late 2023 was carried out near the China–Myanmar border may indicate a shift in China's stance.[46] The status quo in that area had previously been guaranteed by a China-mediated ceasefire. This change in stance was attributed by analysts to concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to influence the PDF in light of evolving dynamics between NUG and EAO groups.[47] On 13 November 2023, China issued arrest warrants for junta-aligned Ming Xuecheng and his family members for their involvement in online scamming operations. According to The Diplomat, this move signaled China's "tacit support for the removal of the Kokang SAZ's leadership".[48] China issued more arrest warrants in December for ten high-ranking Kokang officials and business leaders for being members of "family criminal gangs", including the founder of the Kokang region's Border Guard Forces, Bai Xuoqian.[49] [50] The junta signalled its unhappiness at China's role in Operation 1027 and allowed anti-China demonstrations outside the embassy in Yangon in November.

The International Crisis Group said China seeks to maintain relations with all the main parties to preserve its leverage and stop geopolitical rivals from capitalising on turmoil.

On 6 December 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged to "achieve domestic reconciliation" and "continue the political transformation process" in Myanmar during a meeting with Myanmar's Foreign Minister Than Swe.[51] On 4 January 2024, which is Myanmar's Independence Day, China opted to remain silent and did not send a congratulatory message, unlike prior years when Chinese president Xi Jinping personally sent such congratulatory messages.[52] NUG had written to Beijing officially to request China to stop providing arms to the ruling military junta, and received an acknowledgement of receipt without substantive reply.[53]

India

India, which represents Myanmar's fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest import partner, has continued a business-as-usual approach to cross-border relations and continues to recognize the military junta.[54] State-owned and private Indian companies, including Yantra India, supplied arms and raw materials to the junta, enabling the military to conduct surveillance and boost its artillery and missile stocks. A 2023 UN report alleges that these arms were likely to be used in the commission of international crime and that companies have avoided sanctions through shell companies.[55] The India–Myanmar border is 1021miles in length and runs from the tripoint with China in the north to the tripoint with Bangladesh in the south.[56] Amid escalating clashes in Rakhine, India urged its citizens to avoid travel to Rakhine State in early February 2024.[57]

India's consistent cooperation with the junta, at some point, is believed to be due to the consistent fear over Chinese involvement, rather than being sympathetic to the junta; India's relations with China have been hostile due to ongoing territorial conflicts, and India is suspicious of Chinese involvement out of fear that it could be part of China's grand strategy to isolate India, plus China also has several involvement in the ongoing Insurgency in Northeast India.[58] [59] As for the results, although India might have been acutely aware of the authoritarian and inhuman nature of the junta, New Delhi has opted to ignore this in order to prevent Myanmar from failing to China's hands, a strategy that is met with criticism for questionable outcomes.[60]

Russia

Russia has embraced deeper ties with the Burmese military junta, as the civil war has progressed. Russia has provided materiel, military training for over 50 Myanmar Air Force pilots, and diplomatic backing to the regime.[61] Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia several times, personally meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in September 2022. The military junta backed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia was among the few countries to send a congratulatory message to the junta on Myanmar's Independence Day.[62] In March 2024, Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, saw Russia still being the number one source of weapons for the junta.[63]

European Union and NATO countries

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have, in response to the ongoing violence, sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with the Burmese military.[64] [65] However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been undermined by poor coordination among the governments and the lack of sanctions against high-impact targets., only 13% of Burmese sanctions targets were sanctioned by the US, the UK and the EU. Further, the UK and US governments have not sanctioned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is the country's largest source of foreign currency.[66] Burmese sanctions targets have also evaded international sanctions by channeling funds through affiliated firms.[67] For instance, a subsidiary of Myanma Economic Holdings Limited, a sanctioned military-owned conglomerate, created a new affiliated firm to import palm oil.

On 23 December 2022, the US Congress passed and US President Joe Biden signed the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act) into law, which provides the president with additional discretionary authority to make policy changes with respect to Myanmar.[68] The law enables the president to provide "non-lethal assistance" to NUG, EAOs, PDFs, and pro-democracy organisations, to provide humanitarian aid to the country, to impose new sanctions, including on MOGE, and enables the secretary of state to assist civilian and international entities with identifying and documenting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Myanmar.

American foreign policy director Derek Chollet claimed the U.S. has provided nearly $400 million USD in non-lethal aid to pro-democracy groups in Myanmar. He has already met with NUG's Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung[69] and several armed group leaders, including representatives from the Kachin Independence Army.[70]

A passage from The Diplomat thought the U.S. would gain an enormous strategic advantage vis-à-vis China if the U.S. provided just a little more support to Myanmar's resistance forces, hasting the downfall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.[71]

In April 2024, the European Union condemned the public executions held by MNDAA "in the strongest term", calling them "an inhuman and degrading punishment that represents an ultimate denial of human dignity", and added that upholding the rule of law in accordance with international standards is an "effort integral to the aspirations for federal democracy".[72]

Non-state militant groups

On 24 March 2024, the Rising People's Party (RRP) based in Nagaland, India accused factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), a Naga insurgent group active in Northeast India with headquarters in northern Sagaing Region, of having a "tacit understanding" with the military junta, helping with conscription and attacks on PDF's.[73]

Notes and References

  1. Web site: 12 May 2022 . U.N. Security Council: Impose Binding Arms Embargo on Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . Fortify Rights . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071244/https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-2022-05-12/ . live.
  2. Web site: 30 January 2023 . Myanmar: Two years after coup, global action needed to halt military's 'nationwide assault on human rights' . 26 March 2023 . Amnesty International . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071243/https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/myanmar-coup-second-anniversary/ . live .
  3. Web site: 5 May 2021 . UN Security Council: Adopt Global Arms Embargo on Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . Human Rights Watch . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071243/https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/05/un-security-council-adopt-global-arms-embargo-myanmar . live.
  4. News: Wee . Sui-Lee . 26 October 2022 . Shunned by the West, Russia and Myanmar Form a Partnership of Unequals . en-US . The New York Times . 26 March 2023 . 0362-4331 . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071242/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/26/world/asia/russia-myanmar-junta.html . live.
  5. News: ASEAN leaders call for timeline on Myanmar peace . 11 November 2022 . Reuters . https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20240316050332/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-dominate-asean-agenda-little-progress-expected-2022-11-10/ . 2024-03-16 . 2024-03-30 . live .
  6. Web site: Luke Hunt. Myanmar’s rebels rail against New Zealand’s ASEAN meet. 2024-03-27. UCA News.
  7. Web site: 8 February 2023 . Reflections on ASEAN's Special Envoys' Efforts in Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . FULCRUM . en-US . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071248/https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/af-reflections-on-aseans-special-envoys-efforts-in-myanmar/ . live.
  8. Web site: 2 March 2023 . Anwar slams ASEAN on Myanmar: Non-interference not license for indifference . 26 March 2023 . Radio Free Asia . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071248/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anwarmyanmarinaction-03022023142543.html . live.
  9. Web site: Thompson Chau. Al Jazeera. Thailand, Laos try to ‘make junta presentable’ amid ASEAN Myanmar inertia. 2024-03-14.
  10. News: Prak . Chan Thul . 7 January 2022 . Cambodia PM meets Myanmar junta chief as visit sparks protests . Reuters.
  11. News: Macan-Markar . Marwaan . Thai PM and Myanmar junta chief stay engaged via back channels . Nikkei Asia . 12 May 2021.
  12. Web site: Chau . Thompson . Myanmar's democratic struggle at stake in Thailand's election . 26 March 2023 . Al Jazeera . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326071248/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/21/myanmars-democratic-struggle-at-stake-in-thailands-election . live.
  13. News: Thailand scrambles fighters after Myanmar jet airspace breach . 1 July 2022 . Reuters . https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20240316030330/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-scrambles-fighters-after-myanmar-jet-airspace-breach-2022-07-01/ . 2024-03-16 . 2024-03-30 . live .
  14. News: Thailand pledges support of National Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar . Thai PBS World . 16 October 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20231021110008/https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thailand-pledges-support-of-national-ceasefire-agreement-in-myanmar/. October 21, 2023.
  15. Web site: Myanmar Junta’s Strength Waning: Thai Prime Minister Srettha. April 9, 2024. The Irrawaddy.
  16. Web site: Anger in Myanmar, But Crisis Distant to Singaporeans . Lin . Shin . Reporting ASEAN . 5 March 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20231201130917/https://www.reportingasean.net/anger-in-myanmar-but-crisis-is-distant-to-singaporeans/. December 1, 2023.
  17. Web site: Analysis: Quiet Singapore turns up volume on Myanmar as regional fears grow . Reuters . 13 November 2013 . https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20240316050312/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-politics-singapore-diplomacy-idUKKBN2BN0VK/ . 16 March 2024 . live .
  18. News: Singapore PM backs continued exclusion of Myanmar junta from ASEAN meetings . 15 January 2022 . Reuters . https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20240316050313/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/singapore-pm-backs-continued-exclusion-myanmar-junta-asean-meetings-2022-01-15/ . 2024-03-16 . 2024-03-30 . live .
  19. Web site: Supplementary Questions for Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan for the Committee of Supply Debate, 27 February 2023 . 27 February 2023 . Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore . https://web.archive.org/web/20231120151140/https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2023/02/SQs-COS-2023. November 20, 2023.
  20. News: Singapore Called On to Stop Feeding Myanmar Junta's War Machine . 24 August 2023 . The Irrawaddy. https://web.archive.org/web/20231218050331/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/singapore-called-on-to-stop-feeding-myanmar-juntas-war-machine.html. December 18, 2023.
  21. News: Myanmar Junta Imports $1 Billion in Weapons Since Coup: Report . 18 May 2023 . The Irrwaddy. https://web.archive.org/web/20231123053443/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-imports-1-billion-in-weapons-since-coup-report.html. November 23, 2023.
  22. News: Singapore ‘tightens screws’ on Myanmar generals with arms trade crackdown . 12 April 2024 . Al Jazeera.
  23. News: S’pore says it will not hesitate to take action after UN report flags shipments to Myanmar military . 20 May 2023 . The Straits Times.
  24. News: Myanmar Junta Rages Against E. Timor President After Defection Call. 29 December 2023. The Irrawaddy. Irrawaddy Publishing Group. 14 December 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20240118022915/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-rages-against-e-timor-president-after-defection-call.html. January 18, 2024.
  25. News: Myanmar expels East Timor's diplomat in retaliation for supporting opposition forces . AP News . en . 27 August 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20231223164423/https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-east-timor-diplomat-76456c0044bd4ed5eb5049b15c9ae33d. December 23, 2023.
  26. News: Aparajita Banerjee . Myanmar deploys Army troops on Bangladesh border. The Bangladesh Defence Analyst. Bangladesh . 13 September 2020. 13 March 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20231003132112/https://www.defseca.com/national-security/myanmar-deploys-army-troops-on-bangladesh-border/. October 3, 2023.
  27. News: Aparajta Banerjee . Bangladesh prepared to face any situation against Myanmar. The Bangladesh Defence Analyst. Bangladesh . 15 September 2020. 13 March 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20230409083539/https://www.defseca.com/national-security/bangladesh-prepared-to-face-any-situation-against-myanmar/. April 9, 2023.
  28. News: 19 September 2022 . Dhaka summons Myanmar ambassador again, protests land, airspace violation . The Daily Star . Dhaka . 19 October 2022 . 19 October 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20221019204856/https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/diplomacy/news/bangladesh-summons-myanmar-ambassador-strongly-protests-land-airspace-violation-3122161 . live .
  29. News: Another chapter in Bangladesh-Myanmar relations . en . 2022-10-03. https://web.archive.org/web/20221007181302/https://www.newagebd.net/article/182493/article/index.php. October 7, 2022.
  30. Web site: Alamgir. Nur Uddin. Tension mounts as war rages on BD-Myanmar frontier. Daily Sun. February 2024. 5 February 2024. 5 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240205133710/https://www.daily-sun.com/post/733524. live.
  31. Web site: 63 more border guards of Myanmar enter Bangladesh . Prothom Alo English . 7 February 2024 . 7 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240309212406/https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/zzx5e271nm. March 9, 2024.
  32. Web site: PM for patience regarding war-like situation in Myanmar: Law minister. The Business Standard. 5 February 2024 . 5 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240205140717/https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/pm-patience-regarding-war-situation-myanmar-law-minister-787814. February 5, 2024.
  33. Web site: BGB chief suggests suspension of ship movement to St Martin amid Myanmar border conflict. The Business Standard. 7 February 2024 . 7 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240209034247/https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bgb-chief-recommends-suspension-ship-movement-st-martin-amid-myanmar-border-conflict. February 9, 2024.
  34. Web site: অনির্দিষ্টকালের জন্য সেন্টমার্টিন ভ্রমণে নিষেধাজ্ঞা. NTV Online. 8 February 2024 . 8 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240224094228/https://www.ntvbd.com/bangladesh/news-1356321. February 24, 2024.
  35. Web site: Hasib. Nurul Islam. Myanmar sending ship to take back BGP members from Bangladesh. Dhaka Tribune. 8 February 2024 . 8 February 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240208120213/https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/338940/%C2%A0myanmar-sending-ship-to-take-back-bgp-members. February 8, 2024.
  36. Web site: Hundreds of Myanmar Junta Personnel Who Fled Rakhine Clashes Repatriated From Bangladesh. The Irrawaddy. April 25, 2024. Muktadir. Rashid.
  37. Web site: 31 October 2023 . Thousands feared displaced after armed groups, Myanmar junta forces clash near China border . https://web.archive.org/web/20231129100325/https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20231031-thousands-displaced-near-myanmar-china-border-after-attack-by-armed-groups. November 29, 2023 . 13 November 2023 . . China is a top ally and major arms supplier of the junta, and has refused to label its 2021 power grab a coup..
  38. Web site: 8 November 2023 . Offensive on China Border Seen as 'Milestone' in Myanmar Revolt . 13 November 2023 . Voice of America. https://web.archive.org/web/20240116165157/https://www.voanews.com/a/offensive-on-china-border-seen-as-milestone-in-myanmar-revolt-/7346590.html. January 16, 2024. .
  39. News: Anti-Chinese Protests Are on the Rise in Myanmar . 2024-03-20 . en-US.
  40. Web site: Aung Zaw . 25 March 2023 . Commentary: China Once Again on Wrong Side of History in Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . The Irrawaddy . en-US . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326065114/https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/china-once-again-on-wrong-side-of-history-in-myanmar.html . live.
  41. Web site: 9 November 2023 . A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses . 11 November 2023 . BBC News . en-GB. https://web.archive.org/web/20240228045239/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67305690. February 28, 2024.
  42. Web site: Tower . Jason . 24 February 2023 . The Limits of Beijing's Support for Myanmar's Military . 26 March 2023 . United States Institute of Peace . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326065107/https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/limits-beijings-support-myanmars-military . live.
  43. Web site: Ye Myo Hein . 1 February 2023 . US Burma Act Uplifts the Resistance Movement in Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . The Diplomat . en-US . 27 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230327151401/https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/us-burma-act-uplifts-the-resistance-movement-in-myanmar/ . live.
  44. Web site: Scam Centres and Ceasefires: China-Myanmar Ties Since the Coup. International Crisis Group. 2024-03-27.
  45. Web site: China is pushing both sides to the negotiating table in Myanmar. The Irrawaddy. March 11, 2024. Thet Htar. Maung. https://web.archive.org/web/20240312132557/https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/china-is-pushing-both-sides-to-the-negotiating-table-in-myanmar.html. March 12, 2024.
  46. Web site: The Myanmar Junta Is Losing Its Foreign Backers. The Diplomat. January 27, 2024. Ivan U.. Klyszcz. Harold. Chambers. https://web.archive.org/web/20240131014747/https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/the-myanmar-junta-is-losing-its-foreign-backers/. January 31, 2024.
  47. Web site: Operation 1027 reshapes Myanmar's post-coup war . Michaels . Morgan . November 2023 . en . The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  48. Web site: Chinese Authorities Issue Arrest Warrants for Criminal Kingpins in Myanmar's Kokang Region . 13 November 2023 . 13 November 2023 . The Diplomat . en-US.
  49. Web site: YANG ZEKUN . China issues arrest warrants, offers rewards for 10 leaders of telecom fraud gangs in Myanmar. 10 December 2023. China Daily. https://web.archive.org/web/20240214015011/https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202312/10/WS6575b0f6a31040ac301a7086.html. February 14, 2024.
  50. Web site: China Arrest Warrant Names Kokang BGF Founder as Top Suspect in Myanmar Cyber Scam . The Irrawaddy. 11 December 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20240118022545/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-arrest-warrant-names-kokang-bgf-founder-as-top-suspect-in-myanmar-cyber-scam.html. January 18, 2024.
  51. Web site: China calls for political transformation, national reconciliation in Myanmar. EFE. 7 December 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20231225104244/https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2023-12-07/china-calls-for-political-transformation-national-reconciliation-in-myanmar/. December 25, 2023.
  52. Web site: A Few Pariah States Congratulate Myanmar on The Anniversary of Its Independence Day. The Irrawaddy. January 8, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240126092400/https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/a-few-pariah-states-congratulate-myanmar-on-the-anniversary-of-its-independence-day.html. January 26, 2024.
  53. Web site: Finbarr Bermingham. Myanmar’s opposition foreign minister urges China to stop ‘arms deals’ with ruling junta. 2024-04-28. South China Morning Post.
  54. Web site: China, Russia, India enabling Myanmar's military rule: Report. 2 November 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20240314212904/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/china-russia-india-enabling-myanmars-military-report. March 14, 2024.
  55. News: How India is supporting Myanmar's military with arms. https://web.archive.org/web/20240131141149/https://www.dw.com/en/how-india-is-supporting-myanmars-military-with-arms/a-65733102. January 31, 2024 . Krishnan . Murali . 26 May 2023 . Deutsche Welle.
  56. Web site: Burma . CIA World Factbook . 17 September 2020 . 10 February 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210210200835/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/burma/ . live .
  57. News: India issues advisory against traveling to Myanmar's Rakhine state amid escalating crisis. 7 February 2024. Times of India. https://web.archive.org/web/20240308024351/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/travel-news/india-issues-advisory-against-travelling-to-myanmars-rakhine-state-amid-escalating-crisis/articleshow/107483637.cms. March 8, 2024.
  58. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/china-using-myanmar-gambit-to-penetrate-in-south-asia-report/articleshow/104802512.cms
  59. https://www.indiandefencereview.com/why-india-must-deepen-its-ties-with-myanmar-to-counter-china/
  60. https://www.newsweek.com/china-india-asia-jungle-competition-oil-sale-ethnic-conflict-1863458
  61. Web site: 31 May 2023 . Расследование Би-би-си: Россия – крупнейший поставщик оружия бирманской хунте . BBC Investigation: Russia is the biggest arms supplier of the Burmese junta . 11 November 2023 . BBC . ru. https://web.archive.org/web/20231205201252/https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-65767073. December 5, 2023.
  62. Web site: A Few Pariah States Congratulate Myanmar on The Anniversary of Its Independence Day . The Irrawaddy . January 8, 2024.
  63. Web site: Ye Kaung Myint Maung. 2024-03-18. RFA. INTERVIEW: Myanmar’s junta is weakening, but world needs to cut off weapons, funds.
  64. Web site: Canadian Sanctions Related to Myanmar . 19 October 2015 . 26 March 2023 . Government of Canada . 31 January 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230131164348/https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/myanmar.aspx?lang=eng . live.
  65. Web site: New Report Shines Light on Flaws in International use of Sanctions in Response to Myanmar Coup . 26 March 2023 . EarthRights International . en-US . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326065116/https://earthrights.org/media_release/new-report-shines-light-on-flaws-in-international-use-of-sanctions-in-response-to-myanmar-coup/ . live.
  66. Web site: Myanmar: New sanctions welcome, but not enough . 26 March 2023 . Global Witness . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326065116/https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/myanmar-new-sanctions-welcome-not-enough/ . live.
  67. Web site: Htoo Aung . 24 February 2023 . Myanmar's junta-owned companies maintain international economic ties despite sanctions . 26 March 2023 . Myanmar NOW . 26 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230326065108/https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmars-junta-owned-companies-maintain-international-economic-ties-despite-sanctions . live.
  68. Web site: Martin . Michael . 6 February 2023 . What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn't Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar . 26 March 2023 . 19 March 2023 . https://web.archive.org/web/20230319023259/https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-burma-act-does-and-doesnt-mean-us-policy-myanmar . live.
  69. Web site: Nearly 100 Border Guard Police flee into Bangladesh; US provides non-lethal aid to democratic forces. Democratic Voice of Burma. 2024-02-06.
  70. Web site: Myanmar junta hosts China’s envoy for border issue talks. 2024-04-02. RFA.
  71. Web site: Peter . Morris. Why the US Needs to Back Myanmar's Spring Revolution. The Diplomat. 2024-01-08.
  72. Web site: Video shows rebel group sentencing own fighters to death for ‘abuse of power’. 2024-04-25. RFA.
  73. News: Nagaland: NSCN factions have tacit understanding with Myanmar military junta, claims RPP . Northeast Now . 24 March 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240403144200/https://nenow.in/north-east-news/nagaland/nagaland-nscn-factions-have-tacit-understanding-with-myanmar-military.html. April 3, 2024.

This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Foreign involvement in the Myanmar civil war (2021–present)".

Except where otherwise indicated, Everything.Explained.Today is © Copyright 2009-2024, A B Cryer, All Rights Reserved. Cookie policy.